Joseph E Johnston and the defense of Richmond by Newton, Steven H.
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1989 
Joseph E Johnston and the defense of Richmond 
Steven H. Newton 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the United States History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Newton, Steven H., "Joseph E Johnston and the defense of Richmond" (1989). Dissertations, Theses, and 
Masters Projects. Paper 1539623789. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-rab2-9m87 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
INFORMATION TO USERS
The most advanced technology has been used to photograph and 
reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the 
text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and 
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any 
type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Eacn 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
University Microfilms International 
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA  
313/761-4700 800/521-0600
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
O rder N um ber 9102176
Joseph E. Johnston and the defense of Richm ond
Newton, Steven Harvey, Ph.D. 
The College of William and Mary, 1989
C opyrigh t © 1991  b y  N ew to n , Steven H arvey. A ll rig h ts  reserved.
UMI
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON AND THE DEFENSE OF RICHMOND
A Dissertation
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Steven Harvey Newton 
1989
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of 












A . Z. Freeman
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"bald, quiet Joe Johnston,
The little precise Scotch-dominie of a general,
Stubborn as flint, in advance not always so lucky,
In retreat more dangerous than a running wolf-- 
Slant shadow, sniffing the traps and the poisoned meat, 
And going on to pause and slash at the first 
Unwary dogs before the hunters came up.
Grant said of him once,
'I was always anxious with Joe Johnston in front of me,
I was never half so anxious in front of Lee.
He kissed his friends in the Nelson-way we've forgotten, 
He could make men cheer him after six-weeks retreating. 
Another man said of him, after the war was done,
Still with that puzzled comparison we find
When Lee, the reticent sword, comes into question,
'Yes, Lee was a great general, a good man;
But I never wanted to put my arms around his neck 
As I used to want to with Johnston.
The two sayings 
Make a good epitaph for so Scotch a ghost,
Or would if they were all.
They were not quite all,
He had to write his reminiscences, too,
And tell what he would have done if it had not been 
For Davis and chance and a dozen turns of the wheel. 
That was the thistle in him--the other strain-- 
But he was older then.
I'd like to have seen him 
That day as he galloped along beside Beauregard."
— Stephen Vincent Benet, John Brown's Body
To the memory of Carlton Smith, scholar and friend--the 
rarest of men, a teacher who could make history live, 
breathe, laugh, and cry. Without him, many things, 
including this dissertation, would not have happened.
iii
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PREFACE
One of the more curious gaps in Confederate histori­
ography is the lack of a modern study of the Department of 
Northern Virginia under the leadership of General Joseph E. 
Johnston. Certainly the earlier stages of the Peninsula 
Campaign did not lack drama: Johnston's repeated confron­
tations with Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, the sorties 
of the ironclad Virginia, the siege of Yorktown, the rear 
guard action at Williamsburg, the Valley sideshow, and the 
final confused fight at Seven Pines all contain the elements 
necessary for an interesting narrative. Nor did these oper­
ations lack significance. Had the Confederates lost Rich­
mond in the early summer of 1862, that defeat, combined with 
the Federal capture of Memphis, Nashville, New Orleans, and 
Norfolk, would very probably have ended the war with George 
Brinton McClellan elevated to the status of savior of the 
Union. Instead, following Johnston's wounds at Seven Pines, 
Lee took over the Army of Northern Virginia and drove the 
Yankees away from Richmond in short order, not only saving 
the capital for the moment but also beginning a period of 
Confederate resurgence in Virginia that kept the Union Army 
reeling for nearly three years.
Only two book-length treatments, written from a Confed­
erate perspective, have covered the Peninsula Campaign:
v
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volume one of Douglas Southall Freemein's Lee Lieutenants and 
Clifford Dowdey's The Seven Days, the Emergence of Robert E. 
Lee. Robert G. Tanner's Stonewall in the Valley covers the 
Valley Campaign and its relationship to events on the Penin­
sula. This is a surprisingly thin bookshelf for such a 
critical campaign.
To make matters worse, all three books contain serious 
flaws. Tanner, while he deserves considerable praise for 
unearthing new material on the Shenandoah Valley, based his 
whole presentation of Johnston's and Lee's relations with 
Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson on the interpretation orig­
inated by Freeman and extended by Dowdey. As a result he 
failed to examine their basic assumptions, many of which 
turn out upon close analysis to be at best on shaky ground 
and at worst totally unfounded.
Dowdey's work has always been questionable in terms of 
evidentiary foundation, for while he wrote quite well he 
eschewed footnotes. Though quite often the text made Dow­
dey's sources apparent, there were many occasions when his 
strongest contentions (or in Johnston's case accusations) 
were erected entirely upon assertion rather than documen­
tation. This rather cavalier approach to scholarship was 
combined with outright hero-worship of Lee, whom Dowdey 
continually elevated through the literary device of con­
trasting his virtues with Johnston's supposed shortcomings. 
The theme of Dowdey's book can be summarized in a single
vi
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sentence: Johnston's generalship was so inept that only the
caution of McClellan, the Machiavellian maneuvers of Lee 
behind the scenes, and the fact that Johnston was wounded 
too badly to resume command of the army after Seven Pines 
allowed the Confederates to avoid the loss of Richmond.
Dowdey derived much of his interpretation from Freeman, 
though he extended it to the point of caricature. Freeman, 
though consistently judicious and measured in his evalua­
tions, also viewed Johnston through the prism of Lee. In R .
E. Lee he made a point of trying to prove just how lax 
Johnston's administration of the army had been before Seven 
Pines, and he repeated the performance at greater length in 
Lee's Lieutenant's. With prose more subtle and analysis 
much more penetrating than Dowdey's, Freeman nonetheless 
pursued the idea that the proper study of the Army of North­
ern Virginia always begins and ends with Robert E. Lee. 
Johnston, to Freeman, was a gallant man and a good soldier, 
but only an adequate general at best. As Lee stepped upon 
the stage as commander of the army in either of Freeman's 
works the reader can almost feel the author's relief: the
prologue is over, time for the main act.
And that is the problem. As long as the campaign lead­
ing up to Seven Pines is considered as merely a prologue and 
not as a separate entity, Johnston's operations remain hope­
lessly obscured in the long, very deep shadow of Lee. The 
only way, I have come to believe, to understand the Confed-
vii
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erate army in Virginia before Lee assumed command of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, is to limit the scope of inquiry 
to the tenure of Johnston's command. Thus this narrative, 
which commences after a short chapter to introduce Joseph 
Johnston, begins with President Jefferson Davis's mid- 
February summons of Johnston to Richmond to discuss with­
drawing his army from the Potomac line, and ends when the 
General topples off his horse on the evening of May 31,
1862. It is an unorthodox treatment for a military history, 
for none of the battles are decisive, more attention is paid 
to conferences in Richmond than any single combat action, 
and when the study ends McClellan is still only a few miles 
outside Richmond and the fate of the city is very much in 
doubt.
Yet focusing on the period between mid-February and 
late May allows time to deal with several key issues in far 
greater detail than did Freeman or Dowdey. The conference 
in Richmond which decided that the army would pull back to 
the Rappahannock received a line from Dowdey and two pages 
from Freeman; here it merits a chapter to explain it com­
pletely. The question of Johnston's administrative compe­
tence— often raised by his enemies and given great play by 
historians —  is thoroughly investigated, as are his own 
strategic views, which turn out to have been much more com­
plex and comprehensive than heretofore suspected.
This study also takes pains to relate the war in Vir-
viii
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ginia to operations in the western Confederacy. How did the 
fall of Fort Donelson lead not only to Shiloh but also to 
the withdrawal from the Potomac? How did Beauregard's de­
feat at Shiloh affect Davis's state of mind in the April 14 
conference to determine whether or not Yorktown should be 
held? By restricting the focus to Johnston's portion of the 
Peninsula Campaign, these issues and others can be addressed 
in depth.
Johnston as the commander of the Department of Northern 
Virginia is, of course, the main subject of this work, but 
time has been taken to present Davis, Lee, Gustavus Smith, 
James Longstreet, and others in sufficient detail to allow 
the reader to understand the motives behind their actions, 
the feelings that led them sometimes to irrational or emo­
tional decisions. How much of Johnston's decision to en­
trust the attack at Seven Pines to Longstreet and not Smith 
can be traced to his irritation at Smith falling asleep in 
the April 14 conference? In the same meeting, can the 
refusal of both Johnston and Lee to consider strategic com­
promise with the other's view be attributed in part to the 
competitive nature of their friendship?
The study that resulted from this approach is one that 
concentrates on Johnston's role as army commander but hope­
fully without slighting either the men who fought the bat­
tles or the larger issues of Confederate policy-making.
While it will quickly become obvious that I believe that
ix
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Johnston's performance was far better than has usually been 
credited, I have not attempted to gloss over his failures or 
his shortcomings as a commander. I have tried to present 
his case with a fair amount of objectivity and without re­
course to special pleading. It is my belief that such is 
all that the General would have wanted.
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ABSTRACT
This s t u d y  examines Confederate military operations in 
Virginia from February 17 - May 31, 1862, focusing specifi­
cally on the role of Joseph E. Johnston as commander of the 
Department of Northern Virginia. It includes a detailed 
consideration of Confederate grand strategy, Johnston's 
withdrawal f r o m  the Potomac River, the redeployment of the 
army to Yorktown, the siege of Yorktown, and the Battles of 
Williamsburg and Seven Pines.
In February, 1862, following the surrender of Fort 
Donelson, President Jefferson Davis reoriented strategy in 
Virginia from a defense of the frontiers to a closer defense 
of Richmond; he also recalled General Robert E. Lee from 
South Carolina to coordinate that defense. But the strate­
gic concepts of Davis, Lee, and Joseph Johnston (the senior 
field commander in Virginia) often differed a great deal, 
leading to confrontation and discord.
This s t u d y  concentrates on following Johnston's point 
of view during the campaign, especially on his role as a 
field army commander. The conclusion suggests that Johnston 
was a superior strategist, administrator, and operational 
commander, b u t  suffered from serious deficiencies as in 
tactical supervision of his own subordinates and an inabil­
ity to deal tactfully with his superiors.
xiii
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Chapter One 
The General
The chance musket shot and the ricocheting shell 
fragment which wounded General Joseph Eggleston Johnston in 
the early evening of May 31, 1862, effectively ended the 
Battle of Seven Pines. While worried aides dragged their 
commander to safety, the fighting, which had raged between 
Richmond and the Chickahominy River for several hours, 
degenerated into sporadic sniping. Rebels and Yankees alike 
collapsed in exhaustion. The conflict resumed in a desul­
tory fashion the next morning; but neither the Confederate 
divisions defending the capital, nor Major-General George B. 
McClellan's Federal Army of the Potomac could muster the 
energy to strike a decisive blow. Each army had suffered 
about 5,000 casualties in a bloody stalemate. Later, the 
battle appeared significant more because Johnston's wound 
resulted in the appointment of Robert E. Lee as his succes­
sor than for any other reason.
Joseph Johnston always believed that his troops had 
been on the verge of victory when those unlucky shots 
knocked him off his horse and out of the battle. His attack 
had caught two corps of McClellan's army isolated from the 
main body by the rain-swollen Chickahominy. The right wing, 
under Major-General James Longstreet, had driven the enemy
1
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in disarray from three successive lines. The left, com­
manded by Major-General Gustavus W. Smith, was advancing 
under Johnston's eye to deliver the coup de grace. "Dark­
ness only," Johnston insisted, prevented the complete defeat 
of the Federals that night. Likewise, on the following 
morning, he maintained it was simply the inaction of Smith, 
temporarily in command, that saved several Union divisions 
from destruction. Such an accomplishment would have 
silenced those who had begun to say that Johnston's only 
skill as a general lay in his ability to retreat. For the 
rest of his life, Johnston remained convinced that it had 
been his wounds which had prevented him from conclusively 
vindicating the strategy by which he had conducted the 
defense of Richmond.1
In retrospect, Johnston's tactical assessment was far 
too optimistic. Unknown to him, by the time he was struck, 
the entire senior command structure of his army had ceased 
to function. Smith had collapsed from a nervous a i l m e n t . 2 
Smith's deputy, Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting, was 
struggling vainly to coordinate the movements of five
^Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations 
Directed During the Late War Between the States (Blooming­
ton, IN: Indiana University Press, 1959), pp. 139-143;
Joseph E. Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," in Robert U. 
Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, ed., Battles and Leaders of 
the Civil War (Secaucus, N J : Castle, 1980, reprint of 1887 
edition), II: p. 215 (cited hereafter as B&L).
^Benjamin Stoddert Ewell to Joseph E. Johnston, May 4, 
1885, in Robert Morton Hughes Collection, Old Dominion 
University, Norfolk, Virginia (cited hereafter as RMH).
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brigades which were in varying states of disorganization, 
across a field where undergrowth often limited vision to 
less than ten paces.3 Far to the right, Longstreet's 
failure to follow the correct road, and a quarrel over 
seniority with Major-General Benjamin Huger, helped immobil­
ize their troops most of the day. Those who did engage 
fought under Major-General Daniel Harvey Hill, the most 
junior division commander involved in the attack. By dusk, 
Hill's men had fought themselves out, and the General 
himself had become thoroughly disgusted with superiors who 
seemed content to sacrifice his soldiers while they bick­
ered. 4 in short, though Johnston's plan had been sound 
enough, botched execution produced a fiasco which resulted 
in a drawn battle, only because conditions on McClellan's 
side of the line were equally confused.
Later, Johnston's detractors argued that a mismanaged 
battle was the appropriate punctuation to conclude a 
mismanaged campaign. Since March, his only major movements 
had been a pair of retreats which exposed to the enemy all
^Gustavus W. Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven 
Pines," in B&L, II: p.227.
^D. H. Hill to Gustavus W. Smith, May 22, 1885, in
Gustavus W. Smith, The Battle of Seven Pines (New York: C.
C. Crawford, 1895), p. 66. See also "Report of Maj.-Gen. D. 
H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding division [at Seven Pines],"
-- -, 1862, in United States War Department, The War of the
Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series 1, XI (part 1): pp.
943-946 (cited hereafter as OR; all references are to Series 
1 unless otherwise indicated).
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of Virginia north of the Rappahannock River and east of 
Richmond. Fredericksburg, Yorktown, and Norfolk had fallen 
into Federal hands, as the Army of the Potomac marched 
within five miles of Richmond. His most severe critics 
suggested that the General had originally intended to 
surrender the Confederate capital without a fight.5
Such an appraisal is grossly unfair to Johnston. It 
ignores the fact that one of his retreats was ordered by 
President Jefferson Davis, and that the other was rendered 
necessary because Johnston was directed to place himself in 
a strategic cul de sac at Yorktown. Nor did Johnston 
exercise undisputed control over his own department through­
out most of the campaign. For long periods, General Lee, 
commanding in Richmond, directed the operations of four of 
his eight divisions, usually without Johnston's knowledge, 
always without his consent, and often in a pattern com­
pletely at odds with Johnston's own intentions. Between 
March and June, 1862, Joseph Johnston spent almost as much 
of his time reacting to the actions of his own superiors as 
he did those of his opponent.
Nonetheless, Johnston's campaign in defense of Richmond 
must be rated as a strategic victory for the Confederacy. 
First and foremost, it kept his army in being. Given the
^Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate 
Government (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1958, reprint of
1881 edition), II: p. 120; John Bell Hood, Advance and 
Retreat (Secaucus, NJ: Blue and Grey, 1985, reprint of 1880 
edition), pp. 153-155.
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o d d s  with which he had to contend, this was no mean feat. 
H i s  withdrawal from Yorktown successfully extricated the 
Confederacy's only major eastern field army from a carefully 
crrafted double envelopment. Opposed by any commander less 
s k i l l f u l  than Johnston, McClellan might well have captured 
tine entire force. This accomplishment stands out as even 
m o r e  remarkable in light of the convulsions which racked the 
sariny as a result of the first conscription act; Johnston 
h o l d  his army together as a coherent fighting force despite 
t h e  demoralizing and potentially destructive regimental 
e  1 ections.
His operations also bought time, a commodity infinitely 
m o r e  valuable to the Confederacy than the territory for 
w h i c h  he traded it. In the mo'nths Johnston delayed McClel­
l a n ' s  advance, the arms production centers he defended 
s t a m p e d  out thousands of new rifles and cast hundreds of 
c a n n o n .  ^  Additional ordnance supplies filtered into „ 
S o u t h e r n  ports through the Federal b l o c k a d e .  7 At the same
^Tredegar Iron Works cast 164 pieces of field artillery 
a n d  thirty-nine heavy guns between January and June, 1862. 
D u r i n g  the same period, the Richmond arsenal produced at 
l e a s t  6,000 new muskets. See Charles B. Dew, Ironmaker to 
t h e  Confederacy, Joseph R. Anderson and the Tredegar Iron 
W o r k s  (Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot, 1987, reprint of 1966
edition), p. Ill; Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969), p. 31; Larry J.
D a n i e l ,  "Manufacturing Cannon in the Confederacy," Civil War 
T i m e s  Illustrated, Vol. XII, No. 7 (November 1973): p. 10.
^Between April 27, 1862 and August 16, 1862, more than 
4  8,000 small arms slipped through the blockade to arrive at 
Wilmington, Charleston, or Savannah. This was more than 
t h r e e  times the total number of such weapons imported
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time, a combination of Johnston's administrative efficiency, 
Lee's juggling of garrisons along the Atlantic Coast, and 
Rebel operations in the Shenandoah Valley and central 
Virginia allowed the South to neutralize the overwhelming 
numerical superiority with which McClellan opened his 
campaign. Three weeks after Johnston fell, Lee opened the 
Battle of Mechanicsville with the largest Confederate army 
ever sent into combat, and met McClellan with virtual 
numerical parity.8 Johnston's defense of Richmond was the 
first and most critical Confederate success in 1862.
Certainly no one had expected anything less than 
success from Joseph Johnston when the war began. Resigning 
his commission as Brigadier-General and Quartermaster- 
General of the United States Army upon Virginia's secession 
in April, 1861, the fifty-four-year-old Virginian seemed 
inevitably bound for glory. His military career had already 
spanned more than three decades, including command or staff 
service in every branch of the army. Nine wounds and four 
brevet promotions for gallantry attested to his coolness
between September, 1861 and February, 18 62. See Frank 
Vandiver, ed., Confederate Blockade Running Through Bermuda, 
1861-1865, Letters and Cargo Manifests (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas, 1947), pp. xviii, xxiv; Stephen R.
Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy, Blockade Running During 
the Civil War (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina
Press, 1988), pp. 55-73.
^Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil 
War in America, 1861-1865 (Dayton, OH: Morningside, 1986, 
reprint of 1900 edition), p. 86.
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under f i r e . ^  He was one of the most widely read soldiers in 
the army, an acknowledged scholar and expert in military 
history. Winfield Scott, the greatest American soldier 
between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, had been his 
m e n t o r . H i s closest contemporaries— at once both friends 
and rivals— were Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E. Lee.H 
"Johnston," concludes historian Jay Luvaas, "was one of the 
best prepared professional soldiers to enter Confederate 
service."12
Not a large man— "rather below middle height" according 
to British Colonel Arthur Fremantle--Johnston stood about 
five feet eight inches and weighed less than 140 pounds.13 
Yet there was something in the way he moved that made him 
seem taller. A reporter for the Southern Literary Messenger 
overestimated his height by two inches, and added that "he
^Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingood, A Different 
Valor, The Story of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. A.
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), pp. 11-28.
l^Edward Johnston to John Warfield Johnston, January 2, 
1848, in RMH; Winfield Scott, Memoirs of Lieut.-General 
Scott, LL. P., Written By Himself (New York: Sheldon and
Co., 1864), II: p. 517; Govan and Livingood, Different
Valor, p. 20; Dabney H. Maury, "Interesting Reminiscences of 
General Johnston," Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 
XVIII (1890): pp. 178-179 (hereafter cited as SHSP).
UGovan and Livingood, Different Valor, pp. 14, 21, 25.
12jay Luvaas, "An Appraisal of Joseph E. Johnston," 
Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. IV, No. 9 (January 1966): 
p. 7.
l^walter Lord, ed., The Fremantle Diary (Boston:
Little, Brown, & Co., 1954), p. 93.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
looks taller on account of his erect carriage."14 There was 
a quality about him that demanded attention, but also defied 
definition. It was more than the piercing gray eyes, the 
long straight nose, or the grizzled--though neatly trimmed-- 
side-whiskers, mustache, and goatee. This was something 
more than the sum of his individual parts: a sense of
presence.
He simply looked like a soldier. "Soldier-like," 
recorded F r e m a n t l e . -*-5 "Every inch a soldier," said Henry 
Kyd Douglas.-*-® "The beau ideal of a soldier," recalled 
Richard Taylor.1? And Benjamin Stoddert Ewell, who served 
under the General for three years and knew him as well as 
any, told a group of veterans that Johnston "had more the 
appearance of a soldier than anyone I ever met in the 
Confederate, or subsequently in the Union Army."l® Some of 
this martial quality still emanates from war-time photo­
graphs of Johnston. In them, he is always posed in a
14p. w. Alexander, "Confederate Chieftains," Southern 
Literary Messenger, Vol. XXXV, No. 1 (January 1863): p. 35.
l®Lord, Fremantle, p. 93.
-*-®Henry Kyd Douglas, I Rode With Stonewall (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), p. 234.
-*-^Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction (New 
York: Longman's, Green & Co., 1955, reprint of 1889
edition), p . 42.
^Undated notes for a talk by Benjamin S. Ewell before 
the Magruder-Ewel1 Camp, United Confederate Veterans,
Benjamin Stoddert Ewell papers, Swem Library, College of 
William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
position of not-quite-rigid attention, viewing the camera 
inquisitively, even suspiciously, as if it were a courier 
entering his headquarters in the middle of a battle, bearing 
what might be unpleasant news.
His personality ranged from bursts of spontaneous 
affection to guarded reserve. Major Robert Stiles remem­
bered that he liked to greet his close friends, with, a hug 
and a k i s s . 19 "He loved good cheer," recalled staff officer 
Archer Anderson, "he enjoyed a glass of wine, and his 
conversation at a dinner-table with congenial companions was 
often fascinating and memorable."20 Yet there was the 
colder side of Johnston's character; Brigadier-General 
Bradley T. Johnson admitted him to be "quick-tempered and 
imperious."21 "Genial and confiding as he was to the 
friends he knew and trusted, he was reticent and ever 
aversive to those whom he did not like," observed Major- 
General Dabney Maury. Maury also remembered that Johnston 
"was quick to resent any freedom or liberty from those he 
did not like or k n o w . "22 " t o  me he was extremely affable," 
confided Fremantle to his diary, "but he certainly possesses
l^Robert Stiles, Four Years Under Marse Robert (Wash­
ington, DC: n. p., 1903), p. 90.
20Quoted in Bradley T. Johnson, A Memoir of the Life 
and Public Service of General Johnston (Baltimore: R. H.
Woodward & Co., 1891), p. 313.
2Ijbid., p . 268 .
22Quoted in Ibid., pp. 301-302.
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the power of keeping people at a distance when he chooses.
. " 2 3
Colonel Fremantle also noted that Johnston's "officers 
stand in great awe of him. . . . Many of the officers told
me that they did not consider him inferior as a general to 
Lee or anyone e l s e .  "24 & considerable number of officers
who served under both Johnston and Lee held the opinion that 
"Old Joe" was, at the very least, the equal of "Marse 
Robert." Lieutenant-General James Longstreet eulogized him 
as "skilled in the art and science of war, [and] gifted in 
his quick, penetrating mind. . . . "  After the war, Long­
street characterized Johnston rather than Lee as "the most 
accomplished and capable" of Confederate g e n e r a l s . 25 He was 
praised by Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor for "great 
coolness, tact, and judgment," while Lieutenant-General Wade 
Hampton regarded him as a commander "in whose skill and 
generalship I have always entertained implicit confidence.
. . ."26 Junior officers were, if anything, more effusive
23Lord, Fremantle, p. 93.
2 4 j b i d .
25james Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox 
(Secaucus, NJ: Blue and Grey, 1984, reprint of 1896
edition, p. 100; Donald B. Sanger and Thomas Robson Hay,
James Longstreet (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univer­
sity Press, 1952), p. 426; H. J. Eckenrode and Bryan Conrad, 
James Longstreet, Lee's War Horse (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1936), pp. 326-327.
26Taylor, Destruction, p. 28; Wade Hampton, The Battle 
of Bentonville," B&L, IV: p. 703; Manly Wade Wellman,
Giant in Gray, A Biography of Wade Hampton of South Carolina
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in their praise of Johnston. Though he entitled his memoirs 
Four Years Under Marse Robert, Major Robert Stiles opined of 
Johnston that "as a trained, professional soldier, I do not 
believe he had his superior, if indeed his equal, on this 
continent.. . . ."27 Likewise, in I Rode With Stonewall, 
Major Henry Kyd Douglas concluded that "for clear military 
judgment and capacity to comprehend and take advantage of 
what is loosely termed 'the situation, ' General Johnston was 
not surpassed by any general in either army."28
During the summer of 1861, he seemed more than to 
fulfill the promise of his earlier career. In late July, he 
slipped away from the Federal force assigned to pin him in 
the Shenandoah Valley, and rushed his small army to rein­
force Brigadier-General P. G. T. Beauregard at Manassas. 
Neither he nor anyone else had reason to suspect that July 
21, 1861, represented the pinnacle of his career, the last 
moment in the war before his reputation would be unstained 
by controversy or recriminations. All that was visible at 
the time was the victorious general, the assured soldier. 
With a perspective that the participants lacked on that hot, 
dusty afternoon, Stephen Vincent Benet wrote wistfully of
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 165.
27stiles, Four Years, p. 90.
28oouglas, Stonewall, p. 66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
Johnston, "I'd like to have seem him that day. . . ."29
Superficially, Johnston's career continued in an upward 
spiral. He remained at Manassas after the battle and, 
ranking Beauregard, took permanent command of their combined 
armies. During October, the War Department expanded his 
authority over what was styled the "Department of Northern 
Virginia," extending his control over all Confederate forces 
in northwestern Virginia, the lower Shenandoah Valley, 
around Fredericksburg, and down the south bank of the 
Rappahannock to Urbana. When 1862 arrived, Johnston 
commanded the largest, best-equipped Confederate army in the 
entire South.30
But below the surface, all was not well. In August, 
Johnston was stung by newspaper assertions that Beauregard,
29stephen Vincent Benet, John Brown's Body (New York: 
Book of the Month Club, 1980, reprint of 1927 edition), p. 
93.
30johnston's Department of Northern Virginia contained 
62,112 "effectives" on December 31, 1861, compared to 54,004 
"present for duty" in Albert Sidney Johnston's Western 
Department, the Confederacy's next largest army, on about 
the same date. But the difference between the equipment and 
organization of the two armies was considerable; as Richard 
McMurry has recently observed: "The Army of Tennessee was
to suffer greatly because it was built on a foundation of 
sand; the Army of Northern Virginia rested by comparison, on 
a rock." See "General Orders No. 15, Adjutant and Inspect­
or-General 's Office, October 22, 1861," and "Abstract from 
return of the Department of Northern Virginia, commanded by 
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, for the month of 
December, 1861, in OR, V: pp. 913-914, 1015; "Abstract from
return of Western Department, General A. S. Johnston, 
commanding (Date about December 31, 1861)," in OR, VII: p.
813; Richard M. McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies, An Essay in 
Confederate Military History (Chapel Hill, NC: University
of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 74-86.
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not he, had been primarily responsible for winning the 
Battle of M a n a s s a s . 31 Questions arose about the army's 
failure to follow up the victory with an invasion across the 
Potomac. Ludicrous as the idea appeared to anyone privy to 
the actual strength of the army or the woeful inadequacy of 
its supplies, it nonetheless circulated quite freely 
throughout the Confederacy. Johnston could not respond to 
insinuations of inactivity without revealing his weakness 
and, therefore, had to suffer suspicions about his lack of 
offensive intentions in s i l e n c e . 32
In September, he quarreled with President Davis over 
his rank. Historians have often cited this as the main 
factor contributing to later discord between Johnston and 
Davis. The incident, asserted Douglas Southall Freeman, 
"aroused in Johnston a resentment that colored his views 
throughout the war."33 &n examination of the evidence, 
however, suggests that the disagreement over rank may not 
have been the primary cause of the General and the President 
becoming "perfectly and entirely estranged and separated."34
The squabble began with a misreading by Johnston of 
Confederate military law. On August 31, President Davis had
3lFreeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: pp. 117-118.
32johnston, Narrative, pp. 59-63.
33oouglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee, A Biography (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), I: p. 559.
34johnson, Johnston, p. 251.
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submitted his list of nominations to the rank of "general" 
to Congress, which immediately confirmed them. The dates of 
the commissions read: Samuel Cooper, May 16, 1861; Albert
Sidney Johnston, May 28, 1861; Robert E. Lee, June 14, 1861; 
Joseph E. Johnston, July 4, 1861; and P. G. T. Beauregard, 
July 21, 1861.35 Johnston read the list with "surprise and 
mortification" about two weeks later. His understanding of 
the appropriate statutes had lead him to believe that he 
should have ranked first instead of fourth. Since he could 
not conceive of Davis, a former Secretary of War, U. S. 
Senator, and the preeminent constitutional lawyer alive, 
misreading the law, he presumed that his reduction was an 
intentional slight. He had to complain, "lest my silence be 
significant of acquiesence. . . ."36
In such temper, when he sat down to pen his letter, 
Johnston thought that events called for strong language. He 
baldly stated his belief that "this is a blow aimed at me 
alone," which resulted in "the benefit of persons neither of 
whom has yet struck a blow for the Confederacy."37 Contrary 
to what he later asserted, however, Johnston consulted with
35jefferson Davis to Howell Cobb, August 31, 1861, in 
James D. Richardson, ed., The Messages and Papers of 
Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy, Including Diplomatic 
Correspondence, 1861-1865, 2 volumes (New York: R. R.
Bowker, 1966), I: p. 129; Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson
Davis, September 12, 1861, in OR, Series 4, I: p. 605.
36joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, September 12, 
1861, in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 607-608.
37ibid., p. 609.
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his brother Beverly on the phrasing of the letter, and
deleted 350 words so heated that, even when infuriated, he
realized he could not send to the President.38
Stripped of invective, Johnston's argument seemed
logical. Five brigadier-generals had been created by the
acts of March 6 and March 14, 1861. Section five of the
second act provided
That in all cases of officers who have resigned, 
or who may within six months tender their resigna­
tions from the Army of the United States, and who 
may be appointed to original vacancies in the Army 
of the Confederate States, the commissions issued 
shall bear one and the same date, so that the 
relative rank of officers of each grade shall be 
determined by their former commissions in the U.
S. Army, held anterior to the secession of these 
Confederate States from the United States.39
An amendatory act on May 16 allowed for the conversion of 
the title of "brigadier-general" to "general," a change 
which, Johnston contended, could not affect the relative 
seniority of the office-holders. The determination of 
seniority would then be according to the precedence of pre­
war commissions. "The order of rank established by law," as
3 8An incomplete draft of the letter, in the handwriting 
of Beverly Johnston, is in RMH. Aside from the deleted 
paragraph, marked out with a large "X" (see Appendix-A), the 
differences between the draft and the published copy are 
mostly differences of syntax. Johnston, Narrative, pp. 72- 
73; Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, September 12, 
1861, in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 607-608.
39"An Act Amendatory of an Act for the Organization of 
the Staff Departments of the Army and an Act for the 
Establishment and Organization of the Army of the Confeder­
ate States of America," March 14, 1861, in OR, Series 4, I: 
p. 164.
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Johnston saw it, "was— first, J. E. Johnston (brigadier- 
general U. S. A.); second, S. Cooper (colonel U. S. A.); 
third, A. S. Johnston (colonel U. S. A.); fourth, R. E. Lee 
(lieutenant-colonel U. S. A.). "40
Johnston was correct in assuming that the Confederate 
Congress guaranteed resigning officers of the United States 
Army the same relative rank they had enjoyed before the war. 
What he missed was the fact that the act of March 6, 1861, 
changed the manner in which that rank was calculated.
Section twenty-nine wiped out any practical use for brevet 
rank beyond courts martial and boards of inquiry. It also 
specified that an officer's seniority, for purposes of 
command, would be determined from his highest commission in 
the corps or arm in which he currently served.41
This provision accounted, quite legally, for Johnston's 
drop in the rankings. Samuel Cooper held a staff colonelcy
^Ojohnston, Narrative, p. 72.
41-Though certainly not aimed at Johnston personally—  
the law had been passed before he resigned from the U. S. 
Army— this provision was probably included at Davis's 
instigation. He was a long-time opponent of brevet rank, 
and did not believe that staff officers should be entitled 
to exercise command. "An Act for the Establishment and 
Organization of the Army of the Confederate States of 
America," March 6, 1861, in OR, Series 4, I: p. 131. For
Davis's opinion on brevet rank, see Robert M. Utley, 
Frontiersmen in Blue, The United States Army and the Indian, 
1848-1865 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
1967), p. 33; his view on staff officers in command posi­
tions is .found in Jefferson Davis to James Lyons, August 30, 
1878, in Dunbar Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, 
His Letters, Papers, and Speeches (Jackson, MS: n. p.,
1923), VIII: p. 257.
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as the United States Army Adjutant General. He was assigned 
the same post in the Confederacy— with a specific prohibi­
tion against ever commanding troops— so his staff commission 
counted toward his seniority as a general.42 Johnston, on 
the other hand, had been transferred out of the Quarter­
master's Department and back to the line of the army. By 
Confederate law, he then could only claim his highest 1ine 
commission--lieutenant colonel of cavalry— in figuring 
seniority relative to Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E. 
Lee. In those terms, he was junior to b o t h . 43 The proce­
dure Davis followed in arriving at the rank order of his 
senior generals was consistent with the letter of the law.
Davis was ill when he received Johnston's letter of 
protest, and he had reason to believe that the General knew
42jn contrast to U. S. Army regulations, Confederate 
law specifically prohibited staff officers from assuming 
command. The U. S. Army operated on the principle that rank 
"shall always confer the right to command, whether the same 
be by ordinary commission, by brevet commission, or by staff 
commission. . . . "  The Confederates provided that staff 
officers, "though eligible to command, according to the rank 
they hold in the Army of the Confederate States of America, 
shall not assume command of troops unless put on duty under 
orders which specially so direct by authority of the Presi­
dent." "Report of Board of Officers, November, 1850;
Opinion of Secretary of War Charles M. Conrad, 1851; both in 
Letters and Telegrams Received, Secretary of War, Main 
Series, 1801-1870, National Archives, M-567, Reel 192; "An 
Act for the Establishment and Organization of a General 
Staff for the Army of the Confederate States of America," 
February 26, 1861, in OR Series 4, I: p. 115.
4 3see the Official Army Register for August 1, 1855 
(Washington, DC: Adjutant General's Office, 1855), p. 9,
for the relative ranks of the two Johnstons and Lee when the 
1st and 2nd Cavalry Regiments were organized.
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that when he sent it.44 His state of health may have 
contributed to the terseness of this reply. Had Johnston 
written a more diplomatic letter, the President might have 
explained his reasoning, no matter how sick. Stung by the 
attack, Davis fired back his famous bullet: "I have just
received and read your letter of the 12th instant. Its 
language is, as you say, unusual; its arguments and state­
ments utterly one-sided, and its insinuations as unfounded
as they are unbecoming."45
Despite the heat of their rhetoric, however, both men 
acted in such a way as to bury the conflict rather than 
escalate it. Davis did not retain Johnston's letter in the 
official f i l e s . 4 6  Johnston neither threatened to resign nor 
intimated--then, or in the future--that he would not accept 
orders from any of the three generals senior to him. Both 
men refrained from speaking of the issue to anyone besides 
their closest friends, and the conflict did not surface
44oavis had mentioned his illness repeatedly in letters 
to Johnston throughout early September. See Jefferson Davis 
to Joseph E. Johnston, September 5, 1861, and Jefferson 
Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, September 8, 1861, both in OR, 
V: pp. 829-830, 833-834; Rembert W. Patrick, Jefferson
Davis and His Cabinet (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press, 1944), p. 36.
45je fferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, September 14, 
1861, in OR, Series 4, I: p. 611.
46ne gave the letter to Assistant Secretary of War 
Albert Bledsoe with instructions not to file it. See Joseph 
E. Johnston, "Responsibilities of the First Bull Run," B&L, 
II: p. 24 On.
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publicly until much later.47 in fact, all that either man 
actually seems to have done was to write one intemperate 
letter and then return to this duties.
Admittedly, their correspondence became more formal and 
less frequent. "My Dear General" and "Your Friend" disap­
peared from the headings and closings of their letters.48 
The reduction in the number of letters was not, however, the 
result of personal disharmony. The exchange had coincided 
closely with the appointment of Judah P. Benjamin as 
Secretary of War. Because he trusted the former Louisiana
^Stephen Mallory was the only cabinet member who 
mentioned the incident at the time, though Judah Benjamin 
must certainly have been aware of it. Likewise, in Johns­
ton's entourage, only the sometimes overzealous A. H. Cole 
commented on the issue at the time, in an October letter to 
Brigadier-General Roswell S. Ripley in Charleston. Mary 
Chesnut, as close as she and her husband were to both the 
Davis and Johnston families, apparently caught no hint of 
the feud; editor C. Vann Woodward dismissed the entry in the 
first publication of her diary as an afterthought, probably 
inserted in the 1880's. Entry for September 18, 1861, 
Stephen Mallory diary, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC; C. Vann 
Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut's Civil War (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1981), p. 136n; Extract from A. H. 
Cole to Roswell S. Ripley, October 10, 1861, in Ellsworth 
Elliot, West Point in the Confederacy (New York: G. A.
Baker and Co., 1914), pp. 84-86.
^®For examples of correspondence which predates the 
rank controversy, see Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, 
August 19, 1861; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, 
September 5, 1861; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston,
September 8, 1861; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston,
September 13, 1861. The cooler attitude between the two is 
in evidence in Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, 
September 18, 1861; Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, 
September 22, 1861; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, 
November 10, 1861, all in OR, V: pp. 797-798, 829-830, 833-
834, 850-851, 857, 872, 945-947.
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Senator so completely, Davis delegated nearly all of the 
routine details of the War Department to him, and the 
President's personal correspondence with all his generals 
diminished during the fall of 1861.49
Johnston and Davis kept working together in harness, 
and only someone privy to their earlier letters would have 
detected the shift away from their previous informality. In 
November when Davis needed support for his contention that 
he had not prevented a pursuit of the defeated Federals 
after Manassas, Johnston promptly and unequivocally provided 
it.50 Johnston wrote flatteringly of Davis's personal 
popularity in February, 1862: "Your presence here now or
soon would secure to us thousands of excellent troops.
. . ."51 This obviously pleased Davis, who replied, "I will
visit the Army . . .  as soon as other engagements will
49The correspondence between Davis and his two other 
senior generals, Lee and Albert Sidney Johnston, can be 
cited as examples of the lessening of direct presidential 
correspondence. Between November 8, 18 61 and March 3, 18 62, 
the OR shows only a single entry as correspondence between 
Lee and Davis, against fifteen between Lee and the War 
Department; see OR, VI: pp. 928-929. Between November 20, 
1861 and March 4, 1862, the number of entries for corre­
spondence between A. S. Johnston and Jefferson Davis is 
three, against thirty-one between Johnston and the War 
Department. See OR, VII: p. 980; see also Patrick, 
Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet, pp. 164-165.
50jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, November 3,
1861, in OR, II: pp. 511-512; Joseph E. Johnston to
Jefferson Davis, November 10, 1861, in OR, LI (part 2): p.
374 .
51Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 5,
1862, in OR, V: p. 1062.
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permit, although I cannot realize your complimentary 
assurance that great good to the army will result from it.
. . ."52 Davis even essentially defended Johnston's actions 
in March, 1862, in a letter to W. M. Brooks of Alabama: 
"though General Johnston was offended because of his 
relative rank, he certainly never thought of resigning.
."53
The issue, as far as the public was concerned, stayed 
buried. No controversial articles appeared in the Richmond 
newspapers, as they did when Davis and Beauregard conflicted 
over that general's report of the Battle of M a n a s s a s . 54 
Surprisingly, the ranks of the senior generals were not 
common knowledge. In January, 1862, the Richmond Enquirer 
reprinted from the Charleston Courier what purported to be a 
definitive listing of the relative ranks of Confederate 
generals. It is significant because it was inaccurate, 
citing the top four generals in order as Samuel Cooper, 
Albert Sidney Johnston, Joseph E. Johnston, and Robert E. 
Lee.55 n o protests or correction of the list ever ran, 
which probably would have been the case had the rank 
controversy still been boiling. Five months later, the same
52jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, February 14, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1072.
53jefferson Davis to W. M. Brooks, March 15, 1862, in 
OR, Series 4, I: p. 999.
54preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: pp. 102-106.
55Richmond Enquirer, January 10, 1862, p. 3.
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newspaper editorialized positively on the lack of any 
friction between Johnston and Lee: "with neither of the
distinguished Generals, is there any mawkish punctilio about 
r a n k . "56 while relations between the two were considerably 
more strained at Seven Pines than this account suggested, it 
was, nonetheless, an indicator that the question of senior­
ity had not become fuel for public debate.
Yet throughout the campaign in defense of Richmond 
there was a noticeable and increasing tension between Joseph 
Johnston and Jefferson Davis. If this developing rift was 
not directly attributable to Johnston's disaffection over 
his rank, then what caused it? Johnston became more 
contentious with the President because he believed that 
Davis had allowed Benjamin and the rest of the military 
bureaucracy in Richmond to begin meddling in his legitimate 
prerogatives of command. Davis, at the same time, was 
receiving reports from the War Department that Johnston 
could not be depended upon to carry out legitimate admini­
strative directives. Under the tremendous pressure of 
completely redirecting Confederate strategy in the wake of 
the Fort Donelson disaster, the President failed to investi­
gate these contradictory allegations as thoroughly as he 
should have. Instead, he believed the accusations of 
Benjamin and mildly rebuked Johnston for non-cooperation.
Compared to the other decisions Jefferson Davis faced
56Richmond Enquirer, May 30, 1862, p. 2.
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in February, 1862, it seemed a trivial matter. Yet, it came 
near the beginning of the critical period in which the fate 
of Richmond would be decided, a time at which trust between 
the General and the President was becoming especially 
important. Unfortunately, it turned out to be a time when 
trust was increasingly being replaced by suspicion.
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Chapter Two 
The Department of Northern Virginia
Centreville, in northern Virginia, is eighty-five miles 
distant from Richmond. On February 13, 1862, when Jefferson 
Davis folded and sealed the letter he had just written to 
Joseph Johnston, he knew that the envelope would not reach 
the General for at least two, probably three, and possibly 
as many as five days. A clerk would collect it from his 
office and bundle it with the daily correspondence from the 
Secretary of War and the Adjutant and Inspector-General 
which was also addressed to the headquarters of the Depart­
ment of Northern Virginia. Sometime later, the postman 
would toss that bundle into his sack and carry it several 
hundred yards to the Virginia Central railroad Depot on 
Broad Street. In all probability, the presence of official 
mail in the bag did not weigh heavily on his mind or speed 
his steps; the mail train to Centreville only departed once 
a day, early in the morning.-*- Besides, if the President or 
the Secretary of War or the Adjutant General had themselves 
felt any particular urgency about their correspondence, they 
could have sent a telegram.
*-See the train schedules published daily in the 
Richmond newspapers, for example, Richmond Examiner,
February 13, 1862, p. 1.
24
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When the train pulled out of Richmond in the morning, 
two to three hours late— often as not--and crowded with 
soldiers returning from furlough or a stay in the hospital, 
the locomotive struggled to keep up enough steam to maintain 
a speed of just under ten miles per hour. In 1860, the run 
would have been faster, but by the second year of the 
American Civil War, the lack of spare parts produced in 
Northern factories was already being felt on Virginia 
railroads. Couplings and bearings had to be used long after 
they should have been replaced because there were not, and 
would never be, enough replacements while the war dragged 
on. The engineers knew this, and babied their machines, 
despite all the fuming of generals and politicians.2
If the route was slow, it was also circuitous. First, 
the Virginia Central swung northeast in a shallow arc that 
eventually curved back west to intersect the Richmond, 
Fredericksburg, and Potomac at Hanover Junction. The 
junction stood twelve miles north of the city, but the train
^The general condition of prewar railroads in Virginia, 
while among the best in the South, was hardly that good in 
the best of times. The rails were made of soft iron, not 
steel, were usually shaped in a weak "T"-rail configuration, 
but often still included older wooden "stringers" along many 
stretches. Robert C. Black, The Railroads of the Confeder­
acy (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,
1952, pp. 12-14, 31-32; John F. Stover, Iron Road to the 
West, American Railroads in the 1850's (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1987), pp. 65, 203; see also Angus J. 
Johnston II, Virginia Railroads in the Civil War (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 9-
17; Charles W. Turner, "The Virginia Central Railroad at 
War, 1861-1865," Journal of Southern History, Vol. XII, No.
4 (November 1946): pp. 510-533.
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meandered more than twice that distance before arriving 
there.3 Following a brief stop, the train headed forty 
miles northwest, more nearly in a straight line, to Gor- 
donsville.
At Gordonsville some baggage handler or detailed 
soldier plucked the mailbag off the train and carried it 
across to the freight ramp serving the Orange and Alexan­
dria. In theory, the train from Richmond should have made a 
fairly close connection every afternoon with the one 
travelling north from Charlottesville to Manassas; but that 
was only theory. Most days the schedule ran so far out of 
kilter that the mail could sit there for nearly twenty-four 
h o u r s .  ^ Once tossed aboard a northbound car, however, the 
process moved more quickly: eight miles to Orange Court
House, sixteen more to Culpeper, and a further thirty-nine 
to Manassas Junction, most of it straight and well-graded. 
Manassas was only about six and one-half miles from Centre­
ville.
Those six and one-half miles were, however, among the 
most difficult in the state. Winter storms had turned the
3George B. Davis, Leslie J. Perry, Joseph W. Kirkley, 
and Calvin D. Cowles, The Official Military Atlas of the 
Civil War (New York: Arno Press, 1978, reprint of 1891-1895
editions), Plate CXXXVII (hereafter cited as OR Atlas).
Schedules for the Orange and Alexandria were also 
printed in the Richmond newspapers on a daily basis, as well 
as persistent stories of delays in those schedules and 
missed connections. See Richmond Examiner, February 10, p. 
1; February 13, p. 1; February 19, p. 1.
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roads of northern Virginia into muddy troughs that seemed to 
have no bottoms. A rider on a strong horse could only 
manage two miles an hour, and few of the horses hauling 
supplies— or mail— from the depot to Johnston's headquarters 
were strong or well fed.^ Overworked and undernourished, 
horses and even mules simply fell down in the mud and died 
by the hundreds. Teamsters pushed their carcasses to the 
side of the road, where they stiffened and rotted, raising 
"a putrifaction that makes it quite unpleasant to go along 
there."®
Johnston, in a desperate attempt to improve the flow of 
supplies to his army, had decided in December to extend a 
railroad spur from Manassas to Centreville. He was able to 
procure the track from Major-General Thomas J. "Stonewall" 
Jackson who had made off with nearly a dozen miles of Yankee 
rails in a raid a few months earlier on the Baltimore and
^Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, January 14, 
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 23, 
1862, in OR, V: pp. 1028, 1079; Joseph E. Johnston to
Abraham C. Myers, January 14, 1862, in Letters and Tele­
grams Received, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, 
Confederate States of America, National Archives, M-474,
Reel 27 (hereafter cited as LR-AIGO); Mary Conner Moffett, 
ed., Letters of General James Conner, C. S. A. (Columbia,
SC: R. L. Bryan, 1950), p. 60.
^Testimony of J. S. Potter, March 12, 1862, in 3rd 
Congress, 3rd Session, Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1863), I: p. 244 (hereafter cited as JCCW; all
citations are from Volume I unless otherwise indicated); see 
also Augustus P. Dickert, History of Kershaw's Brigade 
(Newberry, SC: Elber H. Aull, 1899), p. 89.
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Ohio.7 Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond produced the spikes 
and nails to tie them together, while local landowners, 
albeit under duress, provided their slaves to grade the 
roadbed and lay the track.8 He found a former railroad 
engineer, Captain Stephen W. Presstman, serving in the 17th 
Virginia, and detached him to supervise their labor.9 
Johnston's railroad had just gone into bareboned 
service when Davis's letter arrived at Manassas Depot. Only 
one dilapidated locomotive, impressed from the Orange and 
Alexandria, plied the line. The lack of a turnaround at the 
end forced the engineer to back cautiously over the bumpy 
road and across the shaky bridge spanning Bull Run in order 
to make his return trip.^8 No fueling stations existed
^Joseph Miles Hanson, Bull Run Remembers . . . The 
History, Traditions, and Landmarks of the Manassas (Bull 
Run) Campaigns Before Washington, 1861-1862 (Manassas, VA: 
National Capitol Publishers, 1953), pp. 40-41.
^Dew, Ironmaker, p. 128; Joseph E. Johnston to A. W. 
Barbour, February 12, 1862, in Joseph E. Johnston papers, 
Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, 
Virginia (hereafter cited as (JJWM).
^ A s s i s t a n t  Adjutant General to Stephen W. Presstman, 
January 9, 1862, in Letters and Telegrams Sent, Army of 
Northern Virginia, January 1862-March 1863, National 
Archives (Hereafter cited as LTS-ANVA); Secretary of the 
Congress to Jefferson Davis, February 17, 1862, in LR-AIGO, 
M-474, Reel 11; James L. Nichols, Confederate Engineers 
(Tuscaloosa, AL: Confederate Publishing Co., 1957), p. 97;
George Wise, History of the Seventeenth Virginia Infantry,
C. S. A. (Baltimore: Kelly, Piet, & Co., 1870), p. 18.
l^Though there are very few written sources on the 
railroad itself, it shows up surprisingly in maps made by 
Federal topographical engineers after the Second Manassas 
campaign, as well as in photographs taken either upon 
McClellan's occupation of the Centreville position in March,
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along the route, so that if the train ran out of wood, the 
crew had to get off and cut down the nearest trees.H 
Freight, baggage, soldiers, and official mail were all 
unloaded unceremoniously into a muddy field near Centre­
ville, and left there for the army's staff to sort out as 
best they could.12
Eventually, when one aide or another recognized the 
mail sack among the flotsam, he would have taken it to Major 
Thomas G. Rhett, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Johnston's 
de facto Chief of Staff. Rhett sorted the mail, every day 
sifting through hundreds of reports; requests for furlough, 
appointment, or discharge; recruiting notices; and miscella­
neous trivia for official letters directed to his commander. 
When he was satisfied that he had found them all, he took 
them the final few feet to the next room: General Johnston's 
office.
A letter from the President demanded, of course, 
immediate attention. Unfortunately, Davis's February 13 
letter to his general does not seem to have survived, and
1862, or during Major-General Irwin McDowell's operations 
during the summer. See Hanson, Bull Run, pp. 40-41; OR 
Atlas, Plates XXII (3), (4), (6), (7), XXIII (1); William C.
Davis, ed., The Image of War, 1861-1865 (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1982), II: pp. 406, 407.
^Abraham C. Myers to Joseph E. Johnston, January 20, 
1862, in Letters and Telegrams Sent, Quartermaster-General, 
Confederate States of America, National Archives, T-131,
Reel 8 (hereafter cited as LS-QMG).
l^Hanson, Bull Run, pp. 40-41.
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only Johnston's indirect paraphrase years later, combined 
with the inferences which can be drawn from a telegram and 
letter he dispatched in response, suggest the content of the 
letter that set in motion Johnston's campaign to defend 
Richmond. "I was summoned to Richmond by the President," he 
recalled, "who wished to confer with me on a subject in 
which secrecy was so important that he could not venture, he 
said, to commit it to paper, and the m a i l . "13
Despite the leisurely pace at which it was delivered, 
the summons must have contained some element of immediacy.
At once, Johnston felt compelled to dash off a telegraphic 
answer, which requested a delay of one or two days while his 
second-in-command, Major-General Gustavus Woodson Smith, 
recovered from his most recent bout with a chronic nervous 
ailment.1^ It must also have suggested to the General, 
despite his later recollection, the subject to be consid­
ered. Both men had been concerned for some time with the 
exposed state of Johnston's army, strung out along the 
Potomac frontier. The paragraph in Johnston's letter to 
Davis the same day, concerning the possible withdrawal of 
his forces deeper into Virginia, appears almost unmistakably 
to be the answer to a direct question, a question not
13johnston, Narrative, p. 96.
l^Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16, 
1862, in JJWM).
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contained in any of Davis's earlier letters.15
Johnston certainly had good reason to be worried about 
the vulnerable disposition of his troops. The Department of 
Northern Virginia controlled the operations of all Confeder­
ate forces north of the Rappahannock River and in the 
Shenandoah Valley. To cover his front with even a thin 
crust of pickets and detached garrisons required Johnston to 
disperse his 47,617 effectives in a dangerous manner (see 
Map No. 1).
Nearly half his strength was deployed in semi-independ­
ent columns, most of which were too far divided to march 
rapidly to reinforce each other in case of an attack.
Jackson had 5,394 men in the Valley, isolated by a march of 
several days from Johnston's main position at Centreville. 
Brigadier-General Daniel Harvey Hill held an exposed outpost 
at Leesburg with just 2,460 soldiers; his correspondence 
throughout the winter revealed his sensitivity to the 
possibility of being cut off by a quick Federal thrust 
across the Potomac. Along the Potomac south of Washington
D. C., Brigadier-General William Henry Chase Whiting's 
command of 7,596 protected ten miles of Johnston's exposed 
right flank from a surprise amphibious landing, but it was
ISjoseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1074.
16"Abstract from Return of the Department of Northern 
Virginia, General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, command­
ing, for the month of February, 1862," in OR, V: p. 1086.
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spread so thin that Whiting also lived in a continual state 
of anxiety about the security of his position. Likewise, 
Major-General Theophilus Holmes' 5,956 troops could only 
maintain a fragile screen of pickets from Aquia Creek down 
to Urbana on the Rappahannock. This left General Johnston 
at Centreville with a field army that, even if he counted 
his reserve artillery park, all his cavalry, and the 
permanent garrison at Manassas, numbered only 26,211 m e n . 17 
North of the river, in an arc that paralleled Johns­
ton's line from Harper's Ferry to the Eastern Shore, 
McClellan's Army of the Potomac reported 185,420 "present 
for duty"--almost four Yankees to each Rebel.1® Not only 
numbers, but disparity of equipment, favored the Federals; 
everything Johnston's troops lacked— rifles, cannon, horses,
l^The breakdown of strength is drawn from Ibid.; for D.
H. Hill's concerns about his position's vulnerability, see
D. H. Hill to Judah P. Benjamin, February 7, 1862, in OR, LI 
(Part 2): p. 465; D. H. Hill to Samuel Cooper, February 7, 
1862, D. H. Hill to Judah P. Benjamin, February 22, 1862, in 
LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 23; Thomas J. Jackson to D. H. Hill, 
February 20, 1862, Thomas J. Jackson to D. H. Hill, February 
22, 1862, in D. H. Hill, "The Haversack,” Land We Love, Vol.
I, No. 2 (June 1866): p. 116. On the vulnerability of
Whiting's line, see Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, 
January 3, 1862, in Letters and Telegrams Received, Secre­
tary of War, Confederate States of America, National 
Archives, M-618, Reel 8 (hereafter cited as LR-SW); Joseph
E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 5, 1861, Joseph E. 
Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 6, 1861, Wade Hampton 
to Joseph E. Johnston, December 8, 1861, in OR, V: pp. 985-
987 .
18"Extract, embracing the 'First Period,' from Maj.
Gen. George B. McClellan's report of the operations of the 
Army of the Potomac from July 27, 1861, to November 9,
1862," in OR, V: p. 12 (hereafter cited as "McClellan's
Report (I ) " ) .
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wagons, medicines, or rations— was available in abundance on 
the other side of the Potomac. A French observer with the 
Union army commented that "the volunteer is provided with 
everything, and is supplied so liberally with rations that 
he daily throws away a part of them," adding dryly that "one 
may imagine what such an army must cost."19 Even McClel­
lan's most strident critics accredited him as the master 
organizer. Journalist and historian William Swinton wrote 
that "if other generals, the successors of McClellan, were 
able to achieve more decisive results than he, it was, 
again, in no small degree, because they had the perfect 
instrument he had fashioned to work w i t h a l . "20
Despite the immensely greater handicaps under which he 
labored, neither his contemporaries nor historians have 
tended to award similar accolades to Joseph Johnston. 
Brigadier-General Robert Toombs complained in September,
1861 that "I never knew as incompetent [an] executive 
o f f i c e r . " 2 1  Secretary of War Benjamin regularly accused 
Johnston of every administrative shortcoming from failure to
l^The Prince de Joinville, The Army of the Potomac:
Its Organization, Its Commander, and Its Campaign (New York: 
Anson D. F. Randolph, 1862), p. 13.
20W ii liam Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the 
Potomac, A Critical History of Operations in Virginia, 
Maryland, and Pennsylvania from the Commencement to the 
Close of the War, 1861-1865, revised edition (New York: 
University Publishing Company, [1881]), p. 67.
21u. B. Phillips, ed.r The Correspondence of Robert 
Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb (Washington, 
DC: n. p., 1913), p. 557.
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file reports to neglecting to provide winter quarters for 
his t r o o p s . 22 "Discipline had been lax under Johnston; 
drunkenness had been frequent; many things were at loose 
ends," concluded Douglas Southall Freeman, who took meticu­
lous pains to praise Lee, not Johnston, for nearly every 
positive step toward the organization of the Army of 
Northern V i r g i n i a . 23 Clifford Dowdey characterized Joseph 
Johnston as lacking energy, and contended that "while social 
life at headquarters was genial and relaxed, Johnston was a 
slovenly administrator and careless about details. He liked 
to be liked."24
Johnston's performance as an administrator that winter 
deserves more credit than he has been allowed. Few, if any, 
Confederate commanders ever organized an army facing such a 
disparity of numbers, had to contend with more serious 
shortages of munitions, or had to deal with such a high 
degree of bureaucratic interference from Richmond. If he 
was not always completely successful in his efforts, and if 
he sometimes became less than tactful in his communications, 
the difficulty of his circumstances has to be pleaded in
22por representative examples, see Judah P. Benjamin to 
Joseph E. Johnston, September 29, 1861, Judah P. Benjamin to 
Joseph E. Johnston, January 25, 1862, Jefferson Davis to 
Joseph E. Johnston, March 1, 1862, in OR, V: pp. 883, 1045-
1046, 1089.
23Freeman, R. E. Lee, II: p. 87.
24clifford Dowdey, The Seven Days, The Emergence of 
Robert E. Lee (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1964), p. 36.
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extenuation.
Johnston's rebel soldiers were not merely outnumbered, 
but man for man they were badly outgunned. The scarcity of 
firearms which plagued the Confederacy in the first year of 
the war was so severe in the Department of Northern Virginia 
that the weapons of soldiers in the hospital had to be 
consolidated to drill recruits in unarmed regiments.25 
Those rifles and muskets actually on hand were a baffling 
mix of calibers, brands, and qualities. The best of them 
were issued to the infantry, while much of Brigadier-General 
J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry made due with sabers, pistols, and 
shotguns.26
The state of Johnston's artillery was even more dismal 
than that of the infantry. The fact that the army contained 
several men who would become the premier cannoneers of the 
war could not outweigh the scarcity of guns or the insuffi­
ciency of powder. Though the precise number is elusive, 
Johnston's entire department probably did not contain more 
than 175 pieces of field artillery, while McClellan could
25q . W. Smith, "Council of war at Centreville, October 
1, 1861, P. G. T. Beauregard to Samuel Cooper, October 25, 
1861, Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, November 16,
1861, Joseph E. Johnston to S. Bassett French, January 29,
1862, in OR, V: pp. 886, 921, 958, 1051-1052; Judah P.
Benjamin to Jefferson Davis, March 6, 1862, in OR, Series 4, 
I: p. 971.
2®Stephen Z. Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War 
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1979,
1985), I: pp. 218-221.
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deploy 465.27 Many of the cannon Johnston did possess were 
six-pounders, which had too small a caliber to be effective 
on the Civil War battlefield.28
The nationwide shortage of gunpowder prevented the 
batteries he did possess from conducting enough live-fire 
training to assure their efficiency in combat. When the 
gunners did get to practice, the results were often demoral­
izing. In order to stretch its meager supply of powder, the 
Ordnance Department mixed in a proportion of less potent 
blasting powder. Brigadier-General Samuel French, command­
ing the Confederate artillery--both light and heavy--with 
which Whiting was attempting to blockade the lower Potomac, 
remembered that his ammunition "was very indifferent." 
"Sometimes," he recalled, "the Armstrong gun, at the same 
elevation, would not throw a shell more than halfway across
27This figure may actually be on the high side for the 
field artillery of the Department of Northern Virginia, 
because the count may have included thirty-five to forty 
heavy guns on the lower Potomac. Jennings C. Wise, The Long 
Arm of Lee, The History of the Artillery of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, one-volume edition (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1959, reprint of 1915 edition), p. 143; J. 
Thomas Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy From 
Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel (New 
York: Rogers & Sherwood, 1887), pp. 95-99.
28johnston believed six-pounders to be less than half 
as effective on the battlefield as twelve-pounders, and 
recommended decreasing them as a proportion of his artil­
lery. See Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 10, 
1861, Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, August 13,
1861, in OR, V: pp. 777, 784; Wise, Long Arm, pp. 67, 71-
72, 79, 110, 136, 145; Daniel, "Manufacturing Cannon," p.
40; Jack Coggins, Arms and Equipment of the Civil War 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 63-64, 66.
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the river; then again far over the r i v e r . " 2 9  such unpre­
dictable differences in performance hardly instilled 
confidence in Johnston's cannoneers.
Aside from being outnumbered and inadequately armed, 
Johnston's troops also suffered from a high rate of sick­
ness. Throughout the fall and winter, the number of 
soldiers confined to the hospitals, either near Centreville 
or further back in Richmond or Charlottesville, varied 
between 13,000 and 16,000— the equivalent of two full- 
strength divisions! Hundreds died each month, and hundreds 
more were discharged by surgeons who pronounced them 
permanently unfit for military d u t y . 3 0
Four circumstances beyond his control accounted for the 
high incidence of disease in Johnston's department. First, 
a significant proportion of his regiments had come straight 
to his army upon organization, instead of remaining in camps 
of instruction for the first few weeks following their 
induction. Consequently, they experienced the normal run of 
"camp diseases" prevalent among new soldiers in both armies
29samuel G. French, Two Wars: An Autobiography of Gen.
Samuel G. French (Nashville: Confederate Veteran, 1901), p.
143; see also Samuel French to Samuel Cooper, February 12, 
1862, Samuel French to Samuel Cooper, February 14, 1862, in 
LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 18; J. B. Walton to Samuel Cooper, 
January 17, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 52; Wise, Long 
Arm, p. 144.
30This information cannot be derived from the "ex­
tracts" of monthly departmental returns in OR, but shows up 
in the originals. The originals of the monthly returns for 
the Department of Northern Virginia for October, November, 
and December, 1861 are in JJWM.
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— mini-epidemics of everything from typhus to influenza— in 
the field.31 This condition was exacerbated by the severity 
of winter in northern Virginia which, to unprepared troops 
from the deep South, must have seemed nearly indistinguish­
able from the blizzards of the Arctic. Exposure to cold, 
wind, rain, and snow, combined with the inadequate shelters 
that the army could provide ("negro cabins," Toombs called 
them), increased the vulnerability of green troops to 
disease to such an extent that several whole regiments had 
to be withdrawn to Richmond because they were totally 
incapacitated.32 Medical care at the front ran from 
rudimentary to nonexistent, simply because there were 
neither enough doctors nor enough medicine. Many of the 
physicians available were apparently incompetent; D. H. Hill
3lBell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb, The Common 
Soldier of the Confederacy (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana
State University Press, 1978, reprint of 1943 edition), pp. 
251-254.
3 2t w o  examples of regiments from the deep South which 
suffered heavily were the 3 5th Georgia and the 14th Alabama. 
Disease in the 14th Alabama was so prevalent that Secretary 
Benjamin had to order it to Richmond in December, 1862 in 
order for it to recover. Judah P. Benjamin to Theophilus 
Holmes, January 5, 1862, in OR, V: p. 1020; Phillips,
Correspondence, pp. 575, 578; Wiley, Johnny Reb, p. 59; 
Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, October 7, 1861, 
Theophilus Holmes to Samuel Cooper, October 9, 1861, Judah 
P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, October 13, 1861, Joseph
E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, November 2, 1861, Judah P. 
Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, November 7, 1861, Joseph E. 
Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, November 11, 1861, Joseph E. 
Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, November 13, 1861, Judah P. 
Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, November 17, 1861, C. W. C. 
Dunnington to R. M. Smith, December 16, 1861, in OR, V: pp.
891, 893, 896-897, 934, 941-942, 948-949, 951, 962, 998-999.
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suggested that the health of the army would be vastly 
improved if "one half of our surgeons were h u n g . "33 A n d  
finally, the diet of the soldiers was chronically low in 
vegetables and anti-scorbutics, while high in half-baked 
bread and sinewy pork and beef of questionable q u a l i t y . 34
Even if more plentiful supplies of weapons, ammunition, 
accoutrement, medicines, and rations had existed, it is 
doubtful that the logistical situation of the Department of 
Northern Virginia that winter could have been significantly 
improved. The supply lines leading from Richmond to 
Manassas, as has already been seen, consisted of rickety, 
single-track railroads served by deteriorating equipment, 
and administered so poorly that the government, the army, 
and the railroad companies sometimes lost sight of dozens of 
loaded freight cars for months at a t i m e . 35 Distribution at 
the receiving end was no more efficient due to the inade-
33QUOted in Jeffrey Wert, "I Am So Unlike Other Folks," 
Civil War Time Illustrated, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (April 1989): 
p. 16; see also extract from the Journal of the Provisional 
Congress, reporting on the Quartermaster's Commissary, and 
Medical Departments, January 29, 1862, in OR, Series 4, I: 
pp. 887-890.
34£xtract from the Journal of the Provisional Congress, 
reporting on the Quartermaster's Commissary, and Medical 
Departments, January 29, 1862, in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 887.
35jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, September 18, 
1861, Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, September 19, 
1861, Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, September 20, 
1861, W. L. Powell to Jefferson Davis, September 20, 1861, 
Abraham C. Myers to Judah P. Benjamin, September 21, 1861, 
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, September 22, 1861, 
in OR, V: pp. 857, 867, 871-873.
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quate number of horses and mules which attempted to haul 
supplies over the muddy roads. Whiting's command on the 
Potomac provided a telling example of the consequences: 
though none of his troops were stationed farther than thirty 
miles from the railhead at Manassas Junction--and some as 
close as sixteen miles— he had to put his division on half 
rations several times during the w i n t e r . 3 6 There were 
rations in the depots but his dilapidated wagon trains could 
not bring them up fast enough to keep pace with daily 
consumption, let alone quickly enough to build up his own 
reserve stock.
The inevitable repercussion was a gradual erosion in 
the morale of Johnston's soldiers. Men who had sustained 
themselves through the fall on the flush of victory genera­
ted at the Battle of Manassas slowly found their will to 
continue eaten away by months of inactivity and intolerable 
living conditions, neither of which showed any immediate 
prospect of improving. Regiments from Tennessee and Alabama 
petitioned the government to send them home.3 7 Hundreds of
36w. H. C. Whiting to Theophilus Holmes, March 21,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, January 14, 
1862, in OR, V: pp. 529, 1028.
3?The 1st (Provisional), 7th, and 14th Tennessee, as 
well as the 4th Alabama petitioned the government to be sent 
home during the winter. Robert E. Lee to Edmund Kirby 
Smith, April 7, 1862, in OR, X (part 2): p. 397; George
Maney to Otho R. Singleton, February 23, 1862, in OR, VII: 
pp. 901-903; Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, 
February 12, 1862, in Letters and Telegrams Sent, Secretary 
of War, Confederate States of America, National Archives, M- 
522, Reel 3 (hereafter cited as LS-WD).
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soldiers illegally extended their furloughs by skulking 
about Richmond instead of returning promptly to the army.3 8 
Alcohol abuse, up to and including blatant drunkenness on 
duty by company and regimental officers, soared.39 The 
recruiters swarming over his camps found Johnston's men 
quite willing to sign up for almost any unit of any kind 
which could guarantee them that they would serve out their 
terms almost anywhere e l s e . 40 as the months of March,
April, and May approached, when the enlistments of more than 
half the department's soldiers would expire, everyone from 
Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Congress down to Joseph 
Johnston and his subordinates feared the worst: the army
threatened to simply melt away without ever fighting another 
battle.41
38Entries for January 23, 1862, January 28-29, 1862, 
February 10-12, 1862, Thomas Bragg diary, typescript, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Caro­
lina, Chapel Hill, NC, pp. 123, 127, 141-144.
39phill ips, Correspondence, p. 5 92; Entry for January 
8, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 104; W. D. Camp to Samuel Cooper, 
February 13, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 11; Joseph E. 
Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 10, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M- 
474, Reel 27.
40johnston, Narrative, pp. 90-91, 99-101.
41joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, January 14, 
1862 (with enclosure showing the organization of troops 
assigned to the Department of Northern Virginia), Joseph E. 
Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, January 18, 1862, Judah P. 
Benjamin, January 25, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston, February 1, 
1862, in OR, V: pp. 1028-1032, 1036-1037, 1045-1046, 1057-
1058; Judah P. Benjamin to Howell Cobb, December 14, 1861 
(with enclosure "Statement of the number of troops now in 
the service enlisted for the war and of the States from 
which they have volunteered"), Henry Hill to the Chairman,
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The fact that an army in more than name even existed in 
February, 1862, was due primarily to the efforts of General 
Johnston. Contrary to the image with which his memory has 
been saddled, the General worked diligently to prepare his 
divisions to face the enemy and bent every resource he 
possessed toward maintaining their strength and propping up 
their sagging morale. Unlike the majority of his men and 
many of his officers, Joseph Johnston allowed himself no 
vacations from the responsibilities of command: from the
day he took charge at Manassas in July 1861, until he 
travelled to Richmond on Jefferson Davis's direct orders in 
February, 1862, Johnston remained with the army.42
Recognizing the dangers of his army's dispersal, 
Johnston instituted a policy of quick response to enemy 
actions designed to allow his widely separated columns to 
react without wasting time to refer to headquarters for 
specific orders. Jackson, in the Valley, and Hill, at 
Leesburg, were encouraged to communicate with each other 
directly and authorized to send reinforcements to any point
Committee on Military Affairs, House of Delegates, Virginia, 
January 20, 1862 (with enclosure "An abstract showing the 
commencement of the termination of service of the volunteers 
of Virginia who went into the service in April, May, and 
June, 1861"), "Statement of troops in the service of the 
Confederate States," March 1, 1862, in OR, Series 4, I: pp.
788-790, 859-861, 962-964.
42johnson, Johnston, p. 78.
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of attack without consulting Centreville.43 jn the same 
manner, Johnston instructed Whiting, on the lower Potomac, 
and Holmes, near Fredericksburg, to coordinate an immediate 
response to any Federal landing in their a r e a s . 44 Johnston 
required Major-General Earl Van Dorn, who might have to 
march his troops on short notice to reinforce any of these 
positions, to have accurate maps of the roads on his flank, 
and assure that the bridges along his line of march were 
kept repaired.4 5 jn this manner, Johnston hoped that the 
speed of his reaction to any Union offensive might somewhat 
offset his inferiority of numbers. In the event that it did 
not, he ordered entrenchments built on the northern bank of 
the Rappahannock River to secure key bridges in case of a 
retreat.46
Johnston actively employed what would today be called 
counter-intelligence procedures to deceive McClellan with 
regard to his weakness. He had logs painted black and 
discarded locomotive stovepipes mounted in the embrasures of
43joseph E. Johnston to Thomas J. Jackson, January 24, 
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 27.
44a . P. Mason to W. H. C. Whiting, February 4, 1862, in
LS-ANVA; Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 5,
1861, Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 6,
1861, Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 7,
1861, in OR, V: pp. 982, 986-987.
45joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 7,
1861, in OR, V: p. 986; Hanson, Bull Run, p. 37.
46joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 9,
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 27; Joseph E. Johnston to R.
W. Hughes, April 9, 1867, in RMH; Johnston, Narrative, p. 445.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
his defenses at Centreville to conceal the fact that the few 
heavy guns Whiting deployed along the Potomac were all that 
the army owned. Scarecrows were even erected to mimic gun 
crews. 4 7 Until winter storms rendered major movements 
impractical, he kept his infantry brigades shuffling across 
his front as ostentatiously as possible, with the objective 
of convincing Yankee spies to count the same soldiers two or 
even three times.48 Likewise, French's field batteries on 
the Potomac stayed on the move all winter, digging in and 
firing a few rounds across the river, then limbering and 
deploying to a new location so that Federal pickets could 
never get an accurate count of their numbers. A small 
passenger steamer, rechristened the C. S. S. George Page, 
was outfitted with one or two light cannon and "armored" 
with spare bits of iron. The vessel was then run back and 
forth between the Occoquan River and Chopawamsic Creek in a 
remarkably successful attempt to convince the enemy that the 
Confederates had managed to place a real ironclad warship on
^Testimony of J. S. Potter, March 12, 1862; Testimony 
of Irwin McDowell, April 1, 1862, in JCCW, pp. 243, 247,
258; Robert T. Bell, 11th Virginia Infantry, 1st edition, 
(Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, 1985), p. 18; Davis, Image of
War, II: p . 398.
48a . M. Barbour to Abraham C. Myers, January 23, 1862, 
in Letters and Telegrams Received, Quartermaster-General, 
Confederate States of America, National Archives, M-469,
Reel 1 (hereafter cited as LR-QMG); Robert Rodes to Lieuten­
ant Ingraham, December 25, 1861, in Jubal A. Early papers, 
Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
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the Potomac.49 The fortuitous combination of Johnston's 
efforts with the incompetence of McClellan's intelligence 
service and the Federal commander's own innate caution 
resulted in the Northern general's firm conviction that the 
rebels in the Department of Northern Virginia numbered
150,000 instead of the 47,000 effectives actually present.50 
There was little Johnston could do directly to improve 
the shortages of weapons, ammunition, equipment, rations, 
and medicines which plagued his army. He tried to augment 
his food supply locally, and an officer was sent to the 
capital to secure anti-scorbutics.51 He also dispatched 
Brigadier-General William Nelson Pendleton, his Chief of 
Artillery, to Richmond, Staunton, and Lynchburg to scavenge 
for the harnesses, caissons, and forges necessary to make 
his field batteries tactically mobile.52 jn the meantime, 
the Chief of Ordnance, Major E. P. Alexander, concentrated
T. Street to R. H. Wyman, December 11, 1861, R. H. 
Wyman to Gideon Welles, December 12, 1861, R. H. Wyman to 
Gideon Welles, December 18, 1861, in United States Navy 
Department, War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Navies (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1921), Series 1, V: pp. 4-5, 7-8 (Here­
after cited as NOR; all citations are from Series 1 unless 
otherwise indicated); Naval History Division Navy Depart­
ment, Civil War Naval Chronology, 1861-1865, one-volume 
edition, (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1971), VI: p. 237; Samuel French to Samuel Cooper, February
7, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 18.
50"McClellan's Report (I)," in OR, V: p. 53.
51a . P. Mason to H. Cole, January 25, 1862, in LS-ANVA.
52susan P. Lee, ed., Memoirs of William Nelson Pendle­
ton (Philadelphia: n. p., 1893), pp. 155-156.
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on keeping rigid control over the expenditure of every grain 
of precious powder that the army had been issued, while 
carefully organizing his slender reserves into mobile trains 
to accompany the divisions when active operations com­
menced
But Johnston reserved his primary efforts for improving 
the efficiency with which supplies were delivered from the 
railhead at Manassas to the troops in the field. As noted, 
he constructed a six-and-one-half-mile rail spur to cut down 
the hauling distance for his overworked teams. Sawmills 
which had been set up to cut lumber for the army's winter 
quarters were kept running to cut planks with which to 
corduroy the worst r o a d s . 54 He appointed an Inspector of 
Transportation to initiate a systematic program of caring 
for the army's draft animals and maintaining its fleet of 
w a g o n s . 55 To assist the department's Chief Quartermaster, 
Johnston assigned another officer to take over specific 
responsibility for administering the stockpiles of materials
5 3Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a 
Confederate (New York: n. p., 1907), pp. 52-53.
54joseph E. Johnston to A. W. Barbour, February 1,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Abraham C. Myers, February 1, 
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Abraham C. Myers, February 3, 
1862, in JJWM.
55j0seph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 14,
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 10; General Orders No. 24, 
Department of Northern Virginia, February 13, 1862, in OR, 
LI: p. 468.
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at M a n a s s a s . M a j o r  Rhett, the Chief of Staff, constantly 
badgered the division and brigade commanders, pursuant to 
Johnston's instructions, to submit accurate and timely 
strength reports, so that only those supplies absolutely 
necessary would have to be carted forward to their posi­
t i o n s . ^  Although the fundamental weakness of the entire 
Confederate war effort could not be offset by his program to 
increase the efficiency of his own supply services, it is 
evident that Johnston spared no energy in trying to get the 
most out of the little his country could provide him.
The General's other priority was to shore up the 
spirits of his soldiers. He believed firmly that his 
personal example and as rigorous a regimen of drill and 
discipline as the weather permitted were key ingredients to 
elevating morale. The sight of Johnston riding around the 
camps near Centreville, became a daily occurrence for the
56joseph E. Johnston to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 
9, 18 61, in E. Murray Smith collection, United States 
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
5^For typical examples of Johnston of his Assistant 
Adjutant General remonstrating with his subordinates over 
their paperwork, see A. P. Mason to Thomas J. Jackson, 
January 4, 1862, A. P. Mason to E. K. Smith, January 6,
1862, A. P. Mason to P. G. T. Beauregard, January 7, 1862, 
Thomas G. Rhett to William Nelson Pendelton, January 7,
1862, "Assistant Adjutant General" to Theophilus Holmes, 
January 7, 1862, A. P. Mason to J. E. B. Stuart, January 9, 
1862, Circular Letter, A. P. Mason to James Longstreet,
Jubal Early, and D. H. Hill, February 7, 1862, in LS-ANVA;
J. B. Washington to Theophilus Holmes, January 31, 1862, 
Joseph E. Johnston to Theophilus Holmes, February 13, 1862, 
Joseph E. Johnston to Thomas J. Jackson, February 13, 1862, 
in JJWM.
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soldiers in the main field army. Like McClellan, Johnston 
held parades and reviews, personally complimenting those 
regiments that proved they had mastered the evolutions of 
the company and the battalion. In addition, however, he 
demanded that his commanders pay attention to tactical 
training. Exercises were conducted throughout the winter on 
both brigade and division levels. Idleness on days without 
formal drill was not tolerated; each morning, in every 
company, orderly sergeants called off the names of the men 
detailed to improve the Centreville entrenchments, unload 
supplies from the freight cars, or upgrade the makeshift 
short l i n e . 58
Johnston understood fully the importance of symbols to 
his soldiers. After General Beauregard designed a new 
Confederate battle flag, Johnston wrote to the governors of 
the states from which he drew his troops, requesting that 
each chief executive forward flags for his own regiments. 
Although only Governor John Letcher of Virginia responded, 
Johnston used the occasion for as much ceremony as possible,
58oorsey Pender to Fanny Pender, September 11, 1861, 
Dorsey Pender to Fanny Pender, November 21, 1861, in William 
W. Hassler, The General to His Lady, The Civil War Letters 
of William Dorsey Pender to Fanny Pender (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1962, pp. 59, 96-97; 
Wise, Seventeenth Virginia, pp. 4 3-44, 49; Samuel French to 
Theophilus Holmes, February 13, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474,
Reel 17; Richard M. McMurry, John Bell Hood and the War for 
Southern Independence (Lexington, K Y : University Press of
Kentucky, 1982), pp. 30-31; Donald B. Sanger and Thomas 
Robson Hay, James Lonqstreet (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana
State University Press, 1952), p. 33.
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holding a series of reviews for the governor to present the 
new banners.^ Later, he tried unsuccessfully to convince 
the President to ride up and address the army, hoping that 
an appeal from Davis would stimulate more reenlistments.60 
On his own, Johnston granted leaves and furloughs to as many 
of the soldiers as he considered could be safely spared at 
one time.61
Johnston also applied the rod. He attempted, through­
out most of the winter, to crack down on the drunkenness of 
his officers, convinced that such was a prerequisite for 
enforcing abstinence among the rank and file. Officers 
found intoxicated on duty were court-martialed, and recom­
mendations sent to Richmond that they be drummed out of the 
s e r v i c e . 62 Resolutely, Johnston signed the first orders 
ever given in the Department of Northern Virginia for the 
execution of deserters and others found guilty of heinous
59f . n . Boney, John Letcher of Virginia (University of 
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1966), p. 149.
60joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 5, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1062.
61joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, February 1,
1862, in OR, V: pp. 1057-1058; A. P. Mason to Thomas J.
Jackson, January 4, 1862, A. P. Mason to E. K. Smith,
January 6, 1862, A. P. Mason to P. G. T. Beauregard, January
7, 1862, in LS-ANVA.
62joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 10,
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 27; W. D. Camp to Samuel 
Cooper, February 13, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 11; 
Phillips, Correspondence, p. 592; Terry L. Jones, Lee"s 
Tigers, The Louisiana Infantry in the Army of Northern 
Virginia (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University
Press, 1987), pp. 35-39.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
c r i m e s . 63 Although generally unnoticed, the scope and 
effectiveness of Johnston's program to support his soldiers'
t
spirits and improve the effectiveness of his army was not 
surpassed by any other commander under similar conditions at 
any time during the war. It was only rivalled by his own 
efforts with the Army of Tennessee and those of Lee with the 
Army of Northern Virginia in the winter of 1863-1864.
Johnston's quiet accomplishments stand out as all the 
more remarkable in light of the fact that the civil-military 
bureaucracy in Richmond seemed consciously determined to 
undermine him. In nearly every area, either Secretary 
Benjamin, Adjutant General Samuel Cooper, Quartermaster 
General Abraham Myers, or Commissary General Lucius Northrop 
directly opposed the field commander. Each official 
quarreled with Johnston in what amounted to the petty 
vindictiveness of an administrator insistent on sustaining 
his own titular authority regardless of the consequences to 
the cause he served. Taken in sum, the counter-productive 
measures pursued by the Confederate administration con­
stantly threatened to undo everything Johnston had striven 
to accomplish.
He clashed constantly with the War Department over the 
question of weapons. Despite its lack of adequate arma­
ments, Johnston's army was the strongest in the Confederacy.
^^Taylor, Destruction, p. 25; Jones, Lee's Tigers, pp. 
40-42 .
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For this reason, Secretary Benjamin and General Cooper 
pressured him incessantly to ship "surplus" muskets--which, 
in their minds included those of soldiers sent to the 
hospital— to Richmond for distribution to new r e g i m e n t s . 6 4  
When Johnston demurred, arguing that "this deprives the 
different regiments of the means of arming their men who 
return from the hospitals," he found himself subject to a 
sudden surprise inspection by Cooper h i m s e l f . 65 Finally, in 
order to retain sufficient muskets to arm his own infantry, 
Johnston was forced to turn a blind eye while his subordi­
nates illegally concealed guns from the Richmond authori­
ties . 66
Despite the well-known numerical and qualitative 
inferiority of Johnston's cannon, the Confederate War 
Department actually attempted, in September, 1861, to halt 
the Tredegar Iron Works' production of field guns in favor
64special Orders No. 147, Adjutant and Inspector 
General's Office, October 19, 1861, Judah P. Benjamin to 
Joseph E. Johnston, October 19, 1861, P. G. T. Beauregard to 
Samuel Cooper, October 25, 1861, Joseph E. Johnston to 
Samuel Cooper, January 28, 1862, in OR, V: pp. 897, 905, 
921, 1049; Entry of January 17, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 116.
65judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, January 24, 
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 28, 1862, 
Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 29, 1862,
Samuel Cooper to Joseph E. Johnston, January 29, 1862,
Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 2, 1862,
Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 3, 1862, in
OR, V: pp. 1043, 1049, 1050, 1059.
66joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, February 12, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1069; Thomas J. Jackson to A. R.
Boteler, January 24, 1862, in Thomas J. Jackson papers, 
Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
of immobile coastal defense artillery.67 Johnston had to 
dispatch a special representative to Richmond to beg that 
the policy be changed. Even then, though the casting of 
field artillery was resumed, seacoast guns remained the 
government's priority.68
Both the Quartermaster General and the Secretary of War 
inhibited Johnston's initiatives to improve the health of 
his troops. When Johnston requisitioned additional blankets 
for his men, Myers peevishly demanded that the General first 
provide the names of the troops who needed them; he com­
pletely ignored the request for anti-scorbutics.69 The War 
Department failed to require the hospitals in the rear areas 
to notify commanders when their soldiers died or received 
discharges, which left Johnston completely ignorant of the 
fate of soldiers sent to the rear, until they happened to 
reappear in camp. The few hospital administrators conscien­
tious enough to try on their own to communicate this 
information to the army, found themselves blocked by the 
reluctance of the Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office to
6^Dew, Ironmaker, p. 114.
68Between Pendleton's July, 1861, mission to Richmond 
and the end of February, 1862, Tredegar produced 103 pieces 
of heavy artillery and only forty-nine field guns. See 
Ibid., p . 111.
69a . P. Mason to R. H. Cole, January 25, 1862, in LS- 
ANVA; Abraham C. Myers to William L. Cabell, December 21, 
1861, in LS-QMG, T-131, Reel 8.
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provide them with the appropriate f o r m s . 7 0
Johnston's attempts to improve the efficiency of his 
supply system were stymied at every turn by Myers and 
Northrop, and occasionally by Cooper's complicity. By way 
of answering Johnston's desperate pleas for more forage for 
his horses, the Quartermaster General observed that "consid­
erable savings would be affected [sic]," if "the animals 
could be subsisted without hay." He suggested that Johnston 
substitute a mixture of "corn shucks, wheat straw and wheat 
chaff, cut into and mixed with corn meal, or corn meal and 
b r a n . "71 Myers stood on the letter of an obscure technical­
ity to prevent Johnston's subordinates at outlying posts 
from naming their own chief quartermasters, a response 
echoed by Northrop with respect to commissaries.72 when 
William L. Cabell, Johnston's Chief Quartermaster, was 
transferred, Myers opposed Johnston's choice for a succes­
sor, and allowed the eventual nominee to become embroiled in
70&. P. Mason to A. P. Hill, February 10, 1862, in LS- 
ANVA; Judah P. Benjamin to P. G. T. Beauregard, January 12, 
1862, in LS-SW; Samuel Cooper to P. G. T. Beauregard,
January — , 1862, Braxton Bragg to Samuel Cooper, January 8, 
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 5; John B. Magruder to Samuel 
Cooper, January 10, 1862, John B. Magruder to Samuel Cooper, 
January 16, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 32; Phillips, 
Correspondence, p. 586.
71-Abraham C. Myers to William L. Cabell, December 21,
1861, in LS-QMG.
72d . H. Hill to Judah P. Benjamin, February 12, 1862, 
in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 23; Nathan Evens to R. H. Chilton, 
January 3, 1862, A. W. Barbour to A. C. Myers, February 8,
1862, in LR-AIGO.
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a distracting fight over relative seniority.73 Northrop 
contested Johnston's plan to supplement his troops' diet by 
local purchase, sticking to a centralized system of acquisi­
tion that sometimes required food bought in northern 
Virginia to travel to Richmond on the overtaxed railroad 
before turning around to return to Johnston's d e p a r t m e n t . 74 
When he finally did locate a meat-packing plant in Johns­
ton's area, it was over Johnston's vociferous protests; 
Thoroughfare Gap, the site of the plant, was a tactically 
vulnerable location.75 Cooper refused to sanction Johns­
ton's appointment of an Inspector of Transportation, and 
delayed action on many other requests by Johnston and his 
subordinates to increase their logistical staffs. As 
Longstreet acidly observed in early 1862, it represented a 
sorry state of affairs when the government reduced a 
division commander to personally inspecting wagon axles for 
grease by its reluctance to appoint a captain to do the
73&. c .  Myers to Joseph E. Johnston, December 11, 1862, 
A. C. Myers to Joseph E. Johnston, January 2, 1862, in LS- 
QMG, T-131, Reel 8: Thomas T. Fisher to Samuel Cooper, 
January 27, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 17; Joseph E. 
Johnston to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 9, 18 61, in E. 
Murray Smith Collection, U. S. Military History Institute.
74Goff, Confederate Supply, pp. 18-19, Leroy Pope 
Walker to Lucius B. Northrop, September 7, 1861, Lucius B. 
Northrop to Leroy Pope Walker, September 9, 1861, in OR, V: 
pp. 883, 835-836.
75johnston, Narrative, p. 104.
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j ob.7^
But possibly the most egregious outrage with which 
Johnston had to contend was the unceasing campaign by 
Benjamin to undermine his command authority. The Louisi­
anian ruled the War Department as if it were a personal 
fiefdom. He sent orders directly to Johnston's subordinates 
without consulting or even informing the General.77 He 
first acknowledged, then arbitrarily repudiated Johnston's 
organization of the army into two c o r p s . 78 Benjamin 
fostered a climate in the War Office which made it accepta­
ble for everyone, from the lowest private to a general 
officer, to send him requests without channeling them
7^Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 14,
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 10; Joseph E. Johnston to 
Abraham C. Myers, January 14, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 
27; James Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, April 9, 1862, in LR- 
AIGO, M-474, Reel 30; General Orders No. 24, Department of 
Northern Virginia, February 13, 1862, in OR, LI (part 2): 
p . 468 .
77judah p. Benjamin to Earl Van Dorn, October 31, 1861, 
Judah P. Benjamin to D. H. Hill, January 18, 1862, Judah P. 
Benjamin to Thomas J. Jackson, January 30, 1862, in OR, V: 
pp. 930, 1036, 1053.
V8V . D. Groner to Samuel Cooper, September 30, 1861 
(with enclosure "List of generals having independent 
commands; also general officers subordinate to them"), in 
OR, Series 4, I: pp. 626-633; Judah P. Benjamin to Robert
Toombs, September 24, 1861, Jefferson Davis to Gustavus W. 
Smith, October 10, 1861, Jefferson Davis to P. G. T. 
Beauregard, October 17, 1861, Judah P. Benjamin to P. G. T.
Beauregard, October 17, 1861, Circular Letter, Judah P.
Benjamin to P. G. T. Beauregard, Joseph E. Johnston and 
others, October 19, 1861, Jefferson Davis to P. G. T.
Beauregard, October 20, 1861, in OR, V: pp. 877, 894, 904-
906 .
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through the department commander.79 More often than not, 
even when official papers passed through Johnston's hands, 
Benjamin would overrule his decision in what seemed to be a 
matter of course. Much of Johnston's trouble eradicating 
alcoholism among his brigades could be traced to Benjamin's 
refusal to implement the recommendations of Johnston's 
courts m a r t i a l . 8 0  Unsuccessfully, the General remonstrated 
with the Secretary, complaining that "the rules of military 
correspondence require that letters addressed to you by 
members of this army should pass through my office." As he 
wrote, Johnston grew both angrier and more acerbic: "Let me
ask, for the sake of discipline, that you have this rule 
enforced. It will save much time and trouble, and create 
the belief in the army that I am its commander. . . ."81
At the same time, Benjamin undercut Johnston's furlough 
and reenlistment program by granting authorization to dozens 
of recruiters to move among Johnston's camps to try to
^ F o r  typical examples, see Wade Hampton to Judah P. 
Benjamin, February 1, 1862, George H. Steyart to Judah P. 
Benjamin, February 22, 1862, in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 902,
946-947; A. T. Rainey to Judah P. Benjamin, February 8,
1862, in LR-SW, M-618, Reel 8; D. H. Hill to Judah P. 
Benjamin, January 22, 1862, D. H. Hill, to Judah P. Ben­
jamin, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 23; Judah P. Benjamin to 
Joseph E. Johnston, February 12, 1862, in LS-SW, M-522, Reel 
3 .
80Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 10,
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 27; "Copy of endorsement on 
letter of Col. Radford of Feb. 5, 1862, to the Adjt. &
Inptr. Genl.," in JJWM.
81joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, February 16, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1075.
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entice unhappy infantrymen into signing up for new companies 
of artillery and cavalry. These recruiters arrived armed 
with furloughs approved by the Secretary of War which 
Johnston possessed no power to contravene. Johnston also 
confronted Benjamin on this issue, pointing out: "you will
readily perceive that while you are granting furloughs on 
such a scale at Richmond I cannot safely grant them at all." 
There should be a system, Johnston insisted. "If the War 
Department continues to grant these furloughs without 
reference to the plans determined on here, confusion and 
disorganizing collisions must be the result."82
The secretary denied that he had ever acted so improp­
erly, even though the most superficial glance at the letter 
books of the War Department would have proven him to be a 
l i a r . 83 Following this exchange, D. H. Hill forwarded a 
sheaf of authorizations signed by Benjamin to General 
Cooper, with the sarcastic request: "Will you be kind
enough, General[,] to forward this note to the Hon. J. P. 
Benjamin that he may be advised that there is a forger in 
his o f f i c e . "84 jn order to keep his army from evaporating, 
Johnston directed his commanders to stop granting any other
82joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, February 1, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1057.
83jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 4, 1862, 
in OR, V: p. 1089. But see literally dozens of Benjamin-
approved furloughs in LS-SW, M-522, Reel 3.
84q . H. Hill to Samuel Cooper, March 5, 1862, in LR- 
AIGO, M-474, Reel 23.
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furloughs, and again looked the other way when some of his 
subordinates began to toss the ubiquitous recruiters into 
the guard house.85 &s Major-General Richard S. Ewell fumed 
in a letter to his fiancee, "Had the Secretary of War's 
orders and permits been carried out by General Johnston as 
regards Artillery and Cavalry, the whole army would have 
been broken up except those two branches."86
Eventually, Johnston would bring his complaints about 
the Secretary's interference in internal army affairs to the 
attention of Jefferson Davis. Instead of inspecting the 
evidence, Davis simply asked Benjamin for an explanation.
The Secretary's response was a collection of misleading— if 
technically correct--statements, facile half-truths, and 
outright falsehoods, all tied together by his lawyer's 
charisma into a rationalization that a close friend could 
find perfectly acceptable.87 Johnston, in fact, came out
85jubal Early to Jefferson Davis, March 28, 1878, in 
Rowland, Jefferson Davis, VIII: pp. 139-140; James Long-
street to Samuel Cooper, February — , 1862, in LR-AIGO, M- 
474, Reel 30.
^Quoted in Percy G. Hamlin, "Old Bald Head" (General 
R. S. Ewell), The Portrait of a Soldier (Strasburg, VA: 
Shenandoah Publishing House, 1940), p. 78.
87Be njamin told Davis in early March that "he has not 
granted leaves of absence or furloughs to soldiers for a 
month past. . . . "  This was technically true; the Secretary 
of War himself had stopped granting furloughs, but he had 
continued to allow recruiters to enter the Department of 
Northern Virginia armed with documents that empowered them 
to grant furloughs and leaves of absence in his name. "The 
authority to re-enlist and change from infantry to artil­
lery," Davis told Johnston, "the Secretary informs me, has 
been given but in four cases. . . . "  This was simply not
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of the exchange with a mild rebuke, Davis observing that 
Benjamin "has complained that his orders are not executed, 
and I regret that he was able to present to me . . . many
true. Not only had Benjamin permitted twelve rather than 
four infantry companies to convert into artillery, he 
continued well into February to authorize ambitious officers 
to recruit throughout Johnston's command for new companies 
of heavy artillery and cavalry— at least ten in the six 
weeks prior to Johnston's protest to Davis. See Judah P. 
Benjamin to M. P. Dyerle, December 17, 1861, Judah P. 
Benjamin to J. W. Anderson, December 18, 1861, Judah P. 
Benjamin to N. Caliborne Wilson, December 19, 1861, Judah P. 
Benjamin to J. F. Waddell, December 19, 1861, Judah P.
Benjamin to T. D. Caliborne, January 4, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin to J. P. Boyd, January 4, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin
to R. Otey, January 6, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E.
Johnston, January 4, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to J. B. 
McMullen, January 15, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to H. G.
Bowie, January 15, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to St. George 
Junkin, January 16, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to A. B. Rhett, 
January 28, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to A. B. Rhett, February 
9, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, February 
11, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to Mat. C. Moore, February 12, 
1862, Judah P. Benjamin to W. Saunders, February 14, 1862, 
Judah P. Benjamin to C. S. Peyton, February 14, 1862, Judah 
P. Benjamin to C. Harwood, February 14, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin to F. J. Reiley, February 14, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin to George W. Clement, February 14, 1862, Judah P. 
Benjamin to J. L. Wilson, February 14, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin to M. Hewitt, February 17, 1862, in LS-SW, M-522,
Reel 3. This list is, if anything, an underestimation of 
the number of permits that Benjamin issued during the 
period. Only those permits which give some indication, 
either by the unit involved, or the address of the recruit­
er, that they are to be recruited within the limits of 
Johnston's department have been included. This, for 
instance, eliminated most of the cavalry transfer and 
reorganization requests, which are much more ambiguous, and 
seem to have been sent out either through the War Department 
or through General Cooper. For an example, see John R. Hart 
to George W. Randolph, April 26, 1862, in LR-AIGO, which 
recounts the issue of a permit to a company of Georgians to 
whom Benjamin issued a permit to go home to acquire horses 
for a transfer to the cavalry. Benjamin's self-justification 
is found in Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 4, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1089.
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instances to justify that complaint. . . ."88
In response to the official roadblocks and Davis's 
refusal to consider his case, Johnston felt an increasing 
sense of bitter alienation from his own superiors, a 
sentiment which had already been growing for months. His 
letters to Whiting, a close friend as well as a trusted 
subordinate, began to reveal this mood as early as November, 
1861. On November 9, he predicted blackly that "the 
Secretary of War will probably establish his headquarters 
within this department s o o n . "89 & n d  three days later, 
Johnston advised Whiting that "General Cooper replied today 
that the guns you asked for should be sent without delay. 
This does not encourage me much as to time. In Richmond 
their ideas of promptitude are very different from ours."90 
Concerned in January that the government was seeking a 
pretext on which to replace him, Johnston joined Beauregard 
and G. W. Smith in an effort to begin saving papers and 
drafting memoranda to prove that they had been doing all 
they could, despite Richmond's interference, to strengthen
88jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 4, 1862, 
in OR, V: p. 1089.
89joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, November 9, 
1861, in OR, V: p. 944.
90joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, November 12, 
1861, in OR, V: pp. 949-950.
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the army.91
By the‘time he started to the capital in answer to the 
President's summons, the gulf between Joseph Johnston and 
Jefferson Davis was, like the distance between Centreville 
and Richmond, much greater than it first appeared.
91"Council of War at Centreville," Gustavus W. Smith, 
October 1, 1861 (countersigned by Joseph E. Johnston and P. 
G. T. Beauregard on January 31, 1862); P. G. T. Beauregard 
to Joseph E. Johnston, December, 1861, in OR, V: pp. 884-
887, 990.
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Chapter Three 
Decision in Richmond
Lead-grey clouds invaded the sky over Richmond on 
February 19, 1862. Steady rain suited the mood of the city. 
Despite Davis's pending inauguration as the Confederacy's 
permanent president, few Richmonders felt either festive or 
optimistic. In little more than a month, an unbroken string 
of defeats had destroyed the confidence of the city on the 
James River. The gloomy atmosphere deepened as the list of 
catastrophes lengthened: a rout at Fishing Creek; the fall
of Fort Henry and Roanoke Island; and now some dire, 
although still unspecified, disaster at Fort Donelson. An 
aide to the Governor observed that depression paralyzed the 
city. Businesses closed, and in the streets, hotels, and 
bars "people did nothing but collect together in groups and 
discuss our disasters."1
The uneasy crowds wandering the city grew larger every 
day. The influx of people associated with the Confederate 
administration, expanding industries, and the armies 
defending Virginia had swollen the population of Richmond to 
more than twice the prewar total of 3 8,000. Camps of
^Charles W. Turner, ed., Captain Greenlee Davidson,
CSA, Diary and Letters, 1851-1863 (Verona, VA: McClure,
1975), pp. 34-35; the weather was reported in the entry of 
February 20, 1862, Bragg Diary, p. 156.
63
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instruction and military hospitals had been established 
throughout the city. Hundreds (possibly thousands, no one 
kept an accurate tally) of soldiers on furlough loitered in 
the streets, searching for a place to spend the night. 
Makeshift prisons housed several thousand Federal prisoners, 
and Yankee officers who had filed paroles with the Provost 
Marshal were allowed to walk around freely. Refugees from 
occupied portions of the state migrated to the capital.
Their numbers, too, are impossible to estimate. The 
inauguration, scheduled to occur in three days, had attract­
ed an additional horde of visitors, making conditions even 
more overcrowded.2
These invasions had predictable results. Already 
inflated prices of food and lodging kept climbing. "Grocer­
ies are very high without any fixed price," complained one 
Richmond newspaper, adding that "it is very difficult to 
give correct quotations as prices are changing every day."^ 
Renters bitterly attacked landlords who "run up miserable 
wooden shells, or . . . lease crazy brick tenements, in 
convenient locations, and ask the most enormous rents for
^Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate State of Richmond 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), pp. 24, 59-62,
78; Virginius Dabney, Richmond, The Story of a City (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), pp. 166-168; Rudolph Von Abele,
Alexander H. Stephens, A Biography (New York: Alfred K.
Knopf, 1946), p. 206; Richmond Examiner, February 21, 1862, 
p . 3 .
^Richmond Religious Herald, February 20, 1862, p. 2.
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uncomfortable r o o m s . V i s i t o r s  who could afford it paid to 
stay in private homes. Hotels sold space on cots spread 
around their lobbies at exorbitant prices, but even this 
expedient could not meet the demand for temporary housing. 
Those who found no other place to stay frequented the bars 
and gambling "hells" as late in the evening as possible, and 
then slept wherever they could.^ The crime rate soared: 
murder--especiaily strangling— and highway robbery became 
particularly prominent, and "disorderly houses" prolif­
erated. The Richmond Examiner observed that "a glance at 
the police report . . . must convince everyone that this 
city is not a safe place to 'thrash' about in at night.
The Dispatch pointedly recalled that the English had only 
solved their crime problem by resorting to liberal use of 
the death penalty.^
The gross overcrowding of the city created an atmo­
sphere in which rumors multiplied like mosquitoes on a 
stagnant pond. Real intelligence about the war was conspic­
uous by its absence, and the most improbable tales circu­
lated with full credence. Richmond newspapers printed every
^Richmond Whig, January 1, 1862, p. 1.
^Wilfred Buck Yearns, The Confederate Congress (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1960), p. 14; Thomas, Richmond, 
pp. 73-74.
^Richmond Examiner, February 21, 1862, p. 3; February 
22, 1862, p. 3.
^Richmond Dispatch, February 21, 1862, p. 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
report and hoped for the best. On February 19, the fate of 
Fort Donelson was still the subject of wild speculation. 
Neither the President nor the War Department had released 
any firm news.8
At 8:00 A. M., Davis and his cabinet secretaries had 
sequestered themselves on the second floor of the Customs 
House, which had been donated by Virginia to the national 
government. The meeting continued for hours, the partici­
pants apparently oblivious to the curious bystanders in the 
street below, while clerks and assistants transacted the 
routine business of government. Questions of grand strate­
gy, it was assumed, were under consideration, and specula­
tions about potential decisions started circulating.9
Into this climate of depression, uncertainty, and 
misinformation, the morning train from Centreville, late as 
usual, wheezed slowly along the Shockoe bottom into Rich­
mond, bearing new grist for the rumor mills. At the 
Virginia Central Railroad Depot on Broad Street, passengers 
began the normal struggle to exit the ramshackle cars. 
Couriers carrying official dispatches, soldiers on furlough 
commissary officers, recruiting agents, newspaper reporters 
and the few private citizens who still held passes to ride
^Newspapers published the following day still printed 
conflicting stories about whether or not a large garrison 
had surrendered at Donelson. See Richmond Dispatch, 
February 20, 1862, p. 3; Richmond Whig, February 20, 1862, 
p. 2; Richmond Examiner, February 20, 1862, pp. 2-3.
^Johnston, Narrative, p. 96; Thomas, Richmond, p. 44.
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the densely packed train bumped up against each other as 
they pressed toward the street. The one exception, the man 
who would have waited until the crowd passed, or for whom it 
would have instinctively parted, was Joseph Johnston.10
Johnston had not visited the capital since June, 1861, 
and his arrival now raised new and much more direct fears 
for the safety of the city.H Why had Johnston come to 
Richmond? As he walked up Broad Street and turned past 
Capitol Square, the question would have followed him. Had 
he come in response to a presidential summons, or travelled 
on his own initiative? Revealing nothing of his purpose, 
the General strode straight into the Customs House; Jeffer­
son Davis's secretary immediately interrupted the meeting to 
inform the President of his caller.12 could disaster be 
imminent in northern Virginia, or were the recent Union 
advances about to be answered by a counter-invasion across
l^In his memoirs, Johnston made two errors relating to 
his visit to Richmond. The first was that he stated that it 
began on February 20, and the second was that he only 
recounted a single day's meeting with Davis and the cabinet. 
Bragg's diary, however, makes it clear that the General 
arrived on February 19, and was present at cabinet sessions 
on both February 19 and 20. Johnston, Narrative, p. 96; 
entries of February 19 and February 20, 1862, Bragg diary, 
pp. 154-157; see also Turner, "Virginia Central," pp. 510-533.
11-Bradley T. Johnston does not document his assertion 
that Johnston had not visited Richmond since the previous 
year, but a careful study of Johnston's correspondence 
indicates that he is correct; see Johnson, Johnston, p. 78.
l^ibid.; Johnston, Narrative, p. 96; Govan and Livin- 
good, Different Valor, p. 93; entry of February 19, 1862,
Bragg diary, p. 154.
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the Potomac? In the hotels and bars the questions flowed 
along with the drinks. Why had Johnston come to Richmond?
The majority of the cabinet was just as mystified by 
the General's sudden appearance as the uncertain citizens of 
Richmond. The expressed purpose of the meeting had been to 
edit a draft of Davis's inaugural address. -*-3 Though he 
certainly did not consider his advisors to be ”a cabinet of 
dummies," as did the Richmond Whig, Davis had limited his 
confidence in dealing with the military crisis to Secretary 
of War, Judah P. Benjamin.14 The remaining five officers—  
Secretary of the Treasury Christopher Memminger, Secretary 
of the Navy Stephen Mallory, Attorney-General Thomas Bragg, 
Postmaster-General John Reagan, and acting Secretary of 
State William Browne— though they had access to better 
military intelligence than the public, had no inkling that 
the President had chosen this particular day to announce a 
major shift in Confederate strategy.
To appreciate the significance of Davis's pronounce­
ment, it is necessary to understand his grand strategy for 
the first year of the war. In the fall of 1861, the 
President had coolly accepted a desperate but calculated 
gamble on behalf of his new nation. Without sufficient 
rifles, cannon, powder, or shot to conduct decisive military 
operations, he boldly authorized his generals to push their
l^Entry of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
14Richmond Whig, February 22, 1862, p. 2.
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poorly equipped, severely outnumbered armies as far forward 
as p o s s i b l e . 1 5  if audacity could disguise abject weakness 
long enough, he believed that a combination of home produc­
tion and imports through the blockade would provide them 
with the weapons to launch real offensives.^-®
l^The policy initiated by Davis in the fall of 1861 has 
often been discounted derisively as a cordon defense, 
adopted as a result of the combination of the President's 
mediocre strategic insight, demands for local defense on the 
part of Confederate governors, and an unwillingness on the 
part of the administration to recognize that there was a 
substantial Federal threat in the west. This is the 
argument presented by Thomas Connelly and Archer Jones.
They do not see the creation of the Western Department as 
part of a comprehensive strategic plan, asserting that Davis 
"merely desired to provide some semblance of command on the 
western front while it was preoccupied with affairs in 
Virginia." In making their case for Davis's inability to 
see beyond departmental administration, Connelly and Jones 
rely on trying to prove by induction rather than hard 
evidence (with an assist from some hazy cause-and-effect 
chronology on the organizational dates of the major depart­
ments) that Davis had no grand strategic plan for the 
conduct of the entire war. They also ignore a considerable 
amount of material written by the President, either during 
or after the war, in which he explained his concept. 
Jefferson Davis to W. M. Brooks, March 15, 1862, in OR, 
Series 4, I: pp. 998-999; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E.
Johnston, November 10, 1861; "Council of War at Centre­
ville," Gustavus W. Smith, October 1, 1862; both in OR, V: 
pp. 884-887; Davis Rise and Fall, I: pp. 406, 449-452; II:
p. 43; Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones, The 
Politics of Command, Factions and Ideas in Confederate 
Strategy (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University
Press, 1964), pp. 92-101.
l®Even the most hostile recollection of Davis's policy 
acknowledged that he advocated constant harrying of the 
enemy across the Potomac. At his conference with Generals 
Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith on September 26, 1861, "the 
President proposed that, instead of an active offensive 
campaign, we would attempt certain partial operations— a 
sudden blow against Sickles or Banks or to break the bridge 
over the Monocacy." See "Council of War at Centreville," 
Gustavus W. Smith, October 1, 1861, in OR, V: p. 887;
Johnston, Narrative, p. 78.
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It was an outrageous bluff, extending far beyond Johns­
ton's Department of Northern Virginia.17 while part of 
General Albert Sidney Johnston's army attempted to blockade 
the Mississippi River from Columbus, Kentucky, the remainder 
had invaded the central portion of the state, and rattled 
sabers loudly at Bowling Green. "Create the impression that 
this force is only an advance guard," he instructed Major- 
General William J. Hardee. Making noise was the best they 
could do: most of the troops in the department were either
sick or u n a r m e d . F r o m  southern Missouri, Major-General 
Sterling Price and his ragtag regiments, many of which had 
not even been formally sworn into Confederate service, tried 
their best to maintain a threatening posture, while in west 
Texas Brigadier-General Henry Hopkins Sibley marched his 
motley 3,700-man "Army of New Mexico" toward Arizona. The 
rest of the Confederate Army guarded the Atlantic or Gulf
1^McClellan's "Aggregate present" on October 15 was 
143,647; Johnston's, for the month of October, was 52,435. 
See "McClellan's Report (I)" and "Abstract from return of 
the Army of the Potomac, General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. 
Army, commanding, for the month of October, 1861," both in 
OR, V: pp. 12, 932.
l®Albert Sidney Johnston to William J. Hardee, November 
9, 1861, in OR, IV: p. 531; Charles Roland, Albert Sidney
Johnston: Soldier of Three Republics, Austin, TX: Univer­
sity of Texas, 1964, pp. 261-277; Thomas Lawrence Connelly, 
Army of the Heartland, The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862 
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1967),
p . 63.
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coasts against amphibious descent by the United States 
Navy.
For months, following the Confederate victory at 
Manassas, the strategy worked. McClellan believed the 
intelligence estimates that attributed to Johnston's army 
more than twice its actual strength.20 in Kentucky, Major- 
General William T. Sherman insisted in November, 1861 that 
Confederate troops at Bowling Green "far outnumber us."21 
His successor, Major-General Don Carlos Buell, was more 
skeptical about Rebel numbers, but still counted almost
l^war Department returns for December 31, 1861 indi­
cated that 59.3% of the Confederate troops "Present for 
duty" were under the command of either Joseph or Albert 
Sidney Johnston. Roughly 36.2% defended the coasts, and 
4.5% were deployed in western Virginia. These percentages 
were only approximate, as the returns upon which they were 
based were somewhat fragmentary, omitting, for instance, 
both Sibley's brigade in New Mexico and Price's division in 
Missouri. Yet adding those forces to the rest would only 
emphasize more clearly that President Davis had pushed the 
bulk of his meager armies to the periphery of the Confedera­
cy. "Consolidated abstract from returns of the Confederate 
forces on or about December 31, 1861," in OR, Series 4, I;
p . 822 .
20A s an example of his habitual inflation of Confeder­
ate numbers, McClellan thought Johnston's army numbered 
115,500 in early March, while the departmental return for 
the end of February showed him with only 47,306 "Aggregate 
present for duty." See "McClellan's Report (I)" and "Ab­
stract from return of the Department of Northern Virginia, 
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding, for the 
month of February, 1862," both in OR, V: pp. 53, 1086.
21william T. Sherman to Lorenzo Thomas, November 4, 
1861, in OR, IV: p. 332.
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every Confederate soldier t w i c e . 22 Partly as a result of an 
aggressive southern military policy, the major Union armies 
remained inactive through the fall and into the winter.
When 1861 ended, Jefferson Davis could look out over a 
national defensive perimeter that was essentially intact.
The necessary weakness of the President's strategy was 
that by committing his available effective troops to the 
frontiers of the Confederacy he could not maintain a 
substantial reserve. His expectation that sufficient arms 
could be obtained to create such a reserve was not realized. 
Since September, 1861, only 15,000 rifles had slipped 
through the blockade, nearly half of which arrived on a 
single vessel. These arms had to be rushed to the front as 
soon as they were unloaded at the docks.23 internal 
production was gearing up, but, when the crisis struck,
22on January 3, 1862, Buell estimated Albert Sidney 
Johnston's force between Columbus and Bowling Green at
80,000 men. Johnston's December 31, 1861 return placed his 
"Present for duty" strength at those points at 43,661.
While that return failed to count two brigades newly arrived 
at Bowling Green, the omission was roughly offset by 
counting some of the troops in Polk's district which were 
west of the line that Buell was considering. See Don Carlos 
Buell to George B. McClellan, November 27, 1861; Don Carlos
Buell to George B. McClellan, December 23, 1861; Don Carlos
Buell to George B. McClellan, December 29, 1861; Don Carlos
Buell to Henry Halleck, January 3, 1862; "Abstract from
return of Western Department, General A. S. Johnston, 
commanding [Date about December 31, 1861]"; all in OR, VII: 
pp. 450-452, 511, 520-521, 528-529, 813.
23The ship was the Finqal, the first ship to brave the 
blockade solely on the government's account, which landed in 
Savannah, Georgia in November carrying 7,520 Enfield rifles. 
Vandiver, Confederate Blockade Running Through Bermuda, pp. 
xiv, xxxix; Wise, Lifeline, pp. 52-55.
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Colonel Josiah Gorgas's Ordnance Department required an 
entire month's production of rifles to outfit a single 
regiment.24 The situation with regard to powder was equally 
dismal. Of the 400,000 pounds that Gorgas projected that 
the Confederacy must import, so little powder had arrived in 
Southern ports that Davis admitted to the cabinet in late 
January that there were fewer than twenty-five charges per 
gun available to the batteries defending the coasts.25 
Thus, when Federal offensives cracked open the eggshell in 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and North Carolina, almost nothing 
stood between the Northern armies and the heartland of the 
Confederacy.
Like many gamblers, Davis had refused to fold his hand 
and start a new game until his losses were e n o r m o u s . 26 gy
2 4only the Richmond arsenal was dependably turning out 
weapons on schedule in February, 1862, at the rate of 1,000 
rifles a month. See Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969), p. 31.
25Entries of January 6, 1862, January 14, 1862, January 
16, 1862, in Bragg diary, pp. 99. 110, 112.
26in Davis's defense, however, it should be said that 
while Fishing Creek, Fort Henry, and Roanoke Island were all 
significant reverses, it was the capitulation of Fort Donel­
son and the loss of 11,000 soldiers that represented the 
major disaster, and that defeat was due far more to the 
incompetence of the political generals in command there than 
to the deficiencies of Davis's strategy. The troops commit­
ted there did not face overwhelming odds, were as well armed 
as any in the Confederacy, and acquitted themselves honora­
bly on the field. As William Preston Johnston, the son of 
Albert Sidney and later a presidential aide, remarked bit­
terly in his defense of his father's record: "The answer to
any criticism as to the loss of the army at Donelson is that 
it ought not to have been lost. That is all there is of it 
[italics in original]." William Preston Johnston, "Albert
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February 17, when he learned that Fort Donelson had surren­
dered, the overall military situation was grave. Brigadier- 
General Ulysses Grant's army, supported by gunboats, stood 
between the two wings of Albert Sidney Johnston's depart­
ment, in perfect position to strike the communications of 
either. Meanwhile, Buell advanced slowly but inexorably 
through central Kentucky toward Nashville. The success of 
Major-General Ambrose Burnside's amphibious expedition into 
Albemarle Sound not only proved the ability of the Federal 
Navy to land Union troops along almost any stretch of coast­
line, but also directly menaced Norfolk and the crucial 
railroad line between Richmond and Wilmington.27
Only the front in northern and eastern Virginia 
remained quiet, and it was apparent that this represented 
the calm before the hurricane. Johnston had pointed out to 
Davis in his February 16 letter that McClellan "controls the 
water, however, and can move on the Potomac as easily now as 
in midsummer. . . . "  Furthermore, the General cautioned,
"We cannot retreat from this point without heavy loss. If 
we are beaten, this army will be broken up, and Virginia, at
Sidney Johnston at Shiloh," B&L, I: p. 548.
27jyicClellan's "aggregate present" on February 1, 1862 
(which did not include some of the forces in western 
Virginia opposite Johnston's Valley District) was 208,086, 
compared to 56,392 in the Department of Northern Virginia. 
See "McClellan's Report (I)" and "Abstract from return of 
the Department of Northern Virginia, General Joseph E. 
Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding, for the month of February, 
1862," both in OR, V: pp. 12, 1086.
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least, l o s t . "28
The President later admitted his miscalculation, though
even in his eulogy for the failed strategy, Davis did not
repent having accepted the risks. "I acknowledge the
error," he wrote on March 15, 1862,
of my attempt to defend all of the frontier, sea­
board, and inland; but will say in justification 
that if we had received the arms and munitions 
which we had good reason to expect, the attempt 
would have been successful and the battle-fields 
would have been on the enemy's s o i l . 29
But belying his reputation for inflexibility, as soon as the 
surrender of Donelson was confirmed, Davis totally reori­
ented Confederate grand strategy in less than forty-eight 
hours.
His deliberations were certainly influenced by the 
opinions of senior generals throughout the Confederacy, many 
of whom had recently written concerning ominous increases in 
Federal strength, often including specific strategic 
suggestions. General Robert E. Lee, in whose judgment Davis 
had implicit trust, had advised from South Carolina on 
January 8 that
The forces of the enemy are accumulating, and 
apparently increase faster than ours. I have 
feared, if handled with proportionate ability with 
his means of speedy transportation and concentra­
tion, it would be impossible to gather troops 
necessarily posted over a long line in sufficient
28joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1074.
29jefferson Davis to W. M. Brooks, March 15, 1-862, in 
OR, Series 4, I: pp. 998-999.
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strength to oppose sudden movements.
Wherever his fleet can be brought no opposi­
tion to his landing can be made except within 
range of our fixed batteries. We have nothing to 
oppose to its heavy guns. . . . The farther he
can be withdrawn from his floating batteries the 
weaker he will become. . . .30
Lee reiterated his warning on February 10, admitting that
while "I exceedingly dislike to yield an inch of territory
to our enemies they are, however, able to bring such large
and powerful batteries to whatever point they please, that
it becomes necessary for us to concentrate our strength."31
On February 15, Major-General Braxton Bragg, another
officer whose views the President valued, had addressed
Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin with his own suggestions:
"Our means and resources are too much scattered. The
protection of persons and property, as such, should be
abandoned, and all our means applied to the Government and
the cause. Important strategic points only should be held."
Bragg advised the removal of Confederate troops from all but
the largest ports on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, as well
as the complete military evacuation of Texas, Florida, and
Kentucky. "A small loss of property would result from their
occupation by the enemy; but our military strength would not
be lessened thereby, whilst the enemy would be weakened by
30Robert E. Lee to Samuel Cooper, January 8, 1862, in 
OR, VI: p. 367.
3lRobert E. Lee to Judah P. Benjamin, February 10,
1862, in OR, VI: p. 380.
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the dispersion."32
Nor did the President lack the opinions of the two 
Generals Johnston. Joseph Johnston had, as previously 
noted, warned on February 16 of the vulnerability of his own 
extended line. Though Albert Sidney Johnston remained out 
of contact on February 16 and 17, almost a month earlier he 
had posted to Richmond a similar warning of imminent 
calamity, ending it with a simple, though extreme, sugges­
tion to prevent disaster:
The enemy will probably undertake no active 
operations in Missouri and may be content to hold 
our forces fast in their position of the Potomac 
for the remainder of the winter, but to suppose 
with the facilities of movement by water which the 
well filled rivers of the Ohio, Cumberland, and
Tennessee give for active operations, that they 
will suspend them in Tennessee and Kentucky during 
the winter months is a delusion. All the re­
sources of the Confederacy are now needed for the 
defense of Tennessee.^
Thus, the consensus among those generals in whom Davis
placed the greatest trust— and their opinion was shared by
other key figures--was that the survival of the Confederacy 
depended upon a concentration of its limited resources in 
defense of a few critical points, even at the risk of losing
32Braxton Bragg to Judah P. Benjamin, February 15, 
1862, in OR, VI: p. 826.
33Albert Sidney Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 22, 
1862, quoted in Roland, Albert Sidney Johnston, p. 227; for 
the inability of Davis and Benjamin to contact Johnston 
during the two days in question, see Judah P. Benjamin to 
Albert Sidney Johnston, February 18, 1862, and William J. 
Hardee to Jefferson Davis, February 18, 1862; both in OR, 
VII: p. 890.
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large sections of territory with less military value.34 Yet
34jt should be emphasized, however, that the opinions 
of Lee, Bragg, and the Johnstons carried the bulk of the 
weight with Jefferson Davis. Others of prominence who 
counseled a concentration of resources included General P.
G. T. Beauregard; Secretary of War Benjamin; and former 
Secretary of War, and currently Brigadier-General, Leroy 
Pope Walker. Beauregard had written to Congressman Roger 
Pryor, his indirect contact with the administration, on 
February 14 that "we must give up some minor points and 
concentrate our forces to save the most important lines, or 
we will lose them all in succession." Connelly and Jones 
use this quotation--curiously citing the manuscript source 
rather than the identical printed letter in OR— to buttress 
their case for Beauregard as the chief architect of the 
concentration of troops that created Johnston's army at 
Shiloh. But there is no direct evidence that Pryor communi­
cated the essence of Beauregard's letter to Davis, and his 
February 18 letter to Samuel Cooper dealt only with the 
specific question of a withdrawal from Columbus, not grand 
strategy. Even if it could be proven that Davis read 
Beauregard's earlier letter, his influence on the President 
at the time would seem to have been minimal. Twice in 
January, Davis had spoken less than favorably about the 
Louisiana general in cabinet sessions. Thomas Bragg 
recorded, on January 8, that when discussing the merits of 
the Confederate generals, Davis "never mentions Beauregard.
I think, after all, he does not like him or think much of 
him." And on January 31, when discussing Beauregard's 
pending assignment to command at Columbus, "the President 
spoke of his engineering talent as good, but did not seem to 
entertain a high opinion of his talents as a General." 
Secretary Benjamin indicated in a February 23 letter to 
Major-General Mansfield Lovell that he had thought for some 
time that Davis's commitment to dispersed garrisons along 
the coasts was a mistake. Referring specifically to 
Mississippi, he told Lovell that the orders to do so "were 
issued against my judgment, but the urgency of the members 
of that State on the President was so great that it was not 
politic to refuse at the time to gratify their wish." But 
while Benjamin had the respect and the constant ear of 
Davis, his biographers agree that he did not, as Secretary 
of War, push hard to bring the President around to his views 
on strategic policy. As Robert Douthat Meade put it, 
Benjamin would "offer suggestions to Davis when he felt he 
could do so without causing undue offense, but he would not 
lay his head on the block." Ex-secretary Walker offered 
unsolicited strategic advice to his successor on February 
17, but, given the fact that he had left the War Department 
partly as the result of a strategic disagreement with Davis,
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in the end, Davis had to face the situation by himself, 
directly assisted only by an inexperienced Secretary of War.
Davis acted both resolutely and quickly in the crisis. 
By February 18, letters drafted by Benjamin at the Presi­
dent's direction had been dispatched to the department 
commanders. These instructions represented a dramatic 
reversal in strategy. Union numerical and naval superiori­
ty, combined with the Confederate arms shortage and the 
arguments of his generals, had convinced Davis that "it may 
not be possible, with our limited means, to protect every 
point which the enemy can attack by means of his fleets.
. . ."35 Benjamin's orders to Bragg stated the case even 
more frankly: "The heavy blow which has been inflicted on
us by the recent operations in Kentucky and Tennessee 
renders necessary a change in our whole plan of campaign.
..36
• • •
any direct effect of his views on the President's eventual 
decisions is doubtful. Judah P. Benjamin to Mansfield 
Lovell, February 23, 1862, in OR, VI: p. 829; P. G. T.
Beauregard to Roger A. Pryor, February 14, 1862; Leroy Pope 
Walker to Judah P. Benjamin, February 17, 1862; P. G. T. 
Beauregard to Samuel Cooper, February 18, 1862; all in OR, 
VII: pp. 880, 889, 890; Entries for January 8, 1862,
January 31, 1862, Bragg diary, pp. 104, 130; Connelly and 
Jones, Politics of Command, pp. 97-100; Patrick, Davis and 
His Cabinet, p. 176; Robert Douthat Meade, "The Relations 
Between Judah P. Benjamin and Jefferson Davis: Some New
Light on the Working of the Confederate Machine," Journal of 
Southern History, Vol. V, No. 4, (November 1939): p. 472.
35jefferson Davis to W. W. Avery, February 18, 1862, in 
OR, IX: p. 436.
36jucjah P. Benjamin to Braxton Bragg, February 18,
1862, in OR, VI: p. 828.
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The new strategy subordinated considerations of local 
defense to a national effort concentrated on preserving the 
economic vitals of the Confederacy. Garrisons would be 
ruthlessly stripped away from less important points and 
transferred to more critical theaters of war. The emphasis 
of military operations was to be changed from static, linear 
defense, to the more active "offensive-defensive" with field 
armies maneuvering and counterpunching the enemy. "We must 
dismiss all ideas of scattering our forces in defense of 
unimportant points and concentrate them at vital lines," 
Benjamin told Major-General Mansfield Lovell.37
Davis contemplated a reduced, but still viable, 
defensive perimeter. The first priority was to seal off 
Federal penetrations in Tennessee, safeguarding both the 
material resources of Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and 
eastern Tennessee, and the Confederacy's only direct rail 
connection between Virginia and the Mississippi River. "No 
effort will be spared," Benjamin assured Major-General 
Leonidas K. Polk, on February 18, "to save the line of 
communication between Memphis and Bristol, so vital to our 
defense."38
To provide General Albert Sidney Johnston the means to 
defend his department, troops were withdrawn from almost all
37juc3ah P. Benjamin to Mansfield Lovell, February 23, 
1862, in OR, VI: p. 829.
38judah P. Benjamin to Leonidas K. Polk, February 18, 
1862, in OR, VII: p. 894.
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quarters of the country. Along the Atlantic coast, eastern 
Florida and parts of eastern North Carolina were abandoned 
outright, as were the small islands off the coast of South 
Carolina and Georgia. The only ports to be held in strength 
were Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah.39 jn the Gulf, 
the Confederates quit Pensacola, removed all but heavy 
artillerymen from Mobile and the small Texas ports, and 
severely reduced the forces defending New Orleans.4 0 Troops 
from Missouri were ordered east of the Mississippi, and the 
garrison at Columbus, Kentucky evacuated its fixed position 
to join the army in the field.
Despite the resistance that Davis knew he would meet 
both from Congress and the State governments, he saw his 
decision as a purely military one, and, as such, above the 
bounds of factional politics. He believed, as he had 
written to Major-General Leonidas Polk in September, 1861, 
that "it is true that the solution of the problem requires 
the consideration of other than the military elements 
involved in it; but we cannot permit the indeterminate 
qualities, the political elements, to control our action in
39lbid., Judah P. Benjamin to Robert E. Lee, February 
18, 1862, in OR, VI: p. 390.
40judah P. Benjamin to Leonidas K. Polk, February 18, 
1862, in OR, VII: pp. 893-894; Judah P. Benjamin to Braxton
Bragg, February 18, 1862; Judah P. Benjamin to Mansfield 
Lovell, February 23, 1862; Judah P. Benjamin to P. 0.
Hebert, February 23, 1862; all in OR, VI: pp. 828-830.
41judah p. Benjamin to Leonidas K. Polk, February 20, 
1862, in OR, VII: p. 893.
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cases of military necessity."42 gy January, after months of
bickering with governors who seemed to balk at every war
measure, no matter how essential, Davis stated himself far
more bluntly. General Thomas Bragg recorded, in his diary,
that Davis stated in a cabinet meeting, that
if such was to be the course of the States towards 
the Gov't the carrying on [of] the war was an 
impossibility--that we had better make terms as 
soon as we could, and those of us who had halters 
around our necks had better get out of the Country 
as speedily as possible. . . .43
Nor was he mistaken in his belief that any strategic
decision would provoke a public outcry from his political 
opponents. As Davis convened his advisors to inform them of 
his decisions, the House of Representatives was counting the 
electoral votes to certify his election as President under 
the permanent Constitution. No sooner had they finished, 
and the results been confirmed, than Tennessee Congressman 
Henry S. Foote rose and demanded "that a committee be 
appointed to enquire into the cause of the recent disasters
which have befallen our arms. . . ."44
The cabinet was the first group of civilian politi­
cians, albeit a friendly one, to whom Davis announced the
42jefferson Davis to Leonidas K. Polk, September 15, 
1861, in OR, IV: p. 188.
43gntry of January 17, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 115; see 
also Boney, Letcher, pp. 132-134; Frank L. Owsley, "Local 
Defense and the Overthrow of the Confederacy," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, Vol. XI, No. 4 (March 1925): pp.
493-494, 498.
44Ric’nmond Examiner, February 20, 1862, p. 2.
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radical shift in policy. Explaining in detail the dismal 
state of military affairs, "the Pres't said the time had 
come for diminishing the extent of our lines--that we had 
not men in the field to hold them and must fall back."45 
The news astounded his audience, and in some way it directly 
affected each of them. Both Postmaster-General Reagan of 
Texas and Navy Secretary Mallory of Florida hailed from 
states Davis had already ordered to be denuded of troops.
The weakening of garrisons at key ports was of special 
concern to Mallory, whose department had ironclads under 
construction at Norfolk and New Orleans. He was already 
contemplating dispatching the completed Virginia into the 
Chesapeake to "make a dashing cruise on the Potomac as far 
as Washington," and dreamed of using the armored frigate to 
attack New York.46 Davis's bombshell meant to him that his 
bases of construction might no longer be secure. Christo­
pher Memminger, the Treasury Secretary, had to calculate the 
impact that the withdrawals would have on an already 
faltering economy and the credibility of $130,000,000 worth 
of Confederate bonds soon to be issued, while acting State 
Secretary Browne would have to find ways to minimize the
45Entry of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 153.
46Mallory's rather fantastic plans were laid out in 
letters to the Virginia's commander, who then had the 
unpleasant job of informing his superior just how unsea­
worthy the frigate really was. See Stephen Mallory to 
Franklin Buchanan, February 24, 1862, and Stephen Mallory to 
Franklin Buchanan, March 7, 1862; both in NOR, VI; pp. 776- 
777, 780-781.
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negative diplomatic effects of surrendering large tracts of 
territory without a contest. For Attorney-General Thomas 
Bragg, the President's revelations sparked a more personal 
response: this was the first he had heard of his brother,
Major-General Braxton Bragg, being ordered out of the quiet 
Gulf toward the crumbling front in Tennessee. Already 
pessimistic about the Confederacy's chances, he found that 
Davis's news left him too distracted to concentrate on 
anything e l s e . 47
But the President had not even finished explaining his 
new strategy. His second priority, after solidifying a line 
in Tennessee, was the defense of Richmond. Johnston's army, 
as well as those of Major-Generals John B. Magruder and 
Benjamin Huger guarding the coastal approaches to the city 
at Yorktown and Norfolk, had been among the few Confederate 
organizations not drained of troops in the concentration on 
T e n n e s s e e . 48 gut the catastrophes in the west, and the more 
immediate defeat at Roanoke Island had also brought Davis to 
the belief that the extended line of defense in Virginia was
4^Entry of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, pp. 152-154.
48johnston had lost three Tennessee regiments in early 
February from the Army of the Northwest, which was temporar­
ily attached to Jackson in the Valley District. While this 
transfer was partly motivated by Grant's expedition against 
Fort Henry, disaffection among those particular regiments 
over their winter quarters and the belief that they would 
not reenlist if stationed in Virginia were the primary 
motivations for the War Department's orders. Judah P. 
Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, February 7, 1862, in OR, V: 
pp. 1066-1067.
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equally vulnerable to dismemberment by Federal naval power. 
"The President was farther of the opinion," wrote Bragg, 
"that we must fall back from Manassas and in the Valley of 
Va. as far as Stanton [sic]."49
Davis's concern for the safety of the capital was not 
the result of some unbalanced, monophobic refusal to 
acknowledge threats to the other theaters of war. He was 
quite aware of the resources and industrial potential of the 
Mississippi Valley and the interior of Georgia. Those 
regions held his nation's future— if it was to have one—  
because only by retaining them and developing their produc­
tive capacity could the Confederacy hope to sustain a long 
war. But what Davis also fully recognized was the fact that 
the loss of Richmond in the first half of 1862 would have 
almost immediately ended the war. If the western heartland 
did represent the Confederacy's future, the eastern capital 
was its present.
"Richmond," wrote historian Peter Parish, "was in 
effect the economic as well as the political capital of the 
Confederacy. . . ."50 city's four largest banks had
combined assets exceeding $10,000,000, a figure that 
appeared especially significant to a capital-poor nation
49sntry of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
^Opeter J. Parish, The American Civil War (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1975), p. 307.
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like the Confederacy.51 Richmond was the major flour- 
milling center for the southeast, and an important transpor­
tation terminus for the region as well; five railroad lines 
radiated out like spokes from a wheel, and heavy barge 
traffic plied the upper James River canal system, while 
ocean-going vessels could dock just below the city.52 The 
only arsenal in the South capable of mass-producing small- 
arms was located in Richmond.53
But as important to the survival of the Confederacy as 
all those attributes were, they were secondary to the city's
capability for heavy manufacturing. "Iron was the key to
Richmond's greatest economic advantage to the Confederacy," 
concluded Emory Thomas.
The city was the center of the industry south of 
the Potomac. In 1860 she claimed four rolling 
mills, fourteen foundries and machine shops, a
nail works, six works for manufacturing iron
railing, two circular-saw works, and fifty iron 
and metal w o r k s . 54
Yet rather than the breadth of Richmond's iron industry what
made it critical to the Confederacy was the concentration of
51-Thomas, Richmond, p. 23.
52Thomas, Richmond, p. 21; see also Thomas S. Berry, 
"The Rise of Flour Milling in Richmond," Virginia Magazine 
of History and Biography, Vol. LXXVII, No. 4 (October,
1970): pp. 387-408.
53The arsenals seized by the Confederates at Nashville, 
Baton Rouge, Montgomery, Mount Vernon, Augusta, Charleston, 
and Savannah were only capable of making accoutrement and 
(with a supply of powder) cartridges. Goff, Confederate 
Supply, p p . 15, 31.
^Thomas, Richmond, p. 23.
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production capability in a single firm: Joseph R. Ander­
son's Tredegar Iron Works.
Tredegar's capacity carried the South through the first 
year of the war. There were eighty-one establishments 
turning out bar, sheet, or railroad iron in the Confederacy. 
Tredegar alone accounted for better than 37% of the total 
production. By the end of February, 1862, Anderson's firm 
had delivered sixty-eight field guns and 197 pieces of heavy 
artillery, while most of the other establishments were 
either still in the process of tooling up to cast cannon, or 
had defaulted on their contracts. Mallory's ironclads would 
have been impossible without Tredegar; the plant cast the 
metal plates that covered the Virginia as well as her rifled 
guns, and was forging the main shaft for the Mississippi.55
Beyond simply supplying the armed forces, Tredegar 
possessed the unique capability, given enough time, to bring 
other industrial plants up to its level. Though there were 
ten rolling mills in the South after secession, only 
Anderson's company owned the steam hammer so necessary for 
sustained mass production. This gave Tredegar the ability 
not only to manufacture ordnance materials, but also to 
create new manufacturing establishments and supplement 
existing ones. Tredegar repaired the rifling machinery 
captured at Harper's Ferry that would soon be sending 500 
new weapons a month to the front from the Fayetteville
S^Dew, Ironmaker, pp. 86, 88, 111, 119.
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arsenal. Even as Davis and his cabinet met, the firm had 
just completed the twelve rolls, six bed circles, and ten 
shafts necessary to put the huge Augusta Powder Mill into 
operation. A second steam hammer, cast in Richmond, would 
eventually allow the Confederate foundry at Selma, Alabama 
to begin manufacturing heavy guns. Virtually none of the 
munitions plants or navy yards that would sustain the 
Confederate military economy in spite of the blockade could 
have been built without the support of the Tredegar Iron 
Works.56
Later, diversification of ordnance production somewhat 
diminished the critical importance of Tredegar, but in 
February, 1862— and for some six months thereafter— Joseph 
Anderson's company represented the single resource without 
which the Confederacy could not survive. So as politically 
important as defending northern Virginia might be, and as 
agriculturally significant as was the Shenandoah Valley, 
President Davis subordinated both to the defense of Rich­
mond .
With a flourish of real-life dramatic timing, the 
President had just mentioned his intention to withdraw from 
the frontiers of Virginia when General Johnston's arrival 
was a n n o u n c e d . 57 Davis's February 13 letter to Johnston was
56oew, Ironmaker, pp. 86, 124-125; Kathleen Bruce, 
Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era (New York: The
Century Co., 1931), pp. 331, 349.
57gntry of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
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unknown to most of the cabinet, and because Johnston had 
been forced to delay his trip due to G. W. Smith's illness, 
even the President had not known exactly when to expect 
him.5 8
Davis left the room to confer with Johnston for a few 
minutes before bringing him into the meeting. He first 
wanted to assure the General that rumors of an impending 
transfer of G. W. Smith to east Tennessee were false.^9 
After that, the President brought Johnston up to date on the
^Freeman, following the Narrative and Davis's February 
19 letter to Johnston, mistakenly asserted that Davis 
summoned Johnston on February 19. Davis's order to Johnston 
on February 16 has not been found, but the gist of it can be 
inferred from the General's telegraphic response the same 
day. There is no extant letter that shows that Johnston 
ever informed Davis of when he would arrive. Freeman, Lee's 
Lieutenants, I: p. 134n; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E.
Johnston, February 19, 1862, in OR, V: p. 1077; Joseph E.
Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16, 1862, in Joseph E. 
Johnston Letterbook, in JJWM.
59johnston had raised the question in his February 16 
letter. Davis had responded on February 19, in a letter he 
had presumably mailed prior to the cabinet meeting, but 
realized that Johnston could not possibly have yet received. 
This was welcome news to the General, of course, but 
tempered by the fact that the rumor was mistaken only as to 
initials: Major-General E. K. Smith, not G. W. Smith was
being detached from the Department of Northern Virginia on 
the request of Albert Sidney Johnston to be sent as comman­
der from the east to take over the mountainous district. 
Benjamin had already informed Johnston that E. K. Smith was 
being transferred on February 15, but the fact that Johnston 
did not actually issue the order until after his trip to 
Richmond suggests that he may have protested it directly to 
Davis. Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, February
15, 1862; Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February
16, 1862; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, February 
19, 1862; Special Orders No. 56, Headquarters Department of 
Northern Virginia, February 21, 1862; all in OR, V: pp.
1073-1074, 1077-1078; Albert Sidney Johnston to Judah P. 
Benjamin, February 14, 1862, in OR, VI: p. 879.
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latest intelligence from the west, explained his concentra­
tion in Tennessee, and told him that he was just in time to 
help decide the question of withdrawing his own army.^O
Johnston readily admitted that, from a purely military 
point of view, withdrawal from his exposed lines in northern 
Virginia to a more concentrated and more defensible position 
behind the Rappahannock was desirable. But he emphasized 
the difficulties of such a movement while winter lingered, 
calling them, "almost insurmountable."61 in his memoirs, 
Johnston's account of the list of problems he presented to 
the cabinet is sustained by Thomas Bragg's diary entry that 
same evening: the General described
the present condition of the roads, the want of 
means by Rail Road Road [sic] to do it expedi­
tiously, and the great sacarfices [sic] we would 
have to make, as any movement of the kind would be 
very soon known to the enemy. He seemed to think 
that the enemy could and would advance by coming 
down to Aquia Creek and getting to Fredericksburg.
Our heavy guns could not be well moved or got away
60ln the published version of the Narrative, Johnston 
did not mention his conference outside the larger meeting, 
and implies that he was ushered directly into the room and 
only informed in front of the secretaries as to the subject 
of the discussion. But, in his first draft of his memoirs, 
Johnston stated that "in the office of his A. D. C., he 
[Davis] informed me that the withdrawal of the army was the 
subject to be considered." That proposition would not have 
made sense to Johnston without at least a short explanation 
of the overall strategic context. Johnston's unpublished 
version is followed here because it accords with Bragg's 
contemporary account. Johnston, Narrative, p. 96; Draft of 
Johnston's Narrative in Box 28, Folder 4, in the Robert 
Morton Hughes collection, Old Dominion University; entry of 
February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
SlEntry of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
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from Evansport.62
This last comment evidently provoked a lively discussion 
about the ways and means of retiring Whiting's heavy 
artillery from the Potomac. Aside from mentioning the 
practical difficulties of such a removal, Johnston finally 
ended the discussion by pointing out that new Federal 
positions on the Maryland shore made it now impossible to 
perform any such maneuver in secret. At that, Davis tabled 
the matter, asked Johnston to consider the issue more fully 
and return the next day to continue the debate.63
Before the cabinet returned to the original business of 
the day--editing the President's inaugural address— Davis 
made several more important comments on his strategy in 
Virginia. According to Bragg, Davis said "that unless 
something of the kind was done"— referring to a withdrawal 
by Johnston— "Richmond would be taken, that we must have 
troops in supporting distance to repel an attack from North 
or South by Burnside, who he thought would endeavor to 
advance to Suffolk, isolate Norfolk which must fall & then 
advance upon Richmond." He believed that Federal strate­
gists would also divert Commodore Porter's mortar fleet to 
assist Burnside. Recognizing that the forces deployed in a 
broad defensive arc around the capital were commanded by
62johnston, Narrative, p. 96; entry of February 19, 
1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
•Gentry of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
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five independent generals, the President admitted that he 
had been recently considering the recall of General Robert 
E. Lee from Georgia to orchestrate their operations. But 
Lee, Davis revealed, felt that Savannah was in immediate 
danger of attack, and did not think he could safely depart 
the area for at least a week, perhaps more. "It was left 
undecided," wrote Bragg.64
After all these revelations, the cabinet abruptly 
returned to work on the speech. Some of the members were 
perhaps relieved to get back to politics, a subject they 
more fully comprehended, and devoted several hours to 
arguing nuance and syntax. But Thomas Bragg, whose brother 
was heading into battle, and whose home state of North 
Carolina seemed to be rapidly disappearing into enemy hands, 
could not concentrate on the task in front of him. "To me 
it seemed rather a useless waste of time. My mind was away, 
and I was thinking of how we were to escape the Storm which 
threatened to overwhelm both Gov't & people."65
Exactly when Johnston left the meeting is not clear. 
Bragg's diary can be read as implying that he was dismissed 
prior to Davis's comments about recalling Lee to Virginia, 
but the entry is too ambiguous to be offered as definitive 
evidence. Johnston never stated, then or later, whether he 
had heard the remarks, although his correspondence with Lee
64Ibid., pp. 154-155.
65Ibid., pp. 155-156.
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the next month can also be read in such a manner as to 
indicate that he did. That question notwithstanding,
Bragg's notes clearly settle two key issues. First, the 
idea for withdrawing Johnston's army originated with Davis; 
it was, in fact, under discussion before Johnston ever 
entered the room. Secondly, the Attorney General's journal 
also confirms explicitly that Davis was considering the 
transfer of Lee back to Virginia to exercise a specific 
coordinating command function. The context also suggests, 
though again stopping short of outright assertion, that the 
President had no intention of turning complete control of 
the defense of Richmond over to Joseph Johnston.
Johnston, for his part, regardless of when he left the 
Mechanic's Institute, probably had other matters on his 
mind. Immediately, he wanted to see his wife, then residing 
at a Richmond hotel. Though she had visited him frequently 
--his critics said excessively— during the winter at Centre- 
ville, he had not seen her in some weeks. On his way to the 
hotel, his natural reserve and his sense of military 
security would have served to deflect the inquiries of 
curious civilians as to his business at the capital. But in 
the hotel lobby, General Johnston met a man whose questions 
he could not so easily avoid.
Twenty-eight-year-old Colonel Dorsey Pender of the 6th 
North Carolina had just finished a thirty-day leave to see 
his wife; he had signed into the hotel overnight to await
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the morning train back to Centreville. From the moment he 
arrived in Richmond that morning, Pender had been hearing 
rumors that the cabinet was in session to discuss the 
withdrawal of the army from Centreville and Manassas. The 
dozens of details such a move would entail for a regimental 
commander must already have been running through his mind 
when he saw his commander enter the hotel. Without hesita­
tion, Pender approached Johnston and put the question 
directly: was the army being withdrawn?
Johnston, horrified at this breach of security, 
politely brushed off the Colonel's inquiry with a negative 
answer, but one which did not totally convince the younger 
officer.66 The exchange also served to place Johnston into 
an even more defensive frame of mind with reference to the 
administration. Davis had ordered him to Richmond with a 
secret summons, and now he found the subject being bantered 
openly in the streets. How far could he trust civilian 
politicians with military secrets?
According to Bragg, the General never broached that 
subject at the cabinet meeting on the following morning. 
Johnston did say that he considered a withdrawal from
66johnston, Narrative, p. 97; Dorsey Pender to Fanny 
Pender, February 21, 1862, in Hassler, General to His Lady, 
pp. 113-114. Pender's letter also provides additional 
confirmation that Johnston was in Richmond for three days 
instead of the two he claimed in his memoirs. Pender's 
February 21 letter says that he reached camp "last even- 
ing"--February 20— which would have placed his meeting with 
Johnston in Richmond in the afternoon of February 19.
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Manassas "advisable, but every means of doing it and saving 
our artillery & stores, especially the heavy guns on the 
Potomac, seemed to be wanting— it was next to impossible." 
This was followed by an exchange of opinions— "a prolonged 
discussion" as Johnston remembered it somewhat derisively—  
by the cabinet secretaries over various schemes to save 
Whiting's exposed c a n n o n . 67 Nothing in this conversation 
would have improved the professional soldier's view of his 
civilian superiors.
The meeting "terminated without the giving of orders," 
recalled Johnston, "but with the understanding on my part 
that the army was to fall back as soon as practicable."68 
Bragg's diary supports this statement, and notes with 
reference to the selection of a new position that Johnston 
"was directed however to have a reconnaisance [sic] of the 
country in his rear with reference to another line, and it 
is probable the Rappahannock will be selected."69
Three years later, Jefferson Davis asserted that a 
reconnaissance had been necessary because Johnston himself
67gntry of February 20, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 157.
68johnston, Narrative, p. 96; Johnston's memory of the 
event had changed, however, by the time he prepared an 
article for the Century a few years later. There he con­
tended that "the President directed me to prepare to fall 
back from Manassas, and to do so as soon as the condition of 
the country should make the marching of troops practicable.
. . ." But his first recollection more nearly matched 
contemporary evidence. Johnston, "Responsibilities," B&L,
I ; p. 256.
6^Entry of February 20, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 157.
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did not have any idea of the country behind him:
On enquiry into the character of his position 
at Centreville, he stated that his lines there 
were untenable; but, when asked what new position 
he proposed to occupy, declared himself ignorant 
of the topography of the country in his rear.
This confession was a great shock to my confidence 
in him. That a General should have been for many 
months in command of an Army, should have selected 
a line which he himself considered untenable, and 
should not have ascertained the topography of the 
country in his rear, was inexplicable on any other 
theory than that he had neglected the primary duty 
of a commander.7 0
The charge reflected the antipathies of 1865 rather than the 
realities of 1862. Johnston was hardly ignorant of the land 
behind him; he had already ordered a survey of the Rappahan­
nock line when his engineers fortified the bridge cross­
ings . 71
But the question of exactly where Johnston's retreat 
would cease was left undecided. In the absence of indisput­
able evidence, one logical reason for this omission suggests 
itself. The stated object of a withdrawal from northern 
Virginia was to move Johnston's troops into closer support­
ing distance of Richmond, should either McClellan or 
Burnside launch and amphibious attack on the city. Obvious­
ly, such a movement would also entail a retrograde by 
Jackson's forces in the Shenandoah, which would, otherwise,
70jefferson Davis to James Phelan, February 18, 1865, 
in Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, VI: pp. 493-494.
71joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 9, 
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 27; Joseph E. Johnston to R. 
W. Hughes, April 9, 1867 , in RMH; Johnston, Narrative, p. 
445 .
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have been left in a position far too exposed to be safe. 
Neither Johnston nor Davis wanted to yield an inch of soil 
unnecessarily, and so both would have favored a position for 
Johnston's main army close enough to defend Richmond, but 
far enough north to support Jackson as far down the Valley 
as possible. The Rappahannock looked like the natural 
choice for such a deployment, but, as trained soldiers, both 
men would have known that the final decision was a judgment 
call based in large measure on the Federal reaction to 
Johnston's movements. Further, Johnston was aware that the 
defense of Richmond was now the administration's stated 
priority, and only someone in Richmond, receiving daily 
intelligence reports from northern Virginia, eastern 
Virginia, and North Carolina, could decide exactly how much 
nearer to the capital he should withdraw. So his destina­
tion, while provisionally the Rappahannock River, had not 
been finally determined.
Leaving the meeting, probably sometime in the early 
afternoon, Johnston spent the remainder of the day trans­
acting minor administrative affairs with Adjutant-General 
Cooper.72 planned to return to Centreville the following
morning, and did not, of course, mention the outcome of the 
cabinet meeting to anyone not already privy to the decision. 
But that evening, if the memoirs of an ardent congressional
72samuel Cooper to Theophilus Holmes, February 20,
1862, in LS-AIGO, Vol. 36, Reel 2.
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foe of the Davis administration are to be believed, the 
General may have committed an indiscretion of another sort.
Just a few days earlier, Henry Stuart Foote had arrived 
in Richmond, newly elected to the permanent Confederate 
Congress from Nashville, Tennessee. Foote, originally a 
Mississippi politician who had defeated Davis for governor 
of that state in a particularly acrimonious race in 1853, 
was an avowed opponent of both secession and the current 
administration. "That Confederate Tennesseans elected pro- 
Union Foote to the Southern Congress," wrote historian 
Patricia Faust, "is almost as puzzling as their representa­
tive's willingness to serve."73 perhaps it was not love of 
the Confederacy but hatred for Davis that convinced Foote to 
accept his election, for he wasted no time pillorying the 
administration's war policies. Even as Johnston prepared to 
leave the cabinet meeting on February 20, Foote, "an orator 
of the fist-pounding Bible-spouting variety," rose on his 
first day in Congress to attack Jefferson Davis so bitterly 
that he missed ending up in a duel with Albert Gallatin 
Jenkins of Virginia by only the narrowest of m a r g i n s . 74
That night, according to Foote's 1866 memoirs, "I
^Patricia j. Faust, "Henry Stuart Foote," in Patricia 
J. Faust, ed., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of 
the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 266
(hereafter cited as HTIE).
^ E l i  n . Evans, Judah P. Benjamin, The Jewish Confeder­
ate (New York: Macmillan, 1988), p. 148; Richmond Examiner,
February 21, 1862, p. 3.
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chanced to be invited to a dinner-party, where some twenty
of the most prominent members of the two houses of the
Confederate Congress were congregated, including the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, Mr. Orr of South Carolina, 
and others of equal rank." Johnston, Foote asserted, had 
also been invited, but seems to have taken little part in 
the conversation, at least until the subject turned to 
Secretary of War Judah Benjamin. While discussing Benja­
min's "gross acts of official misconduct," Foote recorded,
one of the company turned to General Johnston, and 
inquired whether he thought it even possible that
the Confederate cause could succeed with Mr. Ben­
jamin as War Minister. To this inquiry, General 
Johnston, after a little pause, emphatically 
responded in the negative. This high authority 
was immediately cited in both houses of Congress 
against Mr. Benjamin, and was in the end fatal to 
his hopes of remaining in the Department of W a r . 75
No specific corroboration for Foote's anecdote has been
found beyond the fact that Arkansas Congressman Thomas B.
Hanly called for Johnston's appearance before the House on
February 25, to testify during the confirmation debates.
But considerable circumstantial evidence suggests that such
an act would not have been out of character for Johnston.
James Orr, the only other individual mentioned by name in
the story, had been colonel of the 1st South Carolina Rifles
before he had resigned to enter Congress; it is not unlikely
that he would have invited Johnston to the dinner. Johns-
75flenry s. Foote, War of the Rebellion; or Scylla and 
Charbydis (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1866), p. 356.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
ton's alleged comments were certainly in accordance with his 
personal beliefs, as both his own memoirs and contemporary 
correspondence testify. The early postwar date at which 
Foote wrote gives his account more credibility, for most of 
the controversies over Johnston's defense of Richmond that 
might have colored his memory had not yet s u r f a c e d . 76
If Foote's account is accurate, Jefferson Davis's 
friends in Congress could hardly have avoided telling him 
that Johnston's opinions were being quoted in debates in 
order to discredit Benjamin. Such an indiscretion on the 
part of the General at the expense of his friend would have 
only advanced the President's distrust of his field command­
er. Even if the anecdote was fabricated or exaggerated, it 
is indicative of a climate of suspicion that already existed 
between Johnston and Davis in February, 1862, at a time when 
the need for absolute mutual confidence had become para­
mount.
That level of trust declined again, in Johnston's mind, 
the following day. Riding the slow-moving train back to
76poote claimed that Johnston's comments torpedoed any 
chance of Benjamin's reappointment as Secretary of War 
because it was widely quoted in Congressional confirmation 
hearings. Benjamin biographer Robert Douthat Meade credited 
this story, though he did not cite any other sources. See • 
Steward Sifakis, Who Was Who in the Civil War (New York: 
Facts on File, 1988), pp. 479-480; Foote, Scylla and 
Charbydis, p. 356; Robert Douthat Meade, Judah P. Benjamin, 
Confederate Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press,
1943), p. 235; "Proceedings of the First Confederate 
Congress— First Session," in Southern Historical Society 
Papers, Vol. XLIV (June 1923): p. 50.
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Centreville, he made profitable use of the hours by dis­
cussing details of the upcoming withdrawal with one of his 
quartermasters, Major B. P. Noland, who chanced to be riding 
in the same c a r . 77 They were interrupted by a friend of 
Johnston's, "an acquaintance from the county of Faquier, too 
deaf to hear conversation not intended for his ear," who 
told Johnston that he, like Dorsey Pender, had heard that 
the army was being withdrawn from M a n a s s a s . 78 Aghast, the 
General asked him for the source of his information. It had 
come, Johnston said later, "from the wife of a member of the 
Cabinet."79
77Lucius B. Northrop to Jefferson Davis, January 14, 
1885, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, IX: 
p . 32 6.
78johnston, Narrative, p. 97.
79First draft of Narrative, p. 18, in Box 28, Folder 1,
RMH.
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Chapter Four 
Withdrawal from the Frontier
The rain came down even harder in Richmond on Inaugura­
tion day. The deluge "fell in torrents, and the streams and 
gutters were like the flowing of little rivers."-*- Jefferson 
Davis and his Negro footmen approached the wooden platform 
beside the statue of George Washington attired in somber 
black. "This, ma'am, is the way we always does in Richmond 
at funerals and such like," one coachman told an inquisitive 
spectator.2 The tall Mississippian bent to kiss the Bible, 
and then stood bareheaded in the rain and delivered his 
speech. It was vintage Davis, logical and concise, if not 
inspiring; Attorney General Bragg remarked that, after all 
the in camera editing, "it is the best seasoned document 
surely that ever was issued." Bragg also said that February 
22 was "one of the worst days I ever saw."2 "Very few heard 
the inaugural address" over the drumming of the rain, 
recalled one observer, and in the depression gripping the
1-Sally Putnam, Richmond During the War; Four Years of 
Personal Observation by a Richmond Lady (New York: G. W.
Carleton & Co., 1867), p. 106.
2Quoted in James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 
the Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988), p. 403.
^Entries of February 20, 1862, February 22, 1862, Bragg 
diary, pp. 156, 160-A.
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crowd there was a common feeling that the war had passed the 
point where the words of the politicians mattered much 
anyway.4
In Centreville that Saturday, it was also raining, but 
General Johnston met with his staff indoors where they could 
hear him. He had been back from the capital fewer than 
twenty-four hours, and he was determined to waste no time in 
executing the order to withdraw his army. He hoped quietly 
to remove enough of his supplies and heavy guns in about two 
weeks to allow himself freedom of maneuver.
It was an optimistic time-table, perhaps excessively 
so, considering the difficulties that Johnston faced.
Neither his subordinate generals nor his staff had much 
experience in planning the movement of an entire army on so 
much as a route march, much less a retreat with all baggage 
over muddy roads. Likewise, his troops, though well-drilled 
in tactical evolutions, were innocent of real marching 
experience. Mountains of supplies— from an unwanted 
4,000,000 pounds of meat at Thoroughfare Gap to the excess 
trunks of his gentlemen-officers— had to be removed down the 
inadequate railroad line. Something had to be done with 
Whiting's cannons along the Potomac. And it all had to be 
accomplished in complete secrecy, lest McClellan scent that 
something was afoot and attack one of the outlying garrisons 
just as the withdrawal began.
^Putnam, Richmond, p. 107.
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Johnston knew that the command structure of his army 
was dangerously weak. In a little more than three months, 
General Beauregard; Major-Generals Edmund Kirby-Smith and 
Earl Van Dorn; and Brigadier-Generals Milledge Bonham, 
Charles Clark, Philip St. George Cocke, Nathan G. "Shanks" 
Evans, W. H. T. Walker, Henry C. Wayne, and Louis T. Wigfall 
had all left the army due to a variety of causes ranging 
from transfer, to election to Congress; aggrieved resigna­
tion, to s u i c i d e . 5 The result, as Johnston wrote Davis, was 
that
The army is crippled and its discipline greatly 
impaired by the want of general officers. The four 
regiments observing the fords of the Lower Occoquan are 
commanded by a lieutenant-colonel; and, besides a 
division of five brigades is without generals; and at 
least half the field officers are absent— generally 
sick.6
Nor could Johnston feel absolutely confident in the 
abilities of those officers left to him. His senior major- 
general, forty-one-year-old Kentuckian, Gustavus Woodson 
Smith, was a personal friend from prewar days who had 
received his commission based primarily on his reputation as 
an engineer and Johnston's own recommendation: "Smith is a
5E zra J. Warner, Generals in Gray, Lives of the 
Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press, 1959), pp. 23, 29, 51, 57, 84, 280, 315, 
323, 329, 337.
^Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 25, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1081.
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man of high ability, fit to command in chief."7 But Smith 
had "gone South" later than most, missing the Battle of 
Manassas, and had, thus far, little chance to prove Johnston 
correct or live up to his own aura of self-assurance. He 
had been impressive as an administrator during the winter—  
even the irascible Robert Toombs admitted that "the army has 
been a great gainer by his appointment."® But Smith 
suffered from some mysterious nervous malady which, without 
warning, could send him to bed for days at a time. Such an 
attack had already caused Johnston to delay his trip to 
Richmond for three days; would the stress of active opera­
tions make his condition worse?®
A year older and physically Smith's opposite, James 
Longstreet had the robust constitution of a draft horse. A 
fighter, rather than a thinker by nature, Longstreet 
actually benefitted by being slightly deaf, as one cavalry 
officer remembered: "he impressed me then as a man of
limited capacity who acquired reputation for wisdom by never 
saying anything--the old story of the owl. I do not 
remember ever hearing him say half a dozen words beyond
^Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 19,
1861, in OR, V: p. 797; see also Longstreet, Manassas to
Appomattox, p. 103; Warner, Generals in Gray, pp. 280-281.
^Phillips, Correspondence, p. 579.
^Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16,
1862, in JJWM.
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'yes' and 'no,' in a consecutive sentence. . . ."10 He owed 
an early commission as a brigadier-general to an accident of 
timing, but justified it, and his next promotion, with his 
performance at Manassas. Like Smith, he proved his worth as 
an administrator, reputedly paying more attention to 
drilling his division than any other officer.H
Yet, as Johnston began to consider his evacuation, he 
had reason to worry about Longstreet's state of mind. 
Throughout most of the winter, Longstreet had joined in the 
rather convivial atmosphere around headquarters, enlarging 
on prewar notoriety as a skilled poker p l a y e r . 12 But in
early February, not long before Davis summoned Johnston to
Richmond, tragedy had struck the Georgian. In a single 
week, three of his children died of a fever in Richmond; by 
February 25, Longstreet had only just returned from an 
emergency leave to bury his dead. Now his silence appeared 
to be the silence of brooding and depression; how would this 
affect him as a division c o m m a n d e r ? ! ^
10w. W. Blackford, War Years with Jeb Stuart (New York; 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), p. 47.
Hwise, Seventeenth Virginia, p. 49.
l^Moxley Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff 
Officer (New York: Neale, 1905), pp. 37-38.
1^Longstreet's children died on January 25, 26, and 
February 1, 1862; see Sanger and Hay, James Longstreet, pp.
3 6-37. Sorrel remarked in Ibid. about the great change that 
appeared in Longstreet after the loss. In his recent 
revisionist book, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, James Long- 
street and His Place in Southern History, William Garrett 
Piston argues that Longstreet was, nonetheless, Johnston's
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The third major-general with Johnston's field army had 
just received his second star; Richard Stoddert Ewell 
advanced to division command on January 24, 1862, two weeks 
prior to his forty-fifth birthday.14 "Bald as an eagle," 
recalled one staff officer, Ewell "looked like one; had a 
piercing eye and a lisping speech."15 He was a hypochondri­
ac, sometimes an insomniac, and when he grew excited, he 
swore until "he made the air blue"; in an army of eccen­
trics, "Dick" Ewell stood out as a genuine character.16 But 
what of his military capacity? Richard Taylor remembered
most trusted subordinate, and that the army commander wished
that the Georgian and not Smith were second in command. He
cites the fact that Johnston "constantly gave him greater 
responsibilities and more difficult assignments than Smith." 
But Piston's sources do not bear out his contention that in 
February, 1862, Johnston considered Longstreet superior to 
Smith. Piston cites only the Sanger and Hay biography and 
two reports from the Peninsula campaign: Johnston's of
Williamsburg and Longstreet's own from Seven Pines. In 
point of fact, it was Smith, not Longstreet, that Johnston 
considered on February 16, 1862, to be "necessary here as 
the commander of the main body. . . . "  And Longstreet
himself admitted that prior to April, 1862, Smith stood
higher in Johnston's councils than he himself did. On 
balance, however, Piston's book provides a much-needed 
corrective view of Longstreet's performance and place in 
Confederate historiography. William Garrett Piston, Lee's 
Tarnished Lieutenant, James Longstreet and His Place in 
Southern History (Athens, GA: University of Georgia, 1987),
pp. 18, 193; Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February
16, 1862, in OR, V: p. 1074; Longstreet, Manassas to
Appomattox, p. 60.
l^Warner, Generals in Gray, pp. 84-85; the best recent 
treatment of Ewell is Samuel J. Martin, "The Complex 
Confederate," Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. XXV, No. 2 
(April, 1986): pp. 26-33.
ISsorrel, Recollections, p. 53.
l ^ D o u g l a s ,  S t o n e w a l 1 , p .  5 3 .
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that more than once Ewell turned to him and asked, "What do 
you suppose President Davis made me a major-general for?"17 
His deployment on the Confederate right flank had kept him 
from winning any great acclaim at Manassas, and the bleak 
fall and winter had not given him any chance to demonstrate 
any potential for higher responsibilities. Perhaps the fact 
that Ewell was a Virginian had helped. Virginia had 
contributed enough troops to the army to fill one of its 
four divisions; but, after Jackson's transfer to the Valley 
District and before Ewell's promotion, there had been no 
major-generals from the Old Dominion, and only three 
brigadiers. Maintaining a careful, political balance 
between the number of regiments and the number of generals 
hailing from each state had always concerned Jefferson 
Davis, and as the senior Virginian under Johnston's immedi­
ate command, Ewell quite- possibly benefitted as much from 
his state affiliation as from any military reputation.18 
Though neither Smith nor Longstreet had proven his ability 
to handle a division in combat, both must have represented
^Taylor, Destruction, p. 37.
18Martin, "Complex Confederate," p. 28; for the 
President's sensitivity to the issue of balancing the 
regiments, brigades, and generals'from the various states, 
see Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, October 7, 1861, 
Jefferson Davis to Gustavus W. Smith, October 10, 1861,
Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, November 15, 1861, 
General Orders No. 18, Adjutant and Inspector General's 
Office, November 16, 1861, Gustavus W. Smith to D. H. Hill, 
December 26, 1861, Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, 
January 7, 1862, in OR, V: p. 892, 893-894, 954, 960-961,
1008, 1023.
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less of a question mark in Johnston's mind than Ewell, who 
had not yet had enough time to prove himself competent at 
even the administrative level.
The two other major-generals assigned to the Department 
of Northern Virginia--fifty-seven-year-old North Carolinian, 
Theophilus H. Holmes, and thirty-eight-year-old Virginian, 
Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson— both held detached commands. 
Holmes, in charge of the Aquia District, had been a friend 
of Jefferson Davis and a classmate of Joseph Johnston at 
West Point (though at the far end of the class— Johnston 
finished thirteenth and Holmes forty-fourth of forty-six).^9 
He had advanced to the rank of major in the infantry in 
1861, due more to tenacity and the inexorability of army 
seniority than any spark of talent; nonetheless, the fact 
that Holmes was one of only fifteen active, field-grade 
officers to resign his commission had guaranteed him early 
p r o m o t i o n . F r o m  his relatively quiet headquarters at 
Fredericksburg, Holmes had had no opportunity to prove 
himself competent or otherwise, though Johnston had already 
had at least one occasion to criticize him for dilatory
^Walter p. Fleming, "Jefferson Davis at West Point" 
Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, Vol. X 
(1909): p. 267.
20see Official Army Register for 1861 (Washington, DC: 
Adjutant General's Office, 1861), and compare it to Official 
Army Register for 1862 (Washington, DC: Adjutant General's
Office, 1862).
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performance of his duties.21 But the question of Holmes' 
abilities would not have weighed too heavily on Johnston's 
mind, because the withdrawal would necessarily affect the 
Aquia command least of all.
Jackson, however, held a much more critical and more 
dangerous post. Wintering his troops at Winchester, he 
already faced growing Federal threats from the north and 
west; when Johnston withdrew the main army from Centreville, 
a quick thrust by McClellan from the east could trap Jackson 
in a very tight sack. Yet both political and military 
realities demanded that, in avoiding capture or defeat by 
Union forces, Jackson not relinquish a foot more of Valley 
soil than was absolutely necessary. It was an assignment 
that demanded equal portions of boldness, judgment, and 
skill— all talents which the next few months would reveal 
that Jackson possessed in abundance.
But it is important to remember that in February, 1862, 
no one suspected Jackson of harboring the seeds of genius. 
Jefferson Davis had characterized him in a January 31 
cabinet meeting as "utterly incompetent." Both the Presi­
dent and Secretary Benjamin thought him a poor administrator 
who played favorites with his troops when assigning the best
21joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 19, 
1861, in OR, V: p. 797.
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q u a r t e r s . 22 His own subordinates verged on outright mutiny 
during the winter, complaining directly to Richmond of 
mistreatment at the hands of their g e n e r a l . 23 His personal­
ity, prior to his rise to fame, tended to be seen as 
arbitrary and querulous, rather than eccentric and endear­
ing, and his appearance did not improve his image. "Above 
the average height, with a frame angular, muscular, and 
fleshless," wrote Henry Kyd Douglas, Jackson "was, in all 
his movements from riding a horse to handling a pen, the 
most awkward man in the army."24 Even after his rise to 
fame, Jackson's peers respected him more than they loved 
him; A. P. Hill characterized Jackson in November, 1862 as 
"that crazy old Presbyterian fool," and suggested that "the 
Almighty will get tired of helping Jackson after a while 
[sic], and then he'll get the d— ndest thrashing. . . ."25
Johnston, who had been Jackson's superior since May, 
1861 at Harper's Ferry, had his own opinion of the dour
22Entry of January 31, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 130; 
Jefferson Davis to Judah P. Benjamin, January 29, 1862, in 
OR, V: p. 1050.
23william B. Taliaferro et a l . to W. W. Loring, January
25, 1862, W. W. Loring to Judah P. Benjamin, January 31, 
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 7, 1862, 
in OR, V: pp. 1046-1047, 1054-1056, 1065-1066.
24oouglas, Stonewal1, p. 226.
25a . P. Hill to J. E. B. Stuart, November 14, 1862, in 
James Ewell Brown Stuart papers, Virginia Historical 
Society, Richmond, Virginia; see also Mark Grimsley, 
"Jackson: The Wrath of God," Civil War Times Illustrated,
vol. XXIII, No. 1 (March 1984): pp. 10-17.
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Virginian, one which seems to have been more favorable than 
the consensus. Jackson, unlike many other officers, always 
filed his reports on time, kept Johnston apprised of his 
position and intentions, and appeared to be capable of 
critically evaluating intelligence about enemy numbers and 
intentions. Johnston did believe that Jackson tended to be 
overly aggressive. Commenting on Jackson's plan for a 
winter campaign in November, 1861, Johnston observed: "It
seems to me that he proposes more than can well be accom­
plished. . . . "  But once the government had committed to 
the operation, Johnston whole-heartedly supported Jackson 
against all his critics, from private soldiers to the 
President of the Confederacy. After an embarrassing 
directive from Benjamin countermanded his own orders,
Jackson attempted to resign, and Johnston felt strongly 
enough about him to delay his letter and press for a 
reconsideration. To the Secretary of War, Johnston wrote 
pointedly, "I don't know how the loss of this officer can be 
s u p p l i e d . "26 Johnston implied after the war— as d i d  almost 
everyone else— that he had seen early signs of talent for 
independent command that Jackson later demonstrated, but the 
evidence does not support this a s s e r t i o n .  27 still, i t  is
26joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, November 22, 
1861, endorsement on Thomas J. Jackson to Judah P. Benjamin, 
January 31, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Thomas J. Jackson, 
February 3, 1862, in OR, V: pp. 966, 1053, 1059-1060.
27johnston, Narrative, pp. 86-89, 106-107.
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clear that Johnston rated Jackson much higher in February, 
1862, than did almost anyone else.
Among Johnston's brigadiers, four would have figured 
most significantly in his plans for maneuvering the army: 
Jubal Early, D. H. Hill, J. E. B. Stuart, and W. K. C. 
Whiting. All were West Point graduates and Johnston 
recommended at least three of them for p r o m o t i o n . ^8 In the 
absence of government action, the General decided unilat­
erally to advance them to higher levels of responsibility, 
in fact, if not in title.
Early was a forty-five-year-old Virginian who had 
resigned from the army in 1838 to pursue a legal and 
political career in his home state, interrupted only by 
volunteer service in the Mexican War. He had opposed 
secession, but quickly devoted himself to the Confederacy, 
accepting the colonelcy of the 24th Virginia. His conduct 
at Manassas won him a general's star, and by February, 1862,
28warner, Generals in Gray, pp. 79, 136-137, 296-297, 
334-335; Johnston's recommendation for Early's promotion may 
be inferred from the fact that he assigned him to a division 
command prior to receiving the appointment of Richard S. 
Ewell, who was senior to Early. See General Orders No. 22, 
Department of Northern Virginia, February 5, 1862, in OR, V: 
pp. 1061-1062; for Johnston's recommendation of Stuart, see 
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 10, 1861, in 
OR, V: p. 77; Johnston referred to Whiting in glowing terms
throughout the winter and spring, but Whiting's difficulties 
with Jefferson Davis over the command of a Mississippi 
brigade kept Johnston from actually submitting a recommenda­
tion for promotion until April. See Joseph E. Johnston to 
George Wythe Randolph, April 20, 1862, inW. H. C. Whiting, 
Compiled Service Record, Record Group 94, National Archives.
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Johnston had begun using him as a division c o m m a n d e r . 29 
Stoop-shouldered, addicted to chewing tobacco, argumenta­
tive, ambitious, and profane, Early elicited extreme 
responses from his peers: they either liked him or hated
him. Longstreet, in particular, found him distasteful and 
distrusted his capabilities, but Johnston disagreed, and 
consistently handed Early critical assignments.30
Daniel Harvey Hill, as previously noted, commanded the 
detached garrison at Leesburg, stronger than a brigade but 
not quite as large as a division. A forty-one-year-old 
North Carolinian, Hill had resigned from the army in 1849 to 
become a professional educator. An ardent Southern nation­
alist who eagerly embraced secession in 1861, Hill had won, 
as colonel of the 1st North Carolina, the Battle of Big 
Bethel, the first land engagement in Virginia, securing his 
promotion to b r i g a d i e r - g e n e r a l .21 His coolness under fire 
was already well-known among his soldiers: at Leesburg,
29warner, Generals in Gray, p. 79; General Orders No.
22, Department of Northern Virginia, February 5, 1862, in 
OR, V: pp. 1061-1062.
30Longstreet's poor opinion of Early seems to have 
stemmed from an inability to make the Virginian follow 
orders on outpost at Fairfax Court House in the late summer 
of 1861. By the Battle of Williamsburg, his assessment had 
fully crystallized into a belief that Early was incompetent 
to handle a brigade. See James Longstreet to Thomas Jordan, 
undated, but by context from August or September, 1861, in 
James Longstreet, Compiled Service Record, Record Group 94, 
National Archives; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p.
78; Sorrel, Recollections, p. 56.
31warner, Generals in Gray, pp. 136-137.
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when he wanted to know the range and calibre of enemy guns 
across the river, Hill paraded up and down the banks with an 
ostentatious escort until the Federals fired on them. Some 
rounds fell short and others flew overhead. Before the 
barrage ended, Hill casually took a pick and began digging 
up shells embedded in the ground to measure their size.32 
Notoriously moody, his letters and reports read more like 
newspaper editorials than military correspondence. Sarcas­
tic comments about a forger in the War Department and the 
incompetence of army surgeons have already been cited; on 
another occasion, he complained that "it was my hopes [sic] 
to have been a soldier in this war, but I have only been a 
passport clerk."33 Hill's competence and nerve were 
essential components in any withdrawal plans, because for 
one to two days after the movement began, the Leesburg 
garrison would be outside its fortifications and too far 
away from the rest of the army to be reinforced if attacked.
Covering the withdrawal would be the responsibility of 
the army's cavalry brigade, commanded by James Ewell Brown 
"Jeb" Stuart, a Virginian who had just turned twenty-nine. 
Stuart had been a protege and special favorite of Johnston's 
when the two men had served as lieutenant and lieutenant- 
colonel of the 1st Cavalry on the Kansas border in the
32Sti les, Four Years, p. 67.
33d . H. Hill to George Wythe Randolph, March 22, 1862, 
in OR, LI (part 2): p. 513; see also D. H. Hill to Joseph
E. Johnston, May 25, 1885, in RMH.
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1850 's. The two men were reunited in June, 1861, when 
Stuart commanded Johnston's cavalry in the Shenandoah Valley 
and screened the movement to Manassas so successfully that 
the Federal commander did not even know Johnston's army had 
departed for several days.34 He was flamboyant and seemed, 
at times, not to take the war any more seriously than a 
jousting tournament; his headquarters' camp rang with music 
and laughter throughout most nights, and was decorated in 
front with a captured Blakely rifled cannon, next to which 
was chained a trained raccoon.35 gut on duty, even his 
critics admitted that Stuart was the consummate profession­
al. Johnston described his cavalry commander to Davis as "a 
rare man, wonderfully endowed by nature with the qualities
^During the time that Johnston had served in the 1st 
Cavalry in the 185 0 's, he had become embroiled with the 
regiment's commander, Colonel Edwin Vose Sumner, in a feud 
so divisive that the War Department had been forced ulti­
mately to split the regiment into two sections. Johnston's 
partisans in the regiment included Major William H. Emory, 
Captain George B. McClellan, and probably First Lieutenant 
J. E. B. Stuart. Sumner had relieved Stuart of the post of 
regimental quartermaster, and his promotion to captain was 
recommended by Johnston protege, Emory. Warner, Generals in 
Gray, pp. 2 96-29 7; Emory M. Thomas, Bold Dragoon, The Life 
of J. E. B. Stuart (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), pp.
40, 47, 60, 69-73; Robert Ransom to W. T. Walthall, March
23, 1879, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, 
VIII: pp. 370-371; Govan and Livingood, Different Valor,
pp. 21-23; Stephen W. Sear, George B. McClellan, The Young 
Napoleon (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1988), p. 50;
Albert Gallatin Brackett, History of the United States 
Cavalry (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1865), pp. 141-145,
177; Joseph E. Johnston to Flora Cook Stuart, September 28, 
1861, in James Ewell Brown Stuart papers, Virginia Histori­
cal Society.
35Thomas, Bold Dragoon, pp. 90-93.
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necessary for an officer of light cavalry. Calm, firm, 
acute, active, and enterprising, I know no one more compe­
tent than he to estimate the occurrences before him at their 
true value."36
William Henry Chase Whiting commanded the de facto 
division of three brigades blockading the lower Potomac and 
guarding Johnston's right flank. The thirty-seven-year-old 
Mississippian had a well-deserved reputation as one of the 
best engineers in the army; he had not only graduated first 
in his class at West Point in 1845, he had achieved the 
highest grades ever recorded. In June, 1861, as a major of 
engineers, he had been assigned to Johnston's staff as chief 
engineer of the Army of the Shenandoah, and planned the rail 
movement of the army to Manassas. Johnston and Whiting had 
been friends long before the war, and both that acquaintance 
and Johnston's professional evaluation of Whiting's skills 
led to his promotion to brigadier-general on July 21,
1861.^7 Johnston's choice of Whiting to supervise the line 
of the lower Potomac was an example of putting the right man 
in the right place. Whiting constructed multiple firing 
positions for each of his few heavy guns and kept them 
constantly rotating from one to the next, successfully 
disguising his weakness from the Federals across the river.
36joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 10, 
1861, in OR, V: p. 777.
37tyjarner, Generals in Gray, pp. 334-335.
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These positions were fortified only from the front, and left 
in the direct line of sight of concealed field batteries 
placed further back from the river, so that if a Union 
raiding party ever seized one of his forward batteries he 
could drive them off almost immediately.38 Johnston relied 
implicitly on Whiting's judgment as a military engineer, and 
thought highly of his administrative capabilities.
But for all his competence, Whiting could often become 
a management problem for his commander. Though personally 
popular with the troops, who dubbed him "Little Billy," he 
was notoriously pessimistic; Longstreet recalled of Whiting 
that "though of brilliant, highly cultivated mind, the dark 
side of the picture was always more imposing with him."39 
This trait was aggravated by periodic bouts of severe 
depression and impulsive outbursts. Johnston occasionally 
chided him gently about the former, and repeatedly had to 
protect him from the consequences of the latter. In 
January, 1862, an intemperate letter from Whiting to the War 
Department concerning the reorganization of Mississippi 
troops into exclusive brigades had aroused President Davis's 
wrath, and he had demanded that Whiting be stripped of his
38wiHiam T. Street to R. H. Wyman, December 11, 1861, 
R. H. Wyman to Gideon Welles, December 12, 1861, R. H. Wyman 
to Gideon Welles, December 18, 1861, R. H. Wyman to Gideon 
Welles, March 11, 1862, in NOR, V: pp. 4-5, 7-8, 25.
39c. B. Denson, "William Henry Chase Whiting," Southern 
Historical Society Papers, Vol. XXVI (1898): p. 140;
Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 113.
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general's rank and demoted back to a major of engineers.
Only some uncharacteristically diplomatic letter-writing by 
Johnston, and an abject apology he forced out of Whiting, 
sufficed to save his commission.40 a s Johnston sat down to
few
plan his withdrawal on February 25, he was aware that 
Whiting had become despondent over the news of the fall of 
Fort Donelson, and the Mississippian's state of mind would 
have to figure prominently in his calculations.41
Thus, the state of the senior command structure of the 
Department of Northern Virginia in late February, 1862 was 
hardly a cause for optimism. Ten generals had left the army 
in the past few months. None of Johnston's division 
commanders had ever marched, let alone fought, their 
divisions. His second-in-command was in precarious health. 
Three key commanders--Longstreet, Hill, and Whiting— were,
40For Johnston remonstrating with Whiting over the 
Mississippian's bouts with depression, see Joseph E.
Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, March 6, 1862, in OR, V: pp.
1091-1092; for the controversy over Whiting and the Missis­
sippi brigade, see Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, 
December 27, 18 61, Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, 
January 1, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston,
January 5, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin,
January 14, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, 
January 16, 1862, in OR, V: pp. 1011-1012, 1015-1016, 1020,
1028, 1035; Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 12, 
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 13, 1862, 
Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, January 13, 1862, 
in LR-SW, M-618, Reel 8; W. H. C. Whiting to Samuel Cooper, 
January 5, 1862, in LR-SW, M-437, Reel 21; Joseph E.
Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 7, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M- 
474, Reel 27, W. H. C. Whiting to Samuel Cooper, January 5, 
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 52.
41joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, March 6,
1862, in OR, V: pp. 1091-1092.
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for various reasons, deeply depressed. Jackson, Stuart, and 
Whiting were all in disfavor with the authorities in 
Richmond.42 The leadership of Johnston's department looked 
like that of an army recently defeated in battle, rather 
than one about to conduct a major movement.
Nor could Johnston lean too heavily on his staff. He 
had written Davis in the letter of February 16 that he had 
"no competent staff," a condition that existed for three 
reasons.42 First, neither West Point nor the prewar United 
States Army had emphasized staff training. Those officers 
who had somehow acquired staff experience, with few excep­
tions, preferred field command to a supporting role, and 
thus, most staff billets were filled either with untrained 
civilians, political appointees, or officers of such 
mediocre talent that they could not manage a higher commis­
sion. Finally, Confederate law followed United States 
precedent and parsimoniously restricted the number of staff 
officers even an army commander could appoint to ridicu­
lously inadequate figures; Johnston's entire staff for the 
Department of Northern Virginia numbered just eleven
42Davis criticized Stuart's performance in a letter 
erroneously dated February 6, 1862 when printed in OR; a 
careful reading of Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, 
March 3, 1862, reveals that the letter concerning Stuart 
should carry the date March 6, 1862; Jefferson Davis to 
Joseph E. Johnston, February [sic] 6, 1862, Joseph E. 
Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 3, 1862, in OR, V: pp. 
1063-1064, 1088.
42Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1074.
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officers, supplemented by about a half-dozen aides-de- 
camp . 44
As Civil War staffs went, Johnston's was about average. 
Five of the eleven--Colonel G. W. Lay, Acting Inspector- 
General; Colonel W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery; 
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert G. Cole, Chief Commissary; Major 
E. P. Alexander, Chief of Ordnance; and Major Thomas G. 
Rhett, Assistant Adjutant-General— were West Pointers. Two 
of the others— Major A. J. Foard, Chief Surgeon and Captain 
E. J. Harvie, Assistant Adjutant General--were former 
officers in the regular army, but not Academy graduates. 
Taking the family connections of several of these officers 
into consideration, it could be argued, with some justice, 
that Johnston shared the vice of many other generals in 
staffing his headquarters: he surrounded himself with the
sons of the Confederate elite, sometimes to the detriment of 
effective operations.
44Return of the Department of Northern Virginia, 
December 31, 1861, in JJWM; Russell F. Weigley, History of 
the United States Army, enlarged edition (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 240-241; Testimony of 
J. H. Simpson, July 26, 1860, Testimony of A. M. McCook, 
July 26, 1860, Robert C. Buchanan to J. C. Ives, August 3, 
1860, J. G. Barnard to J. C. Ives, August 21, 1860, Edward 
Otho Cresap Ord to J. C. Ives, August 17, 1860, George G. 
Meade to J. C. Ives, August 30, 1860, in Thirty-sixth
Congress, Second Session, Report of the Commission appointed
under the eighth section of the act of Conqress of June 21,
1860, to examine into the organization, system of disci-
pline, and course; of instruction of the United States
Military Academy at West Point (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1860), pp. 85, 86, 236-237, 330-331, 334, 
345; see also J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff, Its History 
and Development (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1961), p. 67.
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Lay and Rhett, among the professionals, had the most 
impressive family pedigrees of anyone on the staff. Yet, 
despite the fact that they had prewar experience commensu­
rate with their positions in the Department of Northern 
Virginia, both men turned out to be something of a disap­
pointment at Johnston's headquarters. Lay was the son-in- 
law of Supreme Court Justice and Assistant Confederate 
Secretary of War, John Archibald Campbell and the former 
aide of Lieutenant-General, Winfield Scott. He was also one 
of the very few officers to resign from the United States 
Army as a lieutenant-colonel, and never achieve a general's 
star during the war. Though experienced, he lacked energy: 
War Department staff officer, Robert G. H. Kean, thought Lay 
possessed "sound principles of administration but . . . 
little vim in the head." He was also, by some reports, an 
alcoholic.45 Thomas Rhett had both lineal and marital ties
4^Lay ended the war working as the Inspector-General of 
the Bureau of Conscription; even there, General Braxton 
Bragg criticized him as indolent. J. B. Jones, A Rebel War 
Clerk's Diary at the Confederate State Capital (New York:
Old Hickory Bookshop, 1935), II: pp. 249, 278; Mrs. Burton
Harrison, Recollections Grave and Gray (New York: Charles
Scribner's Son's, 1911), p. 79; Edward Younger, ed., Inside 
the Confederate Government, The Diary of Robert Garlick Hill 
Kean (New York: Oxford, 1957), pp. 84-85; "List of Officers
in duty in the Bureau of Conscription, August 29, 1864," 
endorsement, Braxton Bragg to Jefferson Davis, September 5, 
1864, in OR, Series 4, II: pp. 609-610; Elliot, West Point,
pp. 370-371; Joseph H. Crute, Confederate Staff Officers, 
1861-1865 (Powhatan, VA: Derwent Books, 1982), pp. 19, 104,
116; Francis Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of 
the United States Army, from Its Organization . . .  to 1903 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1903), I: pp.
620; Jon L. Wakelyn, Biographical Dictionary of the Confed­
eracy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 122-123;
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to the top of Confederate society: his uncle was South
Carolina fire-eater, Robert Barnwell Rhett; his father-in- 
law, Virginia politician Thomson F. Mason; and his wife's 
uncle, Confederate diplomat, James M. Mason. In April,
1861, Rhett had been a major and an army paymaster--the same 
position that James Longstreet resigned for a brigadier- 
generalcy— and when he entered Confederate service, he did 
so at his old rank. Rhett's failure to advance with his 
peers seems to center around his personality; he was good- 
natured company and a fine poker player, but hated paper­
work, and only served on the staff as a personal favor to 
Johnston. There were, of course, persistent rumors that 
Jefferson Davis discriminated against him because of his 
uncle's persistent anti-administration stance.46
C. Vann Woodward and Elisabeth Muhlenfeld, The Private Mary 
Chesnut, The Unpublished Civil War Diaries (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 28n; Woodward, Mary 
Chesnut's Civil War, pp. 28n, 121, 125.
^Thomas Rhett was twice related to the Mason family: 
his brother had married his wife's sister. He was the only 
one of South Carolina's early brigadier-generals not to 
eventually receive an equivalent commission in the Confed­
erate Army. See Charles E. Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to 
War, 1860-1865 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 1950), p. 115; Laura A. White, Robert 
Barnwell Rhett: Father of Secession (New York: Century,
1931), p. 220n; Elliot, West Point, p. 417; Heitman, 
Historical Register, I: pp. 641, 826; Crute, Staff Offi­
cers , pp. 104, 178; Sorrel, Recollections, p. 31; Woodward 
and Muhlenfeld, Private Mary Chesnut, pp. 65n, 150n; 
Wakelyn, Biographical Dictionary, pp. 314, 367-368; Burton 
J. Kendrick, Statesmen of the Lost Cause, Jefferson Davis 
and His Cabinet (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1939), pp.
237-240; Robert E. Lee to Samuel Cooper, June 3, 1862, in 
LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 3.
/
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Among the rest of the professionals there were men from 
whom more might be hoped. Harvie was competent as a junior 
staff officer, possibly because he was doing more or less 
the same job that he had as a lieutenant in the 9th U. S. 
Infantry. Cole had managed the food supplies at Manassas 
efficiently, but his authority did not extend to the meat­
packing plant at Thoroughfare Gap. Only twenty-four medical 
officers of the United States Army resigned their commis­
sions to enter the Confederate Army; as an assistant 
regimental surgeon with nearly eight years" experience, A.
J. Foard represented a treasure to the new nation. As a 
testimony to his talents, in the very fine Confederate 
Medical Department, Foard spent the entire war as Chief 
Surgeon in either the Department of Northern Virginia or the 
Department of Tennessee. Often, Foard's standard operating 
procedures were accepted by the Surgeon-General for the 
entire Medical Department. Pendleton and Alexander repre­
sented equally bright spots on the professional side; both 
men were excellent administrators; between them, they would 
account for two of the four general officers' commissions 
ever granted to artillerymen in the Army of Northern 
Virginia.47
4 7pendleton came under much fire later in the war 
because he was not a field commander, and was misplaced as a 
field artillery commander, so much so that Lee's reorganiza­
tion of the reserve artillery prior to Gettysburg can be 
viewed as an attempt to limit the scope of his influence. 
Sorrel called him "a well-meaning man, without qualification 
for the high post he claimed. . . . "  But for the first few
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The four non-professionals were Major A. H. Cole, 
Inspector of Transportation; Major A. P. Mason, Assistant 
Adjutant General; Major Alfred W. Barbour, Chief Quartermas­
ter; and Major B. P- Noland, the Commissary of Subsistence 
at Thoroughfare Gap. Cole, a loyal Johnston partisan, was 
energetic, outspoken, and assertive in carrying out his 
duties, regardless of any lack of training. He had no 
formal standing, as the War Department still declined to 
acknowledge the need for an Inspector of Transportation; so, 
though competent and active, his authority was seriously 
l i m i t e d . ^ 8  Mason was another case of an officer who
months of the war, dealing with the minutiae of organizing 
the artillery arm, scavenging for material, and setting up 
the foundation for the army's artillery, Pendleton was, 
perhaps, the perfect choice. Alexander earned a reputation 
for thoroughness, precision, and effectiveness at every 
assignment he ever accepted, from arranging the Confederate 
signal service to Johnston's Chief Ordnance, eventually 
rising to Chief of Artillery for the First Corps, Army of 
Northern Virginia, earning the accolade of Lee's "top 
tactical artilleryman" from historian Larry J. Daniel, 
although Jennings C. Wise found fault with Alexander's 
sometimes overly critical nature. See H. H. Cunningham, 
Doctors in Gray, The Confederate Medical Service (Glouces­
ter, MA: Peter Smith, 1970), pp. 34, 161, 249; Richard B.
Stark, "Surgeons and Surgical Care of the Confederate States 
Army," Virginia Medical Monthly, vol. LXXXVIII, No. 10: p.
607; Warner, Generals in Gray, pp. 3-4, 234-235; Elliot,
West Point, pp. 271-272, 287, 316-317, 408; Sorrel, Recol­
lections , p. 114; Larry J. Daniel, Cannoneers in Gray, The 
Field Artillery of the Army of Tennessee, 1861-1865 (Univer­
sity, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 135; Wise,
Long Arm, pp. 76-78, 193-195; Crute, Staff officers, pp. 14, 
21, 103, 115, 189; Heitman, Historical Register, I: pp.
426, 503.
48see the arguments over the appointment of an Inspec­
tor of Transportation, cited in Chapter Two. Cole eventu­
ally rose to become Inspector of Transportation for the 
Confederate Army. A. H. Cole is sometimes confused with R.
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probably acquired his commission as a result of family 
influence. He was the son of Thomson F. Mason and, there­
fore, Thomas Rhett's brother-in-law. He was the son-in-law 
of Judge Campbell, which made him G. W. Lay's brother-in- 
law, as well. Mason seems to have adapted well, but his 
assignment was primarily clerical.49
There is considerable evidence that in February, 1862, 
Johnston already doubted the competence of both Barbour and 
Noland, which was an ominous sign, since the Quartermaster 
and Commissary Departments would be primarily responsible 
for evacuating the bulk of the goods stored near Centre- 
ville, Manassas, and Thoroughfare Gap. Neither man had any 
formal training for his post, and, in Johnston's opinion, 
neither showed much natural inclination toward his duties.50
G. Cole. See Crute, Staff Officers, pp. 68, 103, 115, 125; 
Elliot, West Point, pp. 84-86, 316; Goff, Confederate 
Supply, p. 72.
49Mason's abilities as a staff officer can be inferred 
from the fact that he served almost continuously as the A.
A. G. to army commanders from Johnston to Robert E. Lee to 
Johnston again and then John Bell Hood. Men without talent, 
no matter their family connections, tended to be relegated 
eventually to minor posts. Woodward and Muhlenfeld, Private 
Mary Chesnut, p. 65n; Stewart Sifakis, Who Was Who in the 
Civil War (New York: Facts on File, 1988), p. 436; Crute,
Staff Officers, pp. 104, 116; Wakelyn, Biographical Diction­
ary, p. 314; Kendrick, Statesmen, pp. 237-240.
50johnston had not wanted to lose W. L. Cabell, his 
former Chief Quartermaster, and did not want Barbour to 
replace him; see the dispute over the position of Chief 
Quartermaster for the Department of Northern Virginia in 
Chapter Two. Whether it was Noland personally, or the 
Subsistence Department in general that Johnston distrusted, 
is not clear. What is evident from his correspondence and 
memoirs was a general belief that the department was riddled
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Unfortunately, it was these two officers of all his staff 
that Johnston was powerless to replace, because Confederate 
law gave the right of appointment for those positions to the 
bureau chiefs in Richmond: Johnston's implacable enemies,
Myers and Northrop.51
Thus, Johnston's staff represented that uneven mixture 
of talent and mediocrity peculiar to most Civil War era 
headquarters. Even if the staff could plan the army's 
movements, and the subordinate generals could direct them, 
just how well the troops could execute them was another 
critical question. The rebel soldiers inhabiting the camps 
in northern Virginia in February, 1862 were not yet the 
lean, fast-marching infantrymen that would outpace the 
Federal army time and again in the last two years of the 
war. Instead, Johnston's brigades, which were composed of 
men who had fought no more than a single, short battle (and 
only about half the soldiers present in February had done
with inefficiency, waste, and possibly corruption. That 
Johnston did not have the highest opinion of Noland can be 
inferred from the manner in which he limited his assignment 
during the withdrawal, discussed later in this chapter. 
There is also the fact that Johnston waxed— for him-- 
eloquent on the merits of the army's first Chief Commissary 
and bemoaned his loss, and was also complimentary' toward R. 
G. Cole, but did not mention Noland by name in his memoirs. 
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 16, 1861, 
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 17, 1861, 
Leroy Pope Walker to Lucius B. Northrop, September 7, 1861, 
Lucius B. Northrop to Leroy Pope Walker, September 9, 1861, 
in OR, V: pp. 789-790, 833, 835-836; Johnston, Narrative,
pp. 67-68; Crute, Staff Officers, p. 103.
51-Goff, Confederate Supply, p. 21.
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that), spent a winter drilling in the muddy fields alongside 
their camps. They naively believed that this experience 
would make them seasoned veterans. "A trunk had come with 
each volunteer," Johnston later bemoaned, recalling the 
extent of his soldiers' baggage.52 After spending four 
pages detailing the long list of items that Confederate 
soldiers thought essential to camp life in the first year of 
the war, Carlton McCarthy of the Richmond Howitzers writes 
in 1882 that
It is amusing to think of the follies of the early 
part of the war, as illustrated by the outfits of the 
volunteers. They were so heavily clad, and so burdened 
with all manner of things, that a march was torture.
. . . Subordinate officers thought themselves entitled 
to transportation for trunks, mattresses, and folding 
bedsteads, and the privates were as ridiculous in their 
demands.53
When Johnston issued an order to reduce the troops ' 
impediments to "light marching order," reluctance to part 
with the luxuries of camp life combined with an ignorance of 
military terminology to create tremendous confusion. What 
exactly was "light marching order"? Captain James Conner of 
the Hampton Legion recorded that the term meant, in his 
unit, "nothing but blankets and overcoats, and one day's 
rations, cooked, in their haversacks. The wagons followed
52johnston, Narrative, p. 98; see also Jubal A. Early, 
War Memoirs; Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the 
War Between the States (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1960), pp. 53-54.
53carlton McCarthy, Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life 
in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865 (Richmond: 
Carlton McCarthy and Co., 1882), pp. 16-20.
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with two days' rations and the cooking utensils."54 
Brigadier-General Richard Taylor allowed his men a blanket, 
an extra shirt, an extra pair of drawers, two pairs of 
socks, and an extra pair of shoes; officers were allowed to 
strap a tent "fly" to their saddles.55 The most tragi­
comical description of "light marching order" came from 
Colonel Thomas W. Thomas of the 15th Georgia, who had 
grappled with the problem a few months earlier:
I have had to decide how much a frying pan 
weighed, how much a skillet, how much a tin pail, how 
much a coffee pot--even if a credit was to [be] allowed 
because the handle was off.
We were ordered to put ourselves in 'light 
marching order'— what that was I had to figure out.
Now allowing that the officers have theirs, it requires 
2 lbs. of cooking utensils to the man, counting non­
commissioned officers and privates--this will do— it is 
light marching order and less will not do. . . .
Cooking utensils was the most vexed question before me 
— my ten company commanders were at all points about 
it. . . . Why Sir a treaty can be made with England 
and France, yea with the North itself, with less 
diplomatic skill and talent than it required to settle 
that question of skillets. Besides this I settled the 
officer's clothing question, the knapsack question, the 
blanket question, the tent question, the mess chest 
question, the barrel question, and the extra arms 
question— all in four hours, among ten disputants, when 
no two had similar ideas at the beginning. . . .56
Besides troops, the sheer bulk of supplies and equip­
ment possessed by the Department of Northern Virginia 
represented an almost insurmountable obstacle to rapid 
movement by Johnston's army. In Richmond, Johnston had
54Moffet, Conner, p. 62.
S^Taylor, Destruction, p. 40.
56Phill ips, Correspondence, pp. 582-583.
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emphasized to Davis and the cabinet that "saving our 
artillery & stores, especially the heavy guns on the 
Potomac" would be "next to impossible."57 From Aquia to 
Evansport, Whiting deployed some forty-five heavy cannon, 
ranging in size from 8-inch rifled guns to 42-pound Naval 
smoothbores. Some of these guns had limited mobility, and 
these were the ones that Whiting constantly maneuvered from 
point to point, but most of the heavy cannon were firmly 
planted on siege carriages which rendered them almost 
unmovable. Not only did Whiting lack enough teams of draft 
animals to haul the guns off if field carriages could be 
improvised, but his horses and mules were among the weakest 
in the department.58 Plainly, some other method of removing 
the guns would have to be found.
The question of saving Whiting's guns, as a .logistical 
problem, paled by comparison to the mountains of supplies 
that had grown in the rear of the army. They collected all 
winter because Johnston did not have the wagons to distri­
bute the goods. Considering every category of goods— from 
food and uniforms to ammunition and blankets--3,240,354 
pounds of supplies had accumulated at Manassas Junction, 
despite Johnston's attempts in January and February to have
S^Entry of February 20, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 156.
5®Scharf, Confederate States Navy, pp. 95-99; W. H. C. 
Whiting to Theopnilus Holmes, March 21, 1862, in OR, V: p.
529 .
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deliveries from Richmond halted.59 on the army's immediate 
left flank, at Thoroughfare Gap, stood a meat-packing plant 
erected by the Commissary Department, over Johnston's 
objections.60 On the train back from his Richmond confer­
ence, the General found in his discussions with Major 
Noland, that the surplus piled up both in warehouses and 
sitting in open fields was far greater than he had imagined. 
There were 1,510,819 pounds of pork and 1,195,914 pounds of 
beef which had to be evacuated out of Union reach.61 
Without even considering the supplies on hand at the 
division or brigade level, Johnston had to calculate just 
how to use his inadequate trains and a dilapidated railroad 
effectively enough to spirit away nearly 6,000,000 pounds of 
material!
Johnston's final problem was secrecy. Outnumbered 
nearly four-to-one, he could not afford to have McClellan 
divine his intentions and attack his columns during the 
vulnerable days after leaving their old entrenchments and 
before arriving at their new positions. A variety of 
threats existed. The Federals might combine an attack out 
of the Allegheny Mountains with an advance against Winches-
59johnston, Narrative, pp. 98-99.
60Frank G. Ruffin to Lucius B. Northrop, January — , 
1862, in OR, Series 4, vol. 2, p. 522; Johnston, Narrative, 
p. 99.
61b . P. Noland to Lucius B. Northrop, March 27, 1862, 
in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 1038-1039.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
132
ter to trap Jackson's division. Likewise, a thrust north­
west from Alexandria, simultaneous with one southeast from 
Harper's Ferry, could potentially pick off D. H. Hill as he 
retired from Leesburg. Nor was the least of Johnston's 
fears a sudden amphibious landing on the lower Potomac, 
within hours of the time Whiting deserted his batteries on 
the river. This would put Brigadier-General Joseph Hooker's 
division of Yankees in among Whiting's trains before his 
division had struggled more than a few miles down the muddy 
roads.
Only an impenetrable cloak of deception could cover 
Johnston's army through the first, critical hours of the 
retreat, and, as Johnston reviewed his position, it must 
have been obvious that such would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve. He had just experienced the 
incredible security leaks which prevailed in the Confederate 
capital; no details confided to the government could be 
considered safe. Quite probably, Johnston guessed, even as 
he called his staff together, McClellan already knew that a 
retreat was being discussed. If not, the Federal commander 
would become aware almost as soon as the railroads began 
hauling supplies away from instead of toward Manassas; both 
Union and Confederate lines were simply too porous to keep 
such an operation secret. Worse, still, Hooker's men on the 
Maryland side of the Potomac had been busily erecting new 
observation towers, which might spot any withdrawal the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
133
moment it began.62 Once the army began to move, its only 
protection would be the screen provided by Stuart's cavalry 
brigade— 1,300 horsemen organized into five-and-one-half 
regiments— which could find itself opposed by more than
8,000 blue troopers. To make matters worse, no sooner had 
Johnston begun his preparations, than the Adjutant and 
Inspector-General attempted to strip him of one of his best 
regiments.^3 if removing the army from the frontiers of 
Virginia seemed to be a monumental task, removing it 
secretly must have seemed impossible.
Johnston met the challenges of mobilizing his depart­
ment for a withdrawal behind the Rappahannock River with the 
same systematic efficiency that he had applied to maintain­
ing the strength and morale of his army through the winter. 
He broke the problem down into its constituent parts, and 
assigned the best officer available to each particular job. 
Like a master chef, he stood back from detailed management 
of the preparations once everyone had been assigned his 
respective responsibilities, stepping forward only when it
G e n t r y  of February 20, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 156.
63ihe regiment which the Richmond authorities attempted 
to withdraw was Colonel Robert Ransom's 1st North Carolina 
Cavalry. "Abstract from the return of the Department of 
Northern, Virginia, General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, 
commanding for the month of February, 1862," "Abstract from 
the return of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj.
Gen. George B. McClellan, U.S. Army, for the month of 
February, 1862," in OR, V: pp. 732, 1086; Joseph E.
Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 27, 1862, Joseph E. 
Johnston to Samuel Cooper, March 3, 1862, in JJWM.
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was necessary to adjust the overall design. Johnston's 
administrative skill, assisted by a healthy dose of McClel­
lan's usual timidity, resulted in a well-executed maneuver, 
unmolested by the Federals and accompanied by a minimal loss 
of supplies.
Even before his first staff meeting, Johnston tackled 
the problem of removing more than 6,000,000 pounds of 
supplies. He directed Major Noland to proceed immediately 
to the meat-packing plant at Thoroughfare Gap and shut down 
the operation. Noland was then to begin removing the bulk 
of the meat from the store-houses to the loading platforms 
by the railroad, while shipping off what he could directly 
to Warrenton in his own few wagons. The empty buildings 
were to be burnt or disassembled. Agents were to be 
appointed and dispatched to Mount Jackson and Orange 
Courthouse to arrange for the reception and storage of the 
meat.^^ At the same time, Johnston delegated to Major Cole 
the responsibility for arranging special trains to Thorough­
fare to pick up the tons of beef and pork. Noland assured 
Johnston that if enough trains ran to Thoroughfare, he could 
empty the facility in little more than a week.65
To Lieutenant-Colonel Cole and Major Barbour fell the 
task of emptying the depots at Manassas the Centreville.
6 .  P. Noland to Lucius B. Northrop, March 27, 1862, 
in OR, Series 4, I: p. 1039.
65Ibid.
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Instead of continuing the system of assigning labor details 
on a revolving basis from each brigade in turn, they 
received a permanent working party detached from Ewell's 
division, to be under their exclusive control for the period 
of the evacuation.66 Johnston distrusted both Barbour's 
competence and energy, so he limited the quartermaster's 
direct orders to preparing the stocks on hand for removal, 
and delegated the actual coordination of transportation to 
the two Coles and Brigadier-General Isaac Trimble. The 
Coles were to supervise the wagon trains and Trimble, with 
his brigade, to attend to loading the trains. The appoint­
ment of Trimble to that position represented Johnston's 
attention to detail: the Maryland brigadier had been a
railroad engineer and administrator for thirty years. He 
could be expected to know how to handle any crisis which 
arose.67 Colonel Pendleton and Major Alexander were 
assigned complete responsibility for the preparation of 
their respective commands— the Reserve Artillery and the 
ordnance train--for the move, but were told that when the 
time came they would each be subordinated to one of the 
division commanders for purposes of security and marching
66a . P. Mason to Richard S. Ewell, March 2, 1862, in 
LS-ANVA.
67jubal A. Early to Jefferson Davis, September 22,
1877, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, VIII: 
p. 3; Warner, Generals in Gray, p. 310; Abraham C. Myers to 
Joseph E. Johnston, March 7, 1862, in LS-QMG, T-131, Reel 8.
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orders.68
The army's remote detachments, Johnston handled 
differently. Obviously, at his extreme distance from the 
main body, Jackson could not be closely supervised by 
Johnston's staff. Instead, Johnston relied on Jackson's 
already proven administrative competence, entrusting him 
with the general outlines of the operation and leaving him 
the details to work out by himself. Jackson was ordered on 
March 1 to prepare his command to move in case the main army 
had to fall back. Johnston's letter of instruction has not 
been found, but Jackson's response two days later made it 
clear that he understood his assignment to be "keeping 
between you and the enemy and at the same time opposing his 
advance along the v a l l e y . " 6 9  The logistics of preparing the 
Army of the Valley for eventual retreat were far simpler 
than those facing Johnston, both because his force was but a 
fraction of the size of the main army and because Jackson's 
staff had received some extremely useful— if uncomfortable 
--training for the conduct of rapid movements in the Romney 
operation. Without any fuss, Jackson had his sick and 
wounded gradually shipped back to Staunton and Charlottes­
ville, his main depot relocated from Winchester to Mount 
Jackson, and the movable supplies of the army loaded onto
68special Orders No. 70, Department of Northern 
Virginia, March 5, 1862, in OR, V: p. 1091.
69Thomas J. Jackson to Joseph E. Johnston, March 3, 
1862, in OR, V: pp. 1087-1088.
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the wagons. Major John A. Harman, his profane Chief 
Quartermaster, had the wagon trains ready to move several 
days before Jackson would actually order the evacuation of 
Winchester. So effectively did Jackson plan his own 
withdrawal that no question ever arose in anyone's mind 
concerning a waste of supplies in the Valley District.70
Holmes's task in the Aquia District was even simpler, 
from a logistical point of view. His main depot at Freder­
icksburg would still be within his lines after the retreat, 
and the only evacuation of men or supplies that he would 
have to accomplish was the withdrawal of Brigadier-General 
John G. Walker's brigade from Aquia and Potomac Creeks, and 
the destruction of a few miles of railroad. His most 
pressing task would be to safeguard Johnston's right flank- 
specifically Whiting's division— from a surprise Federal 
landing during the movements. Johnston decided, almost 
immediately upon his return from Richmond, to keep communi­
cation to Holmes down to an absolute minimum, because the 
North Carolinian had little more to do than react to direct 
orders. Besides, there was no telegraphic link between 
Centreville and Fredericksburg, which meant that any 
messages the army commander sent had to pass through
^Thomas J. Jackson to Joseph E. Johnston, March 6, 
1862, in OR, V: pp. 1092-1093; Joseph E. Johnston to T. H.
Williams, February 27, 1862, in JJWM; Robert G. Tanner, 
Stonewall in the Valley, Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's 
Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring of 18 62 (Garden City, NY 
Doubleday, 1976), p. 106.
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Richmond, which now, more than ever, equated, in Johnston's 
mind, to an open breach of security.71
The main question with Hill's Leesburg garrison was not 
logistical but strategic: to what point should Hill's
troops march? Jackson clearly felt that Hill should 
withdraw into the Valley and join his division, and kept 
trying to bring Johnston around to this view even after the 
retreat had begun. He wrote his commander on March 8:
And now, general, that Hill has fallen back, can 
you not send him over here? I greatly need such an 
officer; one who can be sent off as occasion may offer 
against an exposed detachment of the enemy for the 
purpose of capturing it. But his command is mostly 
needed for holding the valley, and I believe that if 
you can spare Hill and let him move here at once, you 
will never have any occasion to regret it. The very 
idea of re-enforcements coming to Winchester would, I 
think, be a damper to the enemy, in addition to the 
fine effect that would be produced on our troops, who 
are already in fine spirits.72
There was undeniable logic in Jackson's argument, but in the 
end, Johnston decided that to dispatch Hill into the Shenan­
doah would run contrary to the general strategy behind the 
withdrawal that Davis had ordered: to bring as many troops
as possible into supporting distance of Richmond. Hill 
would rejoin the main army.
Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, September 5,
1861, Robert E. Lee to Theophilus H. Holmes, March 14, 1862, 
in OR, V: pp. 830, 1099; Theophilus H. Holmes to Samuel
Cooper, March 9, 1862, in OR, LI (part 2): p. 497; Archer
Anderson to W. H. F. Lee, March 11, 1862, in George Bolling 
Lee papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
72Thomas J. Jackson to Joseph E. Johnston, March 8,
1862, in OR, V: p. 1095.
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In the meantime, his primary requirement was security. 
The Confederates at Leesburg were too few to quit their post 
without the advantage of surprise. Johnston advised Hill 
not to burn any supplies or facilities he might have to 
abandon not only because he probably could not do a thorough 
job of destruction, but also because the flames would 
attract enemy attention hours earlier than necessary. The 
retreating column was, however, to set fire to every 
railroad bridge along its line of march. So that Hill's 
troops could concentrate on swift movement instead of 
protecting bulky trains, Johnston had provisions for 3,200 
men stationed along his route for immediate consumption.73
Hill kept his own counsel until the last couple of days 
prior to the move. He even kept the patriotic ladies of 
Leesburg sewing flannel cloth into powder bags for the 
cannon until the very day of the evacuation. One sharp 
artilleryman, however, noticed that the ladies had been 
instructed to concentrate on producing smaller bags for 
field guns rather than the larger items, which would have 
been required for the handful of siege guns that Hill 
planned to abandon on the banks of the Potomac.74
Besides the mountains of supplies at Thoroughfare and 
Manassas, Whiting's heavy artillery along the Potomac was
73joseph E. Johnston to D. H. Hill, March 6, 1862, in 
OR, V: p. 1091.
74stiles, Four Years, pp. 71-72.
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Johnston's other major concern. It was obvious that the 
understrength teams which had not been able to effectively 
transport even rations during the winter could not be 
expected to evacuate the supplies of an entire division, 
plus forty-five guns that each weighed somewhere between
8,000 and 17,000 pounds.75 The only other option seemed to 
be building rafts and attempting to float some or all of 
Whiting's artillery down the Potomac to the railhead at 
Aquia right under the noses of Federal lookouts. Whiting 
had been ordered to investigate that possibility as soon as 
Johnston had returned from Richmond. He consulted French, 
his chief of artillery, as well as Captain Frederick Chatard 
of the Confederate Navy and Colonel J. Johnston Pettigrew, 
commanding a regiment of North Carolina troops supporting 
many of the guns. Pettigrew believed that it might be 
physically possible to build rafts to carry the guns, but 
French and Chatard were adamant that the operation was not 
safe. "I deem the attempt to get them there [Aquia Creek] 
by water with our means, in the face of the enemy, impracti­
cable and hazardous," French reported to Whiting on February 
24. "The steamers guard the river closely and the enemy 
from the opposite shore see everything at the batteries, and 
you may rest assured that by the time two-thirds of the guns 
are dismounted it will be discovered and an attack be made
^^Coggins, Arms and Equipment, p. 88.
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by the steamers and from the guns opposite."76 Johnston 
received this information and passed it on to the President 
the next day, taking responsibility himself for the decision 
not to try to haul the guns off by land: "The land trans­
portation would, it seems to me, require too much time and 
labor, even were the roads tolerable. They are not now 
practicable for our field artillery with their teams of four 
h o r s e s . " 7 7  The only thing that could be done was to try to 
destroy the guns in place so that, at the very least, the 
enemy would not benefit from their capture.
Meanwhile, as Johnston dealt with each of the periph­
eral issues of evacuation, the major impediment to tactical 
mobility--the 6,000,000 pounds of supplies at Thoroughfare 
and Manassas— stubbornly refused to cooperate with the 
department commander's timetable. The primary reason was 
the inefficiency of the Confederate railroads upon which 
Johnston was forced to depend. To remove 6,000,000 pounds 
of cargo, based on an average carrying capacity of 16,000 
pounds per freight car, required at least 375 cars. The 
Orange and Alexandria, which would have primary responsibil­
ity for evacuating everything— at least as far as Gordons- 
ville--had begun the war with only 140 box cars and flat
76w. H. C. Whiting to Samuel G. French, February 24, 
1862, Samuel G. French to W. H. C. Whiting, February 24, 
1862, in OR, LI (part 2): pp. 477-478.
77joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 25, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1081.
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cars. A significant number of these had been seized by the 
Federals in Alexandria and, since then, the slow, steady 
drain of wartime service without replacement parts had 
whittled the fleet down even further. Because the run from 
Manassas to Gordonsville passed over a single line of track 
with short and infrequent turn-outs for passing trains in 
opposite directions, scheduling was of paramount impor­
tance . 78
Still, difficult as the operation appeared, it should 
have been possible in the time Johnston allotted. With the 
average locomotive pulling fifteen freight cars, the entire 
stockpile of the Department of Northern Virginia should have 
required just slightly more than two trains a day during the 
period Johnston allowed for the evacuation.79 gut because 
of the reluctance of the Confederate government to., assume 
complete control of railroads, even in an active military 
theatre, Johnston's staff officers found themselves com­
pelled to negotiate with the civilian superintendents and 
engineers of the rail lines rather than simply requisition­
ing what they needed. Johnston himself had little more real 
control.80
The result was that while Johnston's subordinates could
70johnston, Virginia Railroads, p . vll; Black, Rail­
roads , p. 18; Turner, "Virginia Central Railroad at War," 
pp. 521-522.
79Black, Railroads, 'p. 18.
80ibid., p . 7 6 .
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prepare their supplies for timely removal, once that had 
been accomplished they could do little more than sit beside 
the loading docks and wait for a train to happen along. At 
Thoroughfare Gap, Major Noland began disassembling the meat­
packing plant on February 22; tons of meat were "taken from 
the houses and placed on platforms for convenience of 
loading the cars. The force of hands was increased, and 
every possible arrangement on our part was made for sending 
off the property." But no trains came. Agreements made 
between Commissary Department agents and the superintendent 
of the railroad were not honored, and even Major Cole could 
only manage to conjure up a total of forty-five usable 
freight cars in early March. Noland frantically commenced 
loading as much of the meat— now starting to spoil— as 
possible into his inadequate fleet of wagons, "although," 
Noland reported angrily, "many trains passed the point and 
several of them were entirely empty."81 The process of 
removing the meat actually delayed Johnston's withdrawal by 
several days, and continued even after the infantry had 
marched south. It ended only when Lieutenant Colonel Thomas 
T. Munford of the 2nd Virginia Cavalry, commanding the last 
rear guard of Stuart's cavalry screen, ordered the remains 
of the stockpiles burned at noon on March 12, as the last
81b . P. Noland to Lucius B. Northrop, March 27, 1862, 
in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 1039-1040.
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Confederate troops quit northern V i r g i n i a . 82
While the aroma of burning meat certainly pervaded the 
district for many hours, the scale of the waste and destruc­
tion has been distorted by participants and historians out 
of all proportion to reality. Jubal Early contended after 
the war that so much meat was lost that it "embarrassed us 
for the rest of the war, as it put us at once on a running 
s t o c k . "83 Johnston himself is often cited for his comment 
to Jefferson Davis on March 13, 1862 that "more than half of 
the salt meat at Thoroughfare was left there for want of the 
means of bringing it away."84 Comparing this ratio to the 
total amount of meat reported at the plant, Douglas Southall 
Freeman concluded that "more than 1,000,000 pounds were 
destroyed or given to farmers in the neighborhood."85 This 
has become the standard account of the affair, further 
expanded and exaggerated by later writers, until it reached 
tragi-comic proportions, exemplified by Robert Tanner's 
description in his Stonewall in the Valley; "Unable to 
empty an army packing plant, Johnston consigned a million 
pounds of beef to the flames, and his ill-fed retreating
82ibid.
83Early, War Memoirs, pp. 54-55.
84Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 13,
1862, in OR, LI (part 2): pp. 1073-1074.
83preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 140.
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columns were tormented by the aroma of sizzling s t e a k . "86 
Aside from the fact that every one of Johnston's 
soldiers except a few hundred cavalrymen had already passed 
Thoroughfare Gap before the fire started, nothing close to a 
million pounds of meat was burned. According to the 
official report of Major Noland— filed on March 27, two 
weeks after Johnston made his off-the-cuff estimate to the 
President— of the 2,706,733 pounds of pork and beef at 
Thoroughfare on February 22, 86.3% of it was successfully 
evacuated, leaving only 369,819 pounds beside the railway.
Of that, in the last two days before the burning, Noland 
estimated that at least 200,000 pounds was given away to 
neighborhood farmers, leaving only 169,819 pounds to be 
incinerated— a far cry from 1,000,000 pounds.87
Yet, a loss in excess of 389,000 pounds of meat seems, 
at first, like a very sizable one. But how important was it 
really? The total stockpile at Thoroughfare Gap represented 
2,971,156 daily rations of meat, figured at the often 
optimistic official standard of three-quarters of a pound of 
pork or one-and-a-quarter pounds of beef for one soldier for 
one day. Against the "Aggregate Present" (ration strength) 
for the Potomac District at the end of February, 42,860 
officers and men, this amounted to a stockpile of 69.3 days
86Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley, p. 98.
87g. p. Noland to Lucius B. Northrop, March 27, 1862, 
in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 1038-1039.
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worth of meat. The total poundage either given away or 
burned amounted to no more than a 9.8 days' meat ration for 
Johnston's entire force; the supposed towering mountain of 
food condemned to the fire represented somewhere between 
three and five days' rations for the withdrawing soldiers, 
hardly enough to have seriously "embarrassed" the Confeder­
ates for the rest of the month, let along the rest of the 
war.88
The situation at Manassas Junction was equally, if not 
more, troublesome. General Trimble, Johnston's designee to 
handle the loading of supplies on the trains running south, 
found that no one respected his requests. Conductors 
complained about him to the Quartermaster General, Myers, 
and lesser officers from both the Quartermaster and the 
Commissary Departments felt themselves empowered to contra­
dict him and appropriate space as they chose. Myers's 
unique solution to these problems was to rebuke Johnston for 
having given Trimble any authority, and to suggest to 
Jefferson Davis that Johnston was requiring too many 
trains!88
Making the best of a bad situation, Trimble, Barbour,
88Ibid.; "Abstract from the return of the Department of 
Northern Virginia, General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, 
commanding, for the month of February, 1862," in OR, V: p.
1086; Goff, Confederate Supply, pp. 17-18n.
88Joseph E. Johnston to Abraham C. Myers, March 2,
1862, in JJWM; Abraham C. Myers to Joseph E. Johnston, March 
7, 1862, in LS-QMG, T-131, Reel 8; Abraham C. Myers to 
Jefferson Davis, March 7, 1862,'in OR, V: p. 1093.
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and the two Coles made the tough choices necessary to keep 
the operation even close to their commander's schedule. Any 
equipment already damaged, or rations that had spoiled, was 
shoved to the side; Trimble's men endeavored to load only 
the best materials on the trains. What they could not load, 
they passed out to the troops retreating through the town, 
or attempted to destroy. It is more difficult to pin down 
just what fraction of the total had to be abandoned, because 
no report as thorough as Noland's was ever filed respecting 
the evacuation of Manassas Junction. Only Lieutenant- 
Colonel R. G. Cole's 1871 letter, cited by Johnston in his 
Narrative, provides any quantification for the total amount 
of supplies in the depot, and his account is questionable on 
two grounds. The first is the normal vagaries of hindsight, 
which make his ability to recall exact quantities nine years 
later somewhat suspect. The second problem is that Cole's 
letter is phrased somewhat ambiguously, and it is difficult 
to tell whether or not his figure of 1,434,316 pounds of 
supplies left behind includes the 369,817 pounds of meat at 
Thoroughfare or not. Cole's account does make clear that at 
least 443,000 pounds of bread, flour, and vinegar was 
abandoned because it had already spoiled.90
Without specific Confederate statistics, the best 
information on just what Johnston's army left behind can be
90jc>hnston, Narrative, pp. 98-99n; see also, Davis, 
Image of War, II: pp. 370-373.
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found in Federal reports. Just two days after Johnston
evacuated Manassas, J. S. Potter entered the town with the
first Union cavalry scouts. On March 12, he testified
before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of
the War concerning his observations:
Several hundred barrels of flour, that they had 
attempted to destroy by burning lay there in a pile 
partly consumed. There was also a part of a train of 
cars there, partially destroyed. Among other things, I 
found a very complete printing office, with press, 
type, forms standing, and imposing stone, army blanks, 
&c., and I should think a little paper had been printed
there. The place was generally in a ruin. The depot
was burned, some cars and a locomotive or two de­
stroyed, a bridge blown up, several buildings de­
stroyed, and altogether the most desolate scene, it 
seemed to me, that the human eye could rest upon.91
More dispassionately, McClellan, who certainly had the best 
of motives to exaggerate the booty found in Confederate 
camps, reported to the Secretary of War that he had found 
"many wagons," but only "some caissons, clothing, ammuni­
tion, personal baggage, &c. [italics added]." In fact, he 
closed his description by noting that "the country [was] 
entirely stripped of forage and provisions."92 The context 
of Federal accounts, supported by numerous Rebel reminiscen­
ces, strongly suggests that most of what was abandoned at
Manassas fell into one of three categories: spoiled
rations, excessive personal gear, or broken down transport.
^Testimony of J. S. Potter, March 12, 1862, JCCCW, p.
244 .
92ceorge B. McClellan to E. B. Stanton, March 11, 1862, 
in OR, V: p. 742.
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From a logistical standpoint, therefore, Johnston's evacua­
tion of Thoroughfare Gap and Manassas Junction deserves to 
be applauded rather than scorned.
The withdrawal has also been criticized on operational 
grounds. Freeman again censured Johnston's organization of 
the movement severely in Lee's Lieutenants:
The orders, which wer.e issued piecemeal, were 
wretchedly drawn. In some instances, clarity was 
lacking. Marches were not precisely timed in relation 
to one another. Gen. T. H. Holmes, commanding at the 
northern terminus of the R. F. & P. Railroad, actually 
was not informed of the withdrawal or told what to do 
with the troops or heavy guns on his sector. Neither 
the President nor the Secretary of War was advised when 
the movement would begin or what the lines of retreat 
would be.93
Freeman's assessment, which has become the accepted standard 
account of the withdrawal, neglects many key points, and 
rests on very slender evidence.
Moving several columns simultaneously over roads that 
Captain James Conner of the Hampton Legion characterized as 
"awful; stiff clay, mud, and water; we stalled about every 
hundred yards," could not have been organized on a precise 
minute-by-minute timetable.94 Instead, Johnston followed 
the principal of decentralized authority that he had 
instituted during the winter. Early's division marched 
first, followed by G. W. Smith and Longstreet on parallel 
roads. Smith was assigned to direct the movements of
93preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 140'.
^Moffet, Conner, pp. 84-85.
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Pendleton's Reserve Artillery and D. H. Hill's Leesburg 
garrison, while Longstreet supervised Colonel Walton's 
Washington Artillery Battalion, in addition to his own 
division. Ewell's division formed the infantry rear guard, 
with the dual assignment of supporting Stuart's cavalry 
screen and scouring the country one last time for provisions 
and forage.95
As with his efforts to maintain the strength of the 
army throughout the winter, the withdrawal from the frontier 
was marked through with little touches that bespoke Johns­
ton's attention to detail. Extra tents had been ordered to 
shelter the troops turned out of winter cabins.96 Small 
parties of pioneers were dispatched to improvise temporary 
crossings over rain-swollen streams.97 Each division had a 
bridge on the Rappahannock assigned to it, and when the 
troops arrived at the river, they discovered that the 
railroad bridges had already been planked over to accommo­
date w a g o n s . 98 They also found Johnston's previously 
prepared entrenchment and stacks of incendiary material
95special Orders No. 70, Department of Northern 
Virginia, March 5, 1862, in OR, V: p. 1091; Taylor,
Destruction, p. 38.
96joseph E. Johnston to Abraham C. Myers, February 26, 
1862, in JJWM; Abraham C. Myers to Joseph E. Johnston, March 
2, 1862, in LS-QMG, T-131, Reel 8.
97Taylor, Destruction, p. 36.
98Abraham C. Myers to Thomas R. Sharpe, March 8, 1862, 
in LS-QMG, T-131, Reel 8; Dickert, Kershaw's Brigade, p. 93.
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piled neatly beside the right of way, just in case Federal 
pursuit might be quicker than anyone imagined.99 The entire 
maneuver, recalled Richard Taylor, "was executed with the 
quiet precision characteristic of General Johnston, unri­
valed as a master of logistics."100 of course, the march 
was muddy and uncomfortable for the soldiers, who were 
neither accustomed to long marches nor yet resigned to the 
reality that active campaigning meant giving up the luxuries 
of camp life; but, this result was unavoidable and, in 
Johnston's eyes, probably not a bad thing.101
Whiting's withdrawal from the Potomac was not conducted 
under Johnston's direct eye, but Whiting and French both 
received considerable supervision from Johnston in terms of 
the manner in which he wanted the evacuation conducted. 
Johnston spoke at length with each man on at least one 
occasion during the planning stages, and dispatched at least 
five letters of instruction to Whiting and three to French 
during the two weeks prior to the move.102
99McHenry Howard, Recollections of a Maryland Confed­
erate Soldier and Staff Officer under Johnston, Jackson, and 
Lee (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1914), p. 68; Gary
Gallagher, Fighting for the Confederacy, The Personal 
Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 72.
lOOTaylor, Destruction, p. 36.
101Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 13, 
1862, in OR, LI (part 2): p. 1074.
102prencj1, Two Wars, p. 143; Joseph E. Johnston to W.
H. C. Whiting, February 27, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to W.
H. C. Whiting, February 28, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to W.
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These letters spelled out Johnston's intentions very 
clearly. Heavy guns to be abandoned were to be destroyed in 
place as quickly and quietly as possible. Whiting was 
instructed to phase his withdrawal from north to south: "If
I telegraph 'it is time, ' give your orders and move.
Hampton should have a start of some hours. How would it do 
for him to start after dark, leaving pickets, and march to 
the road leading from Bacon Rice to your camp, bivouac, and 
march at your hour next morning."103 Johnston later 
admonished that, since his would be the first brigade in the 
department to withdraw, "Hampton must move off as cunningly 
as possible."104 Whiting, as the senior brigadier-general 
present, would supervise the movement until he reached the 
Fredericksburg area, where he would automatically come under 
the authority of Holmes.10^
Holmes, of course, had been intentionally left in the 
dark by Johnston until March 8, the day the evacuation 
began. The decision to do so, while defensible on the
H. C. Whiting, March 5, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. 
Whiting, March 6, 1862, in OR, V: pp. 1082-1083, 1085,
1090-1093; Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel G. French, February 
27, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel G. French, March 6, 
1862, W. H. C. Whiting to Samuel G. French, March 7, 1862, 
in OR, LI (part 2): pp. 481, 487, 488.
Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, March 5, 
1862, in OR, V: pp. 1090-1091.
104Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, March 6, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1092.
105Ibid.
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grounds of security and the limited participation of the 
Aquia District in the removal of troops and stores, cer­
tainly infuriated Holmes, who felt he had been misused, and 
complained immediately to the Adjutant and Inspector- 
General . But his very complaint indicated how thorough 
Johnston's orders, once they arrived, had been:
I was notified yesterday by General Johnston that 
he had ordered General French to abandon Evansport, and 
that he and General Whiting with their commands would 
immediately march on Fredericksburg. He advised me to 
place these troops beyond the Rappahannock and only to 
hold the Potomac with strong outposts, breaking up the 
wharf at Aquia and being ready to destroy the railroad 
from thence to Fredericksburg. As the outpost for the 
Potomac, I purpose to keep General Walker's brigade at 
Aquia as it is. I am at a loss whether to remove the 
guns from the batteries there, and will be obliged if 
you will inform me by telegraph. . . .  I have not been 
informed of the object of these sudden and, to me, very 
unexpected movements, and therefore can only strive to 
be ready for anything. . . . Since writing the above 
General French has arrived here and reports his brigade 
en route to Fredericksburg, that all the guns at 
Evansport have been or will be destroyed there before 
the rear guard leaves. . . .106
This letter, which is the mainstay of Freeman's contention
that Holmes was ill-informed, actually indicates that the
commander of the Aquia District received reasonably complete
instructions in a timely fashion, although it is obvious
that Johnston could have taken a few more pains to assuage
his subordinate's ego.
Most likely, Holmes's aggrieved letter to General
Cooper was the first formal notice that Richmond received of
106Theophilus H. Holmes to Samuel Cooper, March 9, 
1862, in OR, LI (part 2): p. 497.
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the beginning of the movement. Johnston had been purpose­
fully vague about his starting date in all his communica­
tions with Davis, because he worried that to be specific 
might result in further leaks that would cost him the 
several hours of secrecy he needed to extricate Whiting's 
and Hill's commands from their exposed positions. Aside 
from that consideration, since Johnston had been given 
positive orders to conduct the withdrawal— as opposed to the 
contingent orders Davis later claimed had been issued— he 
reckoned that setting the exact date was a decision com­
pletely within the army commander's purview.
Johnston always acknowledged that he did not communi­
cate with Richmond until the movement was well under way: 
"The withdrawal from Centreville was not known in Richmond 
until after the army had taken its position on the Rappahan­
nock. "107 He sent his first official notice of the move 
four days after it began, on March 12, by which time 
Smith's, Longstreet's, and Early's divisions had all crossed 
the river, and both Whiting and Hill had reached safe 
havens.-*-08 In a purely military sense, Johnston's decision 
seemed justifiable. Whiting's evacuation was reported by 
Hooker within less than a day, Hill's retreat from Leesburg 
by Colonel John Geary in about twelve hours. Federal
107jo]-mSi-onf draft of Narrative, in Box 28, Folder 3, 
in RMH.
108josep]-i e . Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 12, 
1862., in OR, V: pp. 526-527.
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cavalry uncertainly probed Stuart's cavalry screen in the 
Manassas area on March 8 and 9.109 The Richmond Examiner 
published complete reports of the movement on March 11, even 
correctly inferring that the intent of the operation was to 
place Johnston's army in better position to participate in 
the defense of R i c h m o n d .  H O  Attorney-General Bragg's diary 
indicates that the withdrawal may already have been common 
knowledge in the Confederate capital. m
What Johnston overlooked, underestimated, or ignored 
was the very predictable result that his reticence had on 
the mind of Jefferson Davis.
109josep]1 Hooker to Randolph B. Marcy, March 9, 1862, 
Philip Kearney to E. S. Purdy, March 9, 1862, John W. Geary 
to R. Morris Copeland, March 9, 1862, in OR, V: pp. 524,
537, 549.
HORichmond Examiner, March 11, 1862, p. 2.
IH-Entry of March 10, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 178.
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Chapter Five 
Enter Lee
Even as Confederate rear guards at Leesburg and 
Dumfries spiked the heavy guns and laid powder trails into 
their magazines, and Major Noland waited impatiently for the 
trains to cart away his mountains of beef and pork, two 
events occurred that would have distinct implications for 
the defense of Richmond. The first was the return of 
General Robert E. Lee to the capital city, after an absence 
of several months; the second was the sortie of the iron­
clad, Virginia, into Hampton Roads. The combination of the 
two served to confuse an already strained relationship 
between Joseph Johnston and Jefferson Davis.
General Lee rode the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad 
into the city, accompanied only by a single aide, twenty- 
four-year-old Captain Walter H. Taylor. Lee's arrival was 
so unheralded that it is still impossible to determine with 
absolute certainty whether he entered the capital on 
Thursday, March 6 or Friday, March 7.1 What is clear is 
that as the train lumbered over the James River bridge below 
the smokestacks of the Tredegar Iron Works, Lee himself had
^Freeman, R. E. Lee, I: p. 628; Clifford Dowdey and
Louis H. Manarin, ed., The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee 
(New York: Bramhall House, 1961), p. 124.
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no idea why Jefferson Davis had abruptly summoned him to 
Richmond.
He was the son of Revolutionary War hero and Virginia 
Governor, "Light Horse" Henry Lee. He had served on 
Winfield Scott's personal staff in Mexico, earning three 
brevet promotions for gallantry; and, twice held the 
prestigious position of Superintendent of the United States 
Military Academy. So when Lee had resigned his commission 
as Colonel of the 1st Cavalry, and turned down an offer of 
command of the Union Army in April, 1861, he went South to 
great expectations.2 Virginia immediately conferred upon 
him command of the state's forces, Governor John Letcher 
citing his "talent, experience, and devotion to the inter­
ests of V i r g i n i a . "Whether we have the right of secession 
or revolution," said Jubal Early on the floor of the 
Virginia State Convention, "I want to see my State trium­
phant. I do believe that it will be triumphant under the 
lead of Major-General L e e . " 4  When Virginia formally entered 
the Confederate States, Jefferson Davis appointed Lee as 
third-ranking general officer in the army, behind only 
Samuel Cooper and Albert Sidney Johnston.5
^Warner, Generals in Gray, pp. 179-183.
^George H. Reese, ed. , Proceedings of the Virginia 
State Convention of 1861, February 13 - May (Richmond: n.
p., n. d.), IV: p. 363.
4Ibid.
^Warner, Generals in Gray, p. 180.
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But for Lee, who turned fifty-five in January, 1862, 
the first ten months of the war were filled with personal 
frustration and public criticism. "There is no place I can 
expect to be but in the field," he wrote his wife on May 2, 
1861, anticipating that his administrative assignment to 
coordinate the defense of Virginia from Richmond would end 
with the establishment of the Confederate government.^ He 
was mistaken; Davis retained him at his desk throughout the 
summer. Much to Lee's disappointment, his only contribution 
to the victory at Manassas was the necessary, but personally 
unsatisfying, task of forwarding troops and supplies to 
Johnston and Beauregard.
In August, the President allowed Lee into the field 
with an ill-defined supervisory command in western Virginia. 
At first, he was ebullient at the prospect of active duty, 
and sent his wife optimistic letters filled with descrip­
tions of the country: "The mountains are beautiful, fertile
to the tops, covered with the richest sward of blue grass & 
white clover. The inclosed fields waving with the natural 
growth of timothy. . . . This is magnificent grazing 
country. . . . "7 But within a month, the realities of his
position eroded his confidence and depressed his buoyant 
spirits. His outnumbered troops had few supplies, and
6Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, May 2, 1861, in Dowdey and 
Manarin, Wartime Papers, p. 18.
^Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, August 9, 1861, in Ibid., 
p . 63 .
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measles raged through their camps. His subordinates, 
politician-generals untutored in military operations, feuded 
with each other and ignored his instructions. Even nature 
seemed to have turned against him: "Rain, rain, rain, there
has been nothing but rain," he complained to his son. "So 
it has appeared to my anxious mind since I approached these 
mountains.
Lee first discovered the biting criticism of the 
Southern press when the incompetence of Brigadier-Generals 
John Floyd and Henry Wise combined with Lee's own inexperi­
ence in coordinating field operations and resulted in an 
inglorious failure to drive the enemy off Cheat Mountain in 
mid-September. Beauregard might be hailed as the Confedera­
cy's Napoleon and Jackson nicknamed "Stonewall," but the 
sobriquets reserved for him were "Granny" and "Evacuating 
L e e . "9 At first, he was stoic: "Everybody is slandered,
even the good. How should I escape?"!^ But, by October, 
the harshness of the Richmond papers had become so unrelent­
ing that even the reserved Lee could not keep himself from 
reacting, at least to family and close friends:
I am sorry . . . that the movements of the 
armies cannot keep pace with the expectations of 
the editors of the papers. I know they can
^Robert E. Lee to G. W. C. Lee, September 3, 1861, in 
Ibid., p. 7 0.
^Freeman, R. E. Lee, I: pp. 602-603.
lORobert E * Lee to Mary Lee, September 9, 1861, in 
Dowdey and Mandarin, Wartime Papers, p. 71.
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regulate matters satisfactorily to themselves on 
paper. I wish they could do so in the field. No 
one wishes them more success than I do & would be 
happy to see them have full swing. Genl Floyd has 
the benefit of three editors on his staff, I hope 
something will be done to please them.H
Jefferson Davis, however, had been fully aware of the
handicaps under which Lee had attempted to operate, and
never allowed public opinion to shake his faith in those he
trusted. In November, he recalled Lee from the rain-soaked
mountains and dispatched him to oversee the coastal defenses
of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. The assignment did
not bring a respite from either politicians or publishers,
but did carry the unequivocal authority of a department
commander.
He inherited the same dismal conditions as did Johnston 
in northern Virginia: "The volunteers dislike work & there
is much sickness among them besides. Guns too are required, 
ammunition, & more men."12 Faced with the prospect of 
defending hundreds of miles of coastline with fewer than 
30,000 soldiers and inadequate artillery, Lee instituted a 
policy of defense in depth at critical points, abandonment 
of isolated or insignificant islands, and the maintenance of 
a mobile reserve along the coastal rail line. The key to 
his defensive system was to avoid direct confrontation with
ll-Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, October 7, 1861, in Ibid.,
p . 80 .
l^Robert E. Lee to G. W. C. Lee, January 19, 1862, in 
OR, VI: p. 106.
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the "enemy's big boats;" "I am in favor of abandoning all 
exposed points as far as possible within reach of the 
enemy's fleet of gunboats & of taking interior positions, 
where we can meet on more equal terms."13 Several letters 
that Lee posted to Richmond during this period were critical 
in providing the President with his rationale for shortening 
the lines of the Confederacy on a much larger scale.14
By the end of February, Lee's scanty resources had been 
seriously depleted by Davis's strategic redeployment of 
several of his regiments to Tennessee. Unhappily, and in 
the face of great local opposition, he ordered an almost 
complete withdrawal of Confederate forces from eastern 
Florida, and cut his garrisons along the Georgia and South 
Carolina coasts to the bone. Certain that the Federals 
would assault Savannah when they learned of his reduction in 
force, Lee went to that city in order to personally direct 
its defense. He was there on March 2 when an abrupt and 
unrevealing telegraph from the President arrived: "If
circumstances will, in your judgment, warrant your leaving,
I wish to see you here with the least delay."15
His state of mind, by this point, was gloomy, although
l^Robert E. Lee to Roswell S. Ripley, February 19,
1862, in OR, VI: p. 394.
l^See chapter Three.
l^Robert e . Lee to Joseph E. Brown, February 22, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee to J. H. Trapier, February 24, 1862, Robert E. 
Lee to John H. Milton, February 24, 1862, Jefferson Davis to 
Robert E. Lee, March 2, 1862, in OR, VI: pp. 397-400.
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hardly desperate. The same day he received Davis's tele­
gram, Lee had written to his daughter, Annie, that times 
"look dark at present, & it is plain we have not suffered 
enough, labored enough, repented enough, to deserve success. 
. . . Our people have not been earnest enough, have thought 
too much of themselves & their ease, & instead of turning 
out to a man, have been content to nurse themselves & their 
dimes, & leave the protection of themselves & families to 
others." Though he could not dismiss the numerical superi­
ority of the Federals— "against ordinary numbers we are 
pretty strong, but against the hosts our enemies seem to be 
able to bring everywhere, there is no calculation"— he was 
still combative: "if our men will stand to their work, we
shall give them trouble & damage them y e t . "16
Lee delayed his departure just long enough to write out 
detailed instructions for Brigadier-General A. R. Lawton, 
commanding in Georgia, and to turn over the department to 
his deputy, Major-General John C. Pemberton. Leaving 
Savannah on March 3, he arrived in Charleston the next day, 
and took the train north for Richmond on March 5.17 
Whatever speculation the Virginian made on the nature of 
Davis's orders, it is almost certain that he did not
l^Robert E. Lee to Annie Lee, March 2, 1862, in Dowdey 
and Manarin, Wartime Papers, pp. 121-122.
l^Robert E. Lee to A. R. Lawton, March 3, 1862, General 
Orders No. 6, Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Florida, March 4, 1862, in OR, VI: pp. 400-401; Freeman, R .
E. Lee, I: p. 628.
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anticipate that the President wanted to appoint him Command­
ing General of the Confederate Army.
Even had Lee been publicly expected in Richmond, the 
events of March 8 would have immediately overshadowed his 
entrance. Shortly after noon, the Confederacy's first 
ironclad, the converted frigate Merrimac— rechristened the 
Virginia— steamed slowly out of the Norfolk Navy Yard, down 
the Elizabeth River, and into Hampton Roads. The Virginia, 
recalled Captain John Taylor Wood, who commanded her aft
gun,
was an experiment in naval architecture, differing 
in every respect from any then afloat. The offi­
cers and the crew were strangers to the ship and 
to each other. Up to the hour of her sailing she 
was crowded with workmen. Not a gun had been 
fired, hardly a revolution of the engines had been 
made, when we cast off . . . .  From the start we 
saw that she was slow, not over five knots; she 
steered so badly that, with her great length, it 
took thirty to forty minutes to turn. She drew 
twenty-two feet, which confined us to a compara­
tively narrow channel in the Roads; and, as I have 
before said, the engines were our weak point. She 
was as unmanageable as a water-logged vessel.-'-®
But she was also nearly invulnerable. In an action
lasting four hours, Admiral Franklin Buchanan's ship rammed
and sank the thirty-gun sloop Cumberland, pounded the fifty-
gun Congress into surrender with her rifled cannon, and ran
the frigate Minnesota aground. Shot after shot ricocheted
harmlessly off her angled iron plating. Watching the
unequal fight from Ragged Island on the south bank of the
l®John Taylor Wood, "The First Fight of Ironclads," 
B&L, I : p . 696.
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James River, Brigadier-General Raleigh Colston found that a 
freak acoustical effect imparted an air of eerie unreality 
to the conflict: "to our amazement, not a sound was heard
by us from the beginning of the battle. A strong March wind 
was blowing direct from us toward Newport News. We could 
see every flash of the guns and the clouds of white smoke, 
but not a single report was audible.
The repercussions of the engagement, however, rang loud 
and clear. The Virginia "made obsolete the navies of the 
world," observed historian Shelby Foote, "between noon and 
sunset of that one day. . . ."20 The clash, editorialized 
the Richmond Examiner, "opens a new chapter in naval 
warfare, and marks a new era in the struggle which the South 
is engaged in."21 The effect of the news on the Confederate 
capital, recalled one Richmonder, "was electrifying. . . .
For days, this glorious engagement filled all hearts and 
minds. Nothing else was talked of. . . ."22 The "gunboat 
fever" which had haunted the city on the James evaporated in 
hours; one newspaper commented wryly about residents who 
claimed to have been able to hear the sound of the battle.^3
19r . e . Colston, "Watching the 'Merrimac,'" B&L, I: p.
713 .
2 0shelby Foote, The Civil War, A Narrative (New York: 
Random House, 1958), I: p. 255.
2lRichmond Examiner, March 11, 1862, p. 2.
22putnam, Richmond, pp. 111-112.
^Richmond Examiner, March 11, 1862, p. 2.
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Even the appearance of an opposing ironclad, the Monitor, 
the next day could not keep the optimistic citizens from 
visualizing a fleet of Virginias smashing the blockade and 
securing Southern independence.
Commanders, on the spot, predicted far less grand 
results. Naval officers knew that "at no time did the 
Virginia attain the power and capacity of a seagoing vessel 
or exceed the measure of usefulness originally designed for 
her— that of harbor defense."24 Major-General Huger, 
commanding at Norfolk, did not want to keep risking the 
ironclad in Hampton Roads, and suggested that she be limited 
to operating inside Norfolk H a r b o r . 25 Writing from York- 
town, Major-General John B. Magruder predicted that "the 
Merrimac [sic] will make no impression on Newport News, in 
my opinion, and if she succeeds in sinking the ships lying 
there it would do us little or no good. . . ."26
But, despite these cautions, the first genuinely good 
news in months introduced an atmosphere of optimism into the 
Confederate high command. War Secretary Benjamin admonished 
Huger that "none of us are of the opinion that it would be
24"Extracts from a general court-martial convened at 
the city of Richmond, VA., on the 5th day of July, 1862, for 
the trial of Flag-Officer Josiah Tattnall, C. S. Navy," in 
NOR, VII: p. 793.
2^Benjamin Huger to Judah P. Benjamin, March 13, 1862, 
in OR, IX: p. 65.
26john B. Magruder to Samuel Cooper, March 6, 1862, in 
OR, IX: p. 57; see also John B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee,
March 20, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 386-388.
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proper to lose the vast advantage resulting from the enemy's 
fright at the bare idea of the Virginia reappearing among 
the wooden s h i p s . "27 Naval Secretary Mallory, who fervent­
ly believed in the ironclad's ability to "make a dashing 
cruise on the Potomac as far as Washington" or even New 
York, where "she could shell and burn the city and the 
shipping," was extremely reluctant to give up his dreams.
He pressed the ship's commander for the next month to make 
"a dash in York River, or even further. . . ."28 General 
Lee was never optimistic enough to plan raids on Northern 
cities, but he also subscribed to the idea that the vessel 
could cruise into the York River and disrupt Federal 
shipping there.29 An inflated idea of the Virginia's 
capabilities probably influenced Jefferson Davis to believe 
that the ship could so effectively protect Norfolk and 
Yorktown that he could afford to transfer a substantial 
number of troops from eastern Virginia to the Department of 
Northern Virginia. He telegraphed Johnston on March 10 that 
"further assurances given to me this day that you shall be 
promptly and adequately reinforced, so as to enable you to
27judah P. Benjamin to Benjamin Huger, March 15, 1862, 
in OR, IX: p . 68.
28stephen R. Mallory to Franklin Buchanan, February 24, 
1862, Stephen R. Mallory to Franklin Buchanan, March 7,
1862, in NOR, VI: pp. 776-777, 780-781; Stephen R. Mallory
to Josiah Tattnall, April 12, 1862, in NOR, VII: p. 224.
29Robert E. Lee to Stephen R. Mallory, April 8, 1862, 
in NOR, VII: p. 761.
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maintain your position. . . ."30
Johnston, of course, had already begun his withdrawal 
from the frontier, though Davis would not know that for 
several more days. The juxtaposition of his decision not to 
inform Davis of the start of the operation with Lee's 
appearance in Richmond and the brief elation at the early 
exploits of the Virginia, led to a further deterioration of 
relations between Johnston and the President. It also put 
Lee in a position to begin modifying Davis's plans for the 
defense of Richmond.
Exactly when Davis knew Johnston had evacuated his 
position is difficult to determine. He told Johnston that 
he had received his "first information of your retrograde 
movement" on March 15, though he later admitted that "I have 
had many and alarming reports of great destruction of 
ammunition, camp equipage, and provisions, indicating 
precipitate retreat; but, having heard no cause for such a 
sudden movement I was at a loss to believe it."31 Yet 
Thomas Bragg's diary suggests that the cabinet discussed the 
issue on March 10: "Our Army of the Potomac is moving
everything back. I fear it will be a bad business."^2 That 
is consistent with the timing of Davis's telegram to
30jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 10,
1862, in OR, V: p. 1096.
31jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 15,
1862, in OR, V: p. 527.
32Entry of March 10, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 178.
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Johnston the same day concerning reinforcements. And the 
President could hardly have been unaware of the operation 
after March 11, when the Richmond newspapers began to report 
the story.
The most thorough coverage came from the anti-adminis­
tration Richmond Examiner, which perhaps not coincidentally 
had close ties to Joseph Johnston.33 Characterizing the 
operations as "the judicious movements of our army," the 
Examiner detailed not only the extent of the retreat but 
correctly named Johnston's new line and even analyzed the 
strategic thinking behind Davis's decision to pull back:
The grand movement of the army on the 
Potomac, in withdrawing from its offensive line on 
the river of that name, and assuming a defensive 
one on the line of the Rappahannock and Rapidan, 
places a new complexion on the entire war in 
Virginia.
The policy of this change of position with 
reference to the intended attack of the enemy is 
obvious. The Potomac was the proper base for 
offensive operations against Maryland and Washing­
ton city; but as a line of defense for Richmond, 
or for general resistance, it is the most danger­
ous that could be held. . . .34
The paper further asserted that "General Johnston is 
understood to have the confidence of the administration to
^Former editor R. W. Hughes had married Johnston's 
niece Eliza, the adopted daughter of John B. Floyd. The 
current editor, John M. Daniel, had served the first few 
months of the war on Floyd's staff. Robert M. Hughes, "Some 
Letters from the Papers of General Joseph E. Johnston, 
William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. XI, 2nd Series, No. 4 
(October 1931): p. 320; Jedediah Hotchkiss, Virginia, Vol.
Ill of Confederate Military History, expanded edition 
(Dayton, OH: Morningside Bookshop, 1975), p. 94 9.
^Richmond Examiner, March 11, 1862, p. 2.
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such an extent that, as a singular exception, he has the 
control and direction of military movements in his depart­
ment entirely in his own discretion."35 while the paper's 
antagonistic stance certainly alienated the President, 
Bragg's diary indicates that topics covered in the Examiner 
were often discussed in cabinet meetings. It stretches 
credulity to the breaking point to believe that no one in 
the cabinet or his own entourage would have brought such an 
important story to the President's attention.36
There were other indicators that the move had com­
menced. Theophilus Holmes's complaint about not having been 
informed of Johnston's imminent retreat was posted to Cooper
on March 9, and Lee's response, dated March 14, reveals that
he already knew for certain that the march was under w a y . 3 7 
Johnston himself mailed a letter announcing the change of 
base to Davis on March 12, although the President never 
acknowledged its r e c e i p t . 38
35ibid.
36The cabinet even discussed buying the Richmond 
Enquirer during early February, in order to have a newspaper
friendly to the government being printed in the Confederate
capital. Robert G. Cleland, "Jefferson Davis and the 
Confederate Cabinet," Southwestern Historical Quarterly,
Vol. XIX, No. 3 (January 1916): p. 216; Entries for January
3, 1862, January 8, 1862, February 5, 1862, Bragg diary, pp. 
94, 104-105, 135.
37Theophilus Holmes to Samuel Cooper, March 9, 1862, in 
OR, LI (part 2): p. 497; Robert E. Lee to Theophilus
Holmes, March 14, 1862, in OR, V: pp. 1099-1100.
38joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 12,
1862, in OR, V: pp. 526-527.
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Given the evidence that Davis must have been aware of 
Johnston's action well prior to March 15, why did the 
President deny any such knowledge? Two possibilities 
suggest themselves. The first is that Davis had convinced 
himself that he never issued positive orders for the 
retreat, that it was only discussed as a contingency plan, 
and that Johnston had not been authorized to initiate it 
without further consultation. The preserved correspondence 
between Davis and Johnston from February 23 through March 6 
is unfortunately quite ambiguous. Davis later cited it to 
prove he had never ordered or authorized the move, and 
Johnston quoted many of the same letters in his own memoirs 
to argue the opposite c a s e . 39
Davis's first significant letter of the period, dated 
February 28, began by admitting that Johnston's apprecia­
tions of McClellan's intention to advance very soon "clearly 
indicate prompt effort to disencumber yourself of everything 
which would interfere with your rapid movement when neces­
sary. . . . "  Following a discussion of potential defensive 
lines and the likelihood of reinforcing Johnston's army, the 
President returned to the topic of retreat:
In the mean time, and with your present 
force, you cannot secure your communication from 
the enemy, and may at any time, when he can pass 
to your rear, be compelled to retreat at the 
sacrifice of your siege train and army stores, and
39jefferson Davis to Marcus J. Wright, October 14, 
1980, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, VI: 
pp. 502-504; Johnston, Narrative, pp. 100-101, 482-483.
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without any preparation on a second line to 
receive your army as it retired. As heretofore 
stated in conversation with you, it is needful 
that the armies on the north, the east, and the 
proximate south of this capital should be so 
disposed as to support each other. With their 
present strength and position the armies under 
your command are entirely separated from the 
others.
Threatened as.we are by a large force on the 
southeast, you must see the hazard of your 
position, by its liability to isolation and attack 
in rear, should we be beaten on the lines south 
and east of Richmond; and that reflection is 
connected with consideration of the fatal effect 
which the disaster contemplated would have upon 
the cause of the Confederacy.
Again, Davis commented on the need to save supplies and
munitions, and then presented his analysis of Jackson's
position in the Valley.40
To this point, the letter resembled a strategic
appreciation; but, in the last few lines, the President
included three sentences rife with the potential to be
interpreted in different ways: "As has been my custom, I
have only sought to present general purposes and view. I
rely on your special knowledge and high ability to effect
whatever is practicable in this our hour of need. . . . Let
me hear from you often and fully."41
Honorable men could disagree concerning Davis's
intentions in crafting those sentences, and be so sure of
their reading that they never realized the ambiguity
^Ojefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, February 28, 
1862, in OR, V: pp. 1083-1085.
41Ibid.
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inherent, therein. Obviously, Johnston had been given 
authority to maneuver his army as he saw fit if directly 
attacked, but could he order a retreat without enemy action? 
Johnston firmly believed that he had already been given 
instructions to conduct the withdrawal, and would have read 
those sentences as confirmation that the President had left 
the timing up to him. But, to Davis, the phrase "let me 
hear from you often and fully" may well have betokened a 
desire to be consulted prior to any non-emergency action. 
Unfortunately, each man was so sure of his own interpreta­
tion of the words that after February 28 neither bothered to 
make sure of the other's intentions.
Certainly the letter that Davis dispatched to Johnston 
on March 6 showed clearly that the President, hopedjthat 
events would render the evacuation unnecessary: "I am
making diligent effort to re-enforce your columns. It may 
still be that you will have the power to meet and repel the 
enemy. . . . "  Yet, Davis remained pessimistic, observing 
that "it is not to be disguised that your defective position 
and proximity to the enemy's base of operations do not 
permit us to be sanguine in that result. It is therefore 
necessary to make all due preparations for the opposite 
course of events."42
42jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, February 
[March] 6, 1862, in OR, V: p. 1063. The argument concern­
ing the dating of this letter is made in the notes of the 
preceding chapter.
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Though Davis ended the letter with the admonition to 
"please keep me fully and frequently advised of your 
condition," he coupled this with a reiteration of the army 
commander's latitude of action. "You will be assured that 
in my instructions to you I did not intend to diminish the 
discretionary power which is essential to successful 
operations in the field, and that I fully rely upon your 
zeal and capacity. . . ."43 iphe letter, which probably 
arrived after Johnston had already begun the withdrawal, did 
not decisively clear up potential misunderstandings.
So it is possible that Davis simply did not credit the 
early reports of Johnston's withdrawal, because he could not 
believe that even Johnston would disobey what the President 
evidently considered direct orders. But it is also possible 
that Davis's response to the retrograde may have been 
colored by Lee's arrival in Richmond. For Lee, to Davis's 
great surprise, did not agree with his plans to reduce the 
length of Confederate lines in Virginia.
As soon as the President had developed his strategic 
concept of subordinating all operations in Virginia to the 
defense of Richmond, he had realized that a major command 
problem existed. The city itself was the logical central 
point from which to coordinate the movements of Johnston's 
department with those of Magruder, Huger, and the Richmond 
defenses. And while Davis undoubtedly believed himself
43ibid., pp. 1063-1064.
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competent to direct those armies, he was realist enough to 
understand that he could not do so while also performing as 
the country's chief executive.44
So what were his choices? As much as the President 
admired Judah Benjamin personally and supported his tenure 
at the War Office, he realized the folly of entrusting an 
untrained, if brilliant, civilian with what amounted to an 
operational command. Adjutant General Cooper had evidenced 
neither the talent nor the inclination to handle such an 
assignment. Johnston himself, as the ranking commander in 
the area, would naturally command any combined army; but, 
for several reasons, he was a poor choice for the overall 
responsibility. Probably most important to Davis was his 
belief that Johnston's presence was essential to the morale 
of the Department of Northern Virginia. 111 had no wish," 
Davis remarked later, and in a slightly different context, 
"to separate him from the troops with whom he was so 
intimately acquainted, and whose confidence I believed he 
deservedly possessed."45 Less significant, but also 
presumably a consideration, was the friction that Davis 
recognized existed not only between himself and Johnston, 
but between the general and the Secretary of War, Adjutant 
General, Quartermaster General, and Commissary General.
44Patrick, Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet, pp. 34, 44-
45.
45Davis, Rise and Fall, II: p. 88.
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This fact argued against bringing him to Richmond, espe­
cially when combined with Johnston's apparent willingness to 
be openly friendly with the administration's political 
enemies.
In order for Johnston to be retained in command of his 
own army, yet subordinated to the orders of a supervising 
commander, Confederate law required that the new officer 
outrank him. Eliminating Cooper from consideration, only 
Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E. Lee met that qualifica­
tion. The other Johnston, deeply involved in the campaign 
to redeem the disasters in Tennessee, was obviously not a 
candidate for the post. Almost by default, as soon as Davis 
settled on his new concept for defending Richmond, to 
include establishing a theatre command, the choice fell on 
Lee.
None of the foregoing should be construed to suggest in 
any way that, to Davis, Lee represented Hobson's Choice.
The President had unwavering faith in Lee's capacity as a 
commander, despite his superficially disappointing Confeder­
ate career. As an additional plus, Lee had been the 
original architect of Virginia's defenses, had planned most 
of the fortifications now under construction, and had a 
thorough knowledge of the terrain in northern and eastern 
V i r g i n i a . D a v i s  may have also believed that the rank-
46por the most detailed assessment of Lee's part in 
designing Virginia's defenses, see Freeman, R. E. Lee, I: 
pp. 479-486, 497-500. Davis made his opinion of Lee freely
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sensitive Johnston might be more amenable to accepting
direction from an old friend.
The position that Davis planned for Lee was originally
to be entitled "Commanding General of the Armies of the
Confederate States," following the United States practice of
depositing that title on the senior general officer in
service at the nation's capital. This would allow Lee not
only to control operations in Virginia, but also to deal
with a variety of military matters throughout the Confedera-
cy--matters which were not readily resolved by civilians, as
had been proved by the experience of having Leroy Pope
Walker and Benjamin in the War Office. Davis's friends in
Congress introduced a bill to create the appointment. Even
the President's opponents supported the measure, because
they believed that it would take much of the management of
the war out of his hands.47
The only problem which resulted was from the wording of
the legislation, which Davis considered entirely too strong:
[T]he said officer shall be appointed by the 
President by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate. His usual headquarters shall be at 
the seat of government, and shall be charged, 
under the direction of the President, with the 
general control of military operations, the
known throughout Rise and Fall ; see also Arthur Martin Shaw, 
ed., "Some Post-War Letters from Jefferson Davis to his 
former Aide-de-camp, William Preston Johnston," Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. LI, No. 2 (April 
1943): p. 152.
^Richmond Examiner, March 6, 1862, p. 2; Yearns, 
Confederate Congress, p. 108.
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movement and discipline of the troops, and the 
distribution of the supplies among the armies of 
the Confederate States, and may, when he shall 
deem it advisable, take command in person of our 
army or armies in the field.^8
It was the last line that gave Davis pause, for it put the
assumption of field command at the general's discretion, not
that of the President. Douglas Southall Freeman has
suggested that this question of constitutional authority
represented Davis's major objection: "strict construction
of the organic law was a matter of political conscience, for
which he would do battle even if the enemy's divisions were
a t  t h e  d o o r s  o f  t h e  c a p i t o l . " 4 9
Compelling as this argument seems, Davis's veto message
contained a second line of reasoning, which may have come to
him from consultation with Lee, or upon reflection on the
personality of Johnston. "[N]o general would be content to
prepare troops for battle, conduct their movements, and
share their privations during a whole campaign if he
expected to find himself superseded at the very moment of
a c t i o n . "50 impatient to install Lee officially, Davis
resolved his dilemma by using his own executive power on
48"An Act to create the office of commanding general of 
the armies of the Confederate States," March 6, 1862, in OR, 
Series 4, I: pp. 997-998.
^Freeman, R. E. Lee, II: p. 5.
^Jefferson Davis to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, March 14, 1862, in OR, Series 4, I: p.
997; see also entry of March 14, 1862, Bragg diary, pp. 183- 
184.
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March 13 to order Lee "assigned to duty at the seat of 
government" and "under the direction of the President . . .
charged with the conduct of military operation in the armies 
of the Confederacy."51
Lee did not welcome another desk assignment--"I cannot 
see either advantage or pleasure in my duties"--and the 
newspapers denigrated it as a reduction "from a commanding 
general to an orderly sergeant."52 Historians have tended 
to interpret Lee's distaste and the public derision of the 
position as supporting the view that Davis had nominated him 
for an essentially powerless advisory post. Freeman 
described the assignment thus: "Broadly speaking, Davis
entrusted to him the minor vexatious matters of detail and 
the counseling of commanders in charge of the smaller 
armies. On the larger strategic issues the President 
usually consulted him and was often guided by his advice, 
but in no single instance was Lee given a free hand to 
initiate and direct to full completion any plan of magni­
tude. He had to work by suggestion rather than by command.
. . . "The grandiose official designation was almost 
meaningless," contended Clifford Dowdey, "and he was advisor
5lGeneral Orders No. 14, Adjutant and Inspector 
General's Office, March 13, 1862, in OR, V: p. 1099.
52Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, March 14, 1862, in Dowdey 
and Manarin, Wartime Papers, pp. 127-128; Freeman, R . E .
Lee, II: p . 6.
53preeman, R. E. Lee, II: pp. 6-7.
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in name only. From the beginning, Davis apparently regarded 
Lee as something of an executive assistant. . . ."54 More 
recently, historians Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones have 
argued that "Davis created informally through Lee's appoint­
ment a modern chief of staff," an interpretation that 
credits Lee with more power than previously assumed, but 
still characterizes him as having no actual command authori­
ty. 55
This was not the case. From March 14 until June, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee styled himself and functioned as the Confeder­
acy's commanding general. Davis referred to him as the 
"Commanding General" as did the Secretary of W a r . ^5 Walter 
Taylor described his duties as "military advisor to the 
President and as commanding general of all the armies in the 
f i e l d . " 5 7  Colonel T .  A .  Washington and Major A .  L. Long, 
both of whom soon joined Lee's staff, habitually referred to 
him as the commanding general, and phrased letters in his
54oowdey and Manarin, Wartime Papers, p. 124.
55Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won,
A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana, IL: University
of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 124.
56jefferson Davis to the editor of the Louisville 
Courier-Journal, May 7, 1887, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, 
Constitutionalist, XI: p. 553; George W. Randolph to Robert
E. Lee, April 2, 1862, in LS-SW, Vol. 6-7.
57walter H. Taylor, Four Years with General Lee (New 
York: D. Appleton, 1877), p. 43; see also Walter H. Taylor,
General Lee, His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-1865, with 
Personal Reminiscences (Norfolk: Nusbaum, 1906), p. 38.
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behalf as definitive orders and not requests.58 Lee acted 
directly, and not at all as if he believed his title to be 
purely nominal. On his own authority he issued General 
Orders to the army, transferred troops from one department 
to another, and directed the Adjutant-General's Office to 
settle organizational questions to his specifications. He 
signed the majority of his letters to the commanders of 
departments as "Robert E. Lee, General, Commanding."^9
Following United States Army precedent, Lee did not 
seek to closely control the activities of Albert Sidney 
Johnston, because Johnston's commission outranked Lee's 
appointed position. But, in all his dealings with other 
generals, there is ample evidence that Lee's command 
authority was acknowledged throughout the army. General 
Cooper immediately began to forward all operational inquir­
ies from field commanders to "General Lee, Commanding." The 
list of general officers who directly addressed Lee as the
S^For example, see T. A. Washington to Samuel Cooper, 
April 4, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 30.
59The correspondence preserved in OR is not necessarily 
representative of Lee's habits in signing his letters or 
with respect to his personal command authority. Many of the 
direct orders that he issued during the period under 
consideration were of a direct technical nature and not 
chosen for inclusion. See Robert E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, 
March 18, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, March 
18, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Theophilus Holmes, March 19,
1862, Walter H. Taylor to Benjamin Huger, March 25, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee to Gustavus W. Smith, April 1, 1862, in Robert 
E. Lee Letterbook, National Archives, Washington, DC 
(hereafter cited as Lee Letterbook); Robert E. Lee to Samuel 
Cooper, April 17, 1862, Robert E. Lee to George W. Randolph, 
April 20, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 30.
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commanding general included P. 0. Hebert in Texas, Henry 
Heth and Humphrey Marshall in western Virginia, Benjamin 
Huger in Norfolk, John Bankhead Magruder in Yorktown, John 
Pemberton in South Carolina, and even Joseph Johnston 
himself.60
Clearly, Jefferson Davis did not recall Lee from the 
Atlantic coast to serve as a figurehead. Though Lee 
commanded "under the direction of the President," this 
qualification existed in both Davis's appointment orders and 
the vetoed legislation. In point of fact, the only diminu­
tion of power intended by the President was the prohibition 
against Lee assuming a field command without positive 
orders. To have emasculated the post would have defeated 
the intent of Davis to make Lee the direct supervising 
commander for the defense of Richmond.
The problem that developed in the triangular relation­
ship between Davis, Johnston, and Lee was not, therefore, 
one of any ambiguity in Lee's authority. It was one of 
strategic conception: Lee did not agree with the premise
upon which Davis and Johnston had agreed to conduct opera­
tions. Though necessity had required him to retire inland
60por the best explanation of United States Army 
precedent for the conduct of the commanding general, see 
Robert F. Stohlman, Jr., The Powerless Position, The 
Commanding General of the Army of the United States, 1864- 
1903 (Manhattan, KS: Kansas State University, 1975), pp. 2-
12, in which he discusses the position in the prewar army. 
For an early situation in which rank distinctions played a 
part in limiting the Commanding General's authority, see 
Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. 170-172.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
182
to oppose the Federals along the coast, Lee consistently 
disapproved of intentionally relinquishing territory in 
anticipation of an enemy offensive. He outlined his 
rationale for retaining positions as far forward as possible 
in a letter to Major-General John C. Breckinridge in March, 
1864:
The enemy generally, in his advances in the 
country, threatens several sections and rapidly 
advances against one, and concentration of our 
troops can only be made on a retired line. The 
longer, however, he can be held on an advanced 
line the more certainly can concentration be made 
to oppose him in retired positions.61
There was an emotional as well as an intellectual
component to Lee's disinclination to yield Virginia soil to
the Yankees. Much of his personality was tied up with his
identification as a Virginian; during the secession crisis,
Freeman represents Lee as "determined from the outset that
he would adhere to Virginia and defend her from any foe."62
Though it is probably incorrect to extend this argument as
far as have Thomas Connelly and Archer Jones, and to assert
that "one might infer that Lee was fighting for Virginia and
not the South," there is little room to doubt that Lee felt
a special obligation to contest the Federals grudgingly for
every piece of the Old Dominion's t e r r i t o r y . 63
6lRobert E. Lee to John C. Breckinridge, March 23,
1864, in OR, XXXIII: p. 1239.
62preeman, R. E. Lee, I: p. 434.
63connelly and Jones, Politics of Command, p. 46.
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Lee had even more personal reasons to reject strategic 
withdrawals. He had already lost his ancestral home at 
Arlington to Union occupation in 1861, which concerned Lee 
for financial as well as emotional reasons: "everything at
Arlington will I fear be lost," he had written G. W. C. Lee 
in January, 1862, "& it will take all the land at the White 
House & Romancoke to pay the legacies to the girls with 
interest."64 But a Federal advance up York River would 
threaten White House directly, endangering not only the 
family's financial stability but also the safety of Lee's 
invalid w i f e . 65 These were, however, secondary considera­
tions. Lee, like many other Southerners, was willing to 
risk personal ruin and family disaster to achieve indepen­
dence .
To Lee, Davis's plan to withdraw Johnston's army— and 
Jackson's detachment in the Valley— simply made little, if 
any, military sense, especially in the light of the Virgin­
ia 's apparent ability to defend the mouth of the James 
River. After the war, he confided to Colonel John S. Mosby 
that he believed that Johnston's withdrawal had been a great 
mistake.66 Attorney-General Bragg noticed on March 10 that,
64Robert E. Lee to G. W. C. Lee, January 19, 1862, in 
Dowdey and Manarin, Wartime Papers, p. 105.
65Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, April 4, 1862, in Ibid., 
p . 142 .
66charles Wells, Russell, ed., The Memoirs of Colonel 
John S. Mosby (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1917), p.
375 .
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with respect to Johnston's withdrawal, Lee "had not been
informed of it, I suppose, and to me it seemed he did not
approve of the movement."^
Lee's letter to Holmes on March 16 is also significant
with regard to his appreciation of the military situation in
Virginia. After observing that the muddy condition of the
roads would probably prevent a general advance by McClellan,
he continued:
but that he will advance upon our line as soon as 
he can, I have no doubt. To retard his movements, 
cut him up in detail if possible, attack him at 
disadvantage, and, if practicable, drive him back, 
will of course be your effort and study. It is 
not the plan of the Government to abandon any 
country that can be held, and it is only the 
necessity of the case, I presume, that has caused 
the withdrawal of the troops to the Rappahannock.
I trust there will be no necessity of retrograding 
farther. The position of the main body of the 
Army of the Potomac seems to have been taken in ■ 
reference to the reported advance of the enemy up 
the Shenandoah Valley. A report from General 
Johnston of his plans and intentions has not yet 
been received. His movements are doubtless 
regulated by those of the enemy. . . . [emphasis 
added
For Lee, ten days after arriving in Richmond, and three days 
after his appointment to the army's senior post, to say that 
"it is not the plan of the Government to abandon any country 
that can be held," represented a complete reversal of 
Jefferson Davis's pronouncement to an astonished cabinet on 
February 19 that "the time had come for diminishing the
67Entry of March 10, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 178.
®®Robert E. Lee to Theophilus Holmes, March 16, 1862, 
in OR, V: p. 1103.
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extent of our lines. . . . "  Thus, Davis's hard line in 
response to Johnston's withdrawal may well have been a 
reaction to Lee's strongly held opinion that strategic 
retreats were not only unnecessary but positively dangerous.
If such was the case, then it would explain the next 
immediate controversy between Davis and Johnston: where to
position his army. At the February 20 cabinet meeting,
Davis ordered Johnston "to have a reconnaissance of the 
country in his rear with reference to another line, and it 
is probable the Rappahannock will be selected."69 But 
Johnston had trouble securing sufficient engineers to 
perform such a s u r v e y . ^0 Besides, Davis's February 28 
letter lead him to think that the position of his forces was 
a strategic, rather that a tactical, question; he would 
locate his army however close the President thought it 
should be to Richmond, and fortify that position as best he 
could.
Accordingly, on March 13, Johnston informed Davis that 
as soon as he had emptied the reserve depot at Culpeper 
Court House "I shall cross the Rapidan and take such a 
position as you may think best in connection with those of 
other troops."71 The President asserted in 1865 that he
^Entry of February 20, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 156.
^Ojohnston, Narrative, p. 445.
71-Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 13,
1862, in OR, LI (part 2): p. 1073.
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took this as a declaration that Johnston was "ignorant of 
the topography of the country in his r e a r . "72 yet Johns­
ton's letter itself contains strong evidence that such was 
not the case, for it included a well-conceived suggestion 
for the positioning of the army. "By proper management of 
the railroad it seems to me that, from the neighborhood of 
Gordonsville 20,000, or even 30,000, men might be thrown 
into Richmond in a single day." Centering his divisions on 
Gordonsville would also leave Johnston ready to dispatch 
troops quickly to support Jackson in the S h e n a n d o a h . 73
But the President chose to interpret Johnston's letter 
in the narrowest possible terms, and essentially to repudi­
ate his own strategic design of the previous month. Instead 
of acknowledging his intent to bring Johnston's army within 
supporting distance of the capital, Davis wrote to the 
General:
I have not the requisite topographical knowledge 
for the selection of your new position. I had 
intended that you should determine that question.
. . . The question of throwing troops into
Richmond is contingent upon reverses in the West 
and Southeast. The immediate necessity for such a 
movement is not anticipated.74
"To further inquiry from General Johnston as to where
72jefferson Davis to James Phelan, February 18, 1865, 
in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, VI': pp.
493-494.
73joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 13, 
1862, in OR, LI (part 2): p. 1074.
74jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 15, 
1862, in OR, V: pp. 527-528.
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he should take position," Davis said in his memoirs, "I 
replied that I would go to his headquarters in the field, 
and found him on the south bank of the river, to which he 
had retired, in a position possessing great natural advanta­
ges. "75 The narrative of this visit is extremely confusing, 
and many of the specifics are contradicted by other evi­
dence. Davis implied that the visit began at Rapidan 
Station and continued to Fredericksburg only when Johnston 
expressed ignorance of the defensive potential of the lower 
part of the Rappahannock River. But Johnston and his staff 
consistently denied throughout the decades following the war 
that the President had ever visited the main body of the 
army.76 The dates and locations of the correspondence of 
Davis and Johnston, as well as casual references to the trip 
by Lee and Bragg, all suggest that the President took the 
train to Fredericksburg on March 21 and returned to Richmond 
in the evening of March 22.77 He did, however, travel to 
Fredericksburg via Gordonsville, but there is no direct
75oavis, Rise and Fall, I: p. 465.
7^The testimony of Johnston's aides was omitted in the 
abridgement of his article from the Century Magazine for 
publication in B&L; see Johnston, "Responsibilities," B&L, 
I: p. 257; Joseph E. Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines,"
Century Magazine, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (May 1885): pp. 109-110.
77Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, March 22, 1862, in Dowdey 
and Manarin, Wartime Papers, pp. 133-134; entries of March 
21, 1862, March 24, 1862, Bragg diary, pp. 190-191.
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evidence that he visited Johnston's lines t h e r e . ^8 Even 
when he was collecting evidence for his memoirs, all the 
statements submitted to Davis in 1885 only mentioned a visit 
to Fredericksburg, not to the R a p i d a n . ^ 9
Specific itinerary aside, why did Jefferson Davis visit 
Joseph Johnston at all? Davis claimed that he did so to 
help Johnston select a satisfactory defensive position, a 
task made necessary because Johnston "had neglected the 
primary duty of a commander" in determining a safe line of 
retreat. If this was the case, it is difficult to explain 
why the President waited a week after receiving Johnston's 
inquiry to act. By the time Davis met Johnston, the army 
had already taken a permanent line on the south bank of the 
Rappahannock, complete with artillery emplacements on 
commanding hills and entrenchments around the bridges. Nor 
does it make sense for the Chief Executive of the Confeder­
ate States to spend two days surveying a defensive line 
forty miles north of the capital when he had just appointed 
a commanding general to supervise the operations of the 
armies in the field.
Contemporary letters and telegrams suggest that Davis
7®hnn Eliza Gordon to Douglas A. Gordon, March 22,
1862, provided by Robert K. Krick, to whom I am indebted for 
the information.
79j. t . Doswell to William S. Barton, August 10, 1885, 
John L. Mayre to William S. Barton, August 11, 1885, 
statement of Frank T. Forbes, August 15, 1885, in Rowland, 
Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, IX: pp. 377-378, 381-
383 .
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visited Johnston for another reason entirely. Federal 
advances in North Carolina and the first landing of troops 
from the Army of the Potomac at Fortress Monroe had con­
vinced Davis— and Lee— that the main Union effort was to be 
made against either Richmond or Norfolk from the south­
east.^^ The President went to see Johnston in order to 
gauge personally the feasibility of withdrawing some 
infantry and artillery from the Department of Northern 
Virginia to reinforce the other departments defending 
Richmond. He also needed to find a senior commander to 
accompany the troops.81 Fully aware of Johnston's sensitiv­
ity to having his army raided for general officers, Davis 
probably decided that it would be better to confront the 
issue in person.
Davis planned to have two brigades of infantry, each 
supported by an artillery battery, sent to the capital, from 
which they could be deployed with about a day's notice to 
North Carolina, Norfolk, Yorktown, or even back to the 
R a p p a h a n n o c k . 82 Loath as he was to part with any of his 
soldiers, Johnston recognized that this sort of maneuver was
SORobert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, March 18, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 385-386; Robert E. Lee to Jefferson
Davis, March 22, 1862, in OR, LI (part 2): p. 512.
81jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 22,
1862, in OR, V: p. 392; Robert E. Lee to Jefferson Davis,
March 22, 1862, in OR, LI (part 2): p. 512.
82jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 22,
1862, in OR, V: p. 392; Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel
Cooper, March 24, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 27.
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precisely why he had been withdrawn closer to Richmond, and 
he could not have argued against the logic of establishing a 
centrally located reserve, no matter how small.
Besides, Davis's plan allowed Johnston to rid himself 
of one general in whom he had little confidence, and advance 
another for whom he had great plans. Theophilus Holmes had 
never been a favorite with his commander, and his loud fits 
of pique at being kept in the dark during the withdrawal had 
greatly embarrassed Johnston. Since then, even though 
reinforced by Whiting's 7,000 men, Holmes maintained an 
incessant barrage to Richmond on the untenability of his 
p o s i t i o n . 83 Unfortunately, his date of rank made him senior 
to every other Major-General in the Department of Northern 
Virginia except G. W. Smith.84 gut as a native North 
Carolinian, Holmes was a politically acceptable choice if a 
senior officer had to be sent to oppose Burnside. Johnston, 
therefore, was hardly unhappy about agreeing to let him go. 
Holmes's departure paved the way to advance Smith from 
division commander to the semi-independent command of the 
Aquia District.85
Johnston and Davis seem to have had only one prolonged
83Theophilus Holmes to Robert E. Lee, March 14, 1862, 
Theophilus Holmes to Robert E. Lee, March 15, 1862--Lee's 
correspondence in reply indicates that Holmes also wrote on 
March 16 and 17; see OR, V: pp. 1100, 1103, 1104-1105,
1106.
84warner, Generals in Gray, pp. 84, 141, 151, 192, 281.
85johnston, Narrative, p. 109.
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private conversation during the President's stay in Freder­
icksburg. That occurred around midday on March 22, when the 
two men rode north across the Rappahannock onto Stafford 
Heights, accompanied only by a few aides, who discreetly 
fell back out of earshot.®® What they discussed remains a 
subject for conjecture; neither man ever alluded to the
conversation in letters or memoirs. But, at the end of the
ride, President Davis did agree with General Johnston that 
the north bank of the river, and even the city of Freder­
icksburg, could not be held against a determined enemy
attack. To one of Holmes's aides Davis quipped, "To use a
slang phraze [sic], your town of Fredericksburg is right in 
the wrong place."87 Following this excursion, the President 
met with several delegations of townspeople; drafted the 
orders detaching Holmes, two brigades, and two batteries 
from Johnston's army; and caught the afternoon mail train 
back to Richmond.®®
Those two weeks, from March 7 to March 22, 1862, 
represented a definite, if undramatic, turning point in the 
Confederate defense of Richmond. Davis, once committed to a 
close defense of Richmond, was now vacillating between his
®®J. T. Doswell to William S. Barton, August 10, 1885, 
in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, IX: pp.
377-378.
®7Ibid.
®®Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 22,
1862, in OR, V: p. 392.
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own concept and that of Lee, which envisioned keeping the 
Federals at arm's length for the longest practical time. 
Eventually, by mid-April, Davis would subscribe totally to 
Lee's idea of defending as much of Virginia as possible, 
instead of concentrating on the defense of the capital. But 
between March 22 and April 17, 1862, neither Davis nor Lee 
had complete control of Confederate strategy.
From Johnston's perspective, the result was a series of 
mixed messages from his high command. First, the President 
seemed to authorize his withdrawal from the frontier, and 
then he essentially repudiated it. Next, Davis told 
Johnston on March 15 that there was no immediate need to 
consider shuttling troops into the capital, and reversed 
himself a week later. Johnston represented the President 
during this visit in his Narrative as "uncertain," and his 
correspondence over the next few weeks indicated that he 
often wondered just who was in charge of operations in 
Virginia— Davis or L e e ? 8 9
89j0hnston, Narrative, p. 109.
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Chapter Six 
Should Yorktown Be Defended?
Sixty miles south of Norfolk, on March 20, 1862, the 
Federal transport, Delaware, deposited two companies of 
Colonel Thomas G. Stevenson's 24th Massachusetts on the 
undefended wharves at Washington, North Carolina. The 
cannon had been removed from the batteries designed to 
protect the town, and the pilings sunk to obstruct the Tar 
River were too far under the water to keep back a shallow- 
draft transport. A drill-master of some repute in the 
prewar Massachusetts militia, Stevenson formed his men up 
and marched them smartly into the center of the town. At 
the court house "we nailed the Stars and Stripes to a flag­
pole" while "the band played national airs and the men 
cheered." The Bay State soldiers then reshouldered arms, 
marched to their boats, and steamed back down to Pamlico 
Sound. The astonished residents of Washington had been 
"occupied" for about an hour, but the message was clear: 
the United States Navy could land troops almost anywhere 
along the unprotected Confederate coast.-*-
But as disquieting as was the news out of North
1"Report of Col. Thomas G. Stevenson, Twenty-fourth 
Massachusetts Infantry," March 23, 1862, in OR, IX: pp.
269-270; Sifakis, Who Was Who, p. 624.
193
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Carolina, a more ominous storm was finally breaking; when 
Joseph Johnston and Jefferson Davis conferred in Fredericks­
burg, McClellan had already begun his much-delayed grand 
offensive. New York Times reporter William Swinton watched 
in awe as the Army of the Potomac struck its camps around 
Washington, D. C. and marched down to the docks at Alexan­
dria and Annapolis. Four hundred assorted steamers and 
schooners, escorted by the North Atlantic Blockading 
Squadron, had been contracted to shift McClellan's entire 
army to Fortress Monroe as the prelude to his advance on 
Richmond. Swinton watched, day after day, as the troops 
tramped across the wharves and jammed themselves into the 
transports. The figures went down in his notebook as the 
Yankee soldiers boarded the boats: "one hundred and twenty-
one thousand five hundred men, fourteen thousand five 
hundred and ninety-two animals, forty-four batteries, and 
the wagons and ambulances, ponton-trains [sic], telegraph 
materials, and enormous equipage required for an army of 
such magnitude. . . ."2
The movement of such a considerable host, spread out 
over several weeks, could not be concealed. Confederate 
pickets stationed near Gloucester Point on York River 
reported "Twenty-eight steamers, four floating batteries, 
[and] twenty-six sails of different kinds" heading for Fort
^Swinton, Campaigns, p. 100.
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Monroe on March 2 0.3 From Norfolk the same afternoon, a 
signal officer observed the arrival of "nineteen steamers 
loaded with troops and nine schooners" in Hampton Roads.4 
The flotilla seemed endless: "sometimes I counted several
hundred vessels at the anchorage, and among them twenty or 
twenty-five large steam transports waiting for their turn to 
come up to the quay and land the fifteen or twenty thousand 
men whom they brought," recalled the Prince de Joinville.3 
A civilian reported to Magruder's pickets on March 24 that 
"the re-enforcements of the enemy that arrived at Old Point 
yesterday . . . extend as far as the eye can observe toward 
Hampton. The force is immense— entirely out of my power to 
estimate."^ From Yorktown, Magruder had no such qualms 
about guessing: he placed Federal numbers between Fortress
Monroe and Newport News that day at 35,000. "Should he 
advance now he would carry all the strong points, and re­
enforcements would be too late," Magruder warned the 
Secretary of War.^
The problem for the Confederates was that McClellan's
3Charles A. Crump to John B. Magruder, March 20, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 388.
4James S. Milligan to John B. Magruder, March 20, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 388.
3de Joinville, Army of the Potomac, p. 34.
^Charles Collins to John A. Winston, March 24, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 394.
7john B. Magruder to George W. Randolph, March 24,
1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 392-393.
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intentions were far from clear. That the Union commander 
might be moving his entire army down the Chesapeake Bay was 
only one of a number of options which Davis and Lee had to 
consider. McClellan could be planning to deploy one or two 
corps to Fortress Monroe to attack Yorktown or Norfolk to 
draw Confederate reserves away from a projected advance from 
Manassas or Aquia Creek. Hampton Roads might also be just a 
temporary stopping place for divisions reinforcing Major- 
General Ambrose Burnside's operations in Pamlico Sound, 
which threatened Norfolk from the South. Nor could a 
similar transfer of troops to augment the long-awaited 
Federal attack on Savannah be ruled out.
Lee had no choice but to entrain Holmes and his two 
brigades for North Carolina as soon as they arrived in 
Richmond, to prop up the sagging defenses and morale of the 
state.® Thus, Jefferson Davis's central reserve had been 
committed at the very start of the campaign. The remaining 
troops around Richmond were dispatched to Magruder, but this 
amounted to no more than two Alabama infantry regiments 
which had been kept at the capital because they suffered 
from a high degree of sickness, and the cavalry battalion of 
the shattered Wise Legion. Lee also alerted Magruder and 
Huger to be prepared to reinforce each other in an emergen-
®Robert E. Lee to Theophilus Holmes, March 23, 1862, 
Special Orders No. 67, Adjutant and Inspector General's 
Office, March 24, 1862, in OR, IX: pp. 450-451.
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cy.9 Once those moves had been made, Confederate forces in 
a long arc from the lower Shenandoah Valley, extending along 
the line of the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg, down the 
York River to Gloucester and Yorktown, across the James to 
Norfolk, along the line of the Wilmington and Weldon 
Railroad through North Carolina, and down the South Carolina 
and Georgia coasts, had been fully deployed. No point could 
be materially strengthened without a corresponding weakness 
at another, and no substantial field army could be collected 
without denuding some vital position almost completely.
Such dispersal bothered the President, in part because 
it seemed like a return to the fully extended lines which 
had failed so miserably in Tennessee, and in part because he 
had become a believer in concentrating larger field armies 
for offensive blows. Lee, on the other hand, had a distinct 
propensity for conducting operations with separate columns, 
and never seems to have doubted his own ability to delay the 
enemy long enough with detachments to force him to reveal 
his objective. Once that happened, Lee would marshal his 
own forces to fight it out on ground of his own choosing.10
^Walter H. Taylor to John B. Magruder, March 24, 1862, 
George W. Randolph to John B. Magruder, March 25, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, March 25, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 3): pp. 393-394, 396-397.
lOjohn Morgan Dederer, "The Origins of Robert E. Lee's 
Bold Generalship: A Reinterpretation," Military Affairs,
Vol. XLVI (1985): pp. 117-123; Connelly and Jones, Politics
of Command, pp. 31-33; see also Louis H. Manarin, "Lee in 
Command: Strategical and Tactical Policies," (Ph.D.
dissertation, Duke University, 1965).
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In this case, as soon as Lee became convinced that McClellan 
was intent on advancing up the York-James Peninsula, he 
commenced shuffling reinforcements to the Yorktown line.
Douglas Southall Freeman described his policy as "a 
most interesting example of provisional reconcentration to 
meet an undeveloped offensive," and a "daring, piecemeal 
reconcentration" accomplished with the full support of 
Jefferson Davis. Freeman also asserted that Lee's concept 
had to be implemented in spite of the resistance of Johns­
ton: "several days' exchange of correspondence . . .
convinced Lee that his old friend would not willingly fall 
in with his plan."!-*- Freeman's interpretation overstates 
the concord between Lee and Davis, and exaggerates the 
apparent friction between Lee and Johnston out of all 
proportion.
Davis, in fact, favored a proposal made by Magruder as 
early as March 21 that, given 30,000 reinforcements from 
Johnston's army, he would attempt to "crush the enemy, and 
perhaps with the assistance of the Virginia take Fort 
Monroe. . . ."12 ijlie President directed Lee to sound out 
Johnston on the feasibility of the plan, which the command­
ing general did on March 25, but in language that carefully 
disowned responsibility for the idea: "The President
HFreeman, R. E. Lee, II: pp. 14, 17, 19.
12john B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, March 21, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 389-390.
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desires to know with what force you could march to re­
enforce the Army of the Peninsula or Norfolk. . . . [F]rom 
the accounts received nothing less than 20,000 or 30,000 men 
will be sufficient, with the troops already in position, 
successfully to oppose them." [emphasis added]13 Lee knew 
that such a number of troops represented the majority of 
Johnston's force, and that for him "to organize a part of 
your troops to hold your present line, and to prepare the 
remainder to move to this city, to be thrown on the point 
attacked," would be tantamount to exposing central Virginia 
to the Federals.14 Later correspondence indicated that he 
had expected Johnston to object to such a proposition, which 
may have accounted for his repeated emphasis that the plan 
had been originated by Davis: "The object of the President
is to prepare you for a movement which now appears impera­
tive, as no troops are available but those of your army to 
meet the enemy concentrating on the coast." [emphasis 
added]15
Lee wrote to Johnston concerning a wholesale shift of 
his army because Davis instructed him to do so. But a 
subsequent letter to Margurder clearly indicated that he did 
not think it yet time to begin decisively concentrating the
l^Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, March 25, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 397.
14Ibid.
ISlbid.
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Confederacy's forces. That letter, dated March 26, revealed 
that his own thinking ran along different lines. He began 
by observing that it was still impossible to tell whether 
the Union Army intended to attack Norfolk or advance on 
Richmond. Thus, he concluded, "until some conclusion can be 
drawn as to his point of attack it would be manifestly 
improper to accumulate at either the army to oppose him." 
[emphasis added]
But Johnston had no reason to suspect that Lee and 
Davis did not completely agree on proper strategy. Besides, 
Lee's March 25 letter accorded perfectly with what Johnston 
had understood to be Davis's original strategy for protect­
ing Richmond: utilizing interior lines to transfer troops
from one threatened point to another. After the departure 
of Holmes's two brigades, the Department of Northern 
Virginia deployed about 3 5,000 men between Fredericksburg 
and the Rapidan. Johnston, in a response that seems to have 
confounded Lee, quickly agreed to the premise of a massive 
transfer of his divisions: "If summoned to Richmond, I
shall leave on this frontier only such a force as is now
employed on outpost duty, for the mere purpose of masking
the movement. This will enable me to take to Richmond at
least 25,000 men. . . ."■'-7
^Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, March 26, 1862, in 
OR, p. 398.
l ^ J o s e p h  e. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, March 26, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 400-401.
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The next day, in support of his belief that a movement 
away from his line could be successfully covered by a 
screening force with little risk, Johnston forwarded to 
Richmond an intelligence report from Ewell's Division. The 
letter contained several observations which indicated that 
the Federal forces around Manassas had no intention of 
advancing. "Soldiers are in good spirits, saying they do 
not expect another battle will be fought. . . . They are 
working very slowly at Bull Run Bridge, apparently for 
effect. No other repairs are going on. . . . [A]ll the 
soldiers now at Manassas look to be removed to another 
point."18
Much to Johnston's surprise, a telegram arrived from 
Lee on March 27, ordering him not to move his army to 
Richmond as previously suggested, but to detach and forward
10,000 men to the Confederate capital.19 The decision made 
no sense to Johnston: "the division of the troops of this
department made by the telegram of this afternoon leaves on 
this line a force too weak to oppose an invasion, and 
furnishes to the threatened point a re-enforcement too small 
to command success." But he obediently ordered 7,500 men 
from the main body and a brigade of 2,500 from G. W. Smith's
18w. Stoddert to Joseph E. Johnston, March 26, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 401.
l^The telegram has not been preserved, but Johnston's 
reponse is Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, March 27, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 405.
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district entrained for Richmond. Johnston's only remon­
strance against the order was a request that the authorities 
in Richmond reconsider their original plan: "I beg leave,
with all deference, to suggest to the President the expedi­
ency of transferring to the point about to be attacked the 
whole available force of this department."20
Again he forwarded intelligence reports that suggested 
that the Federals had no offensive intentions in northern 
Virginia or the Valley, beyond movements designed to 
distract Confederate attention from the true point of 
attack. There was activity among the Yankees around 
Manassas, but Johnston's pickets were quite skeptical about 
any possibility of a Federal attack. General Stuart 
concluded from the reports of his cavalry outposts that 
Major-General Edwin V. Sumner's II Corps "made a great to-do 
crossing and recrossing Cedar Run, firing artillery at a few 
vedettes, and the like. . . .  I begin to think this is a 
mere demonstration."21 Jackson reported that, after his 
abortive attack at Kernstown, "the enemy are still at 
Strasburg, and I see no indication of an a d v a n c e . "22
Lee responded on March 28 with two very confusing
20joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, March 27, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 405.
21j. E. B. Stuart to Joseph E. Johnston, March 27, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 406-407.
22'i1homas J. Jackson to Joseph E. Johnston, March 27, 
1862, in OR, XII (part 3): p. 840.
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letters. The first indicated that when the dispatch 
ordering Johnston to detach 10,000 troops had been sent, 
Johnston's own letter agreeing to bring 25,000 had not yet 
been received in Richmond. The letter then placed upon 
Johnston the responsibility of deciding how many troops to 
send, but without giving him any indication of whether 
northern or eastern Virginia was considered to be the most 
threatened point. "[I]t is inferred that you apprehend to 
attack upon your line. If this inference is correct, you 
can commence the movement of your troops to this place." 
Next, Lee informed Johnston that President Davis had been 
responsible for reducing the number of troops to be trans­
ferred from 25,000 to 10,000, because he desired "to have a 
portion in position here to throw where required, while the 
balance might follow if necessary. . . . "  Reiterating that 
it was still not possible to determine the ultimate objec­
tive of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ended by leaving the 
decision completely up to Johnston: "You can therefore,
with this understanding of the case, proceed to forward the 
desired re-enforcements in part or whole, as in your 
judgment they can be spared from the defense of your 
line."23
This letter left more questions unresolved than it 
answered. Having sent Holmes and his two brigades to North
23Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, March 28, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 408.
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Carolina, was it the intent of Davis and Lee to reestablish 
a central reserve at Richmond and attempt to hold every­
where? If so, the idea seemed to contradict the earlier 
precept of throwing the entire army against one Federal 
advance. Nor did Lee ever explain why it would not be 
preferable to have a large force at Richmond, regardless of 
whether McClellan planned to attack Yorktown or Norfolk. 
"With this understanding of the case," Lee had said,
Johnston could use his discretion in deciding whether to 
send 10,000 men or himself bring 25,000 to Richmond. But 
there was no such "understanding" to be derived from the 
letter— it included no hint of just how high a priority 
Johnston should assign to the Rappahannock line.
Lee's second letter could only have deepened Johnston's 
confusion. In it, Lee suggested that the greatest disaster 
that could happen would be the loss of the upper Shenandoah 
Valley, which he believed would follow if Johnston were 
forced off his present line. The decision as to whether to 
detach 10,000 or march with 25,000 men was still to be 
Johnston's, but now Lee had added an entirely new con­
straint, protecting the rail line between Richmond and 
Staunton. "As a mode of expressing to you the limit which 
it is intended to affix I will cite the remark of the 
President, that the loss of the Central road and communica­
tion with the valley at Staunton would be more injurious 
than the withdrawal from the Peninsula and the evacuation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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N o r f o l k . "24 This sentence would have stood out in Johns­
ton's view as distinctly as if it had been written in red 
letters a foot high, because it represented yet another 
reversal on the part of Jefferson Davis. Just a month 
prior, the President had informed Johnston and his cabinet 
that he planned to withdraw up the Shenandoah Valley as far 
as Staunton as an integral part of his strategy to subordi­
nate the defense of Virginia to the defense of Richmond.
Now Johnston was being told that the loss of Norfolk--whicn 
necessarily entailed the loss of the shipbuilding capacity 
at the Navy Yard as well as the probable scuttling of the 
Virginia— and a retreat up the Peninsula which would allow a 
Federal advance within a dozen miles of Richmond— were both 
preferable to the loss of his line on the Rappahannock. It 
almost seemed as if Lee intended to provide Johnston with 
reasons not to move his army to Richmond.
In the wake of these letters, Johnston declined to send 
any more of his brigades to Richmond without specific 
orders; he was not willing to take the responsibility for 
denuding a line suddenly declared critical by his commanding 
g e n e r a l . 25 He possessed no estimates of the strength of the 
enemy on the Peninsula, or, for that matter, any information 
concerning the numbers of Magruder's army or the reliability
24Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, March 28, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 409.
25phillips, Correspondence, p. 593.
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of his defensive line. Nor did he feel that such a decision 
should be his to make— was the coordination of the several 
armies defending Richmond not why Lee had returned to 
Virginia? He could only speculate about the reasons for the 
hesitations and vacillations of his superiors, and their 
inconsistencies did not relieve him from the responsibility 
to defend his own lines until directed elsewhere.
Thus, Johnston spent the next few days consolidating 
his own defenses. Jackson's abortive attack on a Federal 
division at Kernstown on March 23 revealed the strength of 
Major-General Nathaniel Banks' Union forces in the lower 
Shenandoah. Johnston ordered Jackson to avoid further 
combat unless he could lure the enemy far enough south to 
make rapid reinforcement from the main army and a surprise 
attack with superior numbers feasible.26 Ewell's Division 
and Stuart's Cavalry Brigade, the army's only units north of 
the Rapidan River, had been left to picket as actively as 
possible, in order to avoid the Federals launching a 
surprise attack of their own. But it became daily more 
evident that no Union advance from Manassas was contem­
plated, and that the center of Johnston's line— four 
divisions under Lonstreet, Hill, Early, and D. R. Jones— was 
by far the most secure portion.
Accordingly, Johnston delegated temporary command of
2^The letters from Johnston to Jackson are not in OR, 
but he briefed Davis on his orders in Joseph E. Johnston to 
Jefferson Davis, March 26, 1862, in OR, XII (part 3): p. 838.
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the main body to Longstreet and rode to G. W. Smith's 
headquarters at Fredericksburg. Smith's post was certainly 
the most exposed in the Department of Northern Virginia. 
Though his six brigades contained twice as many men as 
Jackson's Division in the Valley, his location was suscepti­
ble to an amphibious flanking movement from several angles. 
Union transports could ascend the Rappahannock as far as 
Fort Lowry; and, if McClellan gained access to York River, 
he could place a sizeable force on Smith's supply line. 
Combined with what was, at the time, the universally 
admitted indefensibility of the city of Fredericksburg from 
a frontal assault, Smith's men were in a precarious situa­
tion. Making matters worse, no direct telegraph line 
existed between Fredericksburg and Rapidan Station, which 
meant that any emergency communication had to pass through 
the hands of the telegraph operators in Richmond; those 
operators did not work at night.27
Johnston seems to have arrived in Fredericksburg about 
March 30, and remained there until April 5.^8 He and Smith
27joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 4, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 419-420.
28The last indication of Johnston's presence at Rapidan 
is A. P. Mason to Jubal A. Early, March 30, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 3): p. 412. After that, the orders and correspond­
ence indicate that Johnston had left Longstreet in command 
there. See J. E. B. Stuart to James Longstreet, April 2, 
1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 4, 1862, in OR, 
XI (part 3): pp. 415-416, 420; Thomas J. Jackson to James
Longstreet, April 3, 1862, Thomas J. Jackson to James
Longstreet, April 5, 1862, Thomas J. Jackson to James
Longstreet, April 5, 1862, in OR, XII (part 3): pp. 842-
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certainly spent a good deal of time discussing their ideas 
of the correct approach to Confederate strategy. The army 
commander conducted several reviews of the troops in order 
to bolster morale.29 Yet the entire visit was pervaded by a 
sense that Johnston was simply marking time, waiting for Lee 
and Davis to decide how to use his army.
Curiously, between March 29 and April 2, Johnston 
neither sent any communications to Richmond nor received any 
from Lee. None appear in the Official Records, but that is 
hardly conclusive evidence; a great many of Johnston's 
letters and telegrams do not appear, therein. But both of 
Johnston's letter and books and his telegraph register are 
devoid of any messages to Richmond. Likewise, Lee's 
official letter book contains no missives directed to 
Johnston. Neither the files of the War Department nor those 
of the Adjutant and Inspector-General reveal any attempt to 
converse with the commander of the Department of Northern 
Virginia. The next communication between Lee and Johnston 
appears to have been a telegram from Lee, dated April 3,
844; G. Moxley Sorrel to Jubal A. Early, April 3, 1862, G. 
Moxley Sorrel to Jubal A. Early, April 3, 1862, G. Moxley 
Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 3, 1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. 
H. Hill, April 3, 1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to Jubal A. Early,
April 4, 1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 4,
1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 5, 1862, in OR,
LI (part 2): pp. 527-528; see also Dorsey Pender to Fanny
Pender, April 3, 1862, in Hassler, General to His Lady, p. 
131; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 65.
29Dorsey Pender to Fanny Pender, April 3, 1862, in
Hassler, General to His Lady, p. 131.
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1 8 6 2 . ^ 0 what explains these five days of silence, while 
every hour saw more Federal transports disgorge troops onto 
the docks at the tip of the Peninsula?
From Johnston's perspective, the answer is relatively 
simple: always economical with words, he often went days
without writing to Richmond if he had no new information.
Lee, confident that Johnston would report any signifi­
cant developments, concentrated his attention entirely on 
the Peninsula. McClellan's deliberate caution in refusing 
to advance from Newport News until more than 50,000 troops 
had been landed actually kept Lee from figuring out his 
intent until early April. On April 1, he wrote to Holmes in 
North Carolina that "while making demonstrations . . .  on 
the Peninsula against General Magruder, his real object is 
to attack Norfolk. . . ."31 Until April 4, Lee's correspon­
dence indicated that he still leaned toward believing 
Norfolk to be McClellan's primary target. Unsure, he waited 
and watched, delaying the orders which would send a signifi­
cant number of troops to reinforce M a g r u d e r . 32
30The existence of this telegram is inferred from 
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 4, 1862, in OR,
XI (part 3): p. 419.
3lRobert E. Lee to Theophilus Holmes, April 1, 1862, in 
OR, IX: p. 455.
32walter H. Taylor to John B. Magruder, April 3, 1862, 
Walter H. Taylor to John B. Magruder, April 3, 1862, T. A. 
Washington to John B. Magruder, April 3, 1862, Robert E. Lee 
to Joseph E. Johnston, April 4, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): 
pp. 418-419, 420; Robert E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, April 3, 
1862, in OR, LI (part 2): p. 528.
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He almost waited too long. General McClellan himself 
arrived at Fortress Monroe on April 2. Five divisions of 
the Army of the Potomac— about 58,000 men— had preceded him. 
On the morning of April 3, two columns of Federal troops 
marched toward Yorktown. Magruder only deployed about
10,000 Confederate soldiers to resist him, and immediately 
withdrew his most exposed outposts, and retired into his 
lines at Yorktown.33
It was a strong, but not impregnable, position. The 
Peninsula narrowed there to a width of a little more than 
six miles, two-thirds of which was blocked by the Warwick 
River. The upper end of the river had been improved as an 
obstacle by opening several dams and flooding several acres 
of farmland. Heavy cannon at Yorktown, and Gloucester Point 
across the river, kept Federal gunboats at bay. Yorktown 
proper was enclosed in a large earthwork, designed more to 
protect the batteries erected to blockade the York River 
than to hold the town against a frontal assault. Between 
the fort and the flooded area were two partially completed 
redoubts connected by a line of hastily dug rifle pits. 
Outnumbered nearly six-to-one, with the trenches between the 
redoubts and the fort still incomplete, and many of the gun 
embrasures at Yorktown gaping empty, Magruder could not have 
held the line for more than a day against a determined
33swinton, Campaigns, pp. 100-102; "Reports of Maj.- 
Gen. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army, commanding at Yorktown, 
&c.," April 5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 403-404.
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attack.34
Fortunately, McClellan did not even probe his lines 
until April 5. By that time, Lee had satisfied himself as 
to Federal intent and began rushing reinforcements to the 
Peninsula. Cadmus Wilcox's Alabama brigade, one of the two 
sent to North Carolina with Holmes; and Raleigh Colston's 
Virginia-North Carolina brigade from Norfolk were immediate­
ly ordered to the Yorktown l i n e . 35 Also, on April 3, Lee 
telegraphed Johnston to send 10,000 more troops to Rich­
mond . 36
This order put Johnston back onto the horns of a 
dilemma. On April 2 and 3, the enemy division at Aquia had 
begun demonstrating against G. W. Smith's outposts, conceiv­
ably as a prelude to an assault on F r e d e r i c k s b u r g . 3 7 The 
message from Lee neither confirmed nor abrogated Johnston's 
previous grant of discretion with regard to detaching the 
troops, and it did nothing to cancel the earlier injunction
34"Reports of Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army 
commanding at Yorktown, &c.," April 5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
1): pp. 403-404; John B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April
5, 1862, in Or, XI (part 3): p. 422; see also OR Atlas,
plates XIV-XIX.
35a . G. Dickinson to B. S. Ewell, April 6, 1862, John 
B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April 7, 1862, A. G. Dickinson 
to Cadmus Wilcox, April 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp.
424-425, 426-427.
36inferred from Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, 
April 4, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 419-420.
37joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 4, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 419-420.
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about the necessity of holding the Rappahannock. Johnston 
decided that his position needed clarification, and he 
immediately wired Richmond with the latest reports of enemy 
activity around Fredericksburg, and requested definitive 
o r d e r s . 38 In the meantime, he directed Longstreet to 
prepare the divisions of Hill, Early, and D. R. Jones for 
transfer to Richmond, but only authorized the Georgian to 
load Early's Division on the trains without specific 
orders.39
His orders to Longstreet, delivered by courier, arrived 
promptly. The telegram to Richmond did not; the office 
there had been shut down for the evening.^0 Frustrated, 
Johnston dispatched an aide with a letter for Lee on the 
morning train to Richmond. By this time, he also knew that 
Jackson had reported the enemy advancing in the Valley, and 
had called on Longstreet for reinforcements. The question 
to which Johnston desperately needed an answer was this: 
did the Rappahannock or the Peninsula now have priority in 
the eyes of his superiors? If communications with the 
Shenandoah Valley were still the paramount consideration,
38ibid.
39q . Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 4, 1862, in OR, 
XI (part 3): p. 420; G. Moxley Sorrel to Jubal A. Early,
April 4, 1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 4,
1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 5, 1862, in OR, 
LI (part 2): pp. 527-528.
40joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 4, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 419-420.
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Johnston wanted Lee to know that the loss of 10,000 more 
troops "will make us too weak to hold this line if pressed 
in front and on the left flank at the same time." Again 
Johnston emphasized that this was a decision that needed to 
be made in Richmond, not northern Virginia: "The President,
however, will always have the means of judging where those 
troops are most needed. "4 3-
Lee's reply represented the first unequivocal order 
that Johnston had received in weeks: "The movement of the
troops from your line must immediately be made to this 
place. Enemy advancing in force from Old Point."42 The 
transfer of troops was immediatly resumed, and Johnston 
telegraphed Lee on April 5 with confirmation and, very 
likely, a repeated suggestion that all of his troops, except 
a screening force, be employed on the Peninsula.4  ^ Lee 
responded by again asking Johnston whether he thought his 
own line safe from attack, apparently ignoring Johnston's 
consistent concern over the relative priority of the defense 
of northern and eastern Virginia.44 Johnston saw the 
situation as one that required the Confederates to risk
41Ibid.
42Robe.rt E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, April 5, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 420.
4^Inferred from Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, 
April 6, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 423.
44Also inferred from Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. 
Lee, April 6, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 423.
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defeat in one area to assure a reasonable chance of victory 
in the another. "The invading army could not be defeated 
without.the concentration of the Confederate forces; but 
they were always more divided than the much more numerous 
army of the enemy," he remarked years later in specific 
reference to another campaign, but the generalization 
reflected his thinking on the defense of Richmond as w e l l . 45 
Lee, it seemed to Johnston, was the man in position to 
calculate the odds and weigh the risks; it was Lee who 
should make the critical decision where to concentrate and 
resist the Federals.
As diplomatically as he could, Johnston tried to prod 
his friend to a decision. He reported on April 6 that most 
of Sumner's II Corps seemed to have been withdrawn from 
Manassas, and that Banks was exerting no pressure on 
Jackson. He pointed out that the trains carried troops to 
Richmond so slowly that there remained abundant time for Lee 
to consider a full redeployment of his army. He included a 
gentle reminder that the responsibility for such a major 
strategic decision had to come from Lee: "I cannot here
compare the state of affairs in my front with those of 
others, and cannot, therefore, decide understandingly 
whether troops are less needed here than elsewhere, which 
seems to me to be the question. He who directs military
4 5The statement was made in reference to the Vicksburg 
campaign. Johnston, Narrative, p. 221.
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operations from information from every department can."^ 
McClellan probed the Yorktown line with two divisions 
on April 5. Magruder fired every gun he could train on the 
advancing Yankees, and paraded his outnumbered soldiers as 
ostentatiously as possible, hoping to bluff the Union 
commander into believing that he had far more than 11,000 
men in his defenses. His imposture succeeded more effect­
ively than he could have dreamed; within two days, McClellan 
had come to the conclusion that Yorktown was so "stongly 
fortified, armed, and garrisoned, and connected with the 
defenses of the Warwick by forts and entrenchments, the 
ground in front of which was swept by the guns of Yorktown," 
that the Army of the Potomac would have to take it by siege 
rather than assault.47
Magruder, of course, was not privy to his opponent's 
decision, and expected hour by hour that McClellan would 
punch through his thinly held line. His correspondence with 
Lee revealed nerves strained to the breaking point. "I have 
made my arrangements to fight with my small force," he 
informed Lee on April 5, "but without the slightest hope of
46joseph e . Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 6, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 423.
^^McClellan erroneously believed that Johnston and his 
army had already arrived in Yorktown by April 7; see George 
B. McClellan to Edward M. Stanton, April 7, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 1): pp. 11-12.
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success."48 He required a minimum of 10,000 more troops to 
hold his line. By the evening of April 6, after two days of 
Federal probing, he reported gloomily that "they discovered 
a weak point, where numbers must prevail. . . . Re-enforce­
ments come very slowly, and will probably be too l a t e . " 4 9  
But as the succeeding days passed, McClellan showed no signs 
of aggressive intent. Howell Cobb's brigade from Norfolk 
arrived, as did those of Jubal Early, Richard Griffith, and 
Robert Rodes from the Department of Northern Virginia.
Newly promoted to Major-General, D. H. Hill appeared and 
took over supervision of the Yorktown fortifications, 
freeing Magruder to concentrate on the remainder of his 
l i n e . 5 0 Magruder began to recover his composure; by April 
8, his letters had ceased to predict calamity. If he 
received enough field guns to secure Mulberry Island on the 
Warwick, Magruder informed Lee, "and if the Warwick line can 
be successfully defended . . . McClellan is defeated, at 
least until the iron-clad vessels of the enemy shall be in
48j0hn B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April 5, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 422.
49john B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April 6, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 425.
50john B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April 6, 1862, 
Henry Bryan to Cadmus Wilcox, April 7, 1862, John B.
Magruder to Gabriel Rains, April 8, 1862, Henry Bryan to 
Lafayette McLaws, April 8, 1862, John B. Magruder to George 
W. Randolph, April 11, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 425,
426-427, 432-433, 436.
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such numbers as to make forts useless."^
But Magruder's days as an independent commander were 
numbered. Davis, Lee, and George Wythe Randolph— Benjamin's 
replacement as Secretary of War— all agreed that the 
concentration of Confederate forces on the Peninsula 
required a more senior and perhaps less mercurial commander. 
Lee directed Joseph Johnston on April 8 to report to 
Richmond, bringing with him all the troops from the Depart­
ment of Northern Virginia except for a force to mask the 
m a n e u v e r . 52 Fourteen days had passed since the idea of 
transferring Johnston's army to oppose McClellan had first 
been proposed. During this time, there had been no aggres­
sive enemy movement of any consequence in northern Virginia, 
while there had been a continuous Federal build-up on the 
Peninsula. Instead of decisively reinforcing Magruder to 
withstand the Army of the Potomac, the Confederate high 
command had preferred to augment him in driblets: a
regiment here, a brigade there. What saved the Confederates 
was not Lee's "provisional reconcentration," for that came 
far too late to be effective, but the timidity of the 
Federal commander. Had McClellan been able to nerve himself 
for an attack even as late as April 7, he would probably 
have crashed through the Yorktown line, captured or dis-
51john B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April 10, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 435-436.
52walter H. Taylor to J. H. Claiborne, April 8, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 430; Johnston, Narrative, p. 110.
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persed the Army of the Peninsula, and begun his march on 
Richmond.
By the time he received the latest instructions from 
Lee, Johnston had only two divisions left that could be 
deployed to the capital, those of Smith and Longstreet, plus 
Stuart's Cavalry Brigade and Pendleton's Reserve Artillery. 
Given discretion when called upon to send off earlier 
detachments, he had purposely withheld his most trusted 
subordinates and their troops, so that wherever he might be 
eventually deployed he would have them at hand. Now he 
instructed each to move his unit to Richmond, by foot as 
well as rail, in order to save t i m e . 53
Meanwhile, Johnston spent a day or two arranging the 
forces which would maintain at least the crust of a defense 
in northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley. There was 
no question of weakening Jackson's three brigades in the 
Valley; although recruits and soldiers returning from their 
reenlistment furloughs had raised his strength to about 
8,500, his division was still not much more than a corps of 
o b s e r v a t i o n . 54 The same applied to Ewell's Division—  
composed of roughly 7,5 00 men in the three brigades— on the
53Johnston, Narrative, p. 110; Longstreet, Manassas to 
Appomattox, p. 66.
54Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley, p. 152.
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middle R a p p a h a n n o c k . 55 Brigadier-General Charles W. Field 
remained at Fredericksburg with about 2,3 00 men when the 
other five brigades of G. W. Smith's Division retired, 
leaving only about 18,000 infantry between that city and the 
Valley.56 it was obviously not a sufficient number of 
troops to contest a full-scale invasion.
Yet Johnston did not plan for these three officers to 
conduct an entirely passive defense. What he had observed 
of Federal movements in northern Virginia convinced him that 
there was no coordinated plan of attack among the various 
Union commanders. Though, in the aggregate, much stronger 
than his own divisions, the Yankees often marched and 
countermarched in such haphazard fashion that on more than 
one occasion it might have been theoretically possible to 
concentrate equal or possibly superior Confederate numbers 
against a single Federal unit.57 Such a strategy was risky, 
but if it worked it promised to confuse and delay any Union 
advance much more effectively than could 18,000 infantry 
waiting passively in their rifle pits, strung out over more
55jubal A. Early, "Strength of Ewell's Division in the 
Campaign of 1862— Field Returns," Southern Historical 
Society Papers, Vol. VIII (1880): pp. 302-303.
56charles w. Field to Robert E. Lee, April 20, 1862, in 
OR, XII (part 2): p. 434.
57such had been the case when Johnston suggested that 
while he was in Federicksburg, Longstreet might detach two 
or more brigades to quickly reinforce Jackson for an attack. 
See Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 26, 1862, 
in OR, XII (part 3): p. 838; see also Johnston, Narrative,
p. 110.
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than 200 miles.
Accordingly, Johnston instructed Jackson to retreat 
toward Swift Run Gap if the Federals approached, so that he 
would then be close enough to Ewell's position to call on 
that division for reinforcements and attack. He ordered 
Ewell to be ready to march to Jackson's assistance, and to 
reconnoiter the roads leading from the Rapahannock to the 
Shenandoah. In the meantime, Johnston also authorized Ewell 
to make any local attacks on isolated Union forces in his 
own front that he thought might be successful. Johnston 
knew that this sort of defense required that his subordi­
nates have the maximum amount of latitude to make their own 
decisions without wasting the time to request permission for 
every proposed movement. "The question of attacking the 
enemy in front of you is one which must be decided on the 
ground," he told Ewell. "It would be well to drive him 
away; you would be freer to aid Jackson, and it might make, 
perhaps, a diversion in his favor." Again he emphasized 
that each division commander was free to make his own 
tactical decisions within the overall framework in which he 
had left him to work: in committing to an offensive move
"you have to consider relative forces, the enemy's position, 
and the facilities for crossing the river. If these are 
favorable, counted with our confidence in the superiority of 
our troops--if you feel confident after considering these
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things, attack."58 Accurate intelligence was essential to 
the success of an attack and would determine the ability to 
retain central Virginia and the middle Shenandoah Valley, as 
well as the survival of his two outnumbered divisions. For 
this reason, Johnston left more than half of his cavalry and 
some of his finest outpost commanders in northern Virgin­
ia. 59
Johnston had probably received his orders from Lee 
sometime in the evening of April 8. Organizing the transfer 
of two divisions and the cavalry brigade, and arranging the 
defense of Jackson, Ewell, and Field, took him about two 
days. He arrived in Richmond either late on April 11 or
^Thomas j. Jackson to Richard S. Ewell, April 14,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Richard S. Ewell, April 17,
1862, in OR, XII (part 3): pp. 848, 852.
^Stuart took with him to the Peninsula the 1st 
Virginia Cavalry, the 4th Virginia Cavalry, and the Jeff. 
Davis (Mississippi) Legion; the Hampton (South Carolina) 
Legion cavalry accompanied G. W. Smith's Division. Remain­
ing in northern Virginia were the 7th Virginia Cavalry 
(Colonel Turner Ashby) in the Valley, about 1,000 strong; 
the 2nd Virginia Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel and then 
Colonel Thomas T. Munford) and the 6th Virginia Cavalry 
(Colonel Thomas S. Flournoy) with Ewell's Division, about 
900 strong in total; and the 9th Virginia Cavalry (Lieuten­
ant-Colonel and then Colonel W. H. F. Lee) with Field's 
Brigade, probably about 400-500 strong. Thus, Johnston left 
approximately 2,300 cavalrymen in northern Virginia— or 
about 1,000 more than he took with him to Yorktown. See 
Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley, p. 152; Jubal A. Early, 
"Strength of Ewell's Division in the Campaign of 1862--Field 
Returns," Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. VIII 
(1880): pp. 302-303; "Organization of the Army of Northern
Virginia, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, on the 
Peninsula, about April 30, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3): p.
484. Charles W. Field to Robert E. Lee, April 20, 1862, in 
OR, XII (part 1): p. 434.
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early April 12.60 Davis, Randolph, and Lee brought him up 
to date on McClellan's inactivity, and strength of Magruder 
and Huger. Magruder's newfound confidence in his ability to 
hold his lines was stressed, and Huger's pessimism concern­
ing his defenses at Norfolk was discounted. The ability of 
the Virginia to keep the James River closed to Federal trans­
ports was highlighted. The President then informed Johnston 
that his command would be extended over the Peninsula and 
Norfolk, where a concerted attempt to resist or even defeat 
the Army of the Potomac would be m a d e . 61
Johnston may have been skeptical; none of the informa­
tion possessed by his superiors had been gathered first­
hand. Davis had never been to the Peninsula. Lee had helped 
plan Magruder's second line of defenses at Williamsburg, and 
had been the one who suggested the flooding of the Warwick 
River; but, he had not set foot on the Peninsula since the 
summer of 1861. Randolph had served as Magruder's Chief of 
Artillery before his appointment to the War Office, but even 
his observations would have been weeks out of date; he could 
not have known, for instance, how near to completion were 
the dedoubts connecting Yorktown to the inundations at the
60johnston, Narrative, p. 110.
61-That the strength of Magruder's line and the capabil­
ities of the Virginia were stressed is inferred from 
previous statements by the principals on the ironclad's 
potential (see preceding chapter) and their subsequent 
positions at the meeting on April 14 (see following chap­
ter); see also, Davis, Rise and Fall, II: p. 86.







M U t e s  IftR.V
IOAM0S if
^JAP fslo. 2. CoNFS’De'R&TG DEFENSE* a t  VofctcrooaN'*' AfRit., 1862.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
224
head of the Warwick. With Yorktown less than a day's travel 
from Richmond, it seemed to Johnston somewhat risky to make 
major strategic judgments without any officer more senior 
than Magruder or Huger having personally examined the ground. 
Davis concurred, and proposed that since Longstreet's and 
Smith's Divisions were still a day or two from the capital, 
Johnston should use the time to conduct an inspection of his 
expanded department before making any final decisions about 
the placement of his troops; Johnston quickly agreed.62
The following morning, Johnston rode the Richmond and 
York River Railroad to White House, and from there took one 
of the contract steamers ferrying troops and supplies down 
the river. Brigadier-General Whiting, who had arrived in 
Richmond that morning, accompanied him, both as a close 
friend and as an engineering officer.63 Probably about 
midmorning, the two arrived on the dock at Yorktown (see Map 
No. 2). The river at that point was only about a mile wide, 
and Johnston could have seen the Confederate batteries on 
Gloucester Point on the north shore through the mist. The 
Federal gunboats swarming just out of range at the river's 
mouth must have seemed much closer.64
ft^ Ibid.
63johnston, Narrative, p. 111.
64por indications of just how close the Federal gunboats 
were willing to approach the Yorktown fortifications during 
early April, see J. Missroon to George B. McClellan, April 
6, 1862, J. Missroon to L. M. Goldsborough, April 9, 1862, 
in NOR, VII: pp. 208, 209-210, 212-213.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The fortification around Yorktown consisted of an earth­
work seven to ten feet high, fifteen to twenty feet deep, 
and fronted by a ditch that averaged ten feet deep. In many 
places, Magruder's engineers had followed the outlines of 
General Cornwallis's 1781 ramparts, which resulted in a fort 
that hugged the perimeter of the town. The work had been 
originally designed to protect the water batteries commanding 
the river and hold the town against a siege, not to block 
the Peninsula to an enemy marching west. As a result, Johnston 
and Whiting noted several peculiarities that diminished the 
fortifications' ability to withstand McClellan's advance.
As many of the land batteries faced away from the Federals 
as toward them. Virtually all of the heaviest rifled cannon 
had been emplaced to cover the river, and could not be brought 
to bear on the Union army. The walls of the fort that directly 
confronted McClellan were actually the weakest: three-to-
five feet narrower than those in the rear. Few of the batter­
ies or the traversing trenches back to the powder magazines 
had overhead cover. Most of the bombproof shelters that 
should have kept the gun crews safe when McClellan's artillery 
opened up were u n f i n i s h e d . 65
These deficiencies Johnston and Whiting could see for
6^"Reports of John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief 
Engineer Army of the Potomac, of operations during the 
siege," in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 316, 317, 337; OR Atlas,
plates XIV, XV, XIX; D. H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April 
13, 1862, D. H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April 15, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 439, 441-442.
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themselves. It remained for D. H. Hill to present his command­
er with more depressing news. He pointed out that labor in 
the protective works around the batteries proceeded so slowly 
because his men did not have tents, and sleeping on the open 
ground in a period of heavy rains had rendered many of them 
too ill to work. Besides, there were not enough sand bags 
on hand to build up protective walls around the open embra­
sures. He had only sixty-five rounds per gun, and just 
sixteen rounds each for his best rifled pieces. With so 
little ammunition he could neither respond to the harassment 
of the gunboats nor prevent McClellan's men from digging 
siege parallels. liven if he had sufficient ammunition, Hill 
told Johnston bitterly, it would not have improved matters 
much. The rifled cannon produced at the Tredegar Iron Works 
were so undependable that they were equally as likely to
explode and kill their own crews as to harm the enemy.
Standing upon the parapet of his works, Hill delivered the 
coup de grace with a gesture toward the enemy lines. About 
800 yards in front of the wall lay a band of trees that 
broke his gunners' line of sight, behind which the Yankees 
could hide and constuct their own batteries. He had known 
about those trees since he had been at Yorktown in 1861, but
no axes had ever come from Richmond to cut them d o w n . 66
66j. Thomas Goode to George W. Randolph, April 12,
1862, D. H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April 13, 1862, D.
H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April 15, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 3): pp. 438, 439, 441-442; Dew, Ironmaker, pp. 179-180.
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Johnston listened to most of Hill's information in 
silence. When the North Carolinian had completed his list 
of the position's inadequacies, Johnston asked him how long 
he felt he could hold his post after McClellan opened fire.
"About two days," Hill said.
Johnston looked surprised, and replied, "I supposed 
about two hours."67
What did Hill think should be done then? D. H. Hill 
was never slow to express his opinions, and it is certain 
that he told Johnston exactly what he wrote to the Secretary 
of War the following day. "Would it not be better to let 
our railroads in North Carolina be cut, our cities in South 
Carolina and Georgia captured, and have the whole Southern 
army thrown here and crush McClellan?" The policy of shifting 
brigades and divisions piecemeal from threatened point to 
threatened point angered him: "By attempting to hold so
many points we have been beaten in detail, and are losing 
all that we have been trying to hold." While the Confederates 
could not match the weight of Union ordnance, Hill had confi­
dence in Southern elan. "We must fight on the field and 
trust to the bayonet. If we had 100,000 men here we could 
march out of the trenches and capture McClellan, unless he 
had a swift-footed h o r s e . "68
6”7d . H. Hill to Joseph E. Johnston, May 25, 1885, in RMH.
68d . H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April 15, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 441-442; see also D. H. Hill to Joseph
E. Johnston, May 25, 1885, in RMH.
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Much of what Hill said appealed to Johnston--he had 
long been an advocate of concentrating a large Confederate 
army even if doing so risked capture of the areas stripped 
of troops. Yet the question he had to ask himself was where 
to employ it? He did not yet know if there was a place, 
anywhere along Magruder's line, from which he might profita­
bly take the offensive.
After instructing Hill to begin moving some of his 
heavy guns from the water batteries to where they could bear 
on the Union Army, Johnston left to examine the remainder of 
the defenses.69 Four hundred yards of trenches, fairly well 
covered by abatis, extended south from the front corner of 
the Yorktown works. While adequate as an extension of the 
main work, this row of rifle pits suffered from two major 
defects. The row dead-ended in a swamp, rather than connecting 
with the entrenchments around Magruder's secondary redoubts 
between Yorktown and the Warwick River. As a result, infantry 
stationed there could neither reinforce the positions to 
their right nor be quickly withdrawn if threatened with 
overwhelming numbers. The second deficiency was the lack of 
a drainage system; soldiers standing guard or fighting from 
those trenches would have to do so in water that varied from
69d . h . Hill to George W. Randolph, April 15, 1862, in 
OR/ XI (part 3): pp. 441-442.
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ankle- to knee-deep.70
Carefully picking their way across the boggy ground 
that separated those trenches from the lesser redoubts--an 
open, if swampy, expanse about 300 yards wide--Johnston and 
Whiting arrived at the larger of the two subordinate fortifi­
cations, Fort Magruder. This redoubt had front walls as 
high and thick as those at Yorktown, and mounted three heavy 
cannon which could fire toward the Union lines. Unfortunately, 
however, it had been originally designed to confront an 
enemy approaching from the south and not the east. Thus, as 
the two generals stood within the fort, they could easily 
see at least one hill within McClellan's lines from which 
cannon could rain shells directly down into the gun emplace­
ments . "71
The second redoubt was about 300 yards farther south.
It was smaller and unnamed. Its square shape provided adequate 
protection for its gun crews, but the same Yankee-occupied 
hill overlooked it as well as Fort Magruder. The cannon in 
this work were not long-range guns, but only smoothbore 
field pieces. They would be absolutely useless until faced
70"Reports of John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief 
Engineer Army of the Potomac, of operations during the 
siege," in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 316, 317; OR Atlas, plates
XIV, XV, XIX; Edward P. Alexander, "Sketch of Longstreet's
Division, Yorktown and Williamsburg," Southern Historical 
Society Papers, Vol. X (1882): p. 36.
"Reports of John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief 
Engineer Army of the Potomac, of operations during the 
siege," in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 316, 317; K. T. Douglas to
Gabriel Rains, April 8, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 432.
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with a direct assault by the Union infantry.72 
The trenches that extended from Fort Magruder to the smaller 
redoubt were extensive and somewhat better drained than 
those immediately around Yorktown. Their layout seemed 
haphazard, almost as if they had been dug by troops inter­
ested in protecting their own camps rather than laid out by 
engineers seeking to establish effective lines of fire. The 
entire system spanned about 800 yards of the front, but did 
not join the works at Yorktown on the left or the Warwick 
defenses on the right.73
Only a broken line of rifle pits, crowned with varying 
heights of parapets and filled to varying depths with water, 
connected the redoubts to Magruder's next defensive point at 
Wynn's Mill. This did not appear that dangerous from a 
defensive point of view, because the two generals could see 
that the area in front of these irregular entrenchments had 
been flooded by closing the Warwick River dams. Nonethe­
less, the question remained: how quickly could a brigade be
moved laterally from the redoubts across nearly 3,000 yards 
of broken ground to support Wynn's Mill in case of an emer-
72ibid.
73"Reports of John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief 
Engineer Army of the Potomac, of operations during the 
siege," in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 316, 317; OR Atlas, plates
XIV, XV, XIX.
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gency?74
At Wynn's Mill, Johnston met Brigadier-General Jubal 
Early, who had assumed command of that part of the line a 
few days ago. After his own initial inspection of the York- 
town-Warwick defenses, Early had predicted to Magruder that 
the line "must be inevitably broken, sooner or later, and in 
that event our whole force gobbled up." He preferred an 
immediate retreat to the Chickahominy River. Showing Johnston 
and Whiting around his sector, which consisted of nothing 
more than rifle pits and hastily dug-in field batteries,
Early attempted to press this idea on his commander. But 
Johnston had seen too much already, and had grown increasingly 
taciturn: "he did not seem disposed to discuss the matter,
and I desisted."75
It is questionable whether Johnston and Whiting travelled 
any farther down the Warwick than Wynn's Mill. It is also 
not certain just when Magruder joined his new commander; he 
had not been informed of Johnston's visit in advance. Magruder 
did not attempt to hide or rationalize the deficiencies of 
his line, for he had never claimed it to be anything more 
than a hasty expedient occupied as a last resort. Eventually, 
thinking perhaps of Hill's plan to gather an army of 100,000
74r . q . Lowe, "Magruder's Defense of the Peninsula," 
Confederate Veteran, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March 1900): p. 105;
OR Atlas, plates XIV, XV, XIX.
75jubal Early to Jefferson Davis, September 22, 1877, 
in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, vol. VIII: 
p . 3.
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men and seize McClellan, Johnston asked him just how an army 
on this line could ever attack the Federals, since Magruder 
himself had flooded the only likely lines of approach to the 
enemy's positions?^
The question would have astounded Magruder, who had 
never intended the line for anything other than a hasty 
defense. His suggestion to be reinforced by Johnston's army 
to conduct an offensive had been made three weeks earlier on 
March 21, at a time when McClellan's forces had not advanced 
beyond Big Bethel. Since being invested at Yorktown, he had 
given up any idea of attacking the enemy. Of 31,500 men, 
once he subtracted the garrisons at Yorktown, Gloucester 
Point, Williamsburg, Jamestown Island, and Mulberry Island, 
he was left with barely 23,000 soldiers to hold a line seven­
teen miles long. Far from planning to attack McClellan, his 
most recent strategic suggestion to Richmond had been to 
rapidly evacuate Norfolk and the entire Peninsula except for 
a small garrison at Yorktown, and to combine his and Huger's 
armies with Johnston's for a counterinvasion across the 
Potomac. Nor did Magruder have any illusions about the 
dangerous position of his army once McClellan managed to 
open either the York or James Rivers; he lived with the 
threat of a flotilla of gunboats and transports steaming up
^Inferred from "Report of Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. 
Army, commanding Department of Northern Virginia, of 
operations from April 15, to May 19," in OR, XI (part 1): 
p. 275.
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one or the other to land Federal divisions in his r e a r . 7 7  
Johnston had seen enough. He had intended to tour 
Magruder's second line of works at Williamsburg, then cross 
the James, examine the Virginia personally, and inspect the 
harbor defenses of Norfolk.78 The information provided by 
Magruder and Hill, combined with the evidence before his own 
eyes, convinced him, however, that while Magruder had performed 
a miracle of improvisation, no rational general would commit 
an army to defend such a place. The 31,500 men already 
there were at grave risk. A week later Johnston put on 
paper what he must have been thinking on April 14: "No one
but McClellan could have hesitated to attack. The defensive 
line is far better for him than for us."79
As he boarded the steamer for the return trip to Richmond, 
Johnston realized that he faced an even larger problem at 
the capital. His superiors all believed that Yorktown was 
defensible, and were resolved to send his entire army into a 
cul de sac. How was he to convince them that such a course 
represented sheer lunacy?
77john B. Magruder to George W. Randolph, April 4, 
1862, John B. Magruder to George W. Randolph, April 11, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 422, 436.
78j0hnston, Narrative, p. 110; Davis, Rise and Fal1 , 
II: p. 86.
79joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 22, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 455.
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Chapter Seven 
Decision in Richmond (II)
A week before Joseph Johnston left Richmond on his 
inspection tour of the Peninsula, Albert Sidney Johnston had 
attempted to redeem his own reputation and Confederate 
fortunes in the west with a surprise attack on Major-General 
Ulysses S. Grant's army at Shiloh, Tennessee. For nearly 
two months, since the surrender of Fort Donelson, Johnston 
had been retreating before the Federal gunboats that roamed 
freely down the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, and 
avoiding contact with the Yankee armies that followed in 
their wake. Nashville and Columbus had been evacuated. 
Desperately, Johnston and his new lieutenant, General P. G. 
T. Beauregard, struggled to assemble an army to resist the 
Union offensive. Slowly, they gathered together the 
remnants of their demoralized garrisons, to which were added 
thousands of troops that Jefferson Davis stripped the 
coastal fortifications to provide. One brigade came at the 
cost of uncovering New Orleans, another left Pensacola 
defenseless, a third thinned Southern lines on the Georgia 
coast. In early April, fate finally seemed to smile on 
Albert Sidney Johnston: Grant's army had encamped without
entrenchments on the banks of the Tennessee River, separated 
by a long day's march from the nearest supporting column.
234
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"I hope you will be able to close with the enemy before 
his two columns unite," Davis telegraphed his friend on 
April 5. "I anticipate victory."1 And Johnston, after 
several days of trying to forge a motley collection of 
garrison troops and nearly untrained recruits into something 
that resembled an army, tried to inspire his men with what
he hoped would be a prophetic line: "Tonight we will water
our horses in the Tennessee River."2 On the morning of 
April 6, 1862, he sent his divisions into what became the 
largest and bloodiest battle yet fought on American soil.
The next message that Jefferson Davis received was a wire 
from Beauregard on the evening of April 6: "We this morning
attacked the enemy . . . and after a severe battle of ten 
hours, thanks be to the Almighty, gained a complete victo­
ry." Beauregard signed himself "General, Commanding," for 
his telegram also included the news that "General A. S. 
Johnston . . . fell gallantly leading his troops into the
thickest of the fight."3 But Beauregard's assurance of
^Jefferson Davis to Albert Sidney Johnston, April 5, 
1862, in OR, X (part 2): p. 394. The best accounts of the
maneuvering and concentration prior to the battle are found 
in Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee (Wilmington, NC: 
Broadfoot, 1987, reprint of 1952 edition), pp. 99-121;
Thomas L. Connelly, Army of the Heartland, The Army of 
Tennessee, 1861-1862 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press, 1967), pp. 126-157; James Lee McDonough, 
Shiloh— In Hell Before Night (Knoxville, TN: University of
Tennessee Press, 1977), pp. 3-26.
^Quoted, in McDonough, Shiloh, p. 84.
3p. G. T. Beauregard to Jefferson Davis, April 6, 1862, 
in OR, (part 1): p. 384.
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victory faded quickly. Within a few days, having withdrawn 
to Corinth, he claimed only a partial defeat of the Union 
Army, admitting that "next day, finding Buell's forces 
arriving on the field to re-enforce Grant, I withdrew.
. . . "4 Ominous rumors began to reach Richmond that 
Beauregard himself had canceled the orders for one last 
charge at dusk which might have completely annihilated 
Grant's force. By April 9, he was telling General Cooper 
that he expected the enemy to attack him "with overwhelming 
force," predicting the loss of "the Mississippi Valley and 
probably our cause," i f  he were not immediately r e i n f o r c e d . ^
The argument that Beauregard made for receiving massive 
reinforcements paralleled almost exactly the one which 
Joseph Johnston would present on his return to Richmond. 
Beauregard reasoned that "we could even afford to lose for a 
while Charleston and Savannah for the purpose of defeating 
Buell's army, which would not only insure us the valley of 
the Mississippi, but our i n d e p e n d e n c e . " 6
Implicit in Beauregard's letter--at least from Davis's 
point of view— was a criticism that the President remained 
unwilling to make tough choices, to take the chance of 
losing in one region to secure victory in another. Had they
4p. G. T. Beauregard to Samuel Jones, April 10, 1862, 
in OR, X (part 2): p. 407.
5p. G. T. Beauregard to Samuel Cooper, April 10, 1862, 
in OR, X (part 1): p. 403.
6 i b i d .
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been on better terms, Davis might have asked the Louisiana 
general whether he realized that just to give him the chance 
to defeat Grant, the President had already risked Fort 
Pulaski, New Orleans, and Pensacola? Granted, by April 14 
Davis did not know for sure that those places would fall, 
one after the other, during the next month, but he certainly 
knew that such was a likely consequence of having fought, 
let alone having failed to win, at Shiloh. Henceforth, the 
President would be a great deal more careful before he 
authorized another massive redeployment of troops on the 
basis of a general's confidence in victory. Davis had 
already bet once on the man he considered the Confederacy's 
greatest general, and lost.
Joseph Johnston, of course, lacked this insight into 
the President's mind. Having rushed back from the Peninsu­
la, he confronted Davis the moment the President entered his 
office. He immediately launched into a criticism of 
Magruder's dispositions, concluding that "although they were 
the most judicious that that officer could have adopted when 
he devised them, they would not enable us to defeat McClel­
lan. . . ."7 The best that could be achieved was to delay 
the Army of the Potomac for a few weeks. Eventually though, 
Johnston argued with uncharacteristic loquacity, McClellan's 
heavier guns would dismount the Confederate cannon, and 
"that being done, we could not prevent him from turning our
^Johnston, Narrative, pp. 112-113.
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position, by transporting his army up the river and landing 
in our rear, or by going on to Richmond and taking posses­
sion there."®
Obviously, said Johnston, an alternative plan must be 
instituted, and on the trip back up the York River he had 
devised one. It was a combination of his own inclinations 
with ideas borrowed both from Magruder and Hill, and he 
proposed it with every certainty that it represented an 
original and irrefutable strategic vision:
Instead of only delaying the Federal Army in 
its approach, I proposed that it should be 
encountered in front of Richmond by one quite as 
numerous, formed by uniting there all the avail­
able forces of the Confederacy in North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Georgia, with those at 
Norfolk, on the Peninsula, and then near Richmond, 
including Smith's and Longstreet's divisions, 
which had arrived. The great army thus formed, 
surprising that of the United States by an attack 
when it was expecting to besiege Richmond, would 
be almost certain to win; and the enemy, defeated 
a hundred miles from Fort Monroe, their place of 
refuge, could scarcely escape destruction. Such a 
victory would decide not only the campaign, but 
the war! ! ! ] [emphasis added].9
It never occurred to Johnston that not only was his concept
not original, but the President had already tried it once in
another theater of the war. The fact that Beauregard had
also suggested it during the past week probably only served
to make Davis even more cautious.
Yet Johnston had brought firsthand information from the
®Ibid., p . 113.
9Ibid.
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Peninsula that could not be discounted. If he was correct, 
and McClellan's eventual penetration of Magruder's line was 
a foregone conclusion, then the implications of the fact had 
to be considered. Could Norfolk be held without Yorktown?
If both were lost, what would be the fate of the Virginia?
On what line could the Federal advance be resisted if the 
Union Navy controlled the York and James Rivers? Tactfully, 
Davis told Johnston "that the question was so important that 
he would hear it fully discussed before making his deci­
sion," suggesting that the General return at 11:00 A. M. to 
meet with him as well as Secretary Randolph and General 
Lee.10 Feeling himself somewhat outnumbered, Johnston asked 
if he could invite Generals Smith and Longstreet to join the 
conference. Davis agreed.H
It took Johnston most of the time before the meeting to 
track down his two division commanders. Longstreet, he 
probably found in his camps; Smith, he finally located at 
the Spottswood Hotel only half an hour before the appointed 
time. There, his second-in-command had nearly collapsed 
from the exertions of the previous few days and his chronic 
nervous malady. Smith told Johnston that he felt entirely 
too ill to attend such an important conference. But 
Johnston was insistent, and rapidly acquainted the Ken­
tuckian with the dangers inherent in allowing the remainder
10Ibid., p. 114.
11-Davis, Rise and Fall, II: pp. 86-87.
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of the army to be deployed to Yorktown. Convinced by 
Johnston's arguments, Smith said that he would attend. An 
inveterate writer of memoranda, the General rose from his 
sickbed to put Johnston's position on paper.
The six men gathered first in the President's office, 
but later adjourned for dinner and reconvened at Davis's 
house, a site selected because the continuation of the 
meeting there was unlikely to be noticed or disturbed.13 
Davis allowed Johnston, as the person whose concerns had 
required the conference, to speak first. Johnston was 
uncomfortable speaking in front of groups— even when he knew 
everyone present, he often had trouble finding the right 
words— so he began by handing the President Smith's memoran­
d u m . ^  The paper called attention to the deficiencies of 
Magruder's defenses, and proposed essentially the same plan 
that Johnston had earlier given the President, except that 
Smith's version specified that a concentrated army at 
Richmond should also include Confederate troops from the 
Shenandoah Valley. This strategy formed the centerpiece of
l^This account is taken from a report of a conversation 
that Smith had in 1863 with Johnston's older brother.
Beverly R. Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, September 14, 
1867, in RMH.
13johnston, Narrative, p. 115.
14johnson, Johnston, p. 313; Gustavus W. Smith, 
Confederate War Papers; Fairfax Court House, New Orleans, 
Seven Pines, Richmond and North Carolina (New York:
Atlantic, 1884), p. 41.
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the debate that followed.16
Both Smith and Longstreet had some preference for an 
alternative which involved using the army thus formed for a 
counterinvasion across the Potomac, but neither man actually 
mentioned this option.16 When they spoke, they supported 
their chief. But neither man contributed very much along 
any line. Longstreet, due to his deafness, had a difficult 
time following the conversation. The first time he did open 
his mouth, to speculate on just how long McClellan might 
delay the opening of his siege batteries, Davis cut him off 
abruptly. "From the hasty interruption," the Georgian 
recalled, "I concluded that my opinion had only been asked 
through polite recognition of my presence, not that it was
16Smith later claimed that his memorandum had called 
for a counter invasion across the Potomac, and that this 
option received considerable attention. But the bulk of the 
evidence points to this as being a postwar addition to the 
record. Not only did neither Johnston nor Davis, nor 
Longstreet recall any such discussion, but in several 
discussions with Beverly Johnston during the war, Smith 
failed to mention any such plan. As Beverly Johnston wrote 
to Joseph in 1868: "Nothing was said by him expressing or
hinting at any other idea as being proposed or suggested by 
him. I am perfectly confident that I could not have 
forgotten so daring and eccentric a scheme as he says (in 
the passage you quote) he presented to the council." See 
Smith, Confederate War Papers, pp. 41-42; Davis, Rise and 
Fal1 , II: p. 87; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 66;
Johnston, Narrative, p. 114; Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. 
Johnston, September 14, 1867, Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. 
Johnston, February 23, 1868, Beverly Johnston to Joseph E.
Johnston, February 23, 1868, in RMH.
16It is assumed here that Smith may well have favored
such an action but not actually have mentioned it. Smith,
Confederate War Papers, pp. 41-42; Longstreet, Manassas to 
Appomattox, p. 66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
242
wanted, and said no m o r e . "17
G. W. Smith had been active in the hour immediately 
after his memorandum had been read, speaking more to the 
wisdom of a Confederate concentration than to conditions on 
the Peninsula, which he had not seen. But as the discussion 
eventually grew more spirited, Smith's stamina waned. He 
became pale and ceased speaking. At length he felt so faint 
that he had to ask Davis if he might lie down on a couch in 
the adjoining room. Within a few minutes, he fell asleep, 
and did not rouse until the very end of the meeting, when 
all the key decisions had already been m a d e . 18
The lack of participation by his two subordinates left 
Johnston, as he had feared, arguing his case alone. 
Longstreet's silence, he could understand and forgive. The 
Georgian was never talkative at the best of times, and the 
depression caused by the death of his family still hung over 
him. Besides, Johnston had never really included him among 
the circle of his intimates with whom he discussed strategy 
and politics.l^ As far as military opinions went, Johnston
l^Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 66; Davis,
Rise and Fall, II: p. 87.
l^Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, September 14,
1867, Joseph E. Johnston to [Gustavus W. Smith], January 6,
1868, Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, February 23,
1868, Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, February 23,
1868, in RMH; Joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith,
January 21, 1868, in JJWM.
l^Longstreet himself admitted that "It was the first 
time that I had been called to such august presence, to 
deliberate on momentous matters. . . ."; see Longstreet,
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would probably have preferred to bring Whiting to the 
meeting, both because he had also seen Magruder's line and 
was one of the army's most respected military engineers.
But Johnston knew that Whiting was still persona non grata 
with the President for his refusal to accept command of a 
brigade of Mississippians in December.20 Longstreet's 
assessment was correct: he had been brought to the meeting
more because the solidity of his physical presence would 
even the odds than due to any intellectual contribution he 
was expected to make.
On the other hand, Smith's withdrawal angered Johnston. 
The Kentuckian had secured his commission on the strength of 
Johnston's recommendation, and had always been privy to the 
most secret counsels of the army. After the transfers of 
Van Dorn and Beauregard, Smith became Johnston's primary 
confidante. Now, "on the most important occasion of the 
kind in my life," Johnston had almost been forced to beg his 
second-in-command to attend.21 in his urgency, Johnston 
perhaps underestimated the extent of his subordinate's 
illness, and interpreted Smith's later silence as reticence, 
his departure from the room as desertion. Rumors floating 
around the upper levels of the army during the next week
Manassas to Appomattox, p. 66.
20see the references to that feud in Chapter Four.
21joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, January 21, 
1868, in JJWM.
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confirmed just how upset Johnston had been: it was reputed
that he told Whiting not long after the meeting adjourned 
that if Smith had not fallen asleep, the army would never 
have been sent to Y o r k t o w n . ^ 2
For his part, Jefferson Davis did not take an active 
role in the discussion either. He had convened the group to 
explore the consequences of Johnston's revelations about 
Confederate weakness on the Peninsula. While immediate 
reaction to Johnston's strategy was negative, he wanted to 
consider the General's arguments thoroughly. He respected 
Johnston's opinions even when he did not agree with them, 
and if he had to decide against the General he wanted 
Johnston to believe that his ideas had received a fair 
hearing. Circumstantial evidence suggests, however, that 
Davis did not come to the meeting with his mind already made 
up. Johnston's proposal did not differ in theory from the 
strategy that the President himself had initiated prior to 
Shiloh; he remained willing to risk territory if he could be 
convinced that the potential gains were commensurate with 
the probable losses. He saw his proper part as the ultimate
22johnston denied the rumor after the war, but in 
language that was singularly unconvincing: "You say that I
told Genl. Whiting that if you had not gone to sleep the 
army would not have been sent to that position (of York- 
town). I cannot pretend to remember what I may have said in 
casual conversation at that time. But such an opinion seems 
to me now so unreasonable that I cannot imagine that it was 
ever entertained by me. I hope, therefore--indeed think 
that Genl. Whiting must have misunderstood me." See Joseph 
E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, January 21, 1868, in JJWM.
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decision-maker, not as an active p a r t i c i p a n t . 23
This left the debate to Johnston, Randolph, and Lee. 
Randolph, like Longstreet, came to the conference still 
relatively new to such critical policy deliberations. The 
gaunt, forty-four-year-old Virginian, however, had a 
personal assurance that Longstreet lacked. In a society 
where family ties assisted access to power and augmented 
personal credibility, Randolph's pedigree was as good, if 
not better, than that of anyone else in the room. Johnston 
and Lee might be descended from Revolutionary War heroes and 
Virginia politicians, but the Secretary of War was the 
grandson of Thomas Jefferson. Though participation in such 
a meeting was still a novelty, unlike Longstreet, Randolph 
never doubted his right to be there.24
The Secretary of War brought with him three particular 
pieces of personal expertise that had bearing on the 
questions at hand. He was the only man in the room with any 
significant naval experience, having served six years at sea 
before his nineteenth birthday, and an additional two in 
land assignments before ill health forced him to resign his
23johnston, Narrative, p. 115.
24Rembert Patrick suggested that Randolph's appointment 
owed more to his family name than any personal stature. But 
Thomas Bragg was clearly impressed by the new secretary.
See Patrick, Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet, p. 122; J. B. 
Jones, Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I: p. 117; H. J. Eckenrode,
The Randolphs, the Story of a Virginia Family (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1946), pp. 257-258; entry of March 24, 1862, 
Bragg diary, p. 192.
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midshipman's commission. He qualified, in general, as an 
artillery expert, having raised the Richmond Howitzers, and, 
in specific, as being knowledgeable about Magruder's guns, 
having been the Chief of Artillery for the Army of the 
Peninsula until mid-February. Finally, along with Lee, he 
was thoroughly acquainted with the disorganization of the 
army caused by the Bounty and Furlough Act, and the tricky, 
behind-the-scenes negotiations underway to write the 
Confederacy's first conscription act.25
Naturally reserved in his demeanor, Randolph, like 
Smith, also suffered from a chronic illness— in his case 
pulmonary tuberculosis. The disease had necessitated his 
resignation from field service, and active debate would have 
tired him almost as quickly as it did the Kentuckian. He 
would have measured his responses, conserved his energy, and 
attempted to contribute to the conversation as dispassion­
ately as possible.26
Thus, the meeting included three men--Longstreet,
Smith, and Davis— who said very little for differing 
reasons; and Randolph, who participated, but did so in a
2 5Though both Patrick and Freeman gave Randolph 
negligible credit for the passage of the conscription act, 
historian Archer Jones has presented a very convincing case 
that Randolph was instrumental in its adoption. See 
Patrick, Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet, p. 124; Freemen,
R. E. Lee, II: pp. 28-29; Archer Jones, Confederate
Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1961), pp. 42-49; Sifakis, 
Who was Who, pp. 530-531.
26sifakis, Who was Who, pp. 530-531.
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restrained and intellectual manner, leaving the brunt of the 
disagreement between Joseph Johnston and Robert E. Lee. G. 
W. Smith remembered that the debate became, even before he 
left, "very heated."27 yet Johnston and Lee were not only 
old friends since their cadet days at West Point, but men of 
great emotional restraint, at least in public display. What 
explains a meeting at which, with the fate of their country 
at stake, tempers flared, and neither man was willing to 
budge an inch from his position?
First, it must be understood that their relationship of 
nearly forty years contained as many elements of rivalry as 
camaraderie. Tension and competitiveness had existed 
between the Johnstons and the Lees since their fathers' day. 
Peter Johnston and Henry Lee had fought together in the 
Revolution, but in the decades after their paths had 
diverged. Johnston became a Republican, Lee a Federalist; 
in the General Assembly they argued opposing views on the 
Alien and Sedition Acts. Both men were politically success- 
ful--Peter Johnston becoming a circuit court judge, Henry 
Lee attaining the governor's chair. But their two families 
represented one of the basic political divisions within 
Virginia. The Lees came from the old Tidewater tobacco 
elite, connected by blood and marriage to the Byrds, 
Randolphs, and Carters. The Johnstons hailed from the 
rougher southwestern portion of the state, and their ties
27smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 42.
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were to a newer, more widespread breed of Southern aristo­
crats: not only the Floyds of Abingdon, but the Breckin-
ridges of Kentucky and the Prestons of South Carolina, as 
well. In the middle decades of the Nineteenth Century, the 
political and financial fortunes of families like the 
Johnstons were on the rise, those of the Arlington-Tidewater 
clans to which the Lees belonged in d e c l i n e . 28
When Joseph Johnston first met Robert E. Lee at the 
United States Military Academy, the two did not become 
instant best friends. Academic attrition among the other 
Virginians in their class, however, slowly brought them 
together. Their personalities seemed agreeably matched.^9 
Both were serious about their studies, although Johnston 
concerned himself, perhaps, a fraction less with his grades 
to the exclusion of all else than did Lee. He occasionally 
slipped off to go ice-skating, infrequently visited the 
infamous Benny Havens tavern, and was rumored to have 
embroiled himself in at least one fist-fight over the charms
2 8Lewis Preston Summers, History of Southwest Virginia, 
1746-1786, Washington County, 1777-1870 (Richmond: J. L.
Hill, 1903), pp. 768-769; Edgar Erskine Hume, Peter Johns­
ton, Junior, Virginia Soldier and Jurist (Charlottesville, 
VA: Historical Publishing Co., 1935), pp. 7-10; Armistead
Churchill Gordon, "Peter Johnston," Dictionary of American 
Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955 edi­
tion), V: pp. 147-148; Connelly and Jones, Politics of
Command, pp. 54-60.
29Freeman, R. E. Lee, I: p. 74.
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of a barmaid.30
Yet the seeds of a life-long friendship were certainly 
sown. It was Lee who comforted Johnston when he received 
the news that his mother had died. Years later, Johnston 
recalled Cadet Lee as "full of sympathy and kindness, genial 
and fond of gay conversation, and even of fun, that made him 
the most agreeable of companions. . . ."31 in the first few 
years after receiving their commissions, the young lieuten­
ants were often stationed together, and their friendship 
deepened. It was Lee, again, who laughed at Johnston's 
romantic escapades, and it was also Lee who crossed a 
battlefield in Mexico to bring personally to Johnston the 
news that his nephew Preston had been killed. For the rest 
of his life, Joseph Johnston always remembered that when his 
friend broke the news, Lee had tears in his e y e s . 32
They were both young officers on the rise in an 
essentially peacetime army where promotion was so slow that 
it sometimes involved waiting for a senior officer to die of 
old age so that everyone below could step up. In the race 
for advancement, a basic difference emerged between the
3 0James A. Bethune to Robert Morton Hughes, February 
25, 1910, George B. Johnston to Robert Morton Hughes, 
December 12, 1912, Robert Morton Hughes to Gamaliel Brad­
ford, December 16, 1912, in RMH; Fleming, "Jefferson Davis 
at West Point," p. 266.
3lQuoted in Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, p.
14.
32QUOted in Ibid., p. 20.
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personalities of the two Virginians. Lee had aspirations to 
higher rank, but overt ambition drove Johnston almost 
relentlessly. He resigned from the army in 1837, he told 
his brother Beverly, "principally because, from the rules of 
our Service, of promotion by regiments, many of my juniors 
who had the luck to be assigned to regiments in which 
promotion was less slow than in that to which I belonged had 
got before me. . . ."33 Johnston accepted a new commission 
when the Corps of Topographical Engineers was formed, 
promising better chances for promotion, only after being 
assured that his break in service would not be counted 
against his seniority.34
Johnston never saw rising in rank as anything but a
33joseph E. Johnston to Beverly Johnston, June 13,
1837, in JJWM; his regiment, the 4th Artillery, had been 
nicknamed the "Immortal Fourth," by junior officers waiting 
for their superannuated superiors to die. See Edward M. 
Coffman, The Old Army, A Portrait of the American Army in 
Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1985), p. 49.
34Govan and Livingood assert that "although gratified 
by his promotion to first lieutenant in July 1836, Johnston 
felt that with the end of the war he should resign. . . .
In September, though, hostilities again broke out in Flori­
da, and he immediately volunteered his services." But 
Johnston's correspondence and discussions with his brothers, 
Edward and Beverly, made it clear that the issue was promo­
tion. It is also no coincidence that Johnston resigned in 
the midst of the three years prior to the Civil War that saw 
more resignations due to frustration over promotion than at 
any other time, and that, like may others, he could only be 
tempted back by the formation of the Corps of Topographical 
Engineers and a guarantee that he would not lose his previ­
ous seniority. Govan and Livingood, Different Valor, p. 16; 
Joseph E. Johnston to Beverly Johnston, June 13, 1837, in 
JJWM; Edward Johnston to John Warfield Johnston, January 2, 
1848, in RMH; Coffman, Old Army, pp. 52, 56.
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contest, for there were too many junior officers and too few 
senior positions. A series of letters he wrote to his 
nephew while Preston was a Cadet are particularly revealing 
of this facet of Johnston's personality. "Determine to beat 
your competitors & you will never fail to do it," he 
admonished the younger man. "Endeavor . . . to be foremost
remember that such efforts are never thrown away; for 
tho' your competitor should be before you, the benefits of 
your very exertions in the contest will be felt thro' 
l i f e . At another point, he advised Preston to avoid some 
of the mistakes he had made: "in selecting your regt. or
corps you must consider which is worth most— agreeable 
present position, in a staff corps, or better promotion in 
the infantry, rifles, or arty. I am inclined to the 
r i f l e s . "36 Promotion, Joseph Johnston admitted to his 
brother Edward in 1851, was "a thing I desire more than any 
man in the army."3 7
He pursued it with a vengeance. Johnston assiduously 
cultivated the good opinion of any senior officer who might 
help him advance his cause, from Brigadier-General William
35joseph E. Johnston to J. Preston Johnston, August 31, 
1839; the original is in JJWM; a slightly edited version 
appears in Robert Morton Hughes, "Some Letters from the 
Papers of General Joseph E. Johnston," William and Mary 
Quarterly, 2nd Series, Vol. XI, No. 4 (October 1931): p. 320.
36joseph E. Johnston to J. Preston Johnston, May 25,
1843, in JJWM.
37joseph E. Johnston to Edward Johnston, January 6,
1851, in JJWM.
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J. Worth to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott. In the 
Mexican War, Johnston accepted the lieutenant-colonelcy of a 
temporary regiment in the hopes that his two-rank promotion 
might eventually become permanent.38 His rank expired with 
the regiment, but Johnston carried on an eight-year fight 
with the War Department and three successive Secretaries of 
War to gain legal recognition for a brevet promotion based 
on his temporary r a n k . 39 Twice he applied directly for 
commissions in newly forming regiments, and in 1860 Johnston 
transferred from the cavalry to staff duty to receive a 
promotion to brigadier-general as Quartermaster-General of 
the Army.  ^0
"No other officer of the United States Army of equal 
rank, that of brigadier-general, relinquished his position
38joseph E. Johnston to J. Preston Johnston, November 
27, 1842, in JJWM; Govan and Livingood, Different Valor, pp. 
16-25; K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1974), p. 276.
39joseph E. Johnston to Edward Johnston, January 6, 
1851, undated opinions of Secretary of War John B. Floyd and 
Adjutant General Samuel Cooper, in JJWM; Samuel Cooper to 
Jefferson Davis, July 13, 1855, endorsement of Joseph E. 
Johnston to Jefferson Davis, July 11, 1855, in SW-MS, M-567, 
Reel 581; abstracted in Haskell Monroe Jr., James T. 
McIntosh, Linda Lasswell Crist, et al., ed., The Papers of 
Jefferson Davis (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univer­
sity Press, 1985), V: pp. 440-441.
40The first time was in January, 1851, when there was a 
rumor that two new regiments would soon be formed. That did 
not happen, but four new regiments were created in March, 
1855. See Joseph E. Johnston to Edward Johnston, January 6, 
1851, in JJWM; Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 
24, 1855, in the Joseph E. Johnston papers, Duke University, 
Durham, North Carolina.
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in it to join the Southern Confederacy," he proclaimed in 
his Narrative.41 This distinction was important to Joseph 
Johnston because his two major rivals for advancement 
throughout his career had been Robert E. Lee and Albert 
Sidney Johnston. Lee had placed ahead of Johnston at West 
Point, outranked him as a captain on entering Mexico, and 
had been placed by then-Secretary of War Jefferson Davis one 
notch above him in the corps of cavalry when it was organ­
ized in 1855. The other Johnston had been a colonel of 
volunteers in Mexico when Joseph was a temporary lieutenant- 
colonel, had also ranked above him in the cavalry, and had 
received a brevet promotion to Brigadier-General in 1858 for 
commanding the Utah Expedition.42
Thus the matter of relative seniority between the three 
was a critical issue to Johnston, explaining his angry 
reaction to Jefferson Davis's decision to rank him behind 
the other two among the generals of the Confederate Army. 
Now, still unconvinced of the legality of that ranking, 
Johnston found himself once again in a position where Lee 
was his superior. Friends or not, Johnston may have 
resented Lee's seniority.
For the most part, Lee had always managed to be 
detached and philosophical about Johnston's passion for
41johnston, Narrative, p. 10.
42/Qfred P. James, "Joseph E. Johnston, Storm Center of 
the Confederacy," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 
XIV, No. 3 (December 1927): p. 345.
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advancement— but he could afford to be, since he had almost 
always remained just one step ahead of his friend until 
Johnston's appointment as Quartermaster General. His 1846 
comment on Johnston's maneuvering to gain a staff post is 
typical of Lee's attitude about the issue: "Joe Johnston is
playing A[d]j[utant]t Gen'l in Florida to his heart's 
content. His plan is good, he is working for promotion. I 
hope he will succeed."43 But in 1860, when Johnston, not 
Lee, received the promotion from lieutenant-colonel to 
brigadier-general, Lee did not manage to remain quite so 
detached. He did write his old friend a letter of hearty 
congratulations, opening with "My dear General: I am
delighted at accosting you by your present title, and feel 
my heart exult within me at your high position."44 Three 
months earlier, however, his heart had not exulted so 
strenuously when he wrote his son Custis of Johnston that 
"in proportion to his services he has been advanced beyond 
anyone in the army and has thrown more discredit than ever 
on the system of favoritism and making brevets."45
Even though both Virginia and the Confederacy had
^Robert E. Lee to John Mackay, February 3 , 1846, 
quoted in Freeman, R. E. Lee, I: p. 411.
44Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, July 30, 1860,
in JJWM; also quoted in Govan and Livingood, Different
Valor, pp. 24-25.
^Robert e . Lee to G. W. C. Lee, April 16, 1860, quoted
in J. William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee,
Soldier and Man (New York: Neale, 1906), p. 114.
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promoted him atop Johnston again, from Lee's perspective his 
old friend had, so far, enjoyed a much better war. To this 
point, the war for Lee had been primarily a desk job; his 
only true field service in western Virginia had brought him 
nothing but public criticism and personal frustration. 
Johnston shared the laurels for winning at Manassas, and had 
spent the intervening months in command of the South's 
largest and best equipped field army. Lee's own military 
secretary, Armistead Long, admitted years later that "at 
this time General J. E. Johnston bore the highest reputation 
in the Confederacy, since by his manoeuvring [sic] with 
Patterson in the Valley, his splendid success at Manassas, 
and his masterly retreat from Centreville he had acquired a 
world-wide renown."^® Though outranking his friend and 
invested with the position of commanding general, Lee saw 
Johnston as having the two things that he desired in war: 
reputation and a field command.
These were the tensions, submerged behind the masks of 
friendship and professional courtesy, that existed between 
the two Virginia generals on April 14, 1862. Each man would 
have denied that his objectivity or his decisions could be 
swayed by such personal resentments, and each undoubtedly 
would have thought he was telling the truth. But each man 
also eventually discovered that the stress of conducting a
46a . L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee (New York: J.
M. Stoddart & Co., 1886), p. 151.
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war at long odds could produce extreme emotional responses 
in him, decades of professional soldiering, notwithstanding. 
The chances of judgment being affected were increased when 
those tensions underlay profound intellectual disagreements.
Four questions dominated the dispute, and a fifth 
critical one never seems to have been asked by anyone at the 
meeting. Could Norfolk be held if McClellan gained the 
Peninsula? How long could the Yorktown-Warwick line be 
maintained against the Federals? Did the loss of that line 
necessarily equate with the loss of the entire Peninsula and 
a retreat to the environs of Richmond? Was the concentra­
tion of troops from Georgia and the Carolinas which Johnston 
proposed desirable or even possible? The unasked question 
was whether or not there was any possible compromise between 
the strategic stances of Johnston and Lee?
"I don't think there was any difference of opinion as
to the necessity of evacuating Norfolk if the Peninsula was 
evacuated," Randolph testified before a Congressional 
committee ten months later.47 Even with the Virginia 
blocking direct approaches to the harbor, all that McClellan
had to do was march far enough up the Peninsula to reach a
point on the James River at which the channels were too 
shallow for the ironclad to operate effectively. A pontoon 
bridge thrown across the river would then allow him to land
^Testimony of George W. Randolph, February 5, 1863, 
"Investigation of the Navy Department," NOR Series 2 (part 
4): p. 716.
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on Huger's supply, link up with Burnside's force in North 
Carolina, and completely isolate the Norfolk garrison.48
Retaining Norfolk--or more precisely the Gosport Naval 
Yard— was a key strategic question for the Confederates. 
Randolph, representing the interests of the navy, pointed 
out that its capture would entail the loss of "our best if 
not our only opportunity to construct in any short time 
gunboats for coastwise and harbor defense."49 ue did not 
overestimate the importance of the facility. Nearly 1,200 
heavy guns had been seized there in the first days of the 
war, providing the scaffolding upon which most of the 
Confederacy's coastal defenses had been erected; several 
hundred still remained, protecting the harbor.50 Removing 
them quickly would be no more practical than saving Whit­
ing's cannon on the Potomac had been.
But even irreplaceable heavy ordnance was secondary to 
the significance of the Gosport Navy Yard. Even though the 
last Union garrison had attempted to burn it to the water's 
edge, the shipyard was the best facility of its kind 
available to the South. The conversion of the Merrimac into
48Ibid., pp. 716-717; Robert E. Lee to Stephen Mallory, 
April 8, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 429-430.
4^Davis, Rise and Fall, II: p. 87.
50Wiiliam H. Parker, Recollections of a Naval Officer, 
1841-1865 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), p.
247; "Report of the armament of batteries around Norfolk, 
October 29, 1861," in NOR, VI: pp. 740-741; Stephen Mallory
to Jefferson Davis, July 18, 1861, in NOR, Series 2 II: p.
77.
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the Virginia had been its most heralded project so far, but 
not its only one. Workers had begun construction in March 
on the Richmond, a second ironclad designed along the same 
lines as her predecessor.51 The presence of two such 
vessels in Hampton Roads would secure the mouth of the James 
River beyond any doubt. During 1861, the navy yard had also 
partly armored the converted merchant steamer Patrick Henry 
which, with her ten guns, was the second most powerful 
Confederate warship operating in the James River.52 Two 
scuttled sailing sloops of war, the Plymouth and the 
Germantown, had been raised and converted into floating 
batteries, each mounting twenty-two heavy g u n s . 53 Two small 
but agile wooden gunboats, christened the Hampton and the 
Nansemond, had been completed in the first months of 1862; 
two more were under construction, and Naval Secretary 
Mallory envisioned a fleet of the pesky little vessels with 
which to harass Federal b l o c k a d e r s . 54 Not only the ships 
currently under construction would be lost if Norfolk fell, 
but the capability to produce many more would also be 
sacrificed.
Johnston, who had cut his inspection trip short before
51"Statistical Data of Confederate Ships," in NOR, 
Series II (part 2); p. 265.
52ibid., p. 262.
53ibid., pp. 254, 263.
54ibid., pp. 255, 261.
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visiting Norfolk, found himself hard-pressed to refute any 
of these arguments. Had he travelled to the port, an 
interview with General Huger would have provided him with a 
counterargument. Norfolk's strategic importance could not 
be disputed, but McClellan's army on the Peninsula hardly 
represented the only threat to its safety. In mid-February 
the "mosquito fleet" of gunboats protecting Elizabeth City, 
North Carolina, had been destroyed by the Federal vessels 
attached to Burnside's expedition. Elizabeth City guarded 
the southern entrance to the Dismal Swamp Canal, a waterway 
which could be traversed by light-draft gunboats all the way 
to Suffolk. Although the Union troops had then turned their 
attention farther south to New Berne, the right flank to 
Huger's position lay wide open. Only a thin screen of 
wretchedly armed Confederates stood between Burnside and the 
one railroad connecting Norfolk to the rest of Virginia.
Even if the Peninsula could be held indefinitely, Johnston 
could have argued, that alone would not guarantee the long­
term safety of Norfolk.55 But he did not know that, and so 
Randolph's point stood unassailed.
But Johnston scored heavily in return on the question 
of Yorktown's ultimate defensibility. He admitted that, 
although Magruder's line could not stand a heavy bombard-
m . Goldsborough to Gideon Welles, February 10, 
1862, in NOR, VI: pp. 604-605; OR Atlas, plates CXXXVII,
CXXXVIII; Benjamin Huger to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 474.
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ment, it could probably hold out against a frontal assault 
by McClellan's army, even if his 31,500 men received no 
further r e i n f o r c e m e n t s .56 However, he maintained that the 
cautious Federal commander would never order such an attack; 
if he had ever had such an inclination, McClellan would have 
tried to force the line weeks ago when Magruder could field 
fewer than 10,000 soldiers to oppose him. Johnston probably 
used words very similar to those which he wrote to Lee two 
weeks later: "It is plain that General McClellan will
adhere to the system adopted by him last summer, and depend 
for success upon artillery and engineering. We can compete 
with him in neither."57
The argument made sense to everyone. Randolph recalled 
that there was unanimity of opinion "that if the enemy 
assaulted our army at the Warwick River line we should 
defeat them. . . . "  Johnston also successfully convinced 
them— possibly with Randolph's help— that if "they made 
regular approaches . . . and took advantage of their great 
superiority of heavy artillery, the probability would be 
that one flank, or both, of the army would be uncovered.
. . ." Randolph concluded that "thus the enemy, ascending 
York and James Rivers in transports, could turn the flank of
56johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," B&L, II: p. 209.
57joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 30, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 477.
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the army and compel it to retreat."58
Sensing his advantage, Johnston pressed two more points 
which he thought argued effectively against deploying any 
more troops into the Peninsula. First, he portrayed the 
climate as being so unhealthy that many of Magruder's men 
had already become too ill to be of any use; should Smith's 
and Longstreet's Divisions be sent there, a similar deple­
tion of their strength could be expected.59 Even if this 
did not occur, the increased number of troops to support on 
the Peninsula could bring the Confederacy no material 
benefit. The two divisions would not give Johnston numbers 
close enough to McClellan's to justify an attack on the open 
field, and Magruder's flooding had insured that no matter 
how numerous an army was transferred to the Peninsula, it 
could not reach the Army of the Potomac to attack it.60
This indictment of the policy of damming and flooding 
the Warwick River probably stung Lee, who had at the least 
approved it, and may actually have been the first to suggest
^Testimony of George W. Randolph, February 5, 1863, 
"Investigation of the Navy Department," NOR, Series 2 (part 
4): pp. 716-717.
59john B. Magruder to Samuel Cooper, May 3, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 408-411.
60"Report of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, 
commanding Department of Northern Virginia, of operations 
from April 15 to May 19," May 19, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): 
p. 275.
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it.61 Instead of responding directly to Johnston's asser­
tion that the Yorktown line was inevitably untenable, he 
raised a new objection. The loss of that line did not 
necessarily mean the loss of the entire Peninsula. Davis 
remembered that Lee "insisted that the Peninsula offered 
great advantages to a smaller force in resisting a numeri­
cally superior a s s a i l a n t . " 6 2
Specifically, Lee argued that where the Peninsula 
narrowed to four miles wide at Williamsburg, and then along 
the banks of the Chickahominy River, there were secondary 
positions from which Johnston's army might delay the enemy 
or even inflict defeat upon him. He recalled that the 
previous year he had devised the plans for a continuous line 
of works at Williamsburg from which to rally against the 
Federals. This line should be much easier to hold than the 
Yorktown line. Magruder had several times reported progress 
in constructing the fortifications. Cannon in place on 
Jamestown Island could probably blockade the James River.63
If that line had to be evacuated, the few bridges over 
the Chickahominy and the tangled swamps around its banks
6lFreeman, R. E. Lee, II: p. 18; Robert E. Lee to John
B. Magruder, March 26, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 399.
62oavis, Rise and Fall, II: p. 87.
63Alfred Rives to Judah P. Benjamin, March 12, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, March 15, 1862, in OR,
IX: pp. 61-62, 68; Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, March
26, 1862, Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, April 9, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 398-399, 433-434; Catesby Ap R.
Jones to S. Barron, May 5, 1861, in NOR, VI: p. 699.
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would provide Johnston yet another chance to confront 
McClellan from a favorable position. Forced to fight for 
one or more of the crossings, the Army of the Potomac would 
have a difficult time bringing its superior numbers to bear, 
and the marshy ground would not be favorable to heavy 
artillery. Lee apparently envisioned a protracted fight 
before the Yankees could force the river. The Federals 
could be deterred from any attempt to land behind Johnston's 
line by burning all the wharves on the York and the James, 
and by making "such display of force in front of the 
landings which the enemy may approach as will retard their 
advance from the rivers to the interior of the country.
."64
The image of a deliberate, step-by-step retreat, with 
the possibility of inflicting a series of sharp repulses--or 
even a major defeat--on the Union Army appealed to the 
President. This was especially true because of what he knew 
of the state of Richmond's defenses; the city was in no way 
prepared to stand a siege. Excavation had not begun on four 
of the eighteen batteries in the ring of fortifications 
around the capital, and those which had been constructed did 
not inspire confidence. Most of the powder magazines 
contained two or three feet of standing water, and large 
tracts of woods obscured the field of fire from many of the
6^Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, March 26, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, April 9, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 3): pp. 398-399, 433-434.
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batteries. Yet these were not even the worst defects of the 
positions. Colonel Charles Dimmock, Chief of Ordnance for 
the State of Virginia, had reported at the end of February 
that the Batteries had been sited too near the city: "so
near can the enemy come that the city can be shelled and 
burned before our works are captured. . . . "  Of course, 
Dimmock admitted that his question was somewhat academic, 
since only twenty-five of the 218 cannon needed to arm the 
batteries had been mounted. Dimmock, like Lee, felt that 
"the line of defense should be near the banks of the 
Chickahominy. . . ."65
Again the brevity of Johnston's tour of the Peninsula 
prevented him from countering Lee's arguments. He did not 
know that the line of fortifications at Williamsburg had not 
been completed to Lee's specifications. Instead, they had 
been modified into a series of detached forts without Lee's 
knowledge or consent. Alfred Rives, Chief of the Confeder­
ate Engineer Bureau, had supervised this change, and even he 
recognized that they were fatally flawed. "I would take 
occasion here to condemn, as a general system, small de­
tached redoubts, although you might infer from what you see 
near Williamsburg that I am in favor of them," Rives told
65Robert Tansill to John H. Winder, February 27, 1862, 
Charles Dimmock to the Speaker of the Virginia House of 
Delegates, February 28, 1862, Alfred Rives to Judah P. 
Benjamin, March 12, 1862, in OR, IX: pp. 45-48, 61-62; John
H. Winder to Samuel Cooper, February 28, 1862, in LR-AIGO, 
M-4 74, Reel 52; John H. Winder to Samuel Cooper, February 
28, 1862, in LR-SW, M-437, Reel 76.
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Magruder's Chief Engineer on March 20. "I was, when they 
were commenced, completely inexperienced. . . .  I now know 
and have known for some months past that the system is most 
defective, making a line equally strong it is true, but 
equally weak at the same time."66 Nor did Johnston know 
that the James River was more than a mile and a half wide at 
Jamestown Island, and that it was questionable whether the 
thirteen poorly entrenched guns there could keep the river 
closed. Beyond the island, the next and only point below 
Richmond from which the James River could be effectively 
blocked was Drewry's Bluff, a point at which construction of 
entrenched batteries had barely been begun.67
No one in the room really knew much about just how 
practical it would be to defend behind the Chickahominy 
River. The necessity of sending out most of the Engineer 
Bureau's officers either to Johnston or Magruder had delayed 
a survey of the river. Even Lee, who advocated the river as 
a third line of defense, did not know the condition or even 
the number of bridges spanning the stream. Most of the 
arguments seem to have been made by examining a blue line on
^Alfred Rives to Henry T. Douglas, March 20, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 388-389; undated manuscript for speech
by Benjamin Stoddert Ewell before the Magruder-Ewell Camp, 
United Confederate Veterans, in Benjamin Stoddert Ewell 
papers, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.
^Alfred Rives to Judah P. Benjamin, March 12, 1862, in 
OR, IX: pp. 61-62; Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May
1, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 8, 1862, 
in OR, IX, (part 3): pp. 485, 500-501.
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some map.6 8
Yet even such a cursory examination should have 
revealed that a Union Army that drew its supplies from the 
York River rather than the James could sidestep uncomforta­
bly close to Richmond without ever contesting the river 
crossings. This would force Johnston to keep more than 
twenty miles of the winding river under observation— a line 
significantly longer than Magruder's at Yorktown. But on 
the Chickahominy, no entrenchments or batteries had ever 
been erected, and the river itself was navigable to Federal 
gunboats more than a dozen miles inland.69 Nor did any 
Confederate batteries exist to keep the Union Navy from 
landing troops west of the river's mouth. Finally, the 
climate around the swamps was, if possible, even more 
malarial than that in the vicinity of Yorktown.^0
Johnston's shock at seeing the condition of the 
Yorktown-Warwick River defenses, and the understandable 
urgency he felt in returning to explain their defects to the 
President, had again deprived him of vital details. Lee's 
contentions about the practicality of defending the Peninsu­
la, even after Magruder's line was evacuated, won the day in 
the mind of Jefferson Davis. At this point in the debate
^^Nichols, Confederate Engineers, p. 84.
69w. Smith to L. M. Goldsborough, May 29, 1862, in NOR, 
VII: p. 435.
^^Alfred Rives to Judah P. Benjamin, March 12, 1862, in 
OR, IX: pp. 61-62; Davis, Rise and Fall, II: p. 103.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
267
then, Lee was far ahead on points. The ultimate fall of 
Yorktown had been the only point he had conceded. Against 
this, he had successfully argued that its defense should be 
protracted as long as possible to preserve Norfolk, and that 
the remainder of the Peninsula was defensible. Now he 
proceeded to attack Johnston's suggestion to bring troops 
from the Carolinas and Georgia to Virginia.
The numbers themselves seem to support Johnston. His 
two divisions in Richmond, plus Magruder's army, totaled in 
excess of 55,000 men. Even discounting the cavalry screen 
and Field's tiny command, Jackson and Ewell could contribute
16,000 infantry. Despite reinforcing the Peninsula, Huger 
still retained 12,000 troops at Norfolk. In the Department 
of North Carolina there were 20,000 Confederate soldiers, 
and another 2 9,000 in the Department of South Carolina and 
Georgia. Most of these troop strengths had been under­
reported by their commanders, and more regiments were in the 
process of organization. With at least 8 3,000 men already 
present in the Old Dominion, Johnston presented a convincing 
numerical argument that by reducing the coastal defenses to 
minimal garrisons at Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah, 
the Confederacy could raise his numbers to parity with the 
Army of the Potomac, which was accurately believed to have 
between 100,000 to 120,000 soldiers.71
7lFor the argument that such numbers were usually 
understated, see the section on the numbers of Johnston's 
army on the Peninsula in the next chapter. See "Abstract
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But there were practical objections to Johnston's plan, 
and Lee made the most of each one. He objected to Johns­
ton's premise that risking the loss of Charleston and 
Savannah against the chance to defeat McClellan was an 
acceptable gamble. The Atlantic ports currently represented 
the major pipeline through which the South was receiving 
weapons from abroad.^2 These weapons were particularly 
critical at just that moment because most of the new 
regiments in Confederate camps of instruction had none. Lee 
was well aware that he could not yet arm all the troops that 
had volunteered for the war within the last month.^3
Yet if losing Charleston and Savannah represented a 
fair trade for McClellan's army in purely military terms, 
the same was not true in a political sense. As Jefferson 
Davis was well aware, the ardor of most governors and many 
Confederate soldiers was limited to the defense of their 
home states. Governors had already grudgingly resisted 
every transfer of troops from their coasts, and regiments 
serving far from home continually petitioned the government
from return of Department of South Carolina and Georgia,
Maj. Gen. John C. Pemberton, commanding, for March 1862," in 
OR, VI: p. 422; "Abstract from the return of the Department
of Norfolk, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger, commanding, for 
January, 1862," "Abstract from statement of the troops 
serving in the Department of North Carolina, commanded by 
Maj. Gen. T. H. Holmes, April 19, 1862, in OR, IX: pp. 38,
459 .
72pavis, Rise and Fall, II: p. 87.
73judah P. Benjamin to Jefferson Davis, March 12, 1862, 
in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 987-988.
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to send them back. With the army undergoing the reorganiza­
tion of all the one-year troops, Lee, Randolph, and Davis 
all feared that thousands of soldiers would allow their 
enlistments to expire if they felt that the government had 
no commitment to protecting their homes while they served 
elsewhere.?4
Severe logistical problems also existed. Just how 
rapidly the rickety network of Confederate railroads could 
deliver tens of thousands of soldiers to Virginia was more 
than questionable, and the inability to do so might well be 
critical. If the massive redeployment Johnston suggested—  
unprecedented in scale even by the pre-Shiloh concentration 
--were set in motion, a slow performance by the railroads 
could spell disaster. A moment of vulnerability would exist 
while the troops were in transit. During this time, neither 
the Atlantic ports nor Johnston's army would be at full 
strength; if the trains rolled too slowly, this moment of 
weakness might stretch out for several weeks. A coordinated 
Federal attack on Charleston and Savannah simultaneous with 
a penetration of Magruder's line might rapidly end the war, 
it was true--but with a Confederate surrender.
Celerity of motion, even willing cooperation, was 
something that everyone in the room knew the railroads could 
not be depended upon to provide. It is unlikely that Davis
^^Davis, Rise and Fall, II: p. 87; Patrick, Jefferson 
Davis and his Cabinet, p. 124; Freeman, R. E. Lee, II: pp.
28-29; Archer Jones, Confederate Strategy, pp. 42-49.
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or Lee could have resisted the urge to point out to Johnston 
that he had blamed all the difficulties in his withdrawal 
from northern Virginia on the railroads.75 The type of 
maneuver that Johnston had proposed would require a far 
greater level of coordination between a minimum of six 
different railroad companies.76 How did Johnston expect 
this to be accomplished?
The General's answer would have been the response that 
any number of Confederate officers made at various critical 
points in the war: government control of the rails. This
was a proposition to which Davis and Randolph were not 
hostile; but the Confederate Congress disagreed. Even as 
the President, the Secretary, and the four generals met, the 
House Committee on Military Affairs was in the process of 
first emasculating and then killing a bill to provide for 
emergency military control of the railroads. In just three 
days, Augustus R. Wright of Georgia and Thomas J. Foster of 
Alabama would successfully attack any such idea as "subver­
sive of, and in direct contravention to, the great and 
fundamental principle of State sovereignty." Even had he 
agreed with Johnston, Davis did not possess the power 
necessary to implement his p l a n . 77
75jOSeph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 28, 
1862, in OR, V: p. 1083.
76j3lack, Railroads, inset map.
77jbid., p. 98.
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Again, there were counterarguments to most of these 
objections, but Johnston did not--in fact could not--have 
known them.. Confederate intelligence on the coast was so 
bad that the conferees did not know that their army in the 
Carolinas and Georgia substantially outnumbered the Union 
forces there. Holmes deployed 20,000 men in North Carolina; 
Burnside opposed him with 14,000. Pemberton reported 29,000 
"Present for Duty" along the lower coast, while Federal 
Major-General David Hunter listed only 17,000 soldiers in 
the same c a t e g o r y . 7® Johnston was more correct than he 
knew. By attempting to defend everything, the Confederacy 
had dispersed a larger number of men so widely that the 
Union Navy could almost always deliver enough Yankees to any 
given point to guarantee local superiority. Careful 
concentration at critical points would have allowed the 
Southern army to defend the coastline with no more than the 
number of troops the Federals were using to attack it. This 
would have freed at least 18,000 men to reinforce Virginia, 
which could have given Johnston more than 100,000 men, the 
minimum number he needed to confront McClellan on the open 
field.79
78pavid Hunter to Edward M. Stanton, April 3, 1862, in 
OR, VI: p. 263; "Abstract from return of the Department of
North Carolina, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside commanding, for 
April, 1862," in OR, IX: p. 381.
79This assumes a reduction in North Carolina from
20.000 to 12,000 troops, and along the lower coast from
29.000 to 19,000 men. Neither diminution of troops would 
have rendered the Confederates incapable of defending the
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Removing just over one third of the soldiers on the 
coasts would have been politically touchy, but not impossi­
ble for the Davis administration. The transportation 
objections to concentration could have been overcome by 
using a concept that General Braxton Bragg would prove to be 
effective in a few months: that of operating the railroad
as if it were a strategic pipeline, shuttling a few troops 
from each garrison a few miles north to "bump" the next 
garrison farther along the route. Confederate experience in 
moving troops in this manner suggests that 18,000 troops 
could have been brought to Virginia in less than three weeks 
without unduly exposing any critical point on the coast.®^
As concerned the question of reorganization, Johnston 
could have argued the fact that he intended to use those 
troops for an offensive; thus offsetting any decline in 
morale resulting from a partial evacuation of the coast. An 
opportunity to strike a blow at the invading Federals had to 
be more satisfying to the minds of Confederate soldiers than 
merely sitting and waiting for the fearsome gunboats to 
appear.81
Johnston, however, could make most of these contentions 
in theory, only, without citing specific details. He did
major ports.
8C>Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, p. 218.
81joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 30, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 477.
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not know the realities of Confederate and Union troop 
strengths on the coast--he had only the assertions of Lee 
and Randolph that the Yankees deployed far more men. He had 
never been thoroughly informed of the extent of the scarcity 
of weapons. Nor had he researched the technical details of 
actually moving thousands of Confederate soldiers to 
Virginia. Lee, on the other hand, seemed to possess every 
answer necessary to support his case, and those answers, 
even if incorrect, stood unchallenged by the end of the 
evening.
By midnight, in Davis's mind, the debate had narrowed 
down to a choice between two radically different options. 
Johnston proposed an almost immediate withdrawal from the 
Peninsula, Norfolk, and much of the coast, luring McClellan 
inland where he could be assaulted by an army of at least 
equal, if not superior, numbers. Lee advocated committing 
as many troops as were currently available— Johnston's two 
divisions--to reinforce McClellan's advance inch by inch, 
preserving Norfolk for as long as possible, and hoping that 
an opportunity to strike a blow might present itself even to 
an outnumbered army. Johnston's plan required immediate 
massive risks, offering an eventual chance for a strategic 
victory. Lee's plan deferred the risks, in the hopes that 
time might provide a better solution.
To Davis, leery of repeating the mistakes of the past 
few months, Johnston's proposal entailed an unacceptable
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level of risk. He finally announced his decision: he would
follow Lee's line of reasoning. Johnston's army would be
committed to the defense of the Peninsula.82
Before examining Johnston's reaction to the President's
declaration, it is important to realize that the chief
failure of all of Davis's advisors was in allowing the 
question to be narrowed down to two mutually exclusive 
choices. The Confederacy's two senior field generals had an 
obligation, in a council call for the purpose of determining 
grand strategy, to lay out for their chief executive all the 
possible solutions to the problem facing him. But Johnston 
and Lee became so enmeshed in their own arguments that they 
did not present their president with a full range of 
options. . A third, possibly very much sounder, strategy for 
defending Richmond existed.
Assuming the correctness of Johnston's view that 
Magruder, with 31,500 men, could hold out just as long at 
Yorktown against McClellan as could Johnston with an army of 
55,000, the question actually boiled down to the most 
effective use that could be made of the 23,500 men in 
Smith's and Longstreet's Divisions, Stuart's Cavalry 
Brigade, and the fifty-six guns of Pendleton's Artillery 
Reserve. Sending them to the Peninsula was one option, but 
so was retaining them in Richmond as the nucleus of Johns­
ton's Grand Armee. Even discarding the more or less
82oavis, Rise and Fall, II: p. 87.
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fantastical schemes of Smith and Longstreet to join Jackson 
and Ewell to cross the Potomac, there was another option.
The remainder of Johnston's army could have been kept 
in the immediate Richmond area to facilitate the very 
delaying strategy which Lee advocated. Those 23,500 men 
represented a labor force capable of completing the Richmond 
defenses, and erecting the vital batteries at Drewry's 
Bluff. Obstructions and delaying positions could have been 
prepared at the Chickahominy bridges. White House and 
Eltham's Landing on the upper York River and those below 
Harrison's Landing on the James could have been strongly 
enough garrisoned to discourage Federal landing even after 
the Yorktown-Warwick line crumbled. His flanks secure, 
Magruder could have dropped back from Yorktown to Williams­
burg where, despite the shortcomings of the fortifications, 
he would have been able to stall McClellan on a line not 
seventeen but four miles long.
In many ways, such a plan would have satisfied the 
wishes of both Lee and Johnston. Two divisions holding the 
retired flanks of the Peninsula would have maximized the 
time to be gained in a delaying action, and would have 
materially increased the chances of successfully combatting 
the enemy at the Chickahominy. The time gained, if it was 
as much as two or three months, would mean more rifle- 
muskets produced in the factories and landed in the ports, 
leading to a substantial reinforcement of Johnston's army.
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If he could not have met the Army of the Potomac with exact 
numerical parity, he could certainly have fielded 85,000- 
90,000 men--no worse disadvantage than he had faced at 
M a n a s s a s . Furthermore, his army would have the advantage 
of awaiting the Yankees behind a third or fourth successive 
defensive line, the final one of which would necessarily 
have drawn McClellan away from his naval support.
But while such a plan might well have been workable, it 
could never arise while Johnston and Lee discussed the 
problem as adversaries, because it would have required each 
man to compromise on at least one of his most dearly held 
strategic precepts. Johnston would have had to accepted an 
operational concept that seemed at odds with his own belief 
in the need to concentrate the Confederacy's outnumbered 
troops. While maneuvering with detached--even isolated—  
columns never bothered Lee, he always advised meeting the 
enemy as far forward as practical with as many troops as 
possible. Keeping better than two divisions in the Richmond 
area violated his natural urge to close with the Federals 
and strike a blow. The two men could only have arrived at 
such a plan in a spirit of collaboration, a feeling sadly 
lacking between good friends that night.
Jefferson Davis, choosing from the plate set before 
him, decided to follow the arguments and instinct of Robert 
E. Lee. He told Johnston that the next morning the General
8 3Livermore, Numbers and Losses, p. 77.
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should start his army for the Peninsula. The President 
acknowledged years later that he had known that Joseph 
Johnston "did not agree with this decision," but that "he 
did not ask to be relieved," which Davis evidently inter­
preted as Johnston's acquiescence to his v e r d i c t . 8 4  
Johnston's own postwar comment in the Narrative has often 
been cited as evidence that he secretly planned to disobey 
Davis's orders and pursue his own strategy of withdrawal 
without reference to the wishes of the government: "The
belief that events on the Peninsula would soon compel the 
Confederate government to adopt my method of opposing the 
Federal army, reconciled me somewhat to the necessity of 
obeying the President's o r d e r . " 8 5  Douglas Southall Freeman 
contended that this ex post facto "comment curiously and not 
creditably revealed the man," while Clifford Dowdey took it 
as evidence that "when Johnston left the meeting to return 
to Yorktown, he had no intention of obeying the intent of
the order."88
It cannot be inferred from his later statement that 
Johnston engaged in willful deception of the government, 
unless he kept this view to himself; the only evidence of 
that fact is Johnston's own words. The published phrasing
84pavis, Rise and Fall, II: p. 88.
85johnston, Narrative, p. 116.
86preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 151; Dowdey, Seven
Days, p. 55.
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is ambiguous, and does not conclusively settle the question 
of whether the General voiced this opinion— this prediction, 
actually--or whether he left the meeting in a taciturn, 
sulky mood. The original draft of Johnston's memoirs is, 
however, much more definitive. Upon receiving Davis's 
instruction, Johnston wrote, "I replied that nothing 
reconciled me to obedience to this order but confidence that 
the cautious character of the Federal General would permit 
me to extricate my troops, after their flank was uncovered 
by the destruction of Yorktown. [emphasis a d d e d ] He had 
not been at all reticent about arguing his case with 
vehemence for several hours; there was no reason for him to 
stop giving the President his opinions just because he had 
lost the debate.
Discouraged but determined to follow his orders and buy 
as much time as he could and still save the army from a trap 
of his own government's creation, Johnston and Longstreet 
left the room. In the parlor, Johnston roused the uncon­
scious Smith and informed him of the outcome of the discus­
sion.®^ There was quiet talk of the next day's prepara­
tions, and the three men departed to begin their campaign.
B^praft of Narrative, p. 18, in Box 28, Folder 3, in 
RMH; see also Joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, 
January 21, 1868, in JJWM.
®®Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, September 14,
1867, Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, February 23,
1868, Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, February 23, 
1868, in RMH*.
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Chapter Eight 
Isolated on the Peninsula
A year earlier in Charleston Harbor, Major Robert 
Anderson had formally surrendered Fort Sumter. The next 
week Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers, and 
Virginia seceded. Tents arose on the fringes of Richmond as 
General Lee struggled to organize the state's volunteers.
In a short time, regiments from the rest of the Confederacy 
began to arrive, some of the earliest being the 1st and 2nd 
South Carolina, "veterans" of the bombardment of Fort 
Sumter. A crowd gathered at the railroad station to meet 
them; and, as Richmonder Sally Putnam recalled, "they bore 
the appearance of guests at a holiday festival, rather than 
the stern features of the soldier." Hundreds of the city's 
citizens flocked to their camps to hear the story of all the 
war there had thus far been: "The evening dress-parade
attracted admiring crowds of ladies, to whom every soldier 
seemed a hero."-*-
By April 15, 1862, however, both the city and the 
soldiers knew a great deal more about war. When Thomas 
Bragg looked out his window at the troops marching through 
Richmond to the Peninsula, he thought that they appeared
Iputnam, Richmond, p. 29.
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"rough but hardy . . . very muddy & . . . anything but neat
and trim." The horses pulling field pieces and caissons 
down Broad Street he thought "much reduced in flesh and all 
looked woebegone. . . ."2 These were not the polished young 
dandies who had marched so gaily off to battle a year ago; 
these were gaunt men who had spent a winter under canvas, 
subsisting on short rations, and pulling guard duty in the 
mud. Some of them were veterans in the true sense now, 
having seen combat at Manassas, Ball's Bluff, Dranesville, 
or a dozen other nameless skirmishes.
In most cases, the trip to Richmond had not been easy 
or even safe. The train conveying Colonel John B. Gordon's 
6th Alabama suffered a head-on collision with a locomotive 
returning up the same track. "Nearly every car on the 
densely packed train," Gordon remembered, "was telescoped 
and torn into pieces; and men, knapsacks, arms, and shivered 
seats were hurled to the front and piled in horrid mass 
against the crushed timbers and ironwork." Several soldiers 
died in the wreck, and dozens more were seriously w o u n d e d . ^  
But even walking to Richmond did not guarantee a safe trip. 
The Hampton (South Carolina) Legion marched to the capital 
from Fredericksburg through rain, hail, and sleet. In 
makeshift shanties of poles and pine brush, the men in
^Entries of April 6, 1862, April 8, 1862, Bragg diary, 
pp. 201-202, 205.
3John B. Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), p. 52.
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Captain James Conner's company slept wet and shivering cold, 
their blankets lagging behind on supply wagons. Fires would 
only reluctantly ignite to cook their biscuits or their 
bacon. Conner sourly describes the latter as having just 
"one streak of lean and five inches of fat." Of sixteen new 
recruits his company had received in the previous month, 
Conner reported that three died of exposure on the march.^
But wet and bedraggled as Johnston's regiments were, to 
the citizens of the city they represented the army that 
would hold McClellan at bay. So Richmonders turned out en 
masse to welcome them. Bands played, women waved handker­
chiefs from second-floor windows, and the streets were lined 
with families, friends, and well-wishers. The day broke 
bright and clear for a change; and, soon after dawn, the 
streets filled with the sound of the tramping feet of 
Longstreet's Division. They had walked from Centreville to 
the Rapidan; and, when the call came to pull back to 
Richmond, Longstreet's men marched, while other troops took 
the trains. Sarcastically, the soldiers dubbed themselves 
"Longstreet's Walking Division," and opined that if Jeffer­
son Davis ever planned for them to reinforce New Orleans, he 
would probably tell them to walk.5
They made a show of their passage through Richmond,
^Moffett, Conner, p. 88.
^Putnam, Richmond, pp. 119-120; Foote, Civil War, I: 
p. 403.
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nonetheless. At the division's head rode its phlegmatic 
commander, James Longstreet, whose mule-like stamina allowed 
his appearance to belie the fact that, since the meeting the 
previous evening, he could not have gotten any sleep. Most 
of the band music was lost on the nearly deaf Georgian, but 
his staff cantered about on their best mounts, raised their 
hats and saluted the crowds. Behind them came the infantry, 
in columns of half-companies "with music, banners, mounted 
officers, artillery, etc.," one soldier recalled.6 "Sol­
diers left the ranks to grasp the hands of friends in 
passing," wrote one Richmonder, "to receive some grateful 
refreshment, a small bouquet, or a whispered congratula­
t i o n s .  Ten thousand troops took a long time to march past 
a given point, and the cheering went on for hours before the 
last Confederate soldier passed down to the wharf at 
Rocketts to board the boats for Yorktown. Some were 
heartened by the turn-out; others barely noticed. A private 
in Brigadier-General George Pickett's Virginia brigade 
ignored all the demonstrations and "sadly gazed at the shop 
windows where loaf-bread, and clean clothing, and books, and 
other needed articles so tantalized my eyes, and empty 
pockets."8
^Putnam, Richmond, pp. 119-120; J. G. de Roulhac 
Hamilton, The Papers of Randolph Abbot Shotwell (Raleigh,
NC: North Carolina Historical Commission, 1929), I: p. 175.
^Putnam, Richmond, p. 119-120.
^Hamilton, Shotwell, I: p. 176.
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"Jeb" Stuart's cavalry paralleled Longstreet's Divi­
sion, flowing down the side-streets to equally enthusiastic 
applause. "They swept through our streets on that beautiful 
morning, with their horses in good order, their own spirits 
buoyant and cheerfull [sic], many of them wearing in their 
caps bouquets of the golden daffodils of early spring," said 
Sally P u t n a m . 9 Stuart camped his brigade just outside the 
city limits, and allowed his men one last night on the town 
before trotting toward Yorktown.10
But for all the showmanship and pageantry of the horse 
soldiers, Longstreet's Assistant Adjutant-General, Moxley 
Sorrel, believed that the finest spectacle of the day had 
been staged by Brigadier-General Robert Toombs. Always more 
politician than general, Toombs led his troops "past the 
crowds at Spottswood Hotel, with childlike delight." His 
brigade was composed of one Virginia and four Georgia 
regiments. Toombs "put himself at the head of one regiment 
and moved it out of sight amid hurrahs, then galloping back 
he brought on another, ready himself for cheers, until the 
brigade was down the street. . .
But the procession through the Richmond streets was to 
be the last moment of glory for some time to come. Gustavus 
W. Smith's Division, which had marched directly to White
^Putnam, Richmond, p. 120.
lOThomas, Bold Dragoon, p. 103.
11-Sorrel, Recol lections, p. 59.
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House on the York River, boarded a motley collection of 
schooners and small steamers for the trip to Yorktown. 
Longstreet's men crowded on flatboats at Rocketts, which 
lurched slowly down the James River toward Jamestown. 
Conditions on the boats were horrible: there was no food,
no water, no provision for sanitation, and, in most cases, 
no place either covered or ventilated to s l e e p . 12 Briga­
dier-General Joseph Kershaw's South Carolinians found 
themselves forced, on an earlier trip, to rotate between the 
holds of their small sailboats and the deck: it was a
choice between freezing or s u f f o c a t i n g . 12 Pickett's men 
used the hours that the tug pulling their flatboat needed to 
clear the obstructions at Drewry's Bluff in order to cut 
tethers to keep sleeping soldiers from being washed over­
board. 14 it was a miserable experience for the infantry, 
and the cavalry and artillery saw little more comfort as 
they trooped down the muddy roads that crossed the Chicka- 
hominy.
Nor did the conditions that Johnston's men found around
Yorktown make up for the poor conditions on the trip. The
l^River transportation was strained to the breaking
point in the transfer of Johnston's army to the Peninsula.
On the James River, for example, even packing the men and 
their baggage in as tightly as possible, the Quartermaster- 
General could only send about 4,000 troops down the river at 
one time. See Larkin Smith to Walter H. Taylor, March 26, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 400.
l^Dickert, Kershaw's Brigade, p. 93.
l^Hamilton, Shotwel1 , I: p. 177.
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trenches in the lines were flooded, the ground for the camps 
boggy, the rain unceasing, the food bad, and the Federal 
artillery and sharpshooters annoying--sometimes fatally 
s o . 15 Soldiers assigned to the redoubts or the rifle pits 
spent their days digging in deeper, often in direct sight of 
the enemy. Pickett's men erected one earthwork only by the 
expedient of posting a lookout to shout, "Lie down!," when 
he saw the smoke issue from the mouths of far-off Yankee 
c a n n o n . 15 Kershaw's troops scoured the area for scraps of 
wood to maintain bonfires around the clock. During the day, 
soldiers not on duty huddled around them; at night they 
competed for sleeping positions near the flames.17 Chief of 
Ordnance E. P. Alexander echoed the sentiments of most 
Confederate soldiers when he claimed that "in the whole 
course of the war there was little service as trying as that 
in the Yorktown lines."18
Joseph Johnston did not immediately accompany his 
soldiers to Yorktown on April 15. Instead, he spent the day 
working out administrative details with Lee and Cooper. He 
had two major worries: the forces left in northern Virgin-
l^Alexander, "Sketch," p. 36; Joel Cook, The Siege of 
Richmond: A Narrative of the Military Operations of Major-
General George B. McClellan during May and June, 1862 
(Philadelphia: G. W. Childs, 1862), pp. 144-145.
l^Hamilton, Shotwel1 , I: pp. 180-181.
l^Dickert, Kershaw's Brigade, p. 95.
l^Edward P. Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confeder­
ate (New York: n. p., 1907), p. 64.
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ia, and his wagon trains.
Johnston's primary concern about Jackson, Ewell, and 
Field was not that they might be overwhelmed, for he 
believed each of the Confederate columns to be much more 
mobile than the Yankees who opposed them. He worried, for 
the most part, about any coordinated actions. With the 
department commander on the Peninsula, the time lag for 
correspondence between Johnston and Jackson could easily 
exceed a week. Johnston reiterated to Ewell that all 
questions of attack and retreat "must be decided on the 
ground"— in the time necessary for letters and telegrams to 
find him, precious opportunities might be lost.19
He instructed Jackson and Ewell to forward their 
correspondence to him through Cooper's o f f i c e . 20 This was 
proper military procedure in the strictest sense, but it is 
difficult to escape the suspicion that Johnston may have 
preferred to keep internal departmental letters out of Lee's 
hands. The April 14 meeting marked a low point in the 
friendship of the two men. Not only did Johnston know that 
Lee differed from him on strategy, he may have suspected 
that the other Virginian planned to use his power as 
Commanding General to put some of them into practice while 
Johnston was isolated on the Peninsula.
19joseph E. Johnston to Richard S. Ewell, April 17, 
1862, in OR~, XII (part 3): p. 852.
20ibid.
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The question of the Department of Northern Virginia's 
wagon trains was one of disposition and security. While the 
Confederates held the James and York Rivers, sufficient, if 
not overly ample, supplies could reach Yorktown by water, 
saving the necessity of committing the rickety wagons and 
worn-out horses to the muddy Tidewater roads and malarial 
atmosphere. In the event of a retreat, however, the threat 
of Federal gunboats prowling up the rivers would close that 
route of supply. Within a few days Johnston's army would 
need to be met by wagon trains of food and ammunition, or 
else disaster might result.
The solution to this problem was to keep Johnston's 
wagons in Richmond, loaded and ready to meet the army with 
only a few hours' notice. But hundreds of wagons could not 
be left in the capital without a guard. Eventually, the 
decision was reached that, until Johnston called for them, 
the wagon trains would become the security responsibility of 
Brigadier-General John H. Winder, Provost-Marshal of 
Richmond, and commander of the newly expanded Department of 
Henrico.21
Johnston was pleased to be relieved of the necessity of 
guarding the wagons, but hardly happy about the status of 
Winder's department. The Department of Henrico had been 
established in December, 1861, to put Richmond under
2lRobert E. Lee to John H. Winder, April 27, 18G2, in 
Lee Letterbook.
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military control. Winder, a Marylander, was willing to 
suffer personal unpopularity to ride herd on Union pris­
oners, guard various military facilities, discipline 
soldiers on furlough, and smell out anti-Confederate 
conspiracies. He never had enough men assigned to him to do 
more than a minimally adequate job, and his enemies periodi­
cally accused him of favoritism, terrorism, and even 
treason. But Winder, with Jefferson Davis's full support, 
persevered at his task.22
On March 26, Davis and Lee extended Winder's authority 
to include Petersburg and all the territory within ten miles 
of both cities. Ostensibly, the President and Commanding 
General made this decision in order to organize better the 
rail transfer points that would also have to be used to 
shift troops in an emergency. It would also place responsi­
bility for the completion of the Richmond fortifications and 
the batteries at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs in the hands 
of a single o f f i c e r . 23 From Johnston's perspective, 
however, this left a dangerous pocket of someone else's 
authority at the central point between all the wings of his 
widespread army. Messages, troops, and supplies all had to
22oeneral Orders No. 8, Adjutant and Inspector-Gener- 
al's Office, March 1, 1862, in NOR, Series 2, III: pp. 122-
123; Robert G. Cleland, "Jefferson Davis and the Confederate 
Cabinet," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIX, No. 3 
(January 1916): p. 216.
23special Orders No. 69, Adjutant and Inspector- 
General 's Office, March 26, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 403.
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pass back and forth through a bottleneck that he did not 
control; Johnston could not even send his own provost 
marshals into the city to round up stragglers.2 4 Johnston 
protested this state of affairs, but Davis and Lee refused 
to give him authority over Winder.25
Disheartened at this outcome, Johnston boarded a 
steamer on York River the morning of April 17, and arrived 
at Yorktown again that evening, just four days after his 
inspection tour. The next morning he officially assumed 
command of the army.26
McClellan had been uncharacteristically aggressive in 
the past few days. On April 16, concerned that Confederate 
batteries at Dam No. 1 could harass the construction of some 
of his siege batteries, the Union commander ordered Briga­
dier-General William F. "Baldy" Smith to "reconnoiter" the 
Rebel position. Smith moved up a Vermont brigade, with a 
pair of field batteries, and opened fired across the creek 
separating the two lines. The Confederate counterfire, from 
a single cannon, was silenced in about an hour, with the 
crew driven from their gun. Smith ordered the 3rd Vermont, 
along with several companies of the 4th, to wade the creek
24a . P. Hill to Samuel Cooper, April 27, 1862, LR-AIGO, 
M-474, Reel 24; Robert E. Lee to John H. Winder, May 3,
1862, in Lee Letterbook.
25inferred from the tone of Joseph E. Johnston to 
Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 499.
26General Orders No. 1, Department of Northern Virgin­
ia, April 18, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 448.
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and probe the now-quiet rifle pits in front of his posi­
tion . 27
The ease with which the Confederate artillery had been 
quieted encouraged McClellan, who had ridden to Smith's 
headquarters sometime after the beginning of the action. He 
told Smith to move up his other two brigades. If circum­
stances permitted, he should attempt to take and hold the 
dam, not just examine it.28
The only forces from the Army of the Peninsula which 
had actually been in the trenches to oppose the Federal 
probe were a single six-pounder from a Georgia battery and a 
company of pickets from the 15th North Carolina of Briga­
dier-General Howell Cobb's brigade. The rest of the 
Confederate outwork was filled with "Quaker guns"— blackened 
logs between wagon wheels— and most of the North Carolinians 
were several hundred yards to the rear, draining and 
improving their camps. Colonel Robert McKinney, a Virginia 
Military Institute graduate, ordered his men to arms as soon 
as word came back that the enemy had crossed the c r e e k . 29
McKinney did not wait for reinforcements, a proper
27"Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, 
commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, of engagement at 
Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys," April 17, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 1): p . 364.
28ibid., April 18, 1862, p. 365.
29"Report of Lieut. Col. Ross R. Ihrie, Fifteenth North 
Carolina Infantry, of the engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's 
Mill)," April 19, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 421-422.
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military but personally fatal decision. He could see more 
Yankees gathering across the water, and would have known 
that if he did not clear the Vermonters out of his rifle 
pits quickly, Smith's Division would soon wade the creek in 
force. McKinney double-timed his Tarheels toward the enemy, 
who opened fire as soon as the North Carolinians came into 
range. Out in front of his men, the Colonel lined them up 
to return fire, and the two sides traded volleys until a 
Federal minie ball caught McKinney in the forehead and 
killed him instantly. Though his lieutenant-colonel later 
denied it, the 15th North Carolina fell back in some 
confusion amid cries from the ranks that it had been ordered 
to retreat.30
But McKinney's prompt response had brought other 
Confederate units to the field. A second regiment from 
Cobb's brigade, the 16th Georgia; and two companies of a 
third, the 2nd Louisiana, rushed without orders to the sound 
of the firing, where they met the 7th and 8th Georgia of 
Brigadier-General D. R. Jones's brigade marching up from the 
other direction. These regiments joined the rallied 15th 
North Carolina to form a force the size of a brigade,
3Qlbid., p. 422; but see "Report of Brig. Gen. Howell 
Cobb, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, Second Divi­
sion, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill)," April 22, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 417.
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probably numbering over 2,000 men.31
Less than half an hour had passed since the 3rd Vermont 
had first occupied the rifle pits, and the regiment's 
position was growing precarious. Reinforcements did not 
appear to be moving up as ordered, and, after the first 
skirmish with the North Carolinians, Colonel Breed N. Hyde 
discovered that few of his men had any dry ammunition left. 
He dispatched a runner to Smith's headquarters with this 
information, and settled in to hold the rifle pits as long 
as he could.32
No Confederate general had yet arrived to coordinate 
the activities of the North Carolinians, Georgians, and 
Louisianians who had converged at the point of attack. 
Precious minutes ticked by, until Colonel George T. Ander­
son, commander of the 11th Georgia and senior field officer 
of Jones's brigade, rode up and assumed command. Quickly, 
he deployed the troops into line, and gave the order to fix 
bayonets. Unlike McKinney, he did not intend to halt and
31ibid.; if these regiments were no stronger than they 
were two weeks later, then they probably numbered:
15th North Carolina: 532 effectives
16th Georgia: 488 effectives
2nd Louisiana (2 cos.) 156 effectives
7th Georgia 611 effectives
8th Georgia:_______________ 251 effectives
Total: 2,028 effectives
See "Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, com­
manded by General Joseph E. Johnston, on the Peninsula, 
about April 30, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3): p. 480.
32"Report of Col. Breed N. Hyde, Third Vermont Infan­
try, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys," April 
17, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 375.
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return the fire of the Vermonters; he would accept initial 
casualties in order to close with his superior numbers and 
regain the trenches before any more Yankees could cross the 
c r e e k . 33 Colonel Hyde, finding himself greatly outnumbered, 
and having received neither reinforcements nor dry powder, 
shouted for a retreat, losing about ninety-five men killed, 
wounded, or captured, before he got his regiment back across
the d a m . 34
Both sides concentrated more troops on opposite sides 
of the creek throughout the afternoon, waiting expectantly 
for the action to r e s u m e . 35 But McClellan had found out 
what he came to learn: the Confederates had little artil­
lery capable of impeding his build-up, but reacted quickly 
to any p r o b e s . 36 Magruder, who believed that the Federals 
had made "a serious effort to break through," turned in to 
Johnston the next day another pessimistic report on the
33"Report of Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, C. S. Army, 
commanding Second Brigade, Second Division, of engagement at 
Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill)," April 22, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): 
p. 417.
34"Report of Col. Breed N. Hyde, Third Vermont Infan­
try, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys," April 
17, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 375.
35"Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, 
commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, of engagement at 
Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys," April 17, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 1): p . 364.
36"McClellan's Report (I)," in OR, XI (part 1): p. 18.
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strength of his lines.37
Johnston had earlier seen the rifle pits as the weakest 
links in Magruder's extended line. The unwelcome news that 
the enemy was also aware of this deficiency caused him to 
examine carefully his options for defending his positions. 
Counting detached forces at Gloucester Point, Williamsburg, 
and Jamestown Island, Johnston's army contained twenty-four 
brigades of infantry, one of cavalry, and two battalions of 
reserve artillery--at least 70,000 men "present for d u t y . "38
37"Reports of Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army, 
commanding at Yorktown, &c.," May 3, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
1): p. 406.
38Tne only relatively complete return for Johnston's 
army on the Peninsula is "Organization of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, 
on the Peninsula, about April 30, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3): 
pp. 479-484. This lists Johnston's army as having 55,633 
"effectives," and is the figure usually accepted for the 
army at Yorktown. It is defective, however, in several 
respects which render it far too low. First, it does not 
include any numbers for the 3rd Virginia Cavalry or the 
Reserve Artillery. Second, being "effective" returns, as 
the Confederates figured them, this represented only the 
enlisted men actually available for the battle line, and 
excluded the officers and detailed men normally carried 
under the heading "present for duty." "Present for duty" 
gives a much more accurate estimation of the army's 
strength, and a consistent one by which to measure Johns­
ton's strength relative to McClellan, who did not use the 
term "effectives" in his returns. Finally, these figures do 
not allow for the fact that the memorandum was compiled 
about April 30, 1862, or two weeks after the balance of 
Johnston's army had arrived at Yorktown. Hundreds, if not 
thousands, of men had been returned to the Richmond hospi­
tals or had wandered off in the interim.
In order to reconstruct Johnston's actual strength on 
the Peninsula, it is necessary to account in some way for 
each of these factors. The strength of the 3rd Virginia 
Cavalry can be determined from Magruder's April 23, 1862 
return, which gives it, and two other independent companies 
of cavalry 923 enlisted men. Jennings Wise used the average
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The army roster contained four major-generals: Smith,
Longstreet, Magruder, and D. H. Hill, each of whom Johnston
strength of Johnston's other field batteries to calculate 
that there were 1,050 enlisted men in the Reserve Artillery. 
Thomas Livermore argued quite convincingly that the "effect­
ive" force of Confederate units represented between 85% 
(cavalry) and 93% (infantry and artillery) of the enlisted 
men "present for duty." Thus 54,344 "effective" infantry 
and artillery equate with 58,434 enlisted men "present for 
duty." Likewise, 2,221 "effective" cavalry equate with 
2,613 enlisted men "present for duty," giving a total 
enlisted strength of 61,047 men. Allowing the lowest 
percentage that Livermore cites for officers in the Confed­
erate army (6.5%), these men were probably accompanied by 
3,968 officers, for a total "present for duty" strength on 
April 30, 1862, of 65,015.
But this still does not account for two weeks of 
debilitating sickness and desertions. What percentage 
should be assigned to that? From Magruder's report on April 
23, only two units--the heavy artillery battalion and the 
artillery from McLaws' division— can be determined with 
relative certainty to have the same composition as they had 
a week later. The heavy artillerymen suffered a 10% decline 
in strength, the field gunners, who presumably saw more 
service in the trenches, lost 20% of their numbers. The 
lower of the two would correlate closely with the rate of 
illness and absence in the Department of Northern Virginia 
during the winter, and seems therefore an acceptable 
percentage. Taking the lower figure, 10%, as a working 
figure, this means that Johnston had 72,239 officers and men 
"present for duty" when he assumed command.
Obviously the figure is an approximation, and each of 
the precise calculations could be challenged, but the 
methodology is that which is most widely accepted, and 
indicates that Johnston's army on the Peninsula was, in 
fact, much stronger than has heretofore been suggested.
See "Abstract from Memorandum Return of the Right Wing, 
Army of the Peninsula, Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder command­
ing, for April 23, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3): p. 460; Wise,
Long Arm, p. 186; Livermore, Numbers and Losses, pp. 67-70; 
Robert E. Lee to Abraham C. Myers, April 29, 1862, Robert E. 
Lee to Samuel P. Moore, April 29, 1862, Robert E. Lee to 
John H. Winder, May 3, 1862, in "Lee Letterbook; Returns of 
the Department of Northern Virginia, October, November, and 
December, 18 61, in JJWM.
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assigned to command a division of six brigades.^9 That he 
thought such divisions overly large is evidenced by the fact 
that he allowed his four subordinates to sub-divide their 
own commands, and requested the promotion of W. H.. C. 
W h i t i n g . 40 Johnston moved to improve the overall quality of 
his brigade commanders, recommending promotion for Colonel 
Wade Hampton, permitting the elderly S. R. Anderson to 
resign, and campaigning to avoid the assignment of politi­
cian-general Henry A. Wise to the army.41
He decided to leave Hill in command of the Yorktown 
fortifications, because the North Carolinian was familiar 
with the strengths and weaknesses of the positions, and 
because he had already begun to implement Johnston's orders 
to move a substantial number of heavy cannon from the river 
to the land side of the f o r t . 42 chief of Artillery Pendle­
ton was dispatched to assist h i m . 43 Johnston limited
^ G e n e r a l  Orders No. 1, Department of Northern Virgin­
ia, April 18, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 448.
40joseph E. Johnston to George W. Randolph, April 20, 
1862, in W. H. C. Whiting, Compiled Service Record.
4lLouis T. Wigfall to Joseph E. Johnston, May [April] 
21, 1862, in JJWM; S. R. Anderson to Samuel Cooper,. March 5, 
1862, S. R. Anderson to Jefferson Davis, March 8, 1862, in 
LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 3; Theopnilus H. Holmes, March 6, 1862, 
in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 23; Warner, Generals in Gray, p. 10; 
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 28, 1862, in OR, 
XI (part 3): p . 471 .
42d . H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April 15, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 442.
43Lee, Memoirs, pp. 180-181.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
297
Magruder's command to the far right side of the l i n e -  
overlooking the Warwick River all the way to the James. He 
assigned Longstreet the center segment; and G. W. Smith the 
reserve.^4
Moving Magruder, who had designed the entire defensive 
system, to the least critical point in the line appears to 
have been a tacit editorial comment by Johnston on "Prince 
John's" initial conduct of operations. Despite having 
commanded on the Peninsula for nearly a year, and having 
held this line for several weeks, Magruder had allowed much 
necessary work to remain undone. He retained too many guns 
facing York River. The critical rifle pits in the center of 
the line had never been connected, improved, or drained. No 
telegraph lines had been run behind his front, and even 
locally no provisions seemed to have been made for comman­
ders to react to a Federal attack. McClellan's probe of 
April 16, had it not been met by troops instinctively 
marching to the sound of the guns, and the initiative of two 
colonels, might well have shattered the key point in the 
Yorktown line. "Labor enough has been expended here to make 
a very strong position," Johnston advised Lee on April 22, 
"but it has been wretchedly misapplied by the young engineer 
officers."45 He did not need to mention who had supervised
^ G e n e r a l  orders No. 1, Department of Northern Virgin­
ia, April 18, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 448.
45joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 22, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 455-456.
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the engineers.
The methodical Longstreet received the assignment to 
shore up the middle of the line. Unlike Magruder, who had 
often halted labor on his fortifications when he could not 
find slaves to impress, the Georgian put his own troops to 
work. Shacks and other buildings behind the lines were 
dismantled, not to be fed into bonfires, but to plank over 
the muddy bottoms of the t r e n c h e s . 46 His regiments worked 
in relays connecting and extending the rifle pits, and 
erecting small redoubts every few hundred feet along the 
line. The rear walls of the two detached redoubts were 
filled in with a combination of earth, sand bags, and bales 
of c o t t o n . 47 Longstreet's men already knew how to walk—  
now he taught them to dig.
The six brigades of G. W. Smith's Division remained in 
reserve throughout the entire period of the army's stay in 
the trenches. The fact that his troops never had to rotate 
into the water-logged front lines caused some resentment 
among the rest of the soldiers of Johnston's army, but the 
deployment represented sound military logic. Smith was 
Johnston's most trusted subordinate, the man he wanted
46q . Moxley Sorrel to A. P. Hill, April 20, 1862, in 
OR, LI (part 2): p. 543.
47pavid F. Riggs, 7th Virginia Infantry (Lynchburg, VA: 
H. E. Howard, 1982), p. 22; Robert T. Bell, 11th Virginia 
Infantry (Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, 1985), p. 19;
Hamilton, Shotwell, I: pp. 180-181; Alexander, "Sketch," p.
36; Alexander, Military Memoirs, p. 64.
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instantly available to protect the army's flanks if McClel­
lan's gunboats succeeded in opening either the James or York 
Rivers. Kept in their camps about a mile to the rear of the 
main line, Smith's brigades could be ready to march hours 
sooner than regiments which would have to be relieved in the 
trenches first. True, Johnston could have rotated the 
troops, brigade by brigade, to give the rest of his men more 
respite from disagreeable duty. But while such an action 
might have improved morale, it could also have left him with 
the fragments of two or more divisions as his reserve, not a 
single concentrated force of 10,000-15,000 men accustomed to 
working together. As usual, Johnston's dispositions were 
governed by military necessity; if he had a failing it was 
that he never saw a need to explain to anyone else that 
which he believed to be patently o b v i o u s . 48
Under ordinary circumstances, the perceived disparity 
in duties assigned might have passed with minor discontent. 
But during the months of March, April, and May, 1862, the 
situation inside every Confederate army, including Johns­
ton's, was hardly ordinary. In a desperate attempt to keep 
Southern brigades from melting away when the enlistments of
4®There is also evidence that Johnston himself was a 
little distant from the problem of the living and working 
conditions of the troops in the trenches. On April 25 he 
wrote to D. H. Hill: "Do I understand you to say that your
men already require relief? I suppose not, as there had 
[been] no occasion yet for fatiguing service." Joseph E. 
Johnston to D. H. Hill, April 25, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): 
p . 46 4.
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the one-year regiments expired, the Confederate Congress had 
passed legislation requiring those units to reorganize for 
three years, but granting each company, battery, battalion, 
and regiment the right to re-elect its o f f i c e r s . ^ 9
It was a most peculiar exercise in democracy: men who
could not vote for their own Senators, or even in some cases 
for President, had demanded and won the right to select by 
popular vote the officers who would lead them into battle. 
For years after the war, veterans recalled the elections 
with reactions that ranged from wry humor to thinly veiled 
disgust. In the 18th Mississippi, Captains A. G. Brown (ex- 
Governor and Senator) and O. R. Singleton (ex-Congressman), 
both standing for higher office, "told us that if we would 
reorganize immediately they would 'wager their heads to 
brass pins the war would end in sixty d a y s . '"50 An orderly 
sergeant campaigning for election to lieutenant in the 1st 
Virginia Cavalry performed the morning roll call while the 
men of his company lay in their bedrolls. He promised them 
that if they elected him he could get the company reorgan­
ized as artillery and sent on detached service to more 
favorable c l i m e s . 51 "it was a comical sight," wrote a
49patrick, Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet, p. 124; 
Freeman, R. E. Lee, II: pp. 28-29; Jones, Confederate
Strategy, pp. 42-49.
50w. Gart Johnson, "The Barksdale-Humphrey Brigade," 
Confederate Veteran, April 1894 supplemental issue, p. 25.
51]3lackford, War Years, pp. 62-63.
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member of the Richmond Howitzers, "to see the officers of an 
army 'elected' by the people in ranks," but Colonel John 
Brockenbrough of the 40th Virginia found nothing humorous in 
the situation: "we find worthless, intriguing, politicians,
and those who have been defeated in company elections, 
taking advantage of all these conflicting bills and unsatis­
factory constructions . . . using bribery, a great deal of 
flash plausibility, and arguments which any worthless 
demagogue is capable of making."52
But the situation was hardly amusing to Joseph Johnston 
or his generals. The elections seriously disrupted disci­
pline, and consumed his senior officers' time supervising 
contests or puzzling out the finer points of byzantine 
Confederate election laws. More detrimental yet, the 
upheaval cost the army the service of hundreds of experi­
enced officers in the midst of an active campaign, men often 
replaced by ciphers, demagogues, and aspirants with true 
potential but no training.
No statistical study has ever quantified the precise 
effect of the elections on either the Department of Northern 
Virginia or the Southern forces as a whole, but rough 
approximations can be made. Over half of the army on the 
Peninsula was affected by the reorganization: fifty of
52carleton McCarthy, Richmond Howitzers in the War,
Four Years Campaigning with the Army of Northern Virginia,
By a Member of the Company (Richmond: n. p., 1891), p. 55;
John M. Brockenbrough to Theophilus Holmes, March 21, 1862, 
in OR, XII (part 3): pp. 832-833.
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eighty-eight and one-half infantry regiments, three of four 
cavalry regiments, and probably twenty of thirty-eight field 
batteries.53 This represented roughly 35,600 officers and 
men, with about 2,175 officers forced to fight for re- 
election.^ Spot samples, and research by historian Robert 
K. Krick, suggest that about thirty-seven percent of the 
company officers and nearly fifty-three percent of the field 
officers were defeated, sending home more than 800 experi-
53Th ese numbers result from a comparison of "Organiza­
tion of the Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by General 
Joseph E. Johnston, on the Peninsula, about April 30, 1862," 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 479-484, with "Statement of the
number of troops now in the service enlisted for the war and 
of the States from which they have volunteered," December 
13, 1861, in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 788-790. The artillery
batteries are not broken out in the second document, and 
have been assigned the same percentage as the infantry, 
which does not seem unlikely, since many of them were 
Virginia companies, which had to reorganize almost without 
exception. The following regiments were therefore affected 
by the reorganization (with battalions and regiments split 
between war companies and twelve-month companies counted as 
half a regiment): Gracie's Battalion, 4, 5 (1/2), 6, 26
Alabama; Arkansas Battalion; 2 Florida, 7 Georgia; 1 
Kentucky; 2 Louisiana; 2, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18 Mississippi;
13, 14, 15, 16, 22, 23 North Carolina; Hampton Legion, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 South Carolina; 1, 7, 14 Tennessee, 1 (1/2) 
Texas; Noland's Battalion, 1, 1 Cavalry, 3, 3 Cavalry, 4 
Cavalry, 7, 8, 11, 17, 18, 19, 24, 26, 28, 32, 46, 47, 49 
Virginia. In the other components of the Department of 
Northern Virginia the percentage of units affected was even 
higher. In Jackson's and Ewell's Divisions, twenty-three of 
thirty-two regiments had to reorganize; in Huger's Division, 
eleven of twelve; and among the units gathered around 
Fredericksburg, eleven out of twenty-one. In total, at 
least ninety-eight out of 152 1/2 infantry and cavalry 
regiments, or more than sixty-two percent, underwent the 
throes of reorganization.
^Taken from the April 30 "effective" strengths, 
allowing for officers by using Livermore's multiplier of 6.5?
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enced officers during March, April, and May.55 Certainly 
some of the defeated candidates had been overage, political 
appointees, or deadwood better pruned from the army rosters, 
but dozens, if not hundreds, of competent men lost their 
positions. Among the able officers who left the army as a 
result of the elections were West Pointers Benjamin Stoddert 
Ewell, Robert Johnston, William E. "Grumble" Jones, Edward 
Murray, Stephen Dodson Ramseur, Beverly Robertson, and 
Armistead Rust; along with Virginia Military Institute 
graduates Charles Crump and Charles Lightfoot.56 Most of 
these men eventually returned to the army in other capaci­
ties, but for the moment they were as lost to Johnston as if
55rphe figure of 37% of company officers is from Robert 
K. Krick, 30th Virginia Infantry (Lynchburg, VA: H. E.
Howard, 1983), p. 13, and is confirmed by spot-checking 
other entries in the H. E. Howard regimental series.
Krick's biographical dictionary— Robert K. Krick, Lee 's 
Colonels, A Biographical Register of the Field Officers of 
the Army of Northern Virginia, 2nd edition (Dayton, OH: 
Morningside, 1984)--makes it possible to determine the 
number, of field officers ousted with some precision. 
Eliminating Gracie's Alabama Battalion, Noland's Virginia 
Battalion, and the 1st Kentucky, which Krick does not cover, 
eighty field officers lost their positions out of 152 
required to stand the elections.
56Ramseur did not leave the army because he had lost an 
election, but because he had won one. He had been serving 
as the captain of the Ellis (North Carolina) Light Artil­
lery, when he learned of his election to the colonelcy of 
the 49th North Carolina, and left the army to go back to his 
home state and finish the regiment's training. See Gary W. 
Gallagher, Stephen Dodson Ramseur, Lee's Gallant General 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,
1985), p. 37; the other cases are drawn from Krick or 
Warner; see Krick, Lee's Colonels, pp. 90-31, 114-115, 181, 
205, 245-246, 283-284; Warner, Generals in Gray, pp. 167, 
260.
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Federal bullets had struck them in combat.
It would be difficult to overstate the confusion caused 
by the elections. Several units, like Dreux's Louisiana 
Battalion and the 9th South Carolina, simply ceased to exist 
when their companies attached to other regiments.57 The 4th 
South Carolina lost so many men that it was barely saved by 
the expedient of reorganizing it as a battalion rather than 
a regiment.58 Enough regiments to fill two brigades, 
petitioned Johnston directly for discharge; he dutifully 
transmitted their request to the Secretary of W a r . 59
Meanwhile, aspiring officers probed for every favorable 
technicality in the poorly written rules, and drove their 
brigadiers to distraction trying to adjudicate their claims. 
Captain David G. Houston of Company D, 11th Virginia, 
asserted that because his company had reorganized several 
days earlier than the remainder of the regiment, he was now, 
by law, the senior captain of the regiment, and due for an 
automatic promotion to a vacant majority. When Brigadier- 
General A. P. Hill forwarded this contention to Richmond, 
Adjutant-General Cooper ruled that Houston was correct:
S^Krick, Lee"s Colonels, p. 48; R. G. Lowe, "The Dreux 
Battalion," Confederate Veteran, Vol. V, No. 2 (February 
1897): p. 55.
^^Krick, Lee's Colonels, p. 452; Thomas G. Rhett to 
James Longstreet, April 27, 1862, Thomas G. Rhett to James
Longstreet, April 28, 1862, in LS-ANVA.
59j0seph E. Johnston to George W. Randolph, April 28, 
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to George W. Randolph, April 29,
1862, in LR-SW, M-618, Reel 9.
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"Officers take rank from the date of their election. It was 
the intention of the law to give this advantage to companies 
first o r g a n i z e d ."60 Later, this precedent was seized by 
Captain Reuben Cleary of the 7th Virginia— another of Hill's 
regiments— to claim likewise an open majority. The War 
Department upheld his right to the post, even though the 
company which elected him had d i s b a n d e d ! 61
But Hill's were among the more simple problems facing 
Confederate officers during the reorganization. In the 9th 
Virginia, stationed at Norfolk, Company C held a disputed 
election for the captaincy. Ten of the seventy-seven men 
abstained, leaving one candidate with thirty-five votes, the 
other with thirty-two. But thirty-five votes, Major Mark 
Hardin pointed out, was only a majority of the sixty-seven 
men who actually voted, not of the entire company. Should 
the election stand? An anonymous endorsement from Cooper's 
office ratified the election.62 Colonel Wade Hampton faced 
an even knottier problem in his brigade with the 16th North 
Carolina, whose Company D entered the election season with 
141 men. On April 22, Hampton presented Secretary Randolph 
with the following conundrum: "Seventy four men of Company
6C>David G. Houston Jr. to Samuel Cooper, May 24, 1862, 
in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 25.
6lRobert Cleary to W. T. Patton, June 10, 1862, in LR- 
AIGO, M-474, Reel 29.
62Mark Hardin to Samuel Cooper, March 25, 1862, in LR- 
AIGO, M-474, Reel 24.
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D 16 NC regt. re-enlisted & chose their officers under the 
bounty act leaving sixty-seven men in old company which is 
now Company D. What disposition shall be made of the 
residue?" He needed a quick answer, because the election-- 
in whichever company the War Department decided really was 
Company D--was scheduled for the following day. Almost 
plaintively, he closed the telegram: "Do answer." There is
no indication in the files that anyone ever did.63
The situation was even more muddled in regiments like 
the 1st Texas and the 5th Alabama, both of which had been so 
hastily assembled in the fall of 1861 that each contained 
five companies enlisted for one year and five that had 
signed on for three. "Does the 11th section of the Act of 
Congress require a new election of officers if the war 
companies and field officer," queried Brigadier-General 
Early, whose brigade included the Alabamians, "or merely an 
election of officers of the 12 months c o m p a n i e s ? " 6 4  Again, 
there is no reply extant; by mid-April, 1862, it seemed as 
if the Secretary of War and the Adjutant-General had quietly 
given up, and decided to ratify whatever the senior officer 
in the field decided fit the rules.
The confusion was not confined to the infantry.
Colonel Pendleton's effort to achieve consistent calibers in
63wade Hampton to George W. Randolph, April 22, 1862, 
in LR-SW, M-618, Reel 9.
64jubal Early to George W. Randolph, April 21, 1862, in 
LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 13.
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each company, not only resulted in the constant transfer of 
guns between different batteries, but left the gunners with 
perplexing electoral questions, as well. The Jeff Davis 
(Alabama) Artillery had originally boasted eight cannon, but 
had been reduced by transfer to six. The problem was that 
the War Department had authorized the overstrength battery 
several additional lieutenants. Did their commissions 
expire with the loss of their guns? Nobody, including the 
Secretary of War, seemed to be certain.65
Competition in the cavalry was even more keen than in 
the infantry or artillery. Of the seven Virginia regiments 
required to undergo reorganization, five voted out their 
colonels, all of whom had been professional soldiers before 
the war. This included the colonels of all three of 
Stuart's regiments on the Peninsula. 66 Jubal Early pro­
tested that "the bad effects of the election system has 
. . . been shown in the case of a Virginia Cavalry Regiment 
[the 3rd], in which, in my opinion by a mistaken [exception] 
of the law, the election of field officers was held by the 
men, and the Colonel, an efficient officer from the old 
army, was beaten."67 But following its system of ratifying
65<rhere is no endorsement on the letter and no reply in 
the letterbooks. Jubal Early to George W. Randolph, April 
21, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 17.
6£>Krick, Lee's Colonels, p. 181; Warner, Generals in 
Gray, pp. 167, 260.
67jubal Early to George W. Randolph, April 21, 1862, in 
LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 13.
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almost any outcome that did not result in the dissolution of 
the regiment in question, the War Department declined to 
overturn the election.
Johnston, like Lee and almost every other profession­
ally educated officer in the army, viewed the elections with 
quiet apprehension. Even in his memoirs, he remained mostly 
silent on the subject, noting only that the law "had the 
effect of weakening the army. . . ."68 But despite their 
other differences, it is nearly certain that Johnston 
wholeheartedly agreed with the position stated by Lee, 
several months earlier:
The best troops are ineffectual without good 
officers. Our volunteers, more than any other, require 
officers whom they can respect and trust. The best men 
for that position should be selected, and it is impor­
tant to consider how it can be effected. It would be 
safe to trust men of the intelligence and character of 
our volunteers to elect their officers, could they at 
the time of the election realize their dependent condi­
tion in the day of battle. But this they cannot do, 
and I have known them in the hour of danger to repudi­
ate and disown officers of their choice and beg for 
others. Is it right then, for a State to throw upon 
its citizens a responsibility which they do not feel 
and cannot properly exercise?®®
Yet regardless of his personal feelings, Johnston could 
do little to ameliorate the ill effects of the elections.
He prevented disgruntled soldiers from simply leaving the 
army when they thought their legal enlistments had expired, 
employing Stuart's cavalry to round them up and return them
68johnston, Narrative, p. 90.
^Robert E. Lee to A. G. Magrath, December 29, 1861, in 
OR, VI: p. 350.
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to the ranks.70 He punctually forwarded the questions of 
his commanders to the appropriate departments in Richmond 
and enforced the ensuing decisions. He sanctioned the 
creation of boards of examination, which would hopefully 
remove the most blatant incompetents before they could do 
severe harm to their own men.71 Beyond these measures, 
there was little for the army commander to do but keep 
himself firmly focused on the military problem at hand: 
resisting McClellan.
There were certainly enough other issues at hand with 
which Johnston had to deal, for at least one of which 
nothing in his entire military career had prepared him. In 
assuming command of the Peninsula and Norfolk, he had also 
acquired a navy. The Virginia and the other vessels under 
construction at Gosport were not really his concern. The 
talented if temperamental Flag-Officer, Josiah Tattnall, had 
assumed command of the ironclad, whose mission was fairly 
simple: to cruise in the vicinity of Hampton Roads as often
and as ostentatiously as possible. The Richmond and the 
other incomplete craft remained under the control of Captain 
Sidney Smith Lee, the commandant of the navy yard. But the 
remainder of the James River Squadron had been ordered out 
of Hampton Roads and up the James to support the far right
70Thomas G. Rhett to J. E. B. Stuart, April 24, 1862, 
in LS-ANVA.
71-Lewis Armistead to Samuel Cooper, May 24, 1862, in 
LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 3.
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of the Yorktown l i n e . 72
Compared to the massive flotilla with which Admiral 
Goldsborough supported the Army of the Potomac, Commander 
John R. Tucker's five vessels seemed almost inconsequential. 
Only the partially armored Patrick Henry, mounting ten guns, 
could be considered a threat to anything other than an 
undefended transport. Her sister ship, the Jamestown, 
sported no armor at all, and carried but two cannon, which 
left her no more powerful than the smaller Teazer, which 
also carried two guns. The Raleigh and the Beaufort 
belonged to Mallory's envisioned fleet of pesky little 
gunboats— converted tugs which, although light of draft and 
manueverable, were essentially impotent, having only a 
single rifled field piece placed in each b o w . 73 as Tattnall 
informed the Secretary of the Navy on April 21: "I can not 
prevent the enemy's gunboats or light draft transports from 
entering and ascending the James River, or their army 
crossing it, except so far as the force of steamers I have 
placed in the river may prevent it. "On this, however," he 
remarked gloomily, "I have little reliance, as the enemy at 
any time can send a force so superior as to compel them to
72Entry of April 5, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 201; Stephen 
Mallory to Josiah Tattnall, March 21, 1862, Stephen Mallory 
to Sidney Smith Lee, March 24, 1862, Josiah Tattnall, April 
20, 1862, in NOR, VII: pp. 748, 749, 768.
73"Report of Flag-Officer Buchanan, C. S. Navy," March 
27, 1862, in OR, IX: p. 8; Stephen Mallory to Jefferson
Davis, July 18, 1861, in NOR, Series 2, II: p. 77.
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retire upon the river behind our forts."7 4
Helpless or not against the Federal Navy, Johnston did 
not realize that, until it actually was overwhelmed,
Tucker's squadron could provide him with intelligence
concerning operations on McClellan's left flank. The five 
vessels could also inhibit, if not prevent, any crossing of 
the lower Warwick River by unsupported Yankee infantry.
Aside from that, Johnston instructed Tucker that "it would 
be well for your boats to do the enemy harm whenever they 
can." He also included the caution that "it is hardly worth
while to fire, however, merely to annoy them." As with his 
most trusted subordinates, Johnston left the final decision 
up to the man in the field— or in this case, in the water—  
"You in the neighborhood can always judge when it is worth 
while to open f i r e . "75
His trust proved to be well placed. A fifty-year-old 
Virginian, with thirty-five years experience afloat, 
including duty in the Mexican War, Tucker was cool under 
fire, meticulous about details,-and a talented tactical 
improvisor. Within a week of his first assignment to 
Johnston's command, the General praised Tucker's abilities 
to Tattnall: "I am much pleased with his intelligence and
74josiah Tattnall to Stephen Mallory, April 21, 1862, 
in NOR, VII: pp. 769-770.
75joseph E. Johnston to John R. Tucker, April 28, 1862, 
in NOR, VII: pp. 775-776.
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z e a l . " 7 6  Both Johnston and the Confederate authorities in 
Richmond would soon find even more reasons to appreciate his 
imagination and nerve.
The normal details of army administration consumed much 
of the rest of Johnston's time. He ordered the few decent 
roads through Williamsburg kept clear of miscellaneous wagon 
traffic in order to ensure that they would be open if 
Smith's Division had to move out quickly.77 Likewise, he 
insisted that the Engineer Bureau inspect and, if necessary, 
repair the major bridges over the C h i c k a h o m i n y .78 Johnston 
also had telegraph lines strung along the length of the 
army's r e a r . 79 He badgered both the Secretary of War, 
requesting better cannon; and General Lee, asking him to 
inspect hospital accommodations for his sick men in Rich­
mond, and to push General Winder to sweep the city for 
soldiers absent without leave.80
76sifakis, Who was Who, p. 662; Joseph E. Johnston to 
Josiah Tattnall, April 28, 1862, in NOR, Series 2, II: p.
633 .
77Thomas G. Rhett to Benjamin S. Ewell, April 21, 1862, 
in LS-ANVA.
78joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 22, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 456.
^indicated in T. G. Hunt to John R. Tucker, April 27, 
1862, in NOR, VII: p. 775.
SOjoseph E. Johnston to George W. Randolph, April 25, 
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 27; Robert E. Lee to Samuel P. 
Moore, April 29, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Abraham C. Myers, 
April 29, 1862, Robert E. Lee to John H. Winder, May 3,
1862, in Lee Letterbook.
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For a man normally economical with words, the army 
commander almost barraged his superiors with updates and 
requests: during his sixteen-day tenure at Yorktown,
Johnston wrote Lee or Randolph at least fourteen times, and 
quite possibly m o r e . 8 1  He also attempted to maintain 
contact with his other subordinates. Several telegraphic 
messages and letters, some delivered by staff officers 
authorized to expand on their content, arrived at Norfolk 
for General Huger, Flag-Officer Tatnall, and Captain L e e . 8 2  
Messages requiring Generals Jackson and Ewell to communicate 
through Cooper's office in Richmond had been dispatched 
before Johnston left the capital; Field received similar 
instructions during the following w e e k . 83 But despite his
8lThis covers the number of letters preserved in OR and 
LS-ANVA, those found so far in LR-AIGO and LR-SW, as well as 
those alluded to in OR and Lee Letterbook, but not actually 
found. The list certainly omits many telegrams and dozens 
of endorsements on correspondence by his juniors, but as it 
stands now, letters or telegrams from Johnston to Lee or 
Randolph can be listed for the following dates (an asterisk 
indicates that the letter in question is mentioned but has 
not been found: Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April
20*, April 22 (two letters), April 24, April 27, April 28,
April 29, April 30, May 1*; Joseph E. Johnston to George W. 
Randolph, April 20, April 24, April 25, April 28 (two letters).
82joseph E. Johnston to Benjamin Huger, April 27, 1862, 
Benjamin Huger to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, Robert E.
Lee to Benjamin Huger, April 29, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): 
pp. 469-470, 474-475; Joseph E. Johnston to Josiah Tattnall, 
April 28, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Josiah Tattnall, May 
1, 1862, Testimony of Sidney Smith Lee, January 31, 1863, 
Investigation of Navy Department, in NOR, Series 2, II: pp.
633-634.
83Thomas G. Rhett to Charles W. Field, April 24, 1862, 
in LS-ANVA.
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best efforts, Johnston soon found himself receiving less and 
less information from the rest of Virginia. By April 26, he 
would certainly have agreed with Colonel Dorsey Pender of 
the 6th North Carolina, who wrote his wife: "We are about
as near cut off from all communication with the world as we 
could well be. Our mail all seems to come by chance and I 
have not yet been able to find out from what post office it 
came."84
But in Johnston's case, the culprit was not the 
Confederate Post Office— it was his superiors in Richmond, 
specifically Generals Cooper (though probably unintention­
ally) and Lee. Though Johnston had left instructions for 
his mail from Jackson, Ewell, and Field to be forwarded to 
him through the Adjutant-General's Office, Cooper sent them 
all, instead, to Lee. Neither the originals nor copies were 
ever posted to Johnston who, unknowingly, found himself 
forced to rely upon letters from Lee, letters that subtly 
distorted not only the situation among Johnston's subordi­
nates, but also his own role in directing t h e m . 85 That Lee
84oorsey Pender to Fanny Pender, April 26, 1862, in 
Hassler, General to his Lady, p. 137.
85while a few of the letters in the OR show endorse­
ments of Lee forwarding them to Johnston, most of the 
letters were never forwarded to Johnston, and several, when 
they were copied for OR, had their endorsements omitted.
See Richard S. Ewell to Samuel Cooper, May 9, 1862, in LR- 
AIGO, M-474, Reel 17, for an example of a letter forwarded 
by Cooper to Lee and not Johnston. Compare the version of 
Richard S. Ewell to Robert E. Lee on May 14, 1862, in OR,
XII (part 3): p. 890, with the version in LR-AIGO, M-474,
Reel 17, which contains an endorsement forwarding it for the
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had the authority to intercept Johnston's correspondence and 
issue orders directly to his subordinates was indisputable; 
it was, however, his methods that were questionable.
Many historians have assumed that Johnston simply 
neglected his detached subordinates, leaving a command 
vacuum into which Lee, Jefferson Davis's "Military Advisor," 
quietly inserted himself, guiding by suggestion in order to 
avoid rumpling Johnston's sensibilities. Clifford Dowdey 
entitled his chapter on the subject "Lee plays at Machiavel- 
li," and Douglas Southall Freeman asserted, without sources, 
that President Davis had instructed a reluctant Lee to 
intercept Johnston's correspondence and "supervise the 
movements of these two officers as long as Johnston was at a 
distance from R i c h m o n d " ^  Robert G. Tanner, in Stonewall in 
the Valley, characterized Lee's intervention as being 
conducted "with great skill and little a u t h o r i t y ."87
But as has already been demonstrated, Lee's position as 
Commanding General was far less than nominal. And he seems
information of Cooper, but not sending it to Johnston. That 
this process did not begin after Johnston's withdrawal from 
Yorktown is evident from an examination of A. Blanchard to 
Samuel Cooper, April 28, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 6. 
Blanchard commanded a brigade in the Department of Norfolk, 
and was, therefore, Johnston's subordinate, but the'letter 
was forwarded to Lee instead. See also arguments on 
communications from Ewell and Jackson for the rest of this 
chapter.
S^Dowdey, Seven Days, p. 63; Freeman, R . E . Lee, II: 
p. 131.
^Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley, p. 156.
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to have hardly blinked at asserting his authority. Two 
letters from Ewell to Cooper, dated April 20 and intended 
for Johnston, announced that Jackson had called him from his 
post on the Rapidan toward the Shenandoah because the 
Federals were advancing. Johnston never saw the letters, 
which were diverted to Lee, who answered them most authori­
tatively: "If it is practicable to strike a speedy blow at
General Banks and drive him back it will tend to relieve the 
pressure on Fredericksburg. "8*3
The same day, Lee mailed a letter to Jackson, advising 
him that "if you can use General Ewell's division in an 
attack on General Banks, and to drive him back, it will 
prove a great relief to the pressure on Fredericksburg.
. . ." If this was impracticable, Lee strongly suggested 
that Jackson return Ewell to supporting distance of Field's 
brigade south of the Rappahannock. Most importantly, Lee 
essentially cut Johnston out of the line of communication by 
telling Jackson to "please communicate with me on this 
subject. [emphasis added]"89
Nor did Lee inform Johnston, in a letter to the 
department commander on the same day, that he had written to 
both of Johnston's subordinates. Besides ignoring his own
SSRichard S. Ewell to Samuel Cooper, April 20, 1862, 
Richard S. Ewell to Samuel Cooper, April 20, 1862, Robert E. 
Lee to Richard S. Ewell, April 21, 1862, in OR, XII (part 
3): pp. 857-859.
8 9 R o b e r t  E. Lee to Thomas J. Jackson, April 21, 1862, 
in OR, XII (part 3): pp. 859-860.
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correspondence with Jackson and Ewell, Lee did not advise 
Johnston that Field had abandoned Fredericksburg, and that 
he, standing on his authority as Commanding General, had 
sent the young brigadier-general explicit orders that were a 
far cry from the deferential suggestions of a military 
adviser. "I desire that you shall do everything in your 
power to prevent the enemy from advancing from Fredericks­
burg," Lee instructed Field on April 19, continuing: "You
will use every exertion to ascertain the strength and 
movements of the enemy and keep me informed of the same.
You will also communicate with General Ewell. . . . "  These 
were positive directives, directives of which Lee did not 
advise Johnston.90
Lee did not even inform Johnston until April 23— six 
days after the fact--that the Confederates no longer held 
Fredericksburg. He vaguely detailed the reinforcements 
being dispatched to Field's position, but in such a way that 
Johnston could not have estimated their numbers, even though 
Lee had an accurate count of the soldiers being sent north. 
Nor did he advise Johnston whether or not either of the 
brigade commanders, Maxcy Gregg or Joseph R. Anderson, 
ranked Field, and would, therefore, take over his command.
In the same pair of letters, Lee finally informed Johnston 
that Jackson had called Ewell into the Valley, but omitted
90Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, April 21, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 452; Robert E. Lee to Charles W.
Field, April 19, 1862, in OR, XII (part 1): p. 433.
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the date on which Jackson had done so, and continued to 
ignore his own correspondence with the two generals.91
Lee 's actions in regard to the Fredericksburg front 
became even more misleading on April 2 6 .  Brigadier-General 
Joseph R. Anderson did indeed outrank Field, and received 
his formal instructions from Lee when he passed through 
Richmond from North Carolina. "You will proceed with your 
brigade to the vicinity of Fredericksburg," Lee told 
Anderson, "where Brig. C. W. Field is now with the troops 
which have preceded you, and assume command of the opera­
tions of our army in that quarter, being the senior general 
officer." No mention was made by Lee that Field had been 
subordinate to Johnston, nor that Anderson's command was a 
district in someone else's department. The appointment to 
command having been made, Lee continued with detailed 
strategic orders: "If it be impossible to drive the enemy
from his present position, I desire you to lose no effort to 
keep him confined to the smallest possible m a r g i n . " 9 2
Anderson obviously considered himself the commander of
91-Lee did not give Johnston the numbers of either 
Gregg's or Anderson's brigades, both of which he would have 
had at least a rough idea from departmental returns in 
Cooper's office. The strength of the regiments sent from 
Richmond he knew exactly, because he had the muster rolls. 
See Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, April 23, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, April 23, 1862, in OR, 
XI (part 3): pp. 458-459; Robert E. Lee to Samuel Cooper,
April 24, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 30.
92Robert E. Lee to Joseph R. Anderson, April 25, 1862, 
in OR, XII (part 3): p. 867.
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one of the Confederacy's many small independent armies, 
answerable only to the Commanding General. Lee neither 
corrected him when he styled his division the "Army of the 
Rappahannock," nor ever informed him that Johnston was his 
official superior.93 Johnston did not receive news of 
Anderson's assumption of command until May 8, when Lee 
responded to a direct question. On the other hand, Lee 
informed both Jackson and Ewell of Anderson's appointment in 
advance, and ordered all three generals to communicate with 
each other.9 4
Lee's methods plainly discomfited both Jackson and 
Ewell. Jackson pointed out to him on April 23 that the 
options that they had been discussing "would be departing 
from General Johnston's instructions. . . ."95 Three days 
later, Jackson, still uneasy about the lack of any word from 
his official superior, queried Ewell: "Do you make regular
reports to General Johnston? The General directed me to 
send communications for him to you. Please acknowledge 
receipt of the accompanying one and let me know to what
93joseph R. Anderson to Robert E Lee, April 29, 1862, 
in OR, XII (part 3): p. 873; See also J. R. Anderson Order
Book, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
94Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 8, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 500-501; Robert E. Lee to Thomas J.
Jackson, April 25, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Richard S. Ewell, 
April 25, 1862, in OR, XII (part 3): pp. 865-866.
95Robert E. Lee to Thomas J. Jackson, April 23, 1862, 
in OR, XII (part 3): p. 863.
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point you send it."®®
Jackson's April 26 letter to Johnston did not survive 
to be included in either the Official Records or the files 
of the Adjutant and Inspector-General's office. But its 
timing suggests that Jackson, who had always kept Johnston 
carefully apprised of his movement, probably explained that 
he intended, on Lee's orders, to leave Ewell's Division to 
observe Banks while he united with Brigadier-General Edward 
Johnson west of Staunton, to attack the Federals debouching 
from the mountains of western Virginia. As aggressive as he 
was, it would have been in character for Jackson to tell his 
superior that he intended to use the discretion granted him 
to pursue his plan unless he was overruled within a few 
d a y s . Four days later, having received no response, 
Jackson began the deceptive maneuvering which inaugurated 
the later-famous "Valley Campaign." It is impossible to 
determine whether or not Johnston would have sanctioned 
Jackson's offensive, because he never received the letter.
Lee's disregard for the formal command structure also 
distressed Ewell. "Dick" Ewell's personality was such that 
his performance depended upon the receipt of explicit
9®Thomas J. Jackson to Richard S. Ewell, April 26,
1862, in OR, XII (part 3): p. 868.
®7jackson had, for instance, always kept Johnston well- 
informed during his Romney campaign in the previous winter. 
Nor would the content have been much different than in 
Thomas J. Jackson to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, in OR, 
XII (part 3): p. 872; Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley, pp.
161-162 .
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orders; ambiguity, or even an excess of personal discretion, 
unnerved him.9 8 And nobody, during April, May, and June, 
1862, ever seemed to want to explain to him where he was to 
march, why he was headed there, or who was in charge. He 
confided in one of his brigade commanders that "he never saw 
one of Jackson's couriers approach without expecting an 
order to assault the north pole."99 Lee's letters suited 
him little better; on April 26 he complained to the Command­
ing General that "I have the honor tc state that I don't 
clearly understand your letter of the 2 5th. . . . "  This was 
followed by an extract and a series of detailed questions 
aimed at pinning down Lee's intent.100 Lee responded 
briefly on April 27 that the information had been more 
intended for Jackson than Ewell, and that Ewell had been 
informed almost as an afterthought.101 Three days later, 
still disgruntled by the fact that he could not determine 
just who was in control of operations, Ewell shot back to 
Lee a rejoinder:
I beg leave to say that it seems important to 
me that the whole line, including the forces south 
of Fredericksburg (Generals Field and Anderson), 
should be under one general, authorized to combine 
them against any point deemed advisable. This
98preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: pp. 350-352.
99yay lor, Destruction, p. 36.
lOORichard S. Ewell to Robert E. Lee, April 26, 1862, 
in OR, XII (part 3): p. 867.
lOlRobert E. Lee to Richard S. Ewell, April 27, 1862, 
in OR, XII (part 3): p. 869.
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does not seem to be the case at present, and the
enemy are exhausting the country at free c o s t . - * - 0 2
Johnston's continued ignorance of this, however, raises 
two significant questions. First, why did Lee keep Johnston 
in the dark? Second, what efforts did or should Johnston 
have made to find out what was occurring in northern 
Virginia?
There is no evidence extant to support Freeman's 
contention that Jefferson Davis ordered Lee to take over 
coordination of the movements of Johnston's detached 
subordinates. Nor did there need to be such a directive—  
the correspondence of Jackson, Ewell, Anderson, and Field 
all reveal the fact that each officer took Lee's title of 
"Commanding General" quite seriously, and assumed that he 
could legally issue them orders. But if he had legal 
authority to command Johnston's subordinates, why did Lee 
not openly advise Johnston that he was doing so?
The correspondence between Johnston and Lee suggests a 
possible answer. Johnston had always been reluctant to 
commit his army to the Peninsula, and when Lee had written 
on April 21 that it might be necessary to detach units from 
Johnston's army to reinforce Field in order to protect the 
Fredericksburg line, Johnston had reacted very negatively:
"I think it anything but expedient to divide these forces." 
Further, said Johnston on April 22:
102Richard S. Ewell to Robert E. Lee, April 30, 1862, 
in OR, XII (part 3): p. 876.
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Should McDowell advance upon the capital, 
which is certainly probable, the only course for 
us, in my opinion, is . . .  to assemble near 
Richmond as many troops as possible, those from 
Norfolk, North Carolina, and South Carolina to be 
joined by this army, then to endeavor to fight the 
enemy before all his forces are united. To detach 
troops from this position would be ruin to those
l e f t . 1 0 3
This reaction caused Lee to tread very lightly around 
the subject of a threat from Fredericksburg, primarily 
because his own preferred strategy involved holding the 
Peninsula as long as possible. This would also have given 
Lee cause to believe that Johnston would respond negatively 
to any suggestion that Jackson and Ewell might actually 
march their divisions farther away from Richmond for any 
reason.
But even allowing for the fact that Lee controlled much 
of Johnston's access to information about other fronts, why 
was there not a greater effort by Johnston to communicate 
directly with his own subordinates? Did his preoccupation 
with McClellan's army and growing siege train make him 
"lose touch" with the rest of his department, as Freeman 
believed?
The question of timing is critically important to 
resolving this issue. Johnston had last written to Jackson 
and Ewell on April 17, before leaving Richmond. Letters 
travelling from Richmond to the Rappahannock, Johnston knew
103jOseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 22, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 456.
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from his own experience, usually required two or three days 
for delivery. A letter forwarded through Ewell to Jackson 
would take at least another day to reach the commander in 
the Shenandoah. Assuming that Jackson responded on the same 
day he received the letter, a minimum of three days could be 
expected in its return trip to the capital. Soon after 
arriving at Yorktown, Johnston discovered that the mail 
between Richmond and the Peninsula normally spent the better 
part of two additional days in transit. Therefore, even 
under the best of circumstances, Johnston would not have 
expected any reply from Jackson until April 24 or 25. A 
single missed connection or significant delay somewhere in 
the postal chain could have reasonably extended this period 
by two days; Johnston should not have had any cause to be 
anxious until after April 27.104
But by that time, Johnston had already received Lee's 
letter of April 23, which seemed to update him on the 
positions of his subordinates. Jackson, he inferred 
incorrectly, had ordered Ewell toward the Valley on April 
21, pursuant to Johnston's original orders to try to engage 
Banks near Swift Run Gap. Given the fact that it should 
take Ewell at least two days to join Jackson, and that Lee 
had "heard nothing . . .  of the junction of Jackson and 
Ewell," Johnston had no real reason to expect either of his
104iphese times are derived from a study of the trans­
mittal and reception dates of earlier correspondence.
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commanders to write until some sort of action commenced.'*-^ 
Even if a battle took place immediately upon Ewell's 
reinforcement of Jackson— which Johnston believed would 
happen about April 24 or April 25— then a letter from 
Jackson could not reasonably be expected until April 29 or 
April 30. The only problem with this series of assumptions 
was that it rested upon the mistaken belief that Jackson had 
ordered Ewell to march on April 21, when he had, in fact, 
done so on April 17. Had he known that events were progres­
sing so rapidly in the Valley, it is unlikely Johnston would 
have remained so sanguine about the lack of correspondence.
Only by the last few days of April would Johnston have 
begun to realize that something was dreadfully amiss with 
his lines of communication to his subordinates. Unfortu­
nately, it was just then that another event occurred which 
rightfully rivetted the army commander's eyes to the Yankee 
army directly in front of him: McClellan's siege artillery
opened fire.
lO^Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, April 23, 1862, 
in OR, XI, (part 3): pp. 458-459.
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Chapter Nine 
The Retreat from Yorktown
The Farinholt House stood on a bluff overlooking 
Wormley's Creek, roughly 4,200 yards south of Yorktown. It 
was a large, colonial-style frame house with four white 
pillars on the front porch, chimneys at either end, and 
third-floor dormer windows. From the roof, an observer with 
a telescope could see over the ramparts protecting Yorktown, 
discern details of the water battery, and even watch the 
unloading of the schooners that glided down the upper York 
River to provide Johnston's army with provisions and 
ammunition. It had been a key observation point for 
McClellan's engineers and artillery officers throughout the 
siege.
Shortly after noon, on Wednesday, April 30, 1862, the 
roof would have been packed with far more men than usual. 
Battery No. 1— often informally known as the "Farinholt 
Battery"— was scheduled to open fire on the Confederates at 
2:00 P. M.2 Brigadier-General William F. Barry, Chief of 
Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, would have been there,
1-Davis, Image of War, II: p. 45.
2 "Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army, 
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege," May
5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 345.
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as well as Colonel Robert 0. Tyler, organizer of the 1st 
Connecticut Heavy Artillery and commander of McClellan's 
siege train. Other officers from the 1st Connecticut, 
serving at batteries still incomplete, might have slipped 
away to watch the effect of the first heavy shells to drop 
into Yorktown, and beside them might well have been officers 
from the 5th New York. The New Yorkers had a special 
interest in the guns in Battery No. 1: they had hauled them
off the ships across paths so muddy that the monstrous 
cannon sunk in to their axles. Then they had dug them out 
and manhandled them at the direction of the artillerymen 
into the battery they helped to excavate.3 Possibly 
McClellan himself, attended by his retinue of staff officers 
and foreign military observers, climbed onto the roof to 
watch what he hoped was the systematic destruction of 
Johnston's fortifications.
Major Elisha F. Kellogg, also from the 1st Connecticut 
Artillery, did not have such a good view of Yorktown, even 
though what he saw counted most of all. Kellogg commanded 
Battery No. 1, and thus he was down inside the carefully dug 
traverses, calculating trajectories for his guns. His 
battery boasted five 100-pound Parrotts and one monster 200- 
pounder. The smaller guns weighed 9,700 pounds, and 
required ten pounds of powder to throw a shell as far as 
6,800 yards; the larger one weighed 16,500 pounds, and
•^Ibid. , p. 348 .
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lobbed its projectiles 8,000 yards on a charge of sixteen 
pounds. The shells themselves weighed between seventy and 
175 pounds. To hit the wharves or the batteries at Yorktown 
was well within their capability, but called for careful 
ranging; missed shots were significant because the big guns 
took nearly an hour to reload.4
Kellogg's targets that Wednesday afternoon were the 
Yorktown wharves, where detailed soldiers struggled to 
unload half a dozen supply vessels. As the first shells 
plunged in, D. H. Hill's soldiers fled the docks in confu­
sion, and the skippers of the schooners cast off and sailed 
behind Gloucester Point, a position which had, heretofore, 
represented safe haven from Yankee shells. But not today. 
Kellogg's 200-pound Parrott slowly pivoted and the gunners 
cranked it almost up to its thirty-five degree maximum 
elevation. They loaded a shell, and sent it crashing down 
among the anchored vessels some 6,200 yards up the river.5 
Hill fired back. His men could sight Battery No. 1 
quite easily, but McClellan's engineers had measured very 
carefully. An 8-inch Columbiad smoothbore was the largest 
piece that the Confederates could bring to bear, and the
4Ibid., p. 339, 345-346; Coggins, Arms and Equipment, 
p. 86; David G. Martin, "Civil War Artillery," Strategy & 
Tactics, No. 81 (July-August 1980): pp. 18-19.
^"Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army, 
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege," May 
5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 345; Martin, "Artillery,"
p. 18 .
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Yankee guns had been dug in just on the fringes of its most 
extreme range. Hill's gunners got close enough to rattle 
the teeth of the New Englanders inside the battery, but not 
close enough to hurt them; General Barry reported several 
days later: "The enemy's fire was well directed, but the
protection afforded by the battery effective, and their fire 
caused us no casualties."^
Lowering the barrels of two of the 100-pounders 
slightly, Kellogg's men returned the favor. They could only 
fire once for every three times the Confederates did, but 
the greater range and shell weight of the Parrott rifles 
soon told; Hill's gun was quickly silenced. The firing 
continued throughout the afternoon and evening, thirty-nine 
heavy shells in all landing inside Hill's p e r i m e t e r . ?
The cannonade ceased with darkness. Gunnery with such 
heavy weapons in the mid-nineteenth century still required 
much direct sighting for accuracy, and McClellan hated to 
waste shells. Dense fog the next morning provided the 
Confederates something of a reprieve. Since no one could 
see where the shells were landing, Kellogg was ordered to 
limit himself to one shot an hour in the direction of the 
wharves, simply to discourage the unloading of s u p p l i e s . ^
S l b i d .
^"Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army, 
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege," May 
5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 345-346.
^Ibid., p. 346.
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But Johnston knew that the fog could not last forever, 
and his own observers confirmed that other heavy batteries 
across the Warwick were only days away from opening fire, as 
well. Nothing in his own artillery park could seriously 
harm McClellan's batteries as they demolished his own 
positions piece by piece. In a classic siege, this would 
have been the moment for a sally against the enemy guns, but 
the inundations of the river to his front made this impossi­
ble.
Johnston had dreaded this moment. The day before 
Battery No. 1 opened fire, he had written to Lee that 
"should the attack upon Yorktown be made earnestly, we 
cannot prevent its fall; nor can it hold out more than a few 
hours." He believed that McClellan would combine his 
bombardment with a rush up the James River by Federal 
ironclads which, unlike the Virginia, had shallow enough 
drafts to follow the main channels. This "would enable him 
to reach Richmond three days before these troops, setting 
out at the same time. Should such a move be made, the fall 
of Richmond would be inevitable, unless we anticipate it."9
Anticipation meant withdrawal: "As two or three days,
more or less, can signify little, I think it best for the 
safety of the capital to do it now, to put the army in 
position to defend Richmond." Yet he intended to move
^Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 473.
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deliberately, "as soon as can be done conveniently, looking 
to the condition of the roads and the time necessary for the 
corresponding movement from Norfolk." And, perhaps remem­
bering Davis's earlier disavowal of approving his withdrawal 
from Manassas, Johnston made sure that Lee understood the 
intent of his communication: "As this is an important
movement, I think it necessary that the intention to make it 
be reported to the Government."10
The opening of Battery No. 1 forced Johnston's hand 
much more quickly than even he had expected. If the 
Federals could deny him the Yorktown docks, then the army 
became almost completely dependent on the trickle of 
supplies which could be landed at Jamestown Island.
Further, he was faced with the prospect that this one 
battery could, within days, dismount all the Confederate 
cannon in the Yorktown water battery, and across the river 
at Gloucester Point. He called his senior officers at 
Longstreet's headquarters on May 1: Smith, Longstreet,
Magruder, Hill, Stuart, Pendleton, and Alexander. Not one 
of them believed that the Yorktown line could or should be 
held longer than another forty-eight hours.H Johnston had 
already ordered Huger to prepare Norfolk for evacuation; now 
he told his subordinates that the withdrawal would occur on 
the evening of May 2, and telegraphed Jefferson Davis to the
IQlbid.
HEarly, War Memoirs, p. 165.
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same effect.12
Though aware that "the wretched condition of the roads 
may cause us heavy losses of materials on the march," 
Johnston determined to avoid leaving anything behind for 
McClellan that could be hauled a w a y . 13 a s  in northern 
Virginia, this did not include his heavy artillery which, 
besides being nearly immobile, would have to cover the 
retirement of his divisions. He ordered Alexander to ship 
to Richmond all the extra ammunition and ordnance stores in 
depot beginning April 3 0 . Pendleton's artillery was 
assigned the best of several poor roads, and scheduled to 
march several hours ahead of the main b o d y . 15 He ordered 
Colonel Fitzhugh Lee's 1st Virginia Cavalry to precede the 
army to the vicinity of Eltham's Landing and West Point, in 
order that the army would be immediately alerted to the 
expected Federal amphibious landing once Yorktown and
12joseph E. Johnston to Benjamin Huger, April 27, 1862; 
the telegram to Davis has not been preserved, but may be 
inferred from Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 1, 
1862; see also Joseph E. Johnston to D. H. Hill, May 1,
1862, all in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 469-470, 484-485.
13joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 473.
P. Alexander to Edwin Taliaferro, April 30, 1862, 
in Beverly Randolph Wellford papers, Virginia Historical 
Society, Richmond, Virginia.
l^Lee, Memoirs, p. 183.
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Gloucester were evacuated.-*-6
A Federal landing on the banks of the York River to his 
rear was Johnston's greatest concern. He believed that the 
Virginia could hold Admiral Goldsborough's flotilla at bay 
on the James, at least for a few days.-^ But even though he 
had ordered the batteries at Gloucester Point to be manned 
for several hours after the retreat of the bulk of the army, 
he harbored few illusions that this would keep the Federals 
from ascending the York River.-*-® So he took what few 
precautionary measures he could. He ordered the supply 
vessels on the York River sailed upstream to critical points 
and sunk in the river as obstructions; fifty-three schooners 
were thus scuttled as Yorktown fell.19 The railroad bridge 
over the York River near West Point was burned, as were the
docks at key points along the river.2® But Johnston knew
that such measures could at best delay, not prevent, an 
amphibious descent on his rear; he could count on having to
1®H. B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major- 
General J. E. B. Stuart (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1885),
pp. 47-48.
• ^ J o s e p h  e. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 473.
l®Joseph E. Johnston to D. H. Hill, May 2, 1862, in JJWM.
l^Naval History Division, Civil War Naval Chronology,
VI: pp. 331-333; Thomas S. Phelps to William Smith, May 5,
1862, in NOR, VII: p. 313.
20Wil liam Smith to L. M. Goldsborough, May 5, 1862, T.
H. Patterson to William Smith, May 4, 1862, William Smith to 
L. M. Goldsborough, May 12, 1862, in NOR, VII: pp. 310-311,
316.
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fight McClellan's troops with part of his army before the 
rest had even cleared the vicinity of Williamsburg.
Johnston wanted G. W. Smith's Division available to 
oppose any Federal landing on the York River. The troops 
were the freshest in the army, and among Smith's brigade 
commanders were Whiting and Hampton, two men whom he trusted 
implicitly. So he arranged that, once the army passed 
through Williamsburg, Smith's Division would be in the lead. 
Whiting's three brigades were scheduled to be among the 
first troops to march away from Yorktown on May 2.21 Re 
also gave Smith control of the 1st Virginia Cavalry, as well 
as Magruder's Division, and part of the Reserve Artillery as 
soon as those units cleared W i l l i a m s b u r g . 22 with half the 
army available to him, Smith should be able, Johnston hoped, 
to contain, if not repulse, a Yankee landing, while Johnston 
supervised the rear guard and the evacuation of the army's 
guns and supplies.
The pounding of heavy shells from battery No. 1 resumed 
in earnest on the morning of May 2: Kellogg's men dropped
sixty rounds on the Yorktown docks and the water battery; 
Hill's 8-inch Columbiad burst returning the f i r e . 23 How
21joseph E. Johnston to D. H. Kill, May 1, 1862, in OR, 
XI (part 3): p. 486.
22gmith, Confederate War Papers, pp. 45-48.
23''Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army, 
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege," May
5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 347.
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many more days could the Yorktown fortifications withstand 
the shells of the Parrott guns? How long before more of 
McClellan's heavy artillery commenced battering the other 
sections of his line? Once the other Union batteries 
opened, the Confederate withdrawal could potentially become 
a bloody disaster. Johnston's timetable was tight--much 
tighter than the one attempted in northern Virginia— because 
no movements near the front could be attempted until 
nightfall, lest they be observed. The orders for the 
retreat were carefully drawn and circulated to all the 
division commanders on the morning of May 2.24
Delays and confusion among the trains of Longstreet's 
and Magruder's Divisions forced Johnston to postpone the 
movement for twenty-four hours. It was a tense day: the
1st Connecticut Artillery poured another thirty-four rounds 
into Hill's fortifications at Yorktown, which now had no 
guns capable of reaching Battery No. 1 with return fire. 
Meanwhile, General Barry reported to McClellan that the next 
morning the ten 13-inch seacoast mortars of Battery No. 4, 
four more in Battery No. 11, five 10-inch siege mortars in 
Battery No. 12, six 30-pound Parrotts in Battery No. 13, and 
three 100-pound Parrotts in Battery No. 14 would all be 
ready to open fire at dawn on May 4. Major Charles S. 
Wainwright of the 1st New York Light Artillery, who had
24Qeneral Orders no. — , Department of Northern 
Virginia, May 2, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 489-490; see
also the copy in LS-ANVA for distribution notes.
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dropped by Barry's headquarters, confided to his diary that 
evening that "it will be a splendid sight when all our guns 
and mortars open, especially if the rebs reply lively; one 
worth half a lifetime to see. . . ."25 Johnston had only 
hours left before the conflagration began.
A heavy rain started to fall in the evening of May 3, 
as the first brigades slipped quietly out of their rifle 
pits.26 it was a decidedly mixed blessing, for while it 
would disguise the movement to some extent, the downpour 
ruined the roads over which the army had to travel.
Alexander wrote: "I recall that night's march as particu­
larly disagreeable. The whole soil of that section seemed 
to have no bottom and no supporting p o w e r . " 2 7  The soil had 
been so soaked with the rain of previous weeks that the 
water could not even sink in; a private in Pickett's Brigade 
remembered that "the clay and sand of the roads was now 
worked into a liquid mortar, which overspread their entire 
surface, hiding the deep holes cut by heavy gun wheels, 
until man or beast discovered them by stumbling therein."28
25»Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army, 
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege," May
5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 347-348; Allan Nevins,
ed., A Diary of Battle, the Personal Journals of Colonel 
Charles S. Wainwright, 1861-1865 (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, and World, 1962), p. 44.
26smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 46.
27Alexander, Military Memoirs, p. 66.
^Hamilton, Shotwell, pp. 199-200.
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The columns waded and struggled along at a pace that never 
exceeded one mile an hour, and that with exhausting effort. 
"The roads," said Alexander, "were but long strings of guns, 
wagons, and ambulances, mixed in with infantry, artillery, 
and cavalry, splashing and bogging through the darkness in a 
river of mud. . . ."29
At best, Johnston knew that his men might make seven or 
eight miles by sunrise. It was barely enough to give him a 
head start on the Federals, and even that was threatened by 
the constant stalling of wagons, caissons, and guns in the 
mud. Horses sank up to their bellies and wagons to their 
axles. Each time this happened, ropes had to be tied to the 
floundering teams and their wagons, and the already jaded 
horses of other wagons brought back to assist in their 
rescue. Often this was not enough, and the infantry and 
gunners swarmed into the mud to manhandle wheels loose from 
the mire.30 Johnston himself dived into the muck to help 
pry loose a 12-pounder of Snowden's (Georgia) Battery.31 
Some of the horses drowned, while others had their hearts 
simply give out. Wagons were abandoned and guns spiked.
One private wrote later, "sometimes I caught myself stumb-
29Aiexander, Military Memoirs, p. 66.
30stiles, Four Years, p. 83; Edgar Warfield, A Confed­
erate Soldier's Memoirs (Richmond: Masonic Home Press,
1936), p. 84; Hamilton, Shotwell, pp. 199-200.
31f . Y. Dabney, "General Johnston to the Rescue," B&L, 
II: pp. 275-276.
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ling over a dead horse and sometimes upon a half-living 
man."32 Yet, somehow, the army kept moving, if only at a 
snail's pace, even though everyone was as tired as Colonel 
Pender, who told his wife, "I have seldom been more sleepy, 
hungry or tired than I am just n o w . "33
The army kept moving, but many individual soldiers did 
not. The backbreaking work, combined with lack of sleep and 
the absence of rations for two days, caused many of Johns­
ton's troops to collapse in an apathetic stupor. D. H. Hill 
counted more than 1,500 stragglers along his route of march 
through Williamsburg, and told his wife, "there are thou­
sands also scattered over the country engaged in plunder­
ing." When Hill attempted to encourage or intimidate them 
into rejoining the ranks, "some answered by my entreaties 
with curses, some with 'I don't care if the Yankees do take
me. I am starving to death and freezing with cold. '"34
Well aware of the condition of his troops, Johnston knew 
that he could only retreat so far before he halted to give 
the men a rest. If not molested by Federal pursuit, he 
intended to halt between the Pamunkey and Chickahominy
32Hamilton, Shotwell, p. 200; Stiles, Four Years, p. 83.
33oorsey Pender to Fanny Pender, May 8 , 1862, in 
Hassler, General to His Lady, p. 140.
34p. H. Hill to "My Dear Wife," May 11, 1862, in D. H.
Hill papers, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg,
Virginia.
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Rivers, and there await McClellan.35
But that depended on just how long McClellan would 
remain in front of empty entrenchments, and how determined 
his pursuit would be. As most of the infantry evacuated the 
fort at Yorktown, Hill's cannoneers inaugurated their 
heaviest bombardment of the Yankee lines during the entire 
siege, firing off their stocks of powder and shot as if 
there were no tomorrow, because there was not; one. By 
midnight, or soon thereafter, the fire begati to slacken, as 
the gunners spiked their pieces one by one, and laid powder 
trails into their magazines. Major Bryan Grimes of the 4th 
North Carolina commanded the last few companies of the 
infantry rear guard, which picked its way back from the 
picket line around 4:00 A. M. Grimes had to balance the 
speed necessary to clear the town before the fuses burned 
down against the need to avoid "torpedoes [that] had been 
planted on all the roads and streets leading into Yorktown.
."36
The torpedoes— mostly 10-pounder shells rigged with 
pressure fuses and buried as mines— were the work of
35smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 48.
36"Report of Brig. Gen. Charles D. Jameson, U. S. Army, 
as General of the Trenches, May 3-4, with indorsement," May
4, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 398; Pulaski Cowper, ed.,
Extracts of Letters of Major-General Bryan Grimes to his 
Wife, written while in Active Service in the Army of 
Northern Virginia, together with some personal recollections 
of the war written by him after its close, etc. (Raleigh,
NC: Alfred Williams, 1884), p. 12.
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Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains. Enraged by Federal 
shelling of New Berne, North Carolina, his hometown, Rains 
considered land mines a fair response. Almost everyone 
else— from Johnston to McClellan— disagreed, but after the 
fact, for Rains had never informed his superiors of his 
intentions. Despite the fact that Johnston would later 
disown the tactic, Rains' explosives killed enough unwary 
Union soldiers to slow down the Federal penetration of 
Yorktown.37
For several hours after sunrise on May 4, as Johnston's
infantry and artillery struggled up muddy roads, Stuart's
depleted cavalry brigade was the only force actually facing 
the Army of the Potomac. Having detached the 1st Virginia 
Cavalry to cover Eltham's Landing, Stuart was left with only 
1,500 sabers to slow down the pursuit. He deployed Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel William Wickham and the 4th Virginia Cavalry, as 
well as part of Colonel Thomas F. Goode's 3rd Virginia 
Cavalry, to cover the Williamsburg road. A few miles south 
of Wickham and Goode, on the Telegraph Road, Stuart himself 
took charge of the Jeff. Davis (Mississippi) Legion and 
several companies of the Wise (Virginia) Legion. There was
37"Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army, 
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege," 
August 25, 1862, "Report of Col. Jesse A. Gove, Twenty- 
second Massachusetts Infantry, of occupation of Yorktown,
May 4," May 4, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 349-350, 399-
400; G. Moxley Sorrel to Gabriel J. Rains, May 11, 1862, A. 
P. Mason to D. H. Hill, May 12, 1862, Gabriel J. Rains to D.
H. Hill, May 14, 1862, in OR (part 3): pp. 509-510, 511,
516-517.
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little or no communication between the two wings of Stuart's 
Brigade, because the heavily wooded country "was exceedingly 
unfavorable for cavalry operations. . . ."38
Stuart was careful throughout the morning to keep
Johnston informed of the advance of Federal cavalry on the 
Telegraph Road under Brigadier-Generals George Stoneman and 
William H. Emory. What he did not know was that, on his
left flank, Wickham and Goode were being pushed back
steadily, until the blue-clad horsemen had actually gotten 
between Stuart and Johnston. This he only found out when a 
courier returned with the news that he could not thread his 
way through Union lines with a message for the army command­
er. Resourceful in every extremity, Stuart trotted his men 
farther south, and detoured around the enemy by way of the 
beaches near Jamestown.39
Johnston, however, did not know that Stuart was 
extricating himself. About noon, he realized that the 
courier was overdue. This was at roughly the same time the 
1st and 4th Virginia Cavalry found themselves pushed back to 
the outskirts of Williamsburg. In the densely forested 
terrain, there was no way to be certain that there was not a 
division of infantry on the heels of the Federal cavalry.
So assuming the worst, at 1:00 P. M . , Johnston himself rode
38"Report of Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, commanding 
Cavalry Brigade," May 13, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 444.
39ibid.; Thomas, Bold Dragoon, pp. 104-105.
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to the rearmost unit in the line of march, Brigadier-General 
Paul J. Semmes' Georgia-Kentucky Brigade, and ordered it 
into the forts around Williamsburg.40 About an hour later, 
Johnston located Brigadier-General Lafayette McLaws, who 
commanded part of Magruder's Division. He instructed him to 
send another brigade back to support Semmes, and to go 
himself to supervise the line.41
McLaws, a Georgian who had graduated from West Point in 
Longstreet's class, picked the South Carolina brigade of 
lawyer-turned-soldier Joseph B. Kershaw for the assignment. 
Both arrived at Semmes' position about 3:00 P. M. McLaws 
was vaguely aware that the fortifications in front of 
Williamsburg were centered on a large earthwork--Fort 
Magruder— with minor works extending toward the rivers north 
and south at intervals of several hundred yards. Semmes had 
already occupied some of the redoubts to the right of the 
road, but neither he nor McLaws knew the exact location of 
all the forts. Fortunately, Colonel Benjamin S. Ewell of 
the 3 2nd Virginia was at hand. Ewell had commanded the post 
of Williamsburg for months, and was thoroughly familiar with 
the terrain. He quickly guided Kershaw's Brigade into the
40"RepOrts of Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes, C. S. Army, 
commanding brigade," May 17, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p.
445.
41"Report of Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army, 
commanding division," May 16, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp.
441-442.
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correct positions.^2
Yet even before the Confederates had deployed their 
second brigade, Stoneman's advance guard arrived. The 
Federal cavalry, apparently unaware that it was probing a 
line now held by infantry, rode forward so boldly, McLaws 
reported, that "at first they were supposed to be our own 
men, so close were they and so confident in their advance.
. . ." He soon realized his error, as Union horse artillery
opened up in support of the horsemen. About this time, 
Colonel J. Lucius Davis, commanding the Wise Legion cavalry, 
and the first of Stuart's detachment to rejoin the army, 
arrived on the scene. McLaws ordered counter-battery fire 
against the Union artillery and a charge by Davis's men on 
the suddenly confused Federal cavalry. The charge routed 
the bluecoats with little loss to either side, and Kershaw's 
men finished occupying the forts along the road. No more 
probes were made against McLaws' positions for the rest of
42"Report of Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army, 
commanding division," May 16, 1862, "Report of General 
Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Department of 
Northern Virginia, of operations from April 15 to May 19, 
May 19, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 275, 441-442. The
information about Ewell conducting McLaws' troops into the 
line is from interlineal notes by Benjamin S. Ewell in the 
original of Johnston's report, which is in JJWM. Ewell 
habitually wrote notes inside Johnston's reports when he 
served on the General's staff later in the war; see Joseph 
E. Johnston to Benjamin S. Ewell, October 12, 1868, in 
Benjamin S. Ewell papers, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, Virginia.
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the afternoon.43
Johnston, who had been looking over McLaw's shoulder 
during the skirmish, knew that the Federal infantry could 
be, at best, a few hours behind the cavalry. When he 
thought of the condition of the roads and the torturous 
progress of his army, he realized that he probably could not 
escape without fighting to slow down the pursuit. Inade­
quate as Magruder's line of redoubts may have been, it 
represented the only prepared fortification between Yorktown 
and Richmond, and he knew that he should make use of it. At 
sunset, he ordered McLaws to pull out his brigades, and to 
be replaced by two from Longstreet's Division.44 if he 
could get the army marching at the crack of dawn, he might 
yet elude McClellan without combat; if not, the action would 
be supervised by one of his most trusted subordinates. This 
arrangement evidently calmed any fears Johnston had that 
night, for he treated two of his staff officers to an 
impromptu, bare-chested display of saber-handling before 
retiring for the evening.45
Longstreet sent back Brigadier-General Richard H.
4 3"Report of Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army, 
commanding division," May 16, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp.
441-442; Thomas, Bold Dragoon, p. 105.
44johnston actually ordered Longstreet to send one 
brigade, but, thinking his brigades too small, the Georgian 
dispatched two. Johnston, Narrative, p. 120; Longstreet, 
Manassas to Appomattox, p. 72.
45Gallagher, Fighting, pp. 49, 80-81.
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Anderson's South Carolinians and Colonel Roger Pryor's mixed 
brigade of Alabamians, Virginians, and Louisianians. 
Anderson, a South Carolinian himself, and a classmate of 
McLaws and Longstreet at West Point, met McLaws just after 
dark. The Georgian had already withdrawn his men from the 
line of redoubts in preparation to resume his march. Heavy 
rain was falling again.46
In the cold, wet darkness, the South Carolinian made an 
error of judgment that the next day would threaten the 
safety of Johnston's retreat. Richard Anderson, who had 
been followed by suspicions of alcoholism throughout his 
Regular Army career, was a talented tactician and a brave 
leader of troops in battle, but he was not a man who paid a 
great deal of attention to detail. "He was indolent," 
admitted Moxley Sorrel. "His capacity and intelligence 
[were] excellent, but it was hard to get him to use t h e m . "47 
That night, he took the easiest course. Expecting that his 
men would be pulled out soon after sunrise, he occupied the 
forts to the right of the road, but only two of the redoubts 
on the left. He did not send out scouts to find out how far 
the line extended; if he had done so, he would have dis­
covered that there were at least four more fortifications 
around the boggy ground bordering the road to Allen's Wharf. 
If seized by the Federals, possession of these works would
^^Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 72-73.
47sorrel, Recollections, p. 128.
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allow them to enfilade Fort Magruder (see Map 3 ). 48
Neither Longstreet nor Johnston knew that this had 
happened. The division commander, having delegated the rear 
guard to Anderson, spent the night preparing his trains and 
the rest of his troops to move. He did authorize Anderson 
to call in other brigades from the division for reinforce­
ments, if pressed, but did not check on his subordinate's 
deployment or personally examine the line of redoubts until 
several hours after dawn. In fact, Longstreet did not even 
arrive on the field until a few minutes after n o o n . 49 
Anderson, his two brigades now reinforced by the 
brigades of A. P. Hill, George Pickett, and Raleigh Colston 
--the remainder of Longstreet's Division--had been fighting 
Brigadier-General Joseph Hooker's 2nd Division, III Corps, 
of the Army of the Potomac, since sunrise. "Being in 
pursuit of a retreating army," Hooker wrote five days later, 
"I deemed it my duty to lose no time in making disposition 
of my forces to attack, regardless of their number and 
position. . . .  By doing so my division, if it did not 
capture the army before me, would at least hold them, in
48Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 72-73;
Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: pp. 177-178; "Report of Maj.
Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Second Corps, 
with congratulatory order from General Joseph E. Johnston,
C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 564-565.
49Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 72; "Report of
Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Second
Corps, with congratulatory order from General Joseph E. 
Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): 
pp. 5 64-5 65 .
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order that others m i g h t . " 5 0  "Hooker," observed historian 
Bruce Catton, "was an army politician and a devious man 
. . . but as a fighter he was direct and straightforward.
. . ."51 without waiting to reconnoiter the strength of the 
Confederate defenses or to acquire authorization from his 
corps commander, Hooker waded in, attacking the fortifica­
tions which Anderson had already garrisoned.52 He drove in 
the Conference skirmishers, but foundered against Fort 
Magruder, and began probing farther down Anderson's right 
flank.53
This only succeeded in attracting the attention of 
Confederate reinforcements. Discounting his own brigade, 
which held Fort Magruder and the two redoubts on the far 
left, and Colston's, which was still marching up, by 10:00 
A. M. Anderson had four brigades, numbering about 8,000 men, 
available for a counterattack. He also had Longstreet's 
permission.54
50"Report of Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army, 
commanding Second Division," May 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
1): p. 465.
51-Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1951), p. 266.
52jyiark Grimsley, "Rear Guard at Williamsburg,1 Civil 
War Times Illustrated, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (May 1985): pp. 12-
13.
53"Report of Brig. Gen. R. H. Anderson, commanding 
Second Brigade," May 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 580.
54"Report of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, 
commanding Second Corps, with congratulatory order from 
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Anderson left Fort Magruder to assume personal command 
of the attack, which was quite successful, despite being 
launched piecemeal. Wilcox advanced first, against Hooker's 
left, and became involved in a confusing fight in dense 
woods. Soon realizing that he was engaging a brigade 
against a division, Wilcox sent for assistance. Since he 
did not know that Anderson was riding to that part of the 
field to take command, he dispatched couriers directly to 
Pryor and A. P. Hill for support. Pryor, in the absence of 
orders from Anderson, and still under obligation to hold two 
of the redoubts, could only reinforce Wilcox's attack with 
two of his three regiments. Hill, who had never received 
adequate orders from anybody, did not know exactly who was 
in command or what he should do. Consequently, he sent a 
courier to find Longstreet and waited. About half an hour 
later, Anderson arrived at his headquarters and ordered him 
to support Wilcox. Pickett's men, meanwhile, waited behind 
Fort Magruder until Anderson remembered to call them forward 
still later in the morning.55 with Anderson busy bringing
OR, XI (part 1): pp. 564-565.
^"Report of Brig. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, C. S. Army, 
commanding First Brigade, Second Division," May 10, 1862, 
"Report of Brig. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, C. S. Army, 
commanding Second Brigade," May 10, 1862, "Report of Brig. 
Gen. George E. Pickett, C. S. Army, commanding Third 
Brigade," May --, 1862, "Report of Brigadier-General Roger 
A. Pryor, C. S. Army, commanding Brigade," May 10, 1862, 
"Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army, command­
ing Brigade," May 25, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 576,
580-581, 584-585, 587-588, 591.
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up reinforcements, no one effectively assumed command of 
anything larger than a brigade for several hours.
The consequences of such disorganization could have 
been disastrous, for there were probably 40,000 Federal 
troops within an hour's march of Hooker's now-beleaguered 
division. That morning, however, there was no one in 
effective command of the Union Army, either. McClellan was 
back in Yorktown, loading Brigadier-General William Frank­
lin's division on transports for an amphibious landing 
farther up the York River. The senior Federal officer at 
Williamsburg was the commander of the II Corps, Major- 
General Edwin Vose Sumner, who sat in his headquarters at 
the nearby Adams House, "slightly befuddled." Because 
Sumner ranked the IV Corps commander, Major-General Erasmus 
Keyes, he could do nothing, despite having two divisions-- 
William F. Smith's and Darius Couch's— nearby. Hooker's own 
commander, Major-General Samuel P. Heintzleman of the III 
Corps, had been delayed, bringing forward his other divi­
sion. 56 Neither army, it seemed, had yet learned how to 
coordinate a battle. It was a perfect example of what the 
Prince de Joinville ruefully characterized as "the American 
system of 'every man for himself.' . . ."57
Numbers and Rebel enthusiasm seemed to be prevailing in 
the chaotic melee. After several hours of confused battle,
56Grimsley, "Rear Guard," p. 27.
57de Joinville, Army of the Potomac, p. 52.
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Hill's 1st Virginia finally supplied the weight that forced 
Hooker's line back several hundred yards, capturing a 
battery of eight guns that the Yankees had time neither to 
spike nor to withdraw.58 yet though the decision to the 
right of Fort Magruder went to the Confederates, they were 
too disorganized to profit by it. The regiments involved in 
the fighting had become intermingled and difficult to 
maneuver. Most of the soldiers were low on ammunition, and 
the brigade commanders soon discovered that the reserve 
ammunition trains were heading in the other direction as 
rapidly as possible. A. P. Hill could not round up either 
enough horses to haul off all his captured guns or axes to 
destroy their carriages.59
Meanwhile, the attention of the senior officers of both 
armies had turned to the opposite flank, toward the redoubts 
north of Fort Magruder which Anderson had failed to occupy. 
Brigadier-General William F. Smith finally prevailed on 
Sumner to let him attempt a flanking maneuver. Sumner 
agreed to let Smith send a brigade to probe the Confederate 
left. Smith selected Brigadier-General Winfield Scott 
Hancock to command the troops, and quietly expanded both 
Hancock's strength and mission when the two were out of
58"Report of Brig. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, C. S. Army, 
commanding First Brigade, Second Division," May 10, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 1): p. 577.
59ibid., pp. 577-578; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomat­
tox, pp. 74-77.
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Sumner's earshot. Smith gave Hancock two additional regi­
ments from an adjoining brigade, plus a battery of artil­
lery. He then, Hancock reported, "authorized me to advance 
farther if I thought advantage could be obtained, and if I 
required them to send to him for re-enforcements."60 
Hancock started at 11:00 A. M.; by noon his force had 
already outflanked Port Magruder, taken two of the ungar­
risoned redoubts, and was advancing toward one held by 
Anderson's men. Smith, sensing a decisive breakthrough, 
promised to order forward another four regiments and an 
additional battery. From his position, Hancock's artillery 
could actually bombard Fort Magruder from the r e a r . 61 if 
decisively reinforced, the attack could possibly succeed in 
cutting off Longstreet's entire division.
Shortly after 12:00 P. M., with Anderson's attention 
completely absorbed in the battle with Hooker on the right, 
and Hancock creeping up on the left, Longstreet finally rode 
back to the field. In his official report, the Georgian 
contended that he did so because "it became evident that the 
trains would not be out of my way before night, and that I 
could, therefore, make battle without delaying the movement 
of the army." He asserted that he arrived on the field in 
time to see "the successful issue of the first grand
60"Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S.
Army, commanding First Brigade," May 11, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 1): p . 535.
61Ibid., pp. 535-537.
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assault" by Anderson's four brigades, which he complimented 
as having been "well arranged. . . . "  It was the victory 
over Hooker's division, Longstreet claimed, that caused him 
to seek reinforcements: "The advanced positions so extended
my lines that I found it necessary to bring other forces 
upon the field."62
Neither Longstreet's own memoirs, nor the reports of 
his own subordinates bear out this account. Anderson's 
attack was hardly well-organized, nor was there any indica­
tion in any of the brigadiers' reports that Longstreet made 
it to their part of the field that early. The division 
commander admitted in his memoirs that it was "the swelling 
noise of battle," from which he "concluded that it would be 
well to ride to the front. . . . "  When Hancock's artillery 
opened from several hundred yards in his rear, he quickly 
became aware that "viewing the ground on the left, I thought 
it not so well protected as Anderson conceived. . . . "63
62"Report of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, 
commanding Second Corps, with congratulatory order from 
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, in 
O R, XI (part 1): pp. 564-565.
^ T h e  question of when Hancock's artillery opened fire 
is critical to understanding how concerned Longstreet would 
have been about his left flank. It has usually been assumed 
that the Federals did not begin firing until late in the 
afternoon, when Early's Brigade had already been deployed on 
the left. Hancock says that he took the first unoccupied 
redoubt about noon, and fired his first shots with his guns 
while advancing on the second. This would have placed the 
action probably between noon and 1:00 P. M. Micah Jenkins, 
left in command at Fort Magruder mentions Hancock opening on 
the rear of Fort Magruder between 3:00 and 4:00 P. M . , but 
does not specifically rule out earlier fire from that
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Even this was quite an understatement. With more than 
two-thirds of his division engaged with Hooker, and the rest 
tied down holding the remaining redoubts, Longstreet 
suddenly realized that he had no troops of his own available 
to deal with Hancock. He sent an aide galloping back up the 
Williamsburg Road with orders for D. H. Hill's Division to 
march back to support him. Longstreet sent this order 
directly to Hill because the North Carolinian had been 
subordinated to him during the retreat. For whatever 
reasons, either haste or embarrassment at having been caught 
in the flank, Longstreet did not send any messages to 
Johnston.64
direction. If, as Johnston later suggested, the Confeder­
ates did not even know that Hancock had gotten into their 
left and rear, there is little to explain Longstreet's 
examination of the ground to his left on first arriving on 
the field (while an active battle was in progress on the 
right) nor his deployment of the bulk of Hill's Division on 
the left. See Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 74; 
"Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, 
commanding First Brigade," May 11, 1862, "Report of Col. M. 
Jenkins, Palmetto Sharpshooters, commanding brigade," -- — , 
1862, "Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division, 
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, "Report 
of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, commanding brigade," June 9, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 536-537, 580, 602-603, 606-
607; Johnston, Narrative, pp. 124-125.
^Longstreet claimed in his memoirs that he first sent 
for a single brigade from Hill's Division, but Hill's report 
makes it clear that his entire division was ordered back. 
That Johnston had not received any messages from Longstreet 
is inferred from Longstreet's memoirs and report, and 
Johnston's own report, none of which mention sending any 
dispatches to his commander. In his report, Johnston only 
said that he returned to the area of Fort Magruder after 
hearing Hill's Division ordered back, and the timing of his 
arrival supports this. In his own memoirs, Johnston claimed 
that "at noon the fighting was reported by Longstreet and
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The first brigade of Hill's Division to arrive was that 
of Jubal Early, at about 3:30 P. M. Along with his four 
regiments and company of artillery, Early had in tow Colonel 
George T. Ward's detachment, consisting of the 2nd Florida 
and the 2nd Mississippi Battalions.65 That Early's troops 
were the first to arrive added to Longstreet's unease at the 
situation, for he neither liked nor trusted the Virginia 
brigadier.
Longstreet was heading toward Anderson's battle as 
Early marched up, probably to find out if he could detach 
some of those regiments to safeguard his left flank. What 
he found instead was that most of the regiments in the four
Stuart to be so sharp, that D. H. Hill's division, which had 
marched several miles, was ordered back to Williamsburg, and 
I returned myself; for at ten o'clock, when the action had 
lasted more than four hours, there seemed to be so little 
vigor in the enemy's conduct, that I became convinced that 
it was a mere demonstration, intended to delay our march 
. . . and had ridden forward to join the leading troops."
But by 10:00 A. M. no one was making any reports from which 
Johnston could have concluded this, and read literally, 
Johnston's paragraph only implies but does not emphatically 
state that he had received messages from Longstreet and 
Stuart. See "Report of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. 
Army, commanding Department of Northern Virginia, of 
operations from April 15 to May 19," May 19, 1862, "Report 
of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Second 
Corps, with congratulatory order from General Joseph E. 
Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, "Report of Maj. Gen. D. 
H. Hill, commanding division, of operations April 6 to May 
8 ," January 11, 1863, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 275, 564-
565, 602; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 74; 
Johnston, Narrative, p. 120.
65"Report 0f Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division, 
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, "Report 
of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, commanding brigade," June 9, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 602-603, 606-607.
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brigades were nearly out of ammunition. Since he could not 
replenish their cartridge boxes from the retreating ordnance 
trains, Longstreet was forced to commit more troops to hold 
the ground gained on his right, even though his left was in 
danger. Colston's Brigade, which had arrived a few minutes 
before Early and Ward's detachment, was ordered to report to 
Anderson.
He reluctantly left Early in charge of the left of the 
line. "I proceeded as near as practicable to the position 
designated by General Longstreet on the left and rear of 
Fort Magruder" Early reported, "and formed my regiments in 
line of battle on the crest of a ridge in a wheat field, and 
near a barn and some houses, with a woods some 200 or 300 
yards in front. . . . "  In that position, "we were not in 
view of any body of the enemy, though we were soon informed 
by the firing from a battery in or beyond the woods toward 
Fort Magruder that a portion of the enemy were in our 
front."66
The battery firing at Early's men from beyond the woods 
was Company E, 1st New York Light Artillery, which had been 
attached to Hancock's force. Unable to grasp the opportu­
nity that Hancock's advance against the unoccupied redoubts 
had given him, and believing that he was about to face 
another major Confederate attack, Sumner overruled Smith,
66"Report of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, commanding 
brigade," June 9, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 606-607.
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and refused to allow him to reinforce Hancock. Hancock sent 
one of his own aides to explain the importance of his 
position and to plead for more troops, but Sumner remained 
adamant. All that had been left for Hancock to do, since 
his augmented brigade was too small to risk a further 
advance on its own, was to open fire with his field artil­
lery, in hopes of diverting the attention of some of the 
Rebels from the other side of the line. The gambit was far 
more successful than he ever could have expected.67
Somehow, Jubal Early came to the conclusion that a lone 
Federal battery had located itself on the Confederate flank, 
and he decided that several Yankee cannon had situated 
themselves in just the right place for him to capture 
them.68 Hill and the remaining brigades of his division had 
marched up by this time, and Early brought the idea to his
67"Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S.
Army, commanding First Brigade," May 11, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 1): p. 535; Grimsley, "Rear Guard," p. 28.
68Early denied in his report that this was his idea, 
attributing it instead to D. H. Kill. But Hill, Longstreet, 
and Johnston all agreed— though their accounts did differ on 
other particulars— that the original idea to capture the 
battery was Early's. See "Report of General Joseph E. 
Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Department of Northern 
Virginia, of operations from April 15 to May 19," May 19, 
1862, "Report of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, 
commanding Second Corps, with congratulatory order from 
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, 
"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division of 
operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, "Report of 
Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, commanding brigade," June 9,
1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 275, 564-565, 602, 607;
Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 78; Johnston, 
Narrative, p. 121.
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superior. What he did not tell the North Carolinian--and 
what Hill forgot to ask--was that he had done no reconnais­
sance to ascertain that the Federal battery was indeed 
unsupported. In fact, Early still did not know exactly 
where it was when he proposed the attack.69 After spending 
several weeks in Yorktown, impotently unable to strike back 
at enemy artillery, Hill was quickly caught up in Early's 
enthusiasm, and set out to find Longstreet to get permission 
to launch the attack.
It was at this point that Johnston himself finally 
showed up. He had been urging the rest of the army up the 
road all morning and afternoon, more concerned with a 
possible landing on the York River than about the Federals 
immediately to his rear.70 When he realized that a second 
division had become embroiled east of Williamsburg, the army 
commander spurred his horse in search of Longstreet and a 
report on the battle. Johnston, Longstreet, and Hill all 
converged somewhere in the rear of Fort Magruder.
Longstreet was feeling more confident by this time.
With Colston's and Ward's regiments in line, supported by 
the reorganizing brigades that had made Anderson's attack, 
he felt that his right flank was secure, at least for the 
rest of the day. Hill reported that the brigades of Jubal 
Early, Winfield Scott Featherston, Gabriel Rains, and Robert
G^Grimsley, "Rear Guard," p. 29.
70johnston, Narrative, p. 120.
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Rodes were now emplaced on the left. Thus, even if the 
redoubts on the far end of the line were in enemy hands, 
Longstreet's Division no longer seemed to be in danger of 
being cut off.71 Always unwilling to admit that events ever 
got out of his control, Longstreet told Johnston that the 
battle had thus far proceeded exactly as he had planned it: 
a successful, limited rear guard action to discourage 
pursuit.72
Hill's proposal then, came at what seemed an opportune 
moment. Success in the form of eight captured guns had 
already been achieved on the right. Why not attempt the 
same on the left, especially as the Yankees there now 
appeared to have no idea what a potentially commanding 
position they held? Johnston deferred to Longstreet's 
opinion, and the Georgian was willing to sanction the 
attack--with one condition. He did not have faith in Early
71"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division, 
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, in OR, XI 
(part 1): pp. 602-603.
72rphe tenor of Longstreet's report may be inferred from 
Johnston's comments on the Georgian's conduct of the battle. 
"I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a 
mere spectator, for General Longstreet's clear head and 
brave heart left me no apology for interference," Johnston 
wrote in his official report. He rewrote himself a much 
larger part in the Narrative, but one which was not com­
pletely borne out by contemporary reports. See also 
Longstreet's account in his memoirs, which played down the 
threat of Hancock on the Confederate left. "Report of 
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Depart­
ment of Northern Virginia, of operations from April 15 to 
May 19," May 19, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 275; Johns­
ton, Narrative, pp. 122-125; Longstreet, Manassas to 
Appomattox, p. 77.
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to carry out the assault competently; later he claimed to 
have announced to the other generals that "the brigade you 
propose to use is not in safe hands." He consented to the 
movement only if Hill directed it personally. Hill a- 
greed.73
With remarkable candor, Hill admitted the next year 
that "neither Longstreet nor myself knew the precise 
location of the battery, and both were entirely ignorant of 
the ground." Despite this, the two "agreed in the general 
plan of getting in rear of the battery by passing through 
the woods to the left of its supposed position." Though he 
"could not distinctly locate the battery by the sound,"
Hill split Early's Brigade into two detachments and, 
commanding one of them himself, marched the 5th and 23rd 
North Carolina, and the 24th and 38th Virginia, into the 
woods in search of enemy g u n s . 74
The ill-considered venture reaped exactly the kind of 
harvest which, in hindsight, might have been expected. 
Early's regiments came out of the woods one at a time, not 
facing, but flanked by, the New York guns which were 
supported by five regiments of Federal infantry. Neither 
Hill nor Early could regain any semblance of control over 
his regiment. Early went down with a wound trying to lead
7 3Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 78.
74"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division, 
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, in OR, XI 
(part 1): p. 603.
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the 24th Virginia and the 5th North Carolina in a desperate 
charge against Hancock's line. Hill remained in the woods 
trying, without success, to organize the other two regiments 
to support him. The 24th Virginia took 190 casualties, the 
5th North Carolina more than 30 0. Watching the Tarheels 
mowed down, Hill always remembered that "the regiment was 
shot down like beeves, the yankees cheering and laughing as 
they fired at the poor fellows."75
Ironically, the only circumstance that saved Early's 
men from even higher casualties was the fact that Hancock 
thought the Confederate regiments lost in the woods were 
about to envelop his own flank. He initially intended to 
charge and capture the entire 5th North Carolina:
The whole line advanced cheering, and on 
arriving . . . delivered two volleys, doing great 
execution. The order was then given to charge 
down the slope, and with reiterated cheers the 
whole command advanced in line of battle. A few 
of the leading spirits of the enemy were bayo­
neted; the remainder then broke and fled. The 
want of protection in my rear, and expecting an 
assault from that quarter every moment, I ordered 
a halt at the floor of the slope, and delivered a 
terrible fire along the whole line, expending 15 
to 20 rounds. The plunging fire from the redoubt, 
the direct fire from the right, and the oblique 
fire from the left were so destructive that after 
it had been ordered to cease and the smoke arose 
it seemed that no man had left the ground unhurt
75"Report Df Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division, 
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, "Report 
of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, commanding brigade," June 9, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 602-603, 606-607; Freeman,
Lee's Lieutenants, I: pp. 182-189; Grimsley, "Rear Guard,"
pp. 29-30.
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who had advanced within 500 yards of our l i n e . 76
Satisfied that the battle was well in hand, Johnston 
had ridden off the field prior to Early's debacle, leaving 
Longstreet to close operations. Longstreet claimed that 
"this mishap could have been remedied by an extreme flank 
movement and complete victory won; but . . .  we were not in 
a condition to increase our responsibilities, and a great 
delay might have endangered other operations of the a r m y . "77
D. H. Hill agreed, but for different reasons: "the turning 
of the Yankee position was still deemed practicable, but I 
soon found that the confusion was so great, arising mainly 
from the want of drill and discipline, that all idea of 
further advance was abandoned." Since Hill's Division still 
had three fresh brigades, he was designated to take over 
rear guard responsibilities for the following d a y . 78
The Battle of Williamsburg had cost the Army of the 
Potomac 2,233 casualties, while Johnston's army lost 1,70379 
Johnston and his subordinates asserted that they had won a
76"Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S.
Army, commanding First Brigade," May 11, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 1): p. 540.
77"Report of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, commanding 
Second Corps, with congratulatory order from General Joseph
E. Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): 
pp. 565-566.
78"Rep0rt of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division, 
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, in OR, XI 
(part 1): p. 604 .
79Livermore, Numbers and Losses, pp. 80-81.
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victory because they had held the field at the end of the 
day, had captured eight guns and several hundred prisoners, 
and because the Federals did not contest the army's with­
drawal the next m o r n i n g . 80 Both Johnston and Longstreet 
were in high spirits that evening. They spent the night 
together at the Bowden House, several miles west of Wil­
liamsburg. Johnston described the battle as merely a 
"pretty severe skirmish," and laughed off the lady of the 
house who "said she had no room for retreating Generals."81
Yet had Johnston taken the time to evaluate the 
engagement critically, he would have learned some disquiet­
ing facts. Longstreet, in whom he reposed great confidence, 
had allowed five of his six brigades to become committed to 
combat before he had even reached the field, leaving himself 
with few reserves and a left flank hanging in the air. Hill 
had shown himself to be aggressive to the point of rashness. 
Elections and service in the Yorktown trenches had taken 
their toll on drill and discipline; regiments from both 
divisions became entangled with each other and the woods 
around them. In fact, Confederate success at Williamsburg 
was more a matter of Union miscues than anything that 
Johnston, Longstreet, or Hill did right.
^ J o h n s t o n ,  Narrative, pp. 124-125; Longstreet,
Manassas to Appomattox, p. 79.
^Testimony of Lemuel J. Bowden, March 13 , 1863, JCCW, 
I: p. 583; undated notes for a speech by Benjamin S. Ewell
before the Magruder-Ewel1 Camp, United Confederate Veterans, 
Benjamin Stoddert Ewell papers, College of William and Mary.
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Johnston had four reasons for not evaluating the 
performance of his army at Williamsburg. The first reason 
was victory— claiming to have won the battle, he hardly had 
much to stimulate him to seek out shortcomings. Longstreet 
was quick to reinforce this idea, effusively praising his 
subordinates, and recommending promotions for Anderson,
Hill, and Pryor.82
Secondly, Johnston's style of supervision on the 
battlefield, it turned out, was not nearly as close as his 
supervision of administrative matters. Both on May 4 and 5, 
the army commander had felt comfortable delegating the 
entire responsibility for tactics on the field to a subordi- 
nate--first McLaws, then Longstreet. On May 5 in particu­
lar, Johnston had not bothered to be present until many 
hours after the battle had begun, and accepted the judgments 
of Longstreet and Hill uncritically. Thus he did not know 
the details of the blunders which had marked the conduct of 
the battle. Was his behavior anomalous, caused by excessive 
concern about amphibious landings and the slow progress of 
the trains, or was it to be a consistent characteristic of 
Joseph Johnston as an army commander? There was no one 
nearby to ask the question.
82Longstreet had an ulterior motive in these requests. 
He wanted Anderson and Hill promoted to command divisions of 
three brigades each under a permanently established army 
corps that he would control. See James Longstreet to Samuel 
Cooper, May 9, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 30; Robert E. 
Lee to James Longstreet, May 28, 1862, in Lee Letterbook.
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Even had Johnston been motivated to examine the army's 
performance more closely, he would have had difficulty in 
doing so, at least for several days. Most of the brigadiers 
were tied up immediately in moving their exhausted commands 
through the torrential rain; few reports of the battle were 
written before May 10. Early did not complete his until 
June, and D. H. Hill's was not submitted until January of 
the following year. When Johnston wrote his official 
account of the battle, he had primarily Longstreet's 
account, which Freeman correctly labeled "casual, almost 
complacent," upon which to base his own narrative.83
The final reason that Johnston turned his attention 
away from Williamsburg was probably the most influential. 
While he and Longstreet celebrated that night, an aide 
arrived at the Bowden House with unwelcome news. Johnston's 
worst fear had been realized: Federal transports had
reached the mouth of the Pamunkey River, between his army
and Richmond.84
Union gunboats, as Johnston predicted, had wasted no 
time ascending the York River after the Confederates 
evacuated Yorktown. Lee wrote Johnston on May 5, even as 
Longstreet and Hill struggled with the Yankees outside 
Williamsburg, that gunboats had been spotted at the mouth of
83preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 189.
^Testimony of Lemuel J. Bowden, March 13, 1863, JCCW, 
I: pp. 583-584.
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the Pamunkey R i v e r . 85 When that letter reached Johnston, 
probably on May 6, it confirmed what his cavalry pickets had 
already discovered: his line of communication was no longer
clear. But the question of McClellan's intentions remained. 
Was the main weight of his pursuit following overland, as 
the battle at Williamburg seemed to indicate; or, had those 
Federal attacks been designed purely to delay Johnston long 
enough to envelop and isolate his army?
The commander on the spot was G. W. Smith, whose 
division reached Barnamsville early on May 6. With the 
remainder of the army strung out all the way back to 
Williamsburg, it was Smith's responsibility to determine the 
Yankee's intent. That evening, Smith and Whiting rode to 
Fitzhugh Lee's forward cavalry pickets in the woods above 
Eltham's Landing, where they had a clear view of the 
disembarking Federals. Blue-clad soldiers, in at least 
division strength, had already landed.86
The troops were the regiments of Brigadier-General 
William B. Franklin's division, the first of four divisions 
that McClellan planned to advance by water to cut off
^Robert e . Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 5, 1862, in 
Lee Letterbook. This letter does appear in OR, but was 
incorrectly dated March 5, 1862, and therefore published in 
the wrong volume. See OR, V: p. 1090.
86"Report of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, C. S. Army, 
commanding Reserve," May 12, 1862, "Report of Brig. Gen. 
William H. C. Whiting, commanding First Division," May 8, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 627, 629; Smith, Confederate
War Papers, p. 47.
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Johnston's retreat. Fortunately for the Confederates, a 
shortage of transports forced McClellan to ship the divi­
sions up the York River sequentially rather than simultane­
ously.®^ Even more fortuitously, the lead division was 
commanded by the least aggressive of the four Union gener­
als . ®®
Though he began landing troops at 3:00 P. M. on May 6, 
Franklin was oppressed by "my ignorance of the topography of 
the place of landing, and the fact that the enemy's cavalry 
and infantry were seen in the woods surrounding the plain 
upon which we landed as soon as the landing began. . . . "
As a result of his apprehension, the division commander sent 
out no scouts of his own, and concentrated instead on 
"extraordinary precautions . . .  to prevent the success of 
an attack."®® Thus he had no idea that the Confederate 
pickets he saw from the plain were virtually the only force 
available to oppose him during the first few hours after his 
landing.
Such was not long to remain the case, however. Smith 
had immediately ordered up Whiting's three brigades from 
Barnamsville, though his object was not initially the attack
87"McClellan's Report (1)," in OR, XI (part 1): p. 23.
®®The others were Fitz-John Porter, Israel B. Richard­
son, and John Sedgewick, all of whom would later earn 
reputations for more combativeness than Franklin; see Ibid.
®9"Reports of Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. 
Army, commanding division," May 17, 1862, in OR, V: p. 615.
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that Franklin supposed. The Kentuckian hoped that the 
absence of any appreciable force to his front would lure 
Franklin into striking inland, away from the artillery 
support provided by his gunboats, and allowing Whiting to 
engage him at advantage.90 When it became obvious on the 
morning of May 7 that the Yankees were entrenching and not 
moving forward, Smith had to change his plans; he ordered 
Whiting to attack Franklin's right flank and drive it back 
close enough to the river for his own artillery to fire on 
the gunboats.91
Whiting selected Brigadier-General John Bell Hood's 
brigade to lead the attack. Though it also contained the 
18th Georgia during the Peninsular Campaign, Hood's command 
earned its fame as the "Texas Brigade." Eltham's Landing 
was the baptism of fire for the 1st, 4th, and 5th Texas, as 
well as Hood's first battle. It was not much of a battle.
The action was little more than a skirmish between 
Hood's brigade, supported by a single battery, and that of 
Brigadier-General John Newton, likewise four regiments 
attended by one company of artillery. Between 9:00 and 
11:00 A. M., Hood drove in Newton's skirmishers, and the two 
lines traded vollies in the woods for another three or four
90smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 47.
91"Report of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, C. S. Army, 
commanding Reserve," May 12, 1862, "Report of Brig. Gen. 
William H. C. Whiting, commanding First Division," May 8, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 627, 629.
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hours, while Hood's artillerymen determined that they could 
not hit the gunboats from an extended range, after which 
Hood was ordered to withdraw. He had taken thirty-seven 
casualties and inflicted 186, a tactical victory to be sure, 
but hardly a devastating defeat for Franklin's division, 
which was reinforced by the first brigade of Sedgwick's 
division that afternoon.92
Victory or defeat is often as much the commander's 
perception as it is reality. Within another twelve to 
twenty-four hours, approximately 25,000 Union soldiers had 
been concentrated near Eltham's, more than enough to engage 
Johnston and attempt to delay his retreat.9 3 gut Franklin, 
the senior division commander, credited reports from Newton 
that he had been attacked by a full division, supported by
20,000 additional troops, and wrote McClellan's Chief of 
Staff, "I congratulate myself that we have maintained our
few supporting troops were engaged on both sides, 
beyond the two brigades--the 5th Maine and 1st New Jersey 
for the Federals and Hampton's Legion and two regiments of 
Anderson's Tennessee brigade for the Confederates— but these 
units had little to do with the actual contest. "Reports of 
Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Army, commanding 
division," May 17, 1862, "Report of Brig. Gen. John Newton, 
U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade," May 8, 1862, "Report 
of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, C. S. Army, commanding 
Reserve," May 12, 1862, "Report of Brig. Gen. John B. Hood, 
C. S. Army, commanding First Brigade," May 7, 1862 in OR, V: 
pp. 615-617, 623-625, 627, 631-632; McMurry, Hood, pp. 38- 
39; Hood, Advance and Retreat, pp. 21-22.
93oerived from "Abstract from return of the Army of the 
Potomac, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, command­
ing, for May 20, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3): p. 184.
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position."94 He soon convinced McClellan that Johnston 
already had 80,000 to 120,000 men in the area, and cautious­
ly awaited the arrival of the main body of the Army of the 
Potomac, while Johnston's weary legions plodded unmolested 
past his position.95
Johnston himself breathed a sigh of relief when he 
halted his divisions near Baltimore Cross Roads on May 10.
He had originally desired to halt at New Kent Court House, 
six miles farther east, but the distance from the Richmond 
and York River Railroad, his line of supply, had forced the 
army to keep moving.96 To Johnston's weary and bedraggled 
soldiers, the halt represented the first chance for a hot 
meal and sleep in several days. Many of them, like D. H. 
Hill, were too exhausted to do more than collapse; "I slept 
nearly all day yesterday," Hill wrote to his wife on May 11, 
"just lying on the ground. . . ."97
Johnston could finally afford to rest his army because 
he had reached the position in which he intended to await
^ " R e p o r t s  of Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. 
Army, commanding division," May 7, 1862, "Report of Brig. 
Gen. John Newton, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade," May 
8 , 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 614, 625.
9 f > G e o r g e  g. McClellan to Edwin M. Stanton (received May 
8 , 1862), in OR, XI (part 3): p. 151.
96joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862, 
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 9, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 3): pp. 499-500, 502-503.
9 .  H. Hill to "My Dear Wife," May 11, 1862, in D. H. 
Hill papers, College of William and Mary.
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McClellan and give battle.98 The area had many advantages 
for a smaller army, fighting on the defensive. Johnston's 
left flank rested on the Pamunkey River which, though 
navigable, was narrow enough to be blockaded by field 
artillery. His right was anchored by the Chickahominy, 
above the head of navigation, but below all the bridges 
which McClellan could have used for a rapid crossing. The 
Richmond and York River Railroad ran directly behind the 
Confederate lines, providing for relative ease of supply. 
Finally, the terrain between the two rivers was heavily 
wooded? limited visibility would help to offset the Federal 
superiority in artillery." The only apparent weakness of 
the position was that it could be flanked by a waterborne 
advance up the James River, though this could not seriously 
endanger Johnston's army as long as the fortifications at 
Drewry's Bluff held out.
As he waited for the Army of the Potomac to arrive, 
Johnston now found the time to resume normal communications 
with the authorities in Richmond. He had not, as Freeman 
and other critics have asserted, ceased to keep his superi­
ors informed of his movements between the withdrawal from 
Yorktown and the skirmish at Eltham's Landing. The
published correspondence in the Official Records does
"Smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 48.
" OR Atlas, Plate XIX (1).
lOOpreeman, R. E. Lee, II: pp. 43-44.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
372
portray Johnston as silent between May 1 and May 7, but this 
is misleading. Numerous notes and endorsements signed by 
Johnston concerning routine administrative matters appear in 
the records of the Adjutant and Inspector-General. Espe­
cially significant are the endorsements by Johnston on two 
letters by Longstreet to Cooper, dated May 7 and May 9, 
which indicate that he filed a preliminary report on the 
battles at Williamsburg.101 Though this document has not 
been found, its existence is further suggested by Johnston's 
immediate reports of the much smaller engagement at Eltham's 
Landing.102 Contextual evidence in Lee's letterbook also 
indicates that Johnston wrote him on May 6, with reference 
to provisions for the a r m y .  103 iphe longest period during 
which Johnston remained incommunicado definitely did not 
exceed four days (May 2-5) and may well have been short­
er. 104
lOljames Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, May 7, 1862,
James Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, May 9, 1862, in LR-AIGO, 
M-474, Reel 30.
102joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 499-500; Joseph E. Johnston to Robert
E. Lee, May 7, 1862, in OR, LI (part 2): pp. 552-553.
103Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 7, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee to Lucius B. Northrop, May 7, 1862, in Lee 
Letterbook.
1^4Johnston announced his intention to evacuate 
Yorktown to Lee on May 1 (not preserved, but mentioned by 
Lee the following day). He evidently attempted to communi­
cate his plan to delay the withdrawal by one day on May 2 or 
3, but discovered that the Williamsburg telegraph office had 
been broken up. If Johnston then attempted to post a letter 
on the same subject to Richmond, is has been lost. During
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Johnston notified Lee on May 7 that he could not 
provision the army near West Point, but indicated that 
Federal naval power concerned him more. "The sight of the 
iron-clad boats makes me apprehensive for Richmond, too, so 
I move on in two columns, one by the New Kent Road under 
Major-General Smith, the other by that of the Chickahominy 
under Major-General Longstreet. 0 5  By the next day, when a 
brief halt at New Kent Court House left him time for 
reflection, Johnston realized that events in his front had 
distracted his attention from the remainder of his command. 
He received three letters from Lee which had, unfortunately, 
been signed for the general by Walter Taylor. This particu-
May 3-5, the retreat from Yorktown and the two engagements 
in front of Williamsburg, Johnston apparently found no time 
to write, but by May 7 his endorsement on Longstreet's 
letter indicates that he had already filed his Williamsburg 
report, as does the context of his May 7 letter to Lee.
This was probably a different letter from his May 6 letter 
to Lee concerning provisions, which had been posted twelve 
miles west of Williamsburg, and would have been written 
either on the evening of May 5 or the morning of May 6.
Thus, a tentative reconstruction of Johnston's correspond­
ence during the withdrawal period looks like this:
May 1: Johnston to Lee (mentioned by Lee)
May 3: Johnston to Lee (telegram that could not be
sent; inferred from Johnston to D. H. Hill, May 3)
May 3: Johnston to Lee (conjectural; letter sent in'
place of telegram?)
May 5 or 6: Johnston to Lee or Cooper (inferred from
endorsements on Longstreet's letters)
May 6: Johnston to Lee (mentioned in Lee Letterbook)
See Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 2, 1862, Joseph 
E. Johnston to D. H. Hill, May 3, 1862, John B. Magruder to 
George W. Randolph, May 6, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp.
488, 491, 496.
105joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 7, 1862, in 
OR, LI (part 2): pp. 552-553.
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larly upset Johnston because one of the letters gave him 
specific orders concerning his wagon trains, and another 
countermanded a portion of his orders to Huger for the 
transfer of certain troops from the south side of the James. 
None of the letters provided him with any intelligence 
concerning affairs in the Valley, central Virginia, or 
around Fredericksburg.106
"My authority does not extend beyond the troops 
immediately around me," Johnston complained. "I request 
therefore to be relieved of a merely nominal geographical 
command. The service will gain thereby unity of command, 
which is essential in war."-*-^ Clifford Dowdey misconstrued 
this paragraph as a "Threatening gesture of 'resignation'" 
which "revealed an infantilism in Johnston's relations with 
the war officers."108 gut the remainder of Johnston's 
letter, and Lee's response, makes it clear that he was only 
asking— albeit quite brusquely— to either have his orders to 
Huger obeyed or to have the Department of Norfolk removed 
from the Department of Northern Virginia. Intemperate 
language aside, Johnston had a reasonable case against the
lO^Only one 0f these letters is printed in OR— Robert
E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
3): p. 497. A second is in the Lee Letterbook. The third
has not been found, but it may be inferred from Johnston's 
response that it did not provide information on the activi­
ties of Jackson, Ewell, or Anderson.
107joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 499.
108Dc>wdey, Seven Days, p. 66.
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Richmond authorities. Without ever informing him, they had 
delayed Huger's withdrawal from Norfolk, ordered a brigade 
from his command to central Virginia, and changed the 
objective of his eventual retreat from Richmond to Peters­
burg. 109 while each of these actions may have been defensi­
ble in terms of the overall strategic situation, ignoring 
Johnston's authority over Huger was a serious infraction 
against proper military procedure.
That Johnston did not intend to relinquish command of 
the Department of Northern Virginia was made clear in his 
next paragraph: "I have had in the Peninsula no means of
obtaining direct information from the other departments of 
my command nor has the Government furnished it." He was 
especially worried about the forces south of Fredericksburg: 
"I wish to place them so that they may not be cut off by an 
army landing at West Point. " H O
This letter sparked a confusing exchange of letters 
between the two generals that lasted for nearly a week, and 
can only be satisfactorily explained if one assumes, as Lee 
finally did, that some of the correspondence miscarried and 
arrived out of order. The exchange centered around the
lO^Qeorge W. Randolph to Benjamin Huger, May 3, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, May 7, 1862, Robert E. Lee 
to Joseph E. Johnston, May 7, 1862, Robert E. Lee to 
Benjamin Huger, May 8, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. 
Johnston, May 8, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 490, 497,
499, 500-501.
HOjoseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 499-500.
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question that had been deferred but not settled weeks 
earlier in Richmond: by what strategy should the Federal
offensive be countered? Subsidiary issues included the 
control and positioning of Anderson's division near Freder­
icksburg and the proper thrust of operations in the Valley. 
The tone of the letters became steadily more antagonistic—  
particularly on Johnston's part— which ironically disguised 
the fact that, by mid-May, both Johnston and Lee had drawn a 
good deal closer in terms of their view on proper conduct of 
operations.
Lee attempted to mollify Johnston on May 8, by assuring 
him, "I consider your authority to extend over the troops on 
both sides of the James River. . . ." But he also cooly 
denied having become Johnston's only conduit of information 
from the outlying districts. "I do not recollect your 
having requested information relating to the other depart­
ments of your command to be forwarded by any other means 
than the usual course of the mails, and supposed the 
commanders were in direct correspondence with you. " H I  This 
sentence ignored exactly such a request, made on April 22, 
which had alerted Lee to the fact that Johnston had no 
direct communication with either Jackson or Ewell, and 
expected to depend on Lee to forward information.H2 The
HlRobert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 8, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 500.
IHjoseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 22, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 455.
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letter also slid quietly by the fact that only in this 
letter did Lee tell Johnston that J. R. Anderson was in 
command below the Rappahannock, that Jackson had marched to 
attack the Pederals west of Staunton, or that a brigade from 
Huger's department had been ordered to central Virginia.
Nor did Lee explain that he himself had been the authority 
by which all these movements had been m a d e . ^ 13
By May 10, based on the intelligence provided by Lee, 
Johnston had the following picture of events in Virginia.
On the Federal side, McClellan was cautiously advancing up 
the Peninsula with something more than 100,000 men. From 
Fredericksburg, Major-General Irvin McDowell's corps, 
estimated accurately as containing nearly 40,000 soldiers, 
was threatening to march south.H4 Banks, who had last been 
reported to Johnston as having 34,000 troops, was apparently 
leaving the Valley to unite with McDowell.H5 Thus, the 
strategic picture that confronted Johnston was one of at 
least 175,000 Yankees converging on Richmond from the north 
and east.
e . x,ee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 8, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 500-501.
H^Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 10, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 505.
ll^The last intelligence from Jackson to Johnston on 
Bank's strength came on March 27, and was, though Johnston 
had no way of knowing it, quite out of date by May 10. See 
Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 8, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 3): p. 501; Thomas J. Jackson to Joseph E. Johnston, 
March 27, 1862, in OR, XII (part 3): pp. 840-841.
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How were the Confederates disposed to receive them? 
Jackson had led a division of 8,000 off into the mountains 
away from the main theater of war. Ewell's Division, 
numbering 8,500 men, was positioned in Swift Run Gap, 
ostensibly outnumbered by four-to-one. At least one brigade 
was located at Gordonsville, observing nothing. Anderson's
12.000 soldiers south of Fredericksburg faced more than 
three times their own numbers. Huger's Division had 
concentrated at Petersburg, where no enemy forces seemed to 
be. In front of McClellan, Johnston now mustered only about
50.000 men, in an army reduced by battle casualties and 
straggling.116 So, even though the Confederates deployed 
over 90,000 troops across the Old Dominion, and still held a 
central position with interior lines, they had spread their 
forces too thin to hope for a victory without concentrating 
somewhere.
Not knowing that Lee and Jackson had been considering 
the question since late April, Johnston saw three possible 
strategies for foiling the Federal offensive. United, the 
forces of Jackson, Ewell, Branch, and Edward Johnson 
(stationed at Monterey) might be able to attack Banks in the 
Valley, prevent Banks from reinforcing McDowell, and allow 
Jackson to march about 20,000 men to reinforce Anderson.
This would allow the force below Fredericksburg to meet
- ^ J o s e p h  e Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 9, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 503.
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McDowell's corps on equal terms, removing the specter of a 
combination of the two Federal columns in eastern Virginia. 
Johnston dispatched orders to Jackson and Ewell on May 13 to 
pursue this course.
If Jackson's force could not detain Banks in the 
Valley, then Johnston believed the proper course was to have 
him march directly "to join either the army near Fredericks­
burg, commanded by Brig. Gen. J. R. Anderson, or this 
one."H8 jf Huger were brought to Richmond at the same 
time, this would create a situation in which Johnston would 
be able to deploy his 90,000 men in one army between enemy 
wings of roughly 75,000 and 100,000, separated by forty 
miles. He could then maneuver to engage either McDowell or 
McClellan in succession, with relative parity of numbers.
The third option available to the Confederates was a 
simple concentration of all available troops to defend 
Richmond, including brigades from North Carolina and points 
farther south. "If the President will direct the concentra­
tion of all the troops of North Carolina and Eastern 
Virginia," Johnston told Lee on May 10, "we may be able to 
hold Middle Virginia at least. If we permit ourselves to be 
driven beyond Richmond we lose the means of maintaining this 
army." He concluded with a contention that only "a concen-
H^Joseph £, Johnston to Richard S. Ewell, May 13,
1862, in OR (part 3): p. 888.
118Ibid.
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tration of all our available forces may enable us to fight 
successfully. " This has traditionally been cited as 
Johnston's preferred strategy, but a close reading of his 
correspondence from May 8 to May 13 suggests that he 
advocated it as much from frustration as preference.120
Either of Johnston's other strategic choices depended 
upon a single variable that he had not yet been able to 
master: the control of the detachments of his army at long
distances. How could he expect to control the operations of 
as many as six separate columns when he could not even 
reliably communicate with five of them? "I must be informed 
of your movements and progress, that your instructions may 
be modified as circumstances change," Johnston told Ewell on 
May 1 3 .-*-21 gy this time, the sentence had almost a plain­
tive ring to it, for since May 8 Johnston had been unable to 
reach Huger or A n d e r s o n . 122 jp must have seemed to Johnston 
that the only way he would ever be able to exert his 
authority over his widely spread divisions would be to 
gather them all in one place, where he could depend for
H^Joseph e . Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 10, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 506.
120por the traditional interpretation of Johnston's 
intention to concentrate, see Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:
p. 202.
121joseph E. Johnston to Richard S. Ewell, May 13,
1862, in OR (part 3): p. 888.
122joseph e . Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 10, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 506.
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success on the fighting qualities of his soldiers and not 
have to rely on a nonfunctional command system to orches­
trate intricate maneuvers.
Though Lee, like Johnston, never outlined his strategy 
for the defense of Richmond in a single sentence or para­
graph, a sampling of his letters indicates that his inten­
tions were now far less at odds with those of Johnston than 
they had been a month earlier. He suggested to Jackson on 
May 8 that at least Ewell's Division should pursue Banks out 
of the Valley, attacking him en route if possible, and 
eventually joining Anderson's force.123 on May 14, Lee was 
contemplating almost exactly the same strategy for Valley 
operations that Johnston had ordered the day before, 
authorizing Walter Taylor to write to Jackson that "if you 
can form a junction with General Ewell with your combined 
forces you should be able to drive Banks from the Val­
ley . "124
Lee was also in agreement with Johnston that the 12,000 
Confederates near Fredericksburg should be united with 
Johnston's main army for the purpose of striking either 
McDowell or McClellan. He advised Johnston on May 10 that 
even President Davis now held the "view that operations of 
its [Johnston's army] several divisions might be combined to
123j}0kert e . Lee to Thomas J. Jackson, May 8, 1862, in 
OR, XII (part 3): pp. 883-884.
1^4Walter H. Taylor to Thomas J. Jackson, May 14, 1862, 
in OR, XII (part 3): p. 889.
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attack the enemy, who seemed to have exposed himself and his 
line of communication, and to prevent any movement that 
might threaten your rear."125 on May 11, for the first 
time, Lee directed J. R. Anderson to "conform all your 
movements to the direction of General Johnston. "126 
next day Lee asked Johnston, "toward what point in the 
vicinity or Richmond do you desire them [outlying troops] to 
concentrate?" The letter specified only Anderson's force, 
but also implied that Lee now understood that Johnston might 
need to draw in the divisions of Jackson and Ewell.127 Lee 
had even apparently accepted Johnston's premise that more 
troops must be drawn from the coast to reinforce Johnston's 
army. In the last month, he had transferred Maxcey Gregg's 
Brigade from South Carolina, and those of Anderson and L. 
O'Bryan Branch from North Carolina. Now he wrote the North 
Carolina Governor, Henry Clark, and Major-General John C. 
Pemberton, commanding Lee's old Department of South Carolina 
and Georgia, that more brigades would have to be released to 
Virginia.128
125Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 10, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 505.
126R0bert E. Lee to John R. Anderson, May 11, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 887.
127R0bert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 12, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 511.
128walter H. Taylor to John C. Pemberton, May 12, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee to Henry T. Clark, May 13, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 3): pp. 512-513.
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Thus, when Davis and Lee rode out unannounced to 
Johnston's headquarters on May 14, there was more concord 
among the senior members of the Confederate command struc­
ture than had existed for months.129 Davis contended in his 
memoirs that the conversation was "so inconclusive" that he 
and Lee were "unable to draw from it any more definite 
purpose than that the policy was to improve his position as 
far as practicable, and wait for the enemy to leave his 
gunboats, so that the opportunity might be offered to meet 
him on land."130 But the contemporary record reveals that 
the President's memory had become colored with the passage 
of two decades. It is doubtful that any discussion of 
operations would have excluded Johnston's instructions to 
Jackson and Ewell, posted the previous day. With respect to 
Johnston's appreciation of the fact that McClellan would 
eventually have to leave his naval support to advance either
129preernan suggested that the date of the Davis-Lee 
visit to Johnston's army cannot be fixed with absolute 
certainty on May 14, but all available circumstantial 
evidence supports that date. Lee addressed a letter to 
Johnston on May 13 that responded to one hand-carried to 
Richmond by A. H. Cole; had he been visiting Johnston that 
afternoon, he would have had no reason to write the letter. 
All of Lee's May 14 correspondence was actually written and 
signed by Walter Taylor, and on the morning of May 15 Taylor 
placed Lee at Drewry's Bluff. See Freeman, Lee's Lieuten­
ants , I: p. 210; Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May
13, 1862, Walter H. Taylor to Joseph E. Johnston, May 15, 
1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 512-513, 518; Walter H.
Taylor to Thomas J. Jackson, May 14, 1862, in OR, XII (part 
3): p. 889; Walter H. Taylor to [J. B. Walton], May 14,
1862, in OR, LI (part 2): p. 556.
130DaviSf Rise and Fall, II: pp. 101-102.
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north or south of the Chickahominy, Lee acknowledged on May 
17 that "I think there can be little doubt as to the 
correctness of your views. . . ."131 Davis himself informed 
Johnston the same day that "if the enemy proceed as hereto­
fore indicated, your position and policy, as you stated it 
in our last interview, seems to me to require no modifica­
tion. . . ."132 The President, Johnston later correctly 
asserted, left with "no cause to complain" about the 
conference, "especially as he suggested nothing better."133 
Whatever fragile harmony had been established among the 
three men soon disappeared, for the next day everyone's 
calculations were upset again. The much dreaded Federal 
ironclads had finally arrived at Drewry's Bluff.
l^lRobert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 523.
132jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 524.
133j0hnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," B&L, II: p. 206.
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Chapter Ten 
Defending Richmond
While the army retreated toward the Chickahominy, 
critical events were also transpiring on the James River. 
When he determined to evacuate Yorktown, Joseph Johnston had 
also dispatched orders to Commander Tucker's James River 
Squadron. Initially, while the Virginia still closed the 
mouth of the James to the Union Navy, Tucker was instructed 
to transport what he could save of the heavy guns at 
Jamestown Island back to Richmond. But eventually, Johnston 
knew, the Virginia would either have to be scuttled, 
lightened to run upriver, or undertake a final, suicidal 
dash into Hampton Roads to try to sell herself as dearly as 
possible among the Federal transports at anchor there. When 
that happened, Tucker and his command were to "continue to 
observe and control the upper James River as long as 
practicable, in order to prevent the enemy from crossing and 
attempting to cut off our forces retiring from Norfolk.
It was an incredibly tall order: against Tucker's five
vessels— only one of which was partially armored— mounting 
just sixteen guns, Admiral Goldsborough would send Commander 
John Rodgers with nine vessels— including the ironclads
Ijoseph E. Johnston to John R. Tucker, May 2, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 488-489.
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Monitor and Galena— boasting forty-five cannon, five of 
which were the monstrous 100-pound siege rifles.2 "When 
hard pressed," Johnston advised Tucker on May 2, "you will 
retire upon Richmond.
But after completing one trip hauling the artillery and 
ordnance stores from Jamestown Island to Richmond, Tucker 
received new orders, this time from Secretary of the Navy 
Stephen Mallory. McClellan's troops held Yorktown, and 
Longstreet was fighting his rear guard action in front of 
Williamsburg; the Confederates on the Peninsula were in full 
retreat. Yet Mallory's orders read: "Proceed to navy yard,
Norfolk, with Patrick Henry and Jamestown and await or­
ders .
The operation could only be attempted at night, because 
it involved running past the heavy batteries at Newport News 
and avoiding detection by the Federal ships prowling Hampton 
Roads. As silently as possible, drifting more than steam­
ing, Tucker steered the two vessels under the Yankee guns
^See L. M. Goldsborough to Gideon Welles, May 21, 1862, 
in NOR, VII: p. 406. The Federal vessels were the Monitor
(two guns), the Galena (six guns), the Wachusett (10 guns), 
the E. A. Stevens (one gun), the Aroostook (three guns), the 
Port Royal (eight guns), the Maratanza (six guns), the 
Mahaska (six guns), and the Dragon (two guns); for detailed 
descriptions, see NOR, Series 2, II: pp. 39, 62, 90, 132,
134, 148, 182, 215, 235.
^Joseph E. Johnston to John R. Tucker, May 2, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 488-489.
^Quoted in J. N. Barney to John R. Tucker, May 4, 1862, 
in NOR, VII: p. 784.
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and picked his way around the obstructions in the Elizabeth 
River on the night of May 5.^
What Tucker found in Norfolk was chaos. Major-General 
Benjamin Huger's Department of Norfolk had always been a 
source of problems for the War Department. The army and 
navy constantly quarreled over spheres of authority, a 
disagreement still unsettled after the subordination of the 
naval forces in the department to Johnston in mid-April.^
The original commandant of Gosport Navy Yard had been 
replaced in March, primarily because of a perceived lack of 
energy in meeting construction d e a d l i n e s .   ^ Huger himself 
had survived calls for his resignation by his own officers, 
members of Congress, and even the Vice-President, who 
labeled him "inefficient--indeed [an] imbecile. . . . "  
President Davis had sustained him, not from any great 
confidence, but for lack of any better candidates to replace 
him. When the subject came up in a March cabinet meeting, 
with members calling for Huger to be superseded, Davis 
responded that "it was easy to say so, but the question was
5john R. Tucker to Stephen R. Mallory, May 8, 1862, in 
NOR, VII: p. 786.
^Benjamin Huger to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 474; Josiah Tattnall to Stephen R.
Mallory, April 29, 1862, in NOR, VII: p. 776.
^Stephen R. Mallory to F. Forrest, March 19, 1862, 
Stephen Mallory to F. Forrest, March 20, 1862, Stephen R. 
Mallory to Sidney Smith Lee, March 24, 1862, in NOR, VII: 
pp. 747-749.
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where to get one to take his place."® Benjamin, Randolph, 
and Lee all found it necessary constantly to send Huger 
detailed orders to accomplish even the simplest of tasks.® 
When Johnston directed Huger on April 28 to "be 
prepared for a prompt movement, and if compelled to move, as 
little public property as possible should be left for the 
enemy," the fifty-seven-year-old South Carolinian panicked. 
He wrote back to Lee, not Johnston, that he could not remove 
or damage his guns, destroy his ammunition, relinquish any 
outlying parts of his garrison, or assist in the destruction 
of property in the navy yard. "It seems to me the best I 
can do is to be prepared to repel promptly any attack and 
defend the position as long as I can."-*-® As the time for 
the withdrawal from Yorktown grew closer, Johnston sent more 
detailed orders to Huger, Tattnall, and Sidney Smith Lee.
The orders were hand-carried by Colonel Lay, who was
^Entries of March 4, 1862, March 7, 1862, Bragg diary, 
pp. 171, 175; see also Jefferson Davis to Benjamin Huger, 
February 26, 1862, in OR, IX: p. 45.
®Judah P. Benjamin to Benjamin Huger, March 5, 1862 
(two letters), Judah P. Benjamin to Benjamin Huger, March 
15, 1862, in OR, IX: pp. 55-56, 68; Robert E. Lee to
Benjamin Huger, March 18, 1862, Walter H. Taylor to Benjamin 
Huger, March 29, 1862, Walter H. Taylor to Benjamin Huger, 
March 31, 1862, George W. Randolph to Benjamin Huger, April 
1, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, April 7, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 384-385, 411, 412-413, 414, 425-426;
see also George W. Randolph to T. M. R. Talcott, April 4, 
1862, in Talcott Family papers, Virginia Historical Society, 
Richmond, Virginia.
l®Benjamin Huger to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862 (two 
letters), in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 474, 682.
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empowered to explain more fully his commander's inten­
tions. When word of Johnston's instructions reached 
Richmond, Davis ordered Secretaries Mallory and Randolph to 
Norfolk to delay the evacuation long enough to ship out such 
supplies as could be saved and destroy those that could 
not.12
Thus occurred the confused situation in Norfolk on the 
night of May 5, when Commander Tucker quietly passed the 
obstructions near Craney Island. Two cabinet secretaries 
were personally supervising the shipment of supplies.12 
Flag Officer Tattnall was trying to convince them that the 
Virginia could not possibly execute his orders to "protect 
Norfolk as well as James River, and if possible prevent the 
enemy from ascending it." At the same time, he was desper­
ately attempting to find a pilot who could navigate the 
ironclad upriver if her draft was lightened.14 Captain Lee 
was dismantling the navy yard, and General Huger, by all
URobert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 2, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 488; Joseph E. Johnston to John R. 
Tucker, May 2, 1862, in NOR, VII: p. 782.
12'restimony of George W. Randolph before the Confeder­
ate States Congress Naval Committee, February 5, 1863, in 
NOR, Series 2, I: pp. 716-717.
l^ibia.
^Testimony of Josiah Tattnall at his court-martial, 
July 19, 1862, in NOR, VII: p. 796.
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reports, was hardly capable of doing anything.15
He discovered that Tucker's two steamers had been 
ordered to Norfolk to attempt to haul off the Richmond 
ordnance supplies and as many gunboats as possible before 
Gosport fell back into Yankee hands. If sneaking into 
Norfolk had been difficult, steaming back upriver with 
several other vessels in tow was even more dangerous.
Tucker did not hesitate; the next night he re-entered 
Hampton Roads. The Patrick Henry towed the unfinished 
ironclad and a partially completed gunboat. The Jamestown 
had in tow another gunboat and the brig loaded down with the 
cannon and ammunition for the Richmond. The two gunboats, 
recalled Lieutenant Commander William H. Parker of the 
Beaufort, "had sawmill engines, and when they got underweigh 
[sic] there was such a wheezing and blowing that one would 
have supposed all hands had suddenly been attacked with the 
asthma or heaves." Miraculously, "they ran by the batteries 
at Newport News however without waking the sentinels up."
The following morning, May 7, while Hood and Newton traded 
volley at Eltham's Landing, Tucker handed the vessels over 
to his smaller ships to be conveyed to Richmond, and
15wc>od, "First Fight," B&L, I: p. 709; testimony of
George W. Randolph before the Confederate States Congress 
Naval Committee, February 5, 1863, in NOR, Series 2, I: pp.
716-717; testimony of Josiah Tattnall at his court-martial, 
July 19, 1862, in NOR, VII: p. 797.
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stationed himself to run the gauntlet again that night.1^
By the night of May 7, however, the Federals had more 
securely closed Hampton Roads; and Tucker's vessels were 
spotted and forced to retreat soon after midnight.
The next morning, Tucker watched impotently as the 
Galena, the Port Royal, and the Aroostook, having themselves 
bypassed the Virginia, pounded the Confederate battery at 
Day's Bluff into submission.17 The Federal gunboats, Tucker 
wrote from his vantage point upriver, "silenced it in one 
hour." As he retreated slowly ahead of the Yankee vessels, 
Tucker warned Commander Ebenezer Farrand, commanding at 
Drewry's Bluff, that "the iron vessel the 'Galena' is one of 
them and can ascend the river to Richmond if she desires. I 
feel anxious for the fate of Richmond. . . ."18
But Fort Huger, sitting atop Harden's Bluff with 
thirteen guns, several of which were rifled, proved too well 
entrenched to be silenced. Under orders from Admiral 
Goldsborough to ascend the James as rapidly as possible "to 
harass the retreat of the rebels wherever they can be 
reached," Commander Rodgers decided to bypass the second
l^william H. Parker, Recollections of a Naval Officer, 
1841-1865 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), p.
278; John R. Tucker to Stephen R. Mallory, May 8, 1862, in 
NOR, VII: p. 786.
l^ibid.
ISjohn R. Tucker to Ebenezer Farrand, May 8, 1862, in 
Charles T. Mason papers, Virginia Historical Society, 
Richmond, Virginia.
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f o r t . T h e  Galena capitalized upon her relative invulnera­
bility to the battery's ordnance, passing and repassing the 
Confederate position seven times to draw fire and distract 
attention from the two wooden vessels. Rodgers hoped that 
he could then quickly engage Tucker's squadron, guaranteeing 
Federal control of the lower James. But the Confederates 
had moved the channel markers, and managed to decoy the 
Galena into a sandbar near Hog Island. Her pipes filled 
with sand and water, choking the engines so effectively that 
she remained aground for thirty-six hours. Rodgers realized 
that without the ironclad the Port Royal and the Aroostook 
alone could not force the river against Tucker's five 
vessels, so he settled in to await repairs and reinforce­
ments. 20 While his engineers pumped out the Galena's fouled 
plumbing, the Confederates finished the evacuation of 
Norfolk and, on May 10, a disconsolate Flag-Officer Tattnall 
ordered the destruction of the Virginia.21
So far, Confederate operations on the James River had 
bought precious time to improve the fortifications at 
Drewry's Bluff. Rodgers did not move up the river from Hog 
Island until the evening of May 12, more than a week after
19l . M. Goldsborough to John R. Rodgers, May 7, 1862, 
in NOR, VII: p. 327.
20john Rodgers to L. M. Goldsborough, May 9, 1862, John 
Rodgers to L. M. Goldsborough, May 11, 1862, in NOR, VII: 
pp. 328-329.
^Testimony of Josiah Tattnall at his court-martial, 
July 19, 1862, in NOR, VII: p. 797.
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Johnston's army had left the trenches at Yorktown.22 The 
time would not have been half so critical had Joseph 
Johnston's suspicions not been well founded: despite having
had nearly eight weeks available to perfect the fortifica­
tions at Drewry's Bluff, the Richmond authorities had 
allowed the work to proceed in a desultory and haphazard 
manner. Even as Commander Rodgers weighed anchor, it was 
questionable whether or not enough guns had been planted 
there to resist his passage.
Captain Augustus H. Drewry's Southside Heavy Artillery 
(Company C, 2nd Virginia Artillery) had been organized from 
overage volunteers in January, 1862. Drewry believed that 
his company's first position, in Battery Nineteen on the 
turnpike between Richmond and Drewry's Bluff, "was unimpor­
tant, and that we would likely be called to field duty, for 
which I did not think my men were well suited. . . .23 He
requested an interview with General Lee in early March, and 
sold the Commanding General on the idea of erecting a 
battery on the James River below Richmond. Already 
conscious of the long-term weakness of Norfolk, Lee quickly 
agreed, sending Major Alfred Rives and Lieutenant Charles T.
22j0hn Rodgers to L. M. Goldsborough, May 12, 1862, in 
NOR, VII: p. 345.
23Quoted in William Izard Clopton, "New Light on the 
Great Drewry's Bluff Fight," Southern Historical Society 
Papers, Vol. XXXIV (1906): p. 83; see also A. H. Drewry,
"Drewry's Bluff Fight," Southern Historical Society Papers, 
Vol. XXIX (1901): pp. 284-285.
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Mason of the Engineer Bureau down the river with Drewry to 
select a suitable location. The three men settled on the 
bluffs on Drewry's own farm, which bore his family name.
The James River narrowed enough there to be obstructed, and 
the cliffs were high enough to allow for plunging fire into 
enemy vessels below. The Southside Artillery marched to its 
new post on March 17.24
Improving Drewry's Bluff, like the rest of the defenses 
of Richmond, turned out be a low priority for Confederate 
authorities. The Tredegar Iron Works provided the iron 
bolts and shoes for the pilings to reduce the channel in the 
river, but only as a secondary effort.25 Lee did not get 
around to requesting cannon for the battery until early 
A p r i l . 26 Drewry could requisition neither wagons and teams, 
nor supplementary labor; he quickly concluded that the 
government had no real interest in his project and set his 
men to building cabins for themselves instead of digging 
firing positions. There was a brief flicker of activity in 
mid-April when three guns, an additional company of artil­
lery, and the commander of the 2nd Virginia Artillery, 
Colonel Robert Tansill, all showed up at about the same 
time. But Tansill and the extra company were soon ordered
24ibid.
25Dew, Ironmaker, p. 182.
26Robert E. Lee to Josiah Gorgas, April 4, 1862, in OR, 
XI (part 3): p. 421.
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away to Fredericksburg, and Drewry recalled that after that 
"the work went on pretty much after the order of a private 
enterprise until a short while before Norfolk was evacuated.
"27
By the time Johnston began to speak of withdrawing from 
Yorktown, Lee and Naval Secretary Mallory began to take 
renewed interest in the project. Starting in late April, 
one or both would usually ride out to the bluffs to check 
the progress of the w o r k . 28 But it was not until early May 
and the urgency caused by Johnston's withdrawal from 
Yorktown that Drewry's Bluff was granted any sort of 
priority. It was almost too late.
On May 2, Lee ordered a company of "sappers and miners" 
to augment Drewry's company.29 The day that the Federal 
gunboats reduced Fort Huger, May 8, Secretary Mallory 
ordered Commander Farrand to take a detail of beached seamen 
to the position and take command of the works.3 0 The next 
day he ordered the crews of the James River Squadron to the
27clopton, "New Light," pp. 83-84.
28joseph T. Durkin, Stephen R. Mallory, Confederate 
Naval Chief (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina
Press, 1954), p. 194; Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, 
April 30, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 10, 
1862, Walter H. Taylor to Joseph E. Johnston, May 15, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 476, 505, 518.
29Robert E. Lee to Samuel Cooper, May 2, 1862, in LR- 
AIGO, M-474, Reel 30.
30stephen R. Mallory to Ebenezer Farrand, May 8, 1862, 
in NOR, Series 2, I: pp. 635-636.
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bluff to emplace cannon from the Jamestown and the Patrick 
Henry.31 On May 11, as Commander Rodgers' crew struggled to 
complete the repairs on the Galena and free her from the Hog 
Island sandbar, Lee ordered six more companies of heavy 
artillery to Chaffin's Bluff, just across the river from the 
original position, to begin digging in a new battery.32 i>he 
following morning, Mallory dispatched Lieutenant Catesby ap 
R. Jones and the crew of the scuttled Virginia (minus only 
engineering officers) to the same location, followed a day 
or two later by Captain John D. Simms and two companies of 
Confederate Marines.33 a company of the Washington (Louisi­
ana) Artillery was also transferred to Chaffin's Bluff on 
May 13.34 While Lee and Davis conferred with Johnston on 
May 14, Secretary Randolph ordered Huger--now in Petersburg 
--to send Brigadier-General William A. Mahone's Virginia 
Brigade to the bluffs to support the artillery, in case 
transports carrying infantry followed the Yankee gunboats.35
By May 15, nearly 1,800 sailors and soldiers gathered 
at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs, and General Mahone was
31scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy, p. 711.
32These six companies constituted 668 men. W. H. Fry 
to Samuel Cooper, May 14, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 18.
33stephen R. Mallory to Catesby ap R. Jones, May 12,
1862, in NOR, VII: p. 799; Scharf, History of the Confeder­
ate States Navy, p. 717.
34Robert E. Lee to J. B. Walton, May 13, 1862, in OR,
LI (part 2): p . 555.
35scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy, p. 717.
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marching up with nearly 4,000 more.36 Twelve guns had been 
placed in hastily dug embrasures; the heaviest were a 10- 
inch Columbiad and a 9-inch Dahlgren R i f l e . 37 After the 
Patrick Henry and the smaller gunboats had passed upriver, 
the Jamestown was sunk in the channel to completely close it 
to anything but boats with the lightest of drafts.38
In material terms there were enough men and guns and 
obstructions at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs to keep 
Rodgers' squadron from threatening Richmond. But there was 
no one really in command. Farrand had been superseded by 
Sidney Smith Lee, who only arrived on the morning of May 
15.39 gut Mahone was also coming to take command, while
36orewry's company, the company of sappers and miners, 
and the company from the Washington Artillery probably 
numbered something less than 300 men. The six companies of 
heavy artillery added 668 more (see note 32 above), and the 
muster rolls of the Virginia, the Patrick Henry and the 
Jamestown numbered over 700 men, to which should be added at 
least another 150 men for the two companies of marines and 
Farrand's original work party. For the muster rolls of the 
three vessels, see NOR, Series 2, I: pp. 289-290, 299-301,
308-311; for the closest estimate of Mahone's Brigade, see 
"Abstract from return of the Department of Norfolk, Maj.
Gen. Benjamin Huger, commanding, for January, 1862," in OR, 
IX: p. 38.
37scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy, p. 
711; Clopton, "New Light," p. 88; Drewry, "Drewry's Bluff 
Fight," pp. 285-286.
38Midshipman D. M. Lee, brother of Fitzhugh Lee and 
nephew of Robert E. Lee, was one of the crewmen of the 
Jamestown who bored the holes in her hull to sink her. See 
Robert Wright, "Sinking of the Jamestown," Southern Histori­
cal Society Papers, Vol. XXIX (1901): pp. 372.
39scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy, p.
717.
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Captain Drewry and the other army officers studiously 
ignored Commander Tucker, who had taken effective control of 
the navy work parties. It was almost as if the army and 
navy were preparing to fight two separate battles.
General Johnston only discovered the true nature of the 
confusion at Drewry's Bluff on May 15, when Federal iron­
clads had already tested the strength of the position. On 
May 13, from his headquarters near Baltimore Crossroads, he 
sent three staff officers to the Richmond area. Major A. H. 
Cole went to evaluate the logistical situation near the 
capital; Major Walter H. Stevens, an engineering officer, 
and Major Jasper Whiting, Smith's Assistant Adjutant- 
General, made the trip to examine the terrain of the upper 
Chickahominy and the preparations made to defend Drewry's 
Bluff. The responses from Stevens and Whiting were immedi­
ate and depressing: "There is nothing," reported Stevens on
May 14, "to prevent their [the Federals'] landing at City 
Point or above, up to Drewry's Bluff, in force." From 
Drewry's Bluff itself, Major Whiting wrote on the same day: 
"Stevens and I have done all we could to stir up the 
imbeciles. It is perfectly discouraging to see how abso­
lutely nothing has been done." He followed this the next 
morning with an even more gloomy assessment:
It won't do to trust these people in any way.
We can't get anything done. . . .  If not too 
late, a good brigade under an energetic officer 
might perhaps save the city. A few more vessels 
sunk; a gun or two well placed, with bomb-proofs; 
some sharpshooters intelligently located— all with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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strong field artillery and infantry supports, and 
some one in charge--might give us, or somebody 
else, time to do something above. Everything now 
is at odds and ends; everybody frightened; and 
everybody looking out for his own affairs. I have 
never been so much ashamed of our people before.
[emphasis in original]40
By the time Johnston read this report, the artillerymen 
at Drewry's Bluff had fought their first disjointed action. 
While President Davis, General Lee, and his brother, Captain 
Lee, all watched, the Galena, now reinforced by both the 
Monitor and the Naugatuck, steamed toward the obstructions 
in the river. Commander Rodgers, believing from past 
experience that his ironclads were invulnerable to Confeder­
ate fire, planned to remove the pilings in the river and 
then bypass the batteries.41
No one on the Confederate side coordinated the defense. 
Two separate parties of sharpshooters, one under Marine 
Captain Simms, the other led by Lt. John Taylor Wood of the 
Virginia, harassed Rodgers' working parties from the banks 
of the James, apparently without any reference to each 
other.42 The army batteries fought under Captain Drewry's 
command; the navy guns were directed by Commander Farrand, 
Commander Tucker, and Lt. Jones. Nobody ordered any 
particular concentration of fire. Instead, the cannoneers
40a 11 quoted in Smith, Confederate War Papers, pp. 48-49.
41john Rodgers to L. M. Goldsborough, May 16, 1862, in 
NOR, VII: pp. 357-358.
42gcharf, History of the Confederate States Navy, pp. 
716-717.
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simply blazed away at whatever targets they could hit.43
The battle opened at 7:45 A. M. on May 15 and lasted 
just over three hours. The Monitor approached within 400 
yards of the obstructions in the river, where it sat despite 
the fire of the batteries on the bluffs, prevented by the 
sharpshooters from sending out working parties. The 
Naugatuck, shrugging off the rebel shells, retired only 
after the 100-pounder in its bow burst. Standing 600 yards 
out from the bluffs, however, the Galena finally showed 
that, under the right conditions, land batteries could stand 
against ironclads. Plunging fire from the Columbiad and the 
Dahlgren Rifle struck her forty-three times. Contrary to 
earlier opinion, Rodgers admitted the next day, the Galena 
"is not shot-proof; balls came through, and many men were 
killed with fragments of her own iron." At 11:05 A. M., 
Rodgers signaled his vessels to retreat. Yet he had not 
been convinced that the fortifications could not be taken; 
with infantry support to clear the banks of the river, he 
still thought that his ironclads could eventually steam past 
them to the Confederate capital. At any rate, he wrote to 
Admiral Goldsborough, "on James River an army can be landed 
within 10 miles of Richmond on either b a n k . " 4 4
43ibid.; Clopton, "New Light," pp. 88-89; Drewry, 
"Drewry's Bluff Fight," pp. 285-286.
44john Rodgers to L. M. Goldsborough, May 16, 1862, L. 
H. Newman to John Rodgers, May 16, 1862, Ebenezer Farrand to 
Stephen R. Mallory, May 15, 1862, in NOR, VII: pp. 357-358,
359-360, 369-370.
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That was the thought that had haunted Johnston since 
late April, and had kept reappearing in his correspondence 
over the past two weeks.45 Now it seemed that his worst 
fear was to be realized. Major Stevens reported on May 14 
that "the danger is on the south side of James River."46 
Unaware that Randolph had done so, Johnston immediately 
"wrote to General Huger . . . desiring him to send a body of 
good riflemen . . .  to shoot the crews of the enemy's 
gunboats near the 'obstruction' in James River. . . . "  He 
also urged Lee to have any deployable forces in the Depart­
ment of Henrico "placed near the battery. . . ."47 jqo 
sooner than he had posted those letters, Johnston began 
receiving even more disturbing news from Drewry's Bluff. 
First came the warning from Major Whiting, and then, from 
Walter Taylor, the first notice of the battle. "The report 
given me by Captain Zimmer, who is connected with the 
Ordnance Department, and who was present," Taylor wrote, "is 
to the effect that the fire of the enemy was very bad.
. . ."48 Lee sent him a more restrained report later in the
45joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, 
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862, Joseph E. 
Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 9, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): 
pp. 473, 499-500, 503-504.
46Quoted in Smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 48.
47joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 15, 1862, in 
Beverly Randolph Wellford papers, Virginia Historical 
Society, Richmond, Virginia.
48walter Taylor to Joseph E. Johnston, May 15, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 518.
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day, which emphasized that "only the two iron boats engaged. 
No one exposed and no chance for sharpshooters. No signs of 
landing."49 But Lee admitted to Huger that he expected 
McClellan to "avail himself of the river as far up as 
possible. He may come beyond City Point. . . ."50
This settled the matter for Johnston; he could not 
afford to wait north of the Chickahominy while the Federals 
possessed the ability to land in his rear and approach 
Richmond before he could react, especially when Lee informed 
him that "there is no force in this city" which could be 
rushed to oppose a landing.51 He called in Smith and 
Longstreet. The failure of the government, he told them, to 
finish the fortifications at Drewry's Bluff invalidated the 
premise under which they had been deployed to give battle 
between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy; the army could 
not afford to become engaged with a superior force without 
secure flanks. Johnston ordered a withdrawal behind the 
river: Longstreet would move his own division to Drewry's
Bluff and take over responsibility for the defense there, 
while Smith assumed responsibility for defending the
49Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 15, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 519.
S O R o b e r t  E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, May 16, 1862, in OR, 
XI (part 3) : p. 520 .
5lRobert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 16, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 520.
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crossings of the upper Chickahominy.52
Johnston promptly advised Lee of his apprehensions, his 
intention to move, and his general plan of action. He 
believed that McClellan would try to shift his base from the 
York to the James, which would require the Federal commander 
to order his troops across the Chickahominy. If so, there 
would come a moment of vulnerability for the larger Yankee 
army, when it would be split in two sections by the river, 
and the smaller Confederate army might engage one portion of 
it with parity or numerical superiority if it could maneuver
swiftly enough.53
Both Lee and Davis accepted this strategy as valid, 
despite contentions to the contrary made by the President 
much later. Lee admitted that work at Drewry's Bluff was 
"progressing, but not satisfactorily." The heavy guns were 
"well posted, but not as perfectly protected as designed, 
for want of time." He hoped that Johnston, when he retired
52james Longstreet to D. H. Hill, May 16, 1862, in OR, 
XI (part 3): pp. 521-522; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomat­
tox, pp. 81-82; Smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 49.
53johnston's second May 15 letter has not been found, 
but its substance can easily be inferred from Robert E. Lee 
to Joseph E. Johnston, May 16, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph 
E. Johnston, May 17, 1862, and Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. 
Johnston, May 17, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 521, 523-
524. Lee's remark that "I have supposed that if your army 
took a position so near this city its right would rest in 
that vicinity [Drewry's Bluff]," implies that Johnston had 
advised him of the position he intended to take near 
Richmond. Lee's second letter agrees with Johnston that 
McClellan would probably try to cross the Chickahominy, and 
the Davis letter reiterates the same point.
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nearer Richmond, would rest the flank of his army there on 
the James to assist with the labor and protect the batter­
ies. 54 "it is fair for us to conclude," Lee continued in 
another letter, "that his operations in front of Yorktown 
will be re-enacted in front of the obstructions on James 
River, unless you can prevent it." As for Johnston's plan 
to strike McClellan when the Army of the Potomac moved . 
toward the James, Lee wrote: "Should his course to James
River be below the mouth of the Chickahominy this will be 
difficult, but should his march be across the Chickahominy 
his passage between that river and the James may furnish you 
the opportunity."^
Davis agreed with his generals. On May 17, he sent an 
aide, Colonel G. W. C. Lee, to report to Johnston on the 
state of the defenses at Drewry's B l u f f . ^ 6  In the letter 
that Colonel Lee hand-carried, the President told the
^Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 16, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 521.
55Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 523.
56Davis implied in his memoirs that he had sent Lee 
primarily to confer upon strategy, rather than as a courier 
instructed to present and receive information. This 
interpretation strains the wording in Davis's letter to the 
breaking point. He also stated that Johnston did not ever 
inform either Colonel Lee or himself as to an intention to 
cross the Chickahominy. Not only, however, had Johnston 
already informed Lee of the impending move, he had already 
begun it when Colonel Lee arrived, and in fact received 
Davis's aide on the near bank of the river. See Davis, Rise 
and Fall, II: p. 103; Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines,"
p. 207; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 523-524.
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General that if McClellan continued to advance with York 
River as his base, then meeting the Federals between the 
Pamunkey and the Chickahominy was still a good plan. "But 
if, as reported here, he should change direction, and, 
leaving his boats on the Pamunkey, would cross the Peninsula 
to join those [boats] on the James River, the opportunity 
desired by you to meet him on the land will then be afford­
ed." Like Lee, Davis suspected that the cautious "Little 
Napoleon" would sidestep down the east bank of the river 
until he came into contact with the Federal fleet on the 
James: "This diminishes the space within which his march
will be exposed to your attack, unless he should cross the 
Chickahominy, which we can hardly hope."57 As late as May 
17, the views of Johnston, Lee, and Davis were still in 
harmony with each other.
Events in the Shenandoah Valley had not ceased while 
Yankee ironclads pounded the Rebel batteries at Drewry's 
Bluff. Following his victory at McDowell, Jackson headed 
back for the Valley to unite with Ewell and attack Banks--a 
project endorsed by both Johnston and Lee. But Banks had 
split his forces in such a way as to confound the orders 
sent by the two Confederate generals. One division of 7,000 
men, under Brigadier-General James Shields, was marching out 
of the Valley to reinforce General McDowell at Fredericks-
S ^ J e f f e r s o n  Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 523-524.
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burg. The remainder of Banks' army had retreated to 
Strasburg--whether to fortify a position or to transfer 
troops by the Manassas Gap Railroad was not certain. Lee, 
who believed that Banks' ultimate objective was indeed to 
leave the Valley, still favored an attack on him by Jackson 
and Ewell. "Whatever movement you make against Banks do it 
speedily, and if successful drive him back toward the 
Potomac, and create the impression, as far as practicable, 
that you design threatening that line," Lee instructed 
Jackson. But he also reminded "Stonewall" "not, in any 
demonstration you may make in that direction, [to] lose 
sight of the fact that it may become necessary for you to 
come to the support of General Johnston, and hold yourself 
in readiness to do so if required."58
Johnston was far less certain that the bulk of Banks' 
forces were intended to quit the Valley. To retreat to 
Strasburg, entrench, and essentially take himself out of the 
war would not, based on previous performance, be out of 
character for the political general from Massachusetts. "If 
Banks is fortifying near Strasburg the attack would be too 
hazardous," Johnston advised Ewell on May 17. "In such an 
event we must leave him in his works." Instead, Johnston 
proposed that Jackson and Ewell unite and strike Shields' 
detached division as it marched toward Fredericksburg, then
^Robert E. Lee to Thomas J. Jackson, May 16, 1862, in 
OR, XII (part 3): pp. 892-893.
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for Ewell "to move on, while General Jackson should keep 
Banks away from McDowell." The letter concluded with 
several sentences that have remained the source of contro­
versy for well over a century:
We want troops here; none, therefore, must keep away, 
unless employing a greatly superior force of the enemy. 
In your march communicate with Brigadier-General 
Anderson, near Fredericksburg; he may require your 
assistance. My general idea is to gather here all the 
troops who do not keep away from McClellan's greatly 
superior forces. General Branch is ordered to Hanover 
Court-House. . . . After reading this send it to 
General Jackson, for whom it is intended as well as for 
yourself.59
Douglas Southall Freeman contended that "Johnston could 
hardly have given more dangerous orders," which sprang from 
his "conservatism and his concern for his own army in front
of Richmond. . . . "  He portrayed Lee, on the other hand, as
following a natural "inclination . . .  to take the lesser 
risks for the sake of the greater gain that would follow a 
defeat of B a n k s . " 6 0  Clifford Dowdey quoted only the portion 
of Johnston's letter that said "we want troops here; none, 
therefore, must be kept away unless employing a greatly 
superior force of the enemy," and asserted that Johnston had 
posted the order, "knowing nothing of the conditions in the 
Valley. . . . "  Later, Dowdey condemned Johnston for issuing 
"sporadic orders" which "had been contradictory, sometimes 
discretionary and sometimes arbitrary, with a day-to-day
59joseph E. Johnston to Richard S. Ewell, May 17, 1862,
in OR, XII (part 3): pp. 896-897.
^Freeman, R. E. Lee, II: pp. 55-56.
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type of thinking that could not direct subordinates with a 
singleness of purpose."61 Also citing only a portion of 
Johnston's orders, Robert G. Tanner accused Johnston of 
trying to enforce upon Jackson "his fundamental strategic 
preference for massing strength by giving up territory and 
fighting only when there was nowhere else to retreat and no 
other friendly forces to muster." His letter, opined 
Tanner, "abandoned everything the Valley Army had striven 
for since the evacuation of Winchester."62
These criticisms share the central assumption that 
Johnston preferred a simplistic strategy of concentration of 
forces at Richmond, and that he was unable to relate 
operations elsewhere to those of his own army. Such a case 
could be made if Johnston were shown to have advocated a 
purely passive course in the Valley and central Virginia, 
and to have subordinated all other designs to the strength­
ening of his own army. Yet this was far from true.
Johnston's suggestion of a combined attack by Jackson 
and Ewell on Shields' division had been overlooked as a 
viable strategic option by his contemporaries and historians 
as well, because the attack upon Banks and Jackson's raid 
down the Valley turned out to be such signal successes (see 
Map No. 4). Yet an attack on the lone Federal division had 
much to recommend it. Jackson and Ewell would have fought
61-Dowdey, The Seven Days, pp. 74-75.
^Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley, p. 199.
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at favorable odds against an enemy caught on the march. 
Success would not only have prevented either Shields or 
Banks from reinforcing McDowell, but would have placed the 
Army of the Valley roughly at Thoroughfare Gap, threatening 
at once Banks' rear, McDowell's rear, and Washington.63 it 
was a position that would have allowed as aggressive a 
commander as Jackson to create fully as much panic north of 
the Potomac as his actual dash toward Harper's Ferry. Even 
had Johnston chosen, upon a defeat of Shields, to pursue the 
most conservative of choices--to return Jackson to the 
Valley, where he would now meet Banks with relatively even 
numbers, while Ewell cooperated with Anderson against 
McDowell— the victory would have borne substantial strategic 
fruit. McDowell, with 30,000 men and orders that included 
the protection of the capital, would have faced an uncom­
fortable situation at best. To his front would have been 
Anderson's 12,000 men, with 4,000 more under Branch in easy 
supporting distance at Hanover Court House. In his rear, 
between his main body and the capital, would have been Ewell 
with 6,000-8,000 troops. At the very least, Johnston's 
proposed maneuver would have prevented him from marching 
south and blithely brushing past Anderson with better than
63vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas of 
American Wars (New York: Praeger, 1959), I: map 51.
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two-to-one o d d s . 64
But Johnston, as well as Lee and Jackson, could read a 
map, and had plenty of reasons to realize that communication 
lags could make what appeared to be a good plan in Richmond 
one that was seriously out-of-date in Staunton. He had, 
after all, been the one who originally ordered Jackson and 
Ewell to work together and decide tactical questions on 
their own. So the very next day, May 18, before he could 
possibly have received the famous protest from Jackson which 
begged to be allowed to attack Banks, Johnston dispatched 
two more letters to the Valley District. In the first, 
Johnston reiterated that the mission of Jackson's army was 
to keep Banks' forces from uniting with McDowell. If he was 
too late to successfully attack Banks, then he must pursue 
the course that led east of the Valley. But Johnston 
emphasized that he had full confidence in Jackson and Ewell 
themselves to choose whichever option held greater promise; 
he would not attempt to dictate a rigid course of action 
from the suburbs of Richmond. In the second letter, the 
army commander was even more explicit: "The whole question
is, whether or not General Jackson and yourself are too late 
to attack Banks. If so the march eastward should be made.
64por evidence that such a plan can be inferred from 
existing documents, see Joseph R. Anderson to Richard S. 
Ewell, May 17, 1862, in which Anderson, who was now in 
contact with Johnston, suggests something very similar, in 
OR, XII (part 3): p. 896.
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If not (supposing your strength sufficient) then attack."65 
Did Johnston, like Lee, anticipate Jackson following up the 
attack with an exploitation toward the Potomac? On May 18 
it is difficult to say, for though he had already advocated 
threatening that line in April (albeit in quite different 
terms), Johnston did not actually authorize Jackson to 
strike north rather than east.66 But at least by May 27 
there was no question in Johnston's mind that Jackson should 
continue to pursue the most aggressive course possible: "If
you can threaten Baltimore and Washington, do so. It may 
produce an important diversion. . . . Your movements 
depend, of course, upon the strength remaining in your 
neighborhood. Upon that depends the practicability of your 
advancing to the Potomac and crossing it. I know of no 
hostile force to prevent either."67 jf Johnston and Lee 
sometimes differed on the exact operations to be pursued in 
the Valley and central Virginia, they never disagreed on the 
methods— striking exposed Federal forces as opportunity
65Quoted in Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 371n.
66The suggestion for crossing the Potomac came in 
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 30, 1862, in OR, 
XI (part 3): p. 477. There Johnston suggested that the
Confederates should "take the offensive, collect all the 
troops we have in the East and cross the Potomac with them.
. . .” Admittedly, the letter was in a much different
context than the Valley campaign, but it does suggest that 
Johnston had begun to think about the advantages of dis­
tracting the enemy with a march north.
67joseph E. Johnston to Thomas J. Jackson, May 27,
1862, in Douglas, Stonewal1, p. 72.
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allowed— or the objective. In point of fact, when Johnston 
wrote "we want troops here; none, therefore, must keep away, 
unless employing a greatly superior force of the enemy," he 
captured in a single sentence the essence of both men's 
strategy in May, 1862.
Federal operations over the next several days sustained 
the strategic insights of Johnston and Lee. McClellan said 
later that after Drewry's Bluff "the question now arose as 
to the line of operations to be followed: that of the James
on one hand, and, on the other, the line from White House as 
a base, crossing the upper Chickahominy." He personally 
preferred the James, because he thought it would give him an 
invulnerable supply line and because advancing on Richmond 
would be easier from the south. But the condition under 
which the Federal government was willing to reinforce him 
with McDowell's corps was that McDowell would join the Army 
of the Potomac by marching rather than by boat. Thus, 
reasoned President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton, 
McDowell could still continue to safeguard Washington, by 
pushing Anderson before him. McClellan was ordered to 
supply McDowell's corps from White House and to keep one 
wing extended north of the Chickahominy to meet him.68 
Unwisely, the Federal commander attempted simultaneously to 
prepare to change his base to the James and spread his right
68ceorge B. McClellan, "The Peninsular Campaign," B&L, 
II: pp. 173-174.
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flank north to receive McDowell. He ordered the first 
troops across Bottom's Bridge on May 20, and within five 
days had divided his army into two unequal parts, precisely 
as the Confederates had wished but hardly dared to hope.
The III and IV Corps were south of the Chickahominy, while 
the II, V, and, VI Corps remained on the north b a n k . 69
But McClellan still had not crossed the Chickahominy on 
May 18 or 19 when Jefferson Davis rode again to Johnston's 
headquarters, this time without General Lee. He was, as 
usual, interested in knowing exactly what course Johnston 
intended to pursue, and just how close he intended to bring 
his troops to Richmond.70 Johnston explained that he had 
pulled his lines in very close to the city in order to 
assure a good water supply, ease of provision, and to put 
his troops into place to work on improving the battery at
69"McClellan's Report (1)," in OR, XI (part 1): pp.
25-26; Swinton, Campaigns, p. 129.
70pavis's later contention, that he was surprised to 
find the army on the south bank of the Chickahominy and that 
the topic of why Johnston had crossed the river dominated 
the conversation, was even dismissed by Freeman, who 
charitably credited the President with confusing his dates. 
The only support for that account came from the gossipy and 
undependable memoirs of Postmaster-General John Reagan, who 
claimed to have accompanied the President that day, and to 
have seen a "look of surprise" sweep over his face, reveal­
ing "a trace of pain." The actual topics of discussion can 
be inferred from Reagan, however, when read in conjunction 
with later accounts by Johnston and Robert E. Lee to Joseph 
E. Johnston, May 18, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 526. See
Davis, Rise and Fall, II: pp. 103-104; Freeman, Lee's
Lieutenants, I: p. 210n; John H. Reagan, Memoirs, with
Special Reference to Secession and the Civil War (New York: 
n. p., 1906), pp. 138-139; Johnston, "Manassas to Seven 
Pines," p . 208.
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Drewry's Bluff and the Richmond defenses.71 He could not, 
however, have satisfied the President's curiosity about 
forthcoming operations, since McClellan had not yet revealed 
whether he would cross the Chickahominy.
But by May 21 there was no question that the Federal 
commander intended to accept the bait. Word of the Yankees 
south of the river reached Richmond, and almost immediately 
Davis had Lee write Johnston for details: "The President
desires to know the number of troops around Richmond, how 
they are posted, and the organization of tfne "divisions and 
brigades; also the programme of operations which you 
propose." Acknowledging that "your plan of operations, 
dependent upon circumstances perhaps yet to be developed, 
may not be so easily explained, nor may it be prudent to 
commit it to paper," Lee suggested that Johnston visit 
Richmond and communicate it in p e r s o n . 72 Johnston immedi­
ately replied with a memorandum showing the approximate 
strength of each of his brigades, and the next day posted 
one letter and had another hand-carried to Lee by Major 
Whiting. Unfortunately, neither of these communications 
seems to have survived. It is not possible to tell by Lee's 
responses whether or not Johnston addressed any questions of
71johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," B&L, II: p.
208; Reagan, Memoirs, p. 139; Longstreet, Manassas to 
Appomattox, p. 82; Lee, Pendleton, p. 184.
^Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 21, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 530.
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strategy.73
His concern for the safety of the capital, however, did
not allow Davis time to sit and wait for a reply. On the
morning of May 22, before Johnston's answers— if indeed his
letters answered Lee's inquiries--could have reached him,
Davis again rode out to the army at Mechanicsville, this
time with Lee alongside. He found neither Johnston nor a
situation calculated to instill in him confidence in his
army commander: "I saw General Stuart and General Cobb," he
wrote Johnston on his return,
but as neither of them communicated to me any plan 
of operations, or appeared to know what troops 
were in front as we approached, I suppose neither 
of them could have been commanding in chief at 
that locality. My conclusion was, that if, as 
reported to be probable, General Franklin, with a 
division, was in that vicinity, he might easily 
have advanced over the turnpike toward if not to 
Richmond.
He was upset enough with this appearance to order Lee back 
to the army on May 23, for a more thorough discussion of 
Johnston's p l a n s . 74
By chance, Davis had ridden into the consequences of a
73Johnston himself admitted that the return was 
approximate--to the low side--and a superficial examination 
reveals that the numbers must have been taken directly from 
his return of effectives on April 30, before the Battle of 
Williamsburg; see "Strength of the several brigades of the 
Army of Northern Virginia near Richmond, as shown by General 
Johnston's memorandum of May 21, 1862." That Johnston wrote 
twice to Lee on May 22 can be determined from Robert E. Lee 
to Joseph E. Johnston, May 22, 1862 (two letters), in OR, XI 
(part 3): pp. 530-534.
74jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 23, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 536.
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dispute between Major-Generals Smith and Magruder. Magru­
der, who had rejoined the army after a brief illness, was 
irritated by the arrangement that subordinated his troops-- 
temporarily, he contended--to Smith. As a result, every 
time Smith ordered regiments here or there, Magruder 
cooperated grudgingly, if at all. On May 22 and 23, their 
relationship had deteriorated to the point that, when Smith 
ordered two regiments from McLaws' Brigade to hold Mechan- 
icsville, Magruder refused and insisted on using two 
regiments from Brigadier-General D. R. Jones" Brigade. 
Magruder 's motivation seems to have come from a desire to be 
contentious, rather than from any sound military reason.
The two Major-Generals also issued a series of conflicting 
orders to the cavalry commanders in the area— not just 
Stuart, but also Colonels Fitzhugh Lee and Beverly H. 
Robertson. The result was confusion around Mechanicsville 
at the most inopportune of moments. Not only were the 
Yankees threatening to advance with at least a division, but 
Davis was present to witness a part of the army at loose 
e n d s . 75 Johnston settled the internal dispute within a few 
days, but Davis's visit had definitely hurt his credibility
75"Report of Col. Beverly H. Robertson, Fourth Virginia 
Cavalry," May 24, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 663-664;
John B. Magruder to Thomas Rhett, May 23, 1862, John B. 
Magruder to Samuel W. Melton, May 23, 1862 (two letters), in 
OR, XI (part 3): pp. 537-539.
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with the Chief Executive.76
Possibly sensitive to the President's criticism, 
Johnston was a good deal more communicative than usual when 
Lee arrived at his headquarters on May 23. He definitely 
intended to strike one of the wings of the Army of the 
Potomac, but had not yet decided which. Johnston himself 
seems to have consistently favored attacking south of the 
river, in the vicinity of Seven Pines.77 But three consid­
erations made him lean on May 23 toward hitting the Federals 
on the north bank, in the vicinity of Beaver Dam Creek and 
Mechanicsville. First and foremost was the necessity for 
keeping McClellan and McDowell separated; an attack at Seven 
Pines might only have the effect of driving them together. 
Also in favor of a northern attack was the fact that the 
ground had already been thoroughly reconnoitered by Majors 
Stevens and Whiting a week earlier.78 Finally, Longstreet, 
in whose tactical judgment Johnston was inclined to have 
greater and greater confidence, had conducted a "careful 
study of the works and armaments at Drury's [sic] Bluff,"
76Johnston resolved the situation by an almost cosmetic 
expedient, "elevating" Magruder on May 28 to command of the 
"Centre" wing of the army, which nominally made him the 
equal of Smith and Longstreet. But in fact Magruder still 
only commanded six brigades, divided formally into two 
"divisions," while each of the other wing commanders 
controlled eleven or twelve brigades. See Smith, The Battle 
of Seven Pines, p. 8.
77johnston, Narrative, p. 130; Smith, The Battle of 
Seven Pines, p. 12.
78smith, Confederate War Papers, pp. 48-49.
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and "ventured the suggestion that we recross the Chickahom­
iny at Mechanicsville and stand behind Beaver Dam Creek.
. . ."79 Johnston planned to wait a few more days, to find 
out just how much distance McClellan would voluntarily put 
between the sundered halves of his army, but he knew that he 
could not afford to delay too long. He told Lee that he 
intended to strike somewhere— probably but not definitely 
north of the river— by May 29.^0
Lee evidently made two responses to Johnston's plan. 
First, he reiterated his suggestion that Johnston visit 
Richmond and communicate his strategy to the President 
directly. This Johnston did on May 24.81 in addition, Lee 
gave Johnston the welcome news that he would try, between 
then and the time of Johnston's attack, to reinforce the 
army with whatever troops could be scraped up in the 
Richmond area. Specifically, there were at least seven 
batteries of field artillery around the capital, which could
79Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 82.
80i>hat Johnston planned to attack by May 2 9 and that he 
favored an assault north of the river can be determined from 
Davis's memoirs, although, as G. W. Smith later pointed out, 
Davis apparently confused the elements of several different 
plans. Far more likely is that Johnston was still waiting 
for the Federals to make themselves more vulnerable in one 
locale or the other. See Davis, Rise and Fall, II: pp.
120-121; Smith, The Battle of Seven Pines, pp. 10-11.
81-Freeman, apparently misreading Davis's memoirs and 
letter to Johnston on May 23, incorrectly places this visit 
by Lee on May 26. See Joseph E. Johnston to James Long­
street, May 24, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 541-542; see
also Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 213.
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be used to augment Pendleton's Artillery Reserve.82 The 4th 
Virginia Heavy Artillery Regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Nicholas C. Harris's heavy artillery battalion where both 
assigned as infantry to Johnston's a r m y . 83 Likewise, 
Johnston was to receive Brigadier-General Henry A. Wise's 
brigade, still in the process of rebuilding from its defeat 
at Roanoke Island. Aside from a complete regiment of 
cavalry, Wise's brigade had roughly the strength of two 
infantry regiments.84 But most significantly, Lee promised 
Johnston that he would try to stretch troops from Holmes's 
Department of North Carolina to cover Petersburg, releasing 
the bulk of Huger's Division for the o f f e n s i v e . 85
The strategic situation began to change more and more 
rapidly after McClellan crossed the Chickahominy. On May 
23, Jackson had initiated his attack on Banks by gobbling up 
a detached regiment at Front Royal, and swung around the 
Federal commander's left flank. By May 25, Banks was in 
full flight and Jackson's brigades entered Winchester; 
within four days they had reached Harper's Ferry and the
82There may have been as many as nine— the statements 
of A. L. Long and Pendleton disagree. See A. L. Long to 
John H. Winder, May 23, 1862, in OR, XI, (part 3): p. 539;
Lee, Pendleton, p. 185.
83special Orders No. 118, Adjutant and Inspector- 
General 's Office, May 23, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 540.
8^Henry A. Wise to D. H. Hill, May 24, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 3): p . 542.
85Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 27, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 552.
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banks of the Potomac.86 it was not, however, the defeat of 
Banks that most affected events around Richmond. Jackson's 
raid had a much more profound consequence: at 5:00 P. M. on
May 24, in a vain attempt to cut off the Confederate 
divisions in the lower Valley, President Lincoln ordered 
McDowell's corps to change front. Instead of marching south 
to link up with the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln instructed 
McDowell to head west in pursuit of Jackson. "At that 
moment," observed Robert G. Tanner, "the Valley Army won its
Valley Campaign."87
This shift was not immediately evident in Richmond, 
because all eyes were rooted firmly on McClellan. The same 
day that Lincoln authorized the diversion of McDowell, 
Brigadier-General Erasmus Keyes advanced units of his IV 
Corps into the village of Seven Pines, and McClellan's 
cavalry finally pushed into Mechanicsville.88 Other Federal 
horsemen probed the swampland between Bottom's Bridge and 
the James on May 25 and 26, and Branch's position at Hanover 
Court House on May 26.89
. ^ D o u g l a s ,  stonewal 1, pp. 58-74.
S^Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley, p. 239.
88"Report of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army 
commanding Fourth Corps, of operations May 24," May 24,
1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 668-669; Johnston, Narra­
tive , p. 130.
89"Report of Lieut. Frank C. Davis, Third Pennsylvania 
Cavalry," May 26, 1862, "Report of Lieut. Col. William N. 
Grier, First U. S. Cavalry," May 26, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1): pp. 675-677.
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Johnston had begun pulling Anderson and Branch closer 
to the Chickahominy as early as May 23. Anderson sent the 
45th Georgia to Ashland Station on May 23, and issued four 
days' rations to the rest of his troops.90 Johnston 
instructed Branch the same day to reconnoiter positions 
nearer to the Chickahominy (and the main body of the army), 
and advised him that "in a few days General J. R. Anderson 
will probably be near y o u . "9 1  The following morning, 
Anderson issued marching orders to his regiments, culminat­
ing in the exhortation: "This Army after having waited long
for an opportunity to meet the enemy who has sheltered 
himself behind the town of Fredericksburg and the river, now 
moves in pursuance of orders from higher authority to unite 
in the great battle on the issue of which depends the fate 
of the capital of our Country."92 Johnston told Branch to 
expect Anderson by May 27.9 3
Anderson was late, almost disastrously so for Branch. 
Brigadier-General Fitz John Porter's V Corps, supported by 
Brigadier-General William H. Emory's Cavalry Reserve— better
90special Orders No. 26, Army of the Rappahannock, May
23, 1862, Joseph R. Anderson Order Book, Virginia Historical 
Society.
91joseph E. Johnston to L. O'Brien Branch, May 23,
1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 537.
92oeneral Orders No. 13, Army of the Rappahannock, May
24, 1862, J. R. Anderson Order Book, Virginia Historical 
Society.
93joseph E. Johnston to L. O'Brien Branch, May 25,
1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 543.
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than 16,000 troops--hit Branch's six regiments at noon on 
May 2 7.94 Branch held his position near Slash Church for 
several hours, until he determined that he was heavily 
outnumbered and that he had recovered all of his detached 
units. Then, after suffering several hundred casualties, he 
withdrew in good order toward Johnston's l i n e s . 95 That same 
day his bloodied brigade, along with Anderson' command, was 
consolidated into a new division under just-promoted Major- 
General A. P. Hill.96
Still without reliable intelligence concerning Mc­
Dowell 's movements, Johnston reached an erroneous but 
understandable conclusion when Porter brushed Branch out of 
Hanover Court House. McClellan was extending his flank 
because he expected McDowell to march south within hours. 
This assumption was buttressed in Johnston's mind by an 
equally incorrect report on May 2 7 from Anderson that 
represented the Federals in Fredericksburg as having 
commenced their march to Richmond. "We must get ready to
94"Abstract from return of the Army of the Potomac,
Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding, for 
May 20, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3): p. 184.
95Branch reported 243 casualties, excluding those in 
the 28th North Carolina and the 4th Virginia Cavalry.
Porter claimed to have found 200 dead and taken more than 
700 prisoners. For a discussion of this discrepancy, see 
Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 220n.
96Robert E. Lee to Samuel Cooper, May 25, 1862, in LR- 
AIGO, M-474, Reel 25; Robert E. Lee to James Longstreet, May 
28, 1862, in Lee Letterbook; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. 
Johnston, May 26, 1862, A. P. Hill to L. O'Brien Branch, May 
27, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 546-547, 554.
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fight," Johnston told G. W. Smith, and summoned his senior
generals to c o n f e r e n c e . 97
The moment of combat seemed to have been forced upon 
the Confederate army, but McClellan's dispositions invited 
attack. Three of his corps had been arrayed in a ten-mile 
line running southeast along the northern bank of the
Chickahominy from Beaver Dam Creek to the Lower Bridge.
Though Beaver Dam Creek was a formidable obstacle, if it 
could be breached quickly the opportunity existed to roll up
the Federal corps in succession. The two corps south of the
river were separated from each other by nearly five miles, 
and would have to march several miles to reinforce the 
troops to the north.
Johnston proposed that his army would slide suddenly to 
the left and that G. W. Smith would lead eleven brigades-- 
his own division under Whiting, D. R. Jones's Division, and 
A. P. Hill's Division— across the Chickahominy above 
Mechanicsville, assault Beaver Dam Creek, and drive down the 
river. The remainder of Magruder's "wing" would hold the 
Chickahominy. D. H. Hill would be posted in front of 
Keyes's IV Corps on the Williamsburg Road, to pin him in 
position, while Longstreet would move northeast of Richmond 
to Nine Mile Road, available as a reserve on either flank of
97smith, The Battle of Seven Pines, pp. 12-13.
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the a r m y . 98
Despite being forced into an offensive, Johnston's 
spirits were high. D. H. Hill told one of his brigadiers 
that "I saw Genls. Johnston & Smith this afternoon. They 
think that tomorrow will be a great day in our history."99 
It was the same day that Johnston learned that Jackson had 
routed Banks at Winchester, and optimistically suggested 
that the Army of the Valley might attempt to cross the 
P o t o m a c . H e advised Lee that a battle probably would be 
fought on May 29, that he had ordered Huger to Drewry's 
Bluff to replace Longstreet, and requested that Holmes's 
Division be brought to Richmond.101
The same day, President Davis and one of his aides, 
Colonel William Browne (formerly the acting Secretary of 
State), visited Johnston at his headquarters. Johnston was 
out riding his lines when the President called, and a 
courier was dispatched to find him. The General sent back a
98johnston mistakenly recalled that Huger's Division 
and not that of D. R. Jones would be brought to reinforce 
Smith's attack. Otherwise, the accounts of Johnston, Smith, 
and Longstreet are remarkably consistent to this point. See 
Johnston, Narrative, p. 131; Smith, The Battle of Seven 
Pines, p. 15, Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 85.
99d . h . Hill to Winfield Scott Featherston, May 27,
1862, D. H. Hill letter, Virginia Historical Society, 
Richmond, Virginia.
lOOjoseph E. Johnston to Thomas J. Jackson, May 27,
1862, in Douglas, Stonewal1, p. 72.
lOljoseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 28, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 555.
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polite note requesting that Davis return later in the 
afternoon, when he would have the time to acquaint the Chief 
Executive with his plans. Davis was then informed that an 
attack would take place on May 29.102
But when the President rode out of the capital on May 
29 expecting to witness a battle, he found consternation and 
confusion that recalled his May 22 visit to the front. As 
had been the case a week earlier, Brigadier-General Howell 
Cobb had little idea what were the army commander's plans—  
nor did Brigadier-General Hood. He could find neither 
Johnston, nor G. W. Smith who was supposed to be conducting 
the attack. Only Longstreet was where Davis thought he 
would be, and the massive Georgian was "walking to and fro 
in an impatient, it might be said fretful, manner."103
Longstreet was incensed because, when it came to the 
point of contact, Smith had balked at attacking. Smith 
claimed that "I reported to General Johnston that I was 
satisfied the three divisions could carry the works at 
Beaver Dam Creek by open assault in front; but that it would 
be a bloody business. . . " He did not think that
1 0 2 ^ 0  record of the conference has survived, though the 
fact that it happened is established by Joseph E. Johnston 
to William Browne, May 27, 1862, in Jefferson Davis papers, 
Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois. It may be 
inferred that Davis was informed of the proposed date of the 
attack from the fact that he rode out again on May 29, for 
which his erroneous chronology of the last half of May in 
his memoirs fails to account satisfactorily. See Davis,
Rise and Fall, II: p. 121.
103paviSf Rise and Fal1 , II: p. 121.
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ordering a wide flanking inarch by A. P. Hill's Division was 
practical, suggesting as an alternative the rather fantastic 
idea that Jackson's divisions--then somewhere north of 
Winchester— be marched back to eastern Virginia for such a 
p u r p o s e . 104 Rumors circulated that Smith had once again 
fallen ill with his mysterious neurological malady. The 
President returned to Richmond, his confidence in Johnston 
eroded once a g a i n . 105
That evening the General called together his subordin­
ates once more: Smith, Longstreet, Magruder, and Stuart.
He announced that Stuart's outposts to the north now 
reported that McDowell had turned back, which meant that 
there was no longer a pressing necessity for the attack.
This satisfied Smith, who continued to express a negative 
opinion of the original plan. Longstreet, supported by 
Magruder and Stuart, demurred, believing that the concept of 
rolling up McClellan's right wing "was made stronger by the 
change of direction of McDowell's column, and should," in 
Longstreet's words, "suggest more prompt and vigorous 
action."106
According to Longstreet's recollection, the council of
104gmith, The Battle of Seven Pines, p. 14.
105oaviS/ Rise and Fall, II: p. 121.
106curiously, the postwar accounts of both Smith and 
Longstreet agree fairly closely regarding the conference to 
this point. See Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 85- 
86; Smith, The Battle of Seven Pines, p. 15.
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war continued for several hours, until, at last, Johnston 
grew disgusted and walked away. His fighting blood aroused 
by the prospect of action, Longstreet followed and suggested 
again the turning movement that Smith felt so impractical. 
With McClellan's inherent caution, there was little chance 
that the Federal commander would strike any detached 
Confederate divisions before they landed on his own flank. 
"General Johnston replied that he was aware of all that, but 
found that he had selected the wrong officer for the work," 
Longstreet asserted in his memoirs, adding that "this ended 
the talk. . . ."107
Longstreet's account is somewhat suspect, as his 
memoirs were originally started as a refutation to charges 
made by Smith after the w a r . 108 But Johnston's opinion of 
Smith might well have already begun to decline by the 
evening of May 29, 1862. Several times Smith's health had 
forced him to alter plans. The Kentuckian quarreled with 
other generals, and twice within the past week Smith had 
caused Johnston to look less than capable in the President's 
eyes. And what had Smith done so far to justify Johnston's 
earlier high regard? The only action to his credit was the 
skirmish at Eltham's Landing, an engagement that, Johnston 
would have recalled, was directed entirely by Smith's
lO^Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 86.
108james Longstreet to Osmun Latrobe, February 10,
1886, in Osmun Latrobe papers, Virginia Historical Society, 
Richmond, Virginia.
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subordinates.
Longstreet, by contrast, had a fighting record that 
began at Manassas and had been extended by victory--at least 
in his own and Johnston's eyes— at Williamsburg. Now it was 
Longstreet who argued for the aggressive course. More and 
more during May, 1862, Johnston came to depend on Longstreet 
rather than Smith. He had always preferred striking 
McClellan's two isolated corps south of the river; suddenly 
in Johnston's mind, such an operation would have an extra 
benefit. Longstreet, not Smith, would be conducting the 
attack.109
109jQhnston, Narrative, p. 130.
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Chapter Eleven 
Seven Pines
Rain threatened Richmond again on May 30, 1862, but the 
ominous grey thunderheads seemed only slightly closer than 
the Yankee army. After the repulse of the ironclads at 
Drewry's Bluff, there had been a momentary rise in the 
city's morale. The Richmond Examiner opined that "when the 
history of this war is reviewed, it will be found that the 
chief service the enemy has gotten from his gunboats had 
been to frighten bad officers and worse troops into surren­
dering positions which they might have continued to hold."^- 
Then had come the news of Jackson's success at Winchester, 
and the hope that his dash toward the Potomac might force 
the recall of the Army of the Potomac to defend Washington. 
But by that overcast Friday the citizens of Richmond knew 
that no such reprieve was in their future. McClellan inched 
ever closer; and, if he were to be driven away, it would be 
by Johnston's outnumbered army, fighting from the outskirts 
of Richmond.
Hundreds, if not thousands, fled the city. The cabinet 
debated where to locate the next line of defense if Johnston
1Richmond Examiner, May 19, 1862, p. 2.
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had to relinquish the city.2 Secretary Randolph ordered the 
City Council to conduct experiments to find the quickest and 
safest method of destroying tons of tobacco stored in Rich­
mond warehouses, in order to prevent its falling into enemy 
hands.3 The specters of Nashville, New Orleans, Memphis, 
and Norfolk hung over the city.
Yet there was a distinct difference between the feeling 
that gripped Richmond and the terror which had clutched at 
the hearts of the inhabitants of other Southern cities.
"After the Confederate command's decision to evacuate their 
city without a fight, the people of Nashville had been 
panic-stricken," wrote historian Walter T. Durham. "Citizens 
shared mixed emotions about the defense of the city. Cer­
tainly most wanted to be shielded from the Union Army; 
however, few wanted to be protected at the expense of the 
destruction of Nashville. The prevailing desire was to stop
2The only record extant of the cabinet meeting in which 
this topic was discussed is that of John H. Reagan, who 
painted the picture of an emotional Robert E. Lee declaring 
that "Richmond must not be given up. . . ." Even ignoring 
the fact that Lee knew that Johnston had no intention of 
giving up the capital and that such an outburst would have 
been totally out of character for Lee, it should be suffi­
cient to note that the anecdote is sandwiched between two 
others of doubtful credibility. Without any supporting 
evidence, Reagan's description of the scene is best relegated 
to the status of colorful apocrypha. Reagan, Memoirs, p. 139.
3Manarin, Richmond at War, pp. 176-177.
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the Yankees— but not in the streets of the c i t y . " ^  In New 
Orleans, when Flag-Officer David G. Farragut's fleet had run 
the batteries and Major-General Mansfield Lovell's troops 
had withdrawn from the city, the mayor announced to the City 
Council that "it would be proper to say that the withdrawal 
of troops rendering resistance impossible, no obstruction 
could be offered to the occupation of the place by the 
enemy. . . ."5 The citizens of Memphis watched from the
banks of the Mississippi as their River Defense Fleet was 
destroyed, and then surrendered their city without further 
resistance.6 Norfolk had also surrendered without a fight, 
once the army and navy left town.
In Richmond the prevailing attitude was equally pessi­
mistic, but the gloom was underlain with a grim determina­
tion, in President Davis's words, "that the ancient and 
honored capital of Virginia, now the seat of the Confederate 
Government, shall not fall into the hands of the enemy.
Many say rather let it be a heap of rubbish."7 Already 
Governor John Letcher and Mayor Joseph Mayo had declared
^Walter T. Durham, Nashville, The Occupied City, The 
First Eighteen Months, February 16, 1862, to June 30, 1863 
(Nashville: Tennessee Historical Society, 1985), pp. 1, 14.
^Marion A. Baker, "Farragut's Demands for the Surrender 
of New Orleans," B&L, II: p. 95.
^Samuel Carter III, The Final Fortress: The Campaign
for Vicksburg, 1862-1863 (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1980), pp. 51-52.
^Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 524.
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their determination to defend the city regardless of what 
the Confederacy did. Letcher visited Johnston's army on May 
30, to spread his resolve to the Virginia regiments within 
its divisions.® The Mayor repeatedly stirred crowds by 
declaring that "rather than . . . surrender the city founded 
by his own ancestors, he would resign the office of the 
mayoralty, and though bending under the approach of three 
score years and ten, he would shoulder the musket himself in 
defense of the capital." "Some of the most wealthy of our 
population," recalled Sally Putnam, "declared they would 
fire their own beautiful residences, in preference to deliv­
ering up the city to our foes. . . .
The ultimate fate of Richmond, however, still lay with 
Joseph Johnston's army. When that army had halted between 
the Pamunkey and Chickahominy Rivers, it was plain that the 
retreat had taken its toll. "The army is very much demoral­
ized," D. H. Hill told his wife. "Some five thousand threw 
away their guns and fled to Richmond to avoid a battle.
There were other reasons for leaving the ranks besides 
cowardice. No rations had been issued since Williamsburg, 
reducing the Richmond Howitzers to stealing feed corn from 
their own starving horses. Even General officers roamed the
®Boney, John Letcher, p. 163.
^Putnam, Richmond, p. 131.
H. Hill to "My Dear Wife," May 11, 1862, in D. H. 
Hill papers, College of William and Mary.
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countryside foraging: Brigadier-General Richard Griffith
rode into the artillerymen's camp one night to beg an ear of 
corn for himself and several for his horse.11 Well-drilled 
soldiers might have been held in the ranks by veteran offi­
cers, but Hill pointed out that "the reorganization of the 
army at Yorktown, under the elective system, had thrown out 
of service many of our best officers. . . . nl2 Once again, 
Joseph Johnston found himself faced with an army on the 
verge of melting away.
Once again Johnston took immediate steps to improve the 
morale and efficiency of that army. With Lee, he coordinated 
the delivery of rations and the return of the army's wagon 
trains.1  ^ Armed with reports from his regimental and brigade 
commanders, Johnston finally managed to convince the Richmond 
authorities to allow his own provost marshals into the city 
to recover his absentees.1  ^ The army commander also began a
11Stiles, Four Years, pp. 85-86.
12"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command­
ing division, of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 
1863, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 605.
^Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 7, 1862, 
Robert E. Lee to Abraham C. Myers, May 7, 1862, Robert E. Lee 
to Lucius B. Northrop, May 7, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Abraham 
C. Myers, May 8, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Lucius B. Northrop, 
May 8, 1862, in Lee Letterbook; Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. 
Johnston, May 13, 1862, A. H. Cole to Joseph E. Johnston, May 
13, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 512-513.
^Walter Taylor to John H. Winder, May 14, 1862, in Lee 
Letterbook; George T. Anderson to George W. Randolph, May 16, 
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 3; John B. Gordon to George W. 
Randolph, May 13, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 21; A. P.
Hill to Samuel Cooper, May 13, 1862, A. P. Hill to Samuel
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thorough reorganization of both the artillery and cavalry 
serving under him, a reorganization that was to greatly 
strengthen those branches throughout the summer and fall.-*-^  
Between May 13 and May 30, Johnston's efforts, combined 
with those of Lee to reinforce him, caused the army to 
bounce back in terms of fighting spirit, organization, and 
numbers. Longstreet, who had never ceased his own efforts 
to buttress morale, wrote that when his men "have their 
bellies full, also their cartridge boxes," then "I don't 
fear McClellan or anyone in Yankeedom." By the end of May 
he felt that his troops "were never so resolved" to fight as 
they were then; they "even asserted that they would dig 
bayous, to reach the enemy's trenches, if not allowed some 
other means of getting to him."16 The Artillery Reserve had
Cooper, May 22, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 24.
15johnston inaugurated the practice of consolidating 
understrength batteries, and, from contextual evidence, seems 
to have envisioned separate artillery battalions supporting 
each division. His calls for the independent companies of 
cavalry around the state to be gathered together into regi­
ments led the Confederate authorities, during May, June, and 
July, 1862, to issue orders creating the 5th, 10th, 12th, and 
13th Virginia Cavalry Regiments, and the 14th, 15th, and 
17th Virginia Cavalry Battalions. See Lee, Pendleton, p.
185; Wise, Long Arm, pp. 186-187; D. H. Hill to John Trapier, 
May 28, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 25; Joseph E. Johnston 
to Robert E. Lee, May 14, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Benjamin 
Huger, May 16, 1862, Special Orders No. 120, Department of 
Northern Virginia, May 28, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp.
515, 519, 558.
16james Longstreet to Gustavus W. Smith, May 8, 1862, in 
Smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 145; James Longstreet to 
Jefferson Davis, September 2, 1887, in Rowland, Jefferson 
Davis Constitutionalist, IX: pp. 594-595.
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been increased from fifty-six to nearly ninety guns; the 
Cavalry Brigade enlarged by the addition of several regi­
ments. 17 With the addition of Huger's and A. P. Hill's 
Divisions, by May 31 Johnston's army attained the greatest 
strength it had yet known: nearly 88,000 officers and men
present for duty. Counting the brigades of Brigadier-General 
Roswell S. Ripley and John G. Walker, both of which were 
approaching Richmond on May 31, and adding in the garrison 
troops in the city itself, the Confederacy had managed, both 
through the administrative efficiency of General Johnston 
and a herculean effort to secure reinforcements by General 
Lee, to gather more than 97,000 men for the defense of the 
c a p i t a l . IS on the same day, McClellan reported the Army of
l^Lee, Pendleton, p. 185; A. L. Long to John H. Winder, 
May 23, 1862, Special Orders No. 120, Department of Northern 
Virginia, May 28, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 539, 558;
Special Orders No. 121, Adjutant and Inspector-General's 
Office, May 27, 1862, Special Orders No. 122, Adjutant and 
Inspector-General's Office, May 28, 1862, in OR, LI (part
2): p. 564.
l^This calculation begins with Johnston's May 21 mem­
orandum. Deficient as that paper is, it is the only starting 
point available for deducing the army's strength prior to 
Seven Pines. As previously mentioned, many of the figures 
had been drawn directly from the April 30 return of the 
army, before the retreat and before Williamsburg. So it is 
certain that the army had lost several thousand men from 
those figures between April 30 and May 21. But it is also 
certain that many of the stragglers returned to the ranks, 
and many more were dragooned in Richmond by Johnston's or 
Winder's provosts, so the figures for the four divisions, 
Pendleton's Artillery Reserve, and the Cavalry Brigade still 
offer good approximations of the "effective" strength of the 
army on May 21. This figure is 53,68 8.
But significant reinforcements joined the army during 
the next ten days. Nine artillery batteries left Richmond 
to join the army, which, calculated at the average "effec-
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tive" strength of artillery companies at that time, would 
have fielded 560 men. The 4th Virginia Heavy Artillery and 
four more companies of heavy artillery were also assigned to 
the army as infantry. The 4tn, with ten companies, had a 
strength of 466 men in late June, after the Battle of Seven 
Pines; it is not disproportionate to credit the other four 
companies with at least 200 men. Seventeen infantry compan­
ies of the Wise Legion also joined the army. Fifteen of 
them reported their strength in late June; adding in the 
other two at the same average strength gives an "effective" 
number of 942 infantry. The 3rd Virginia Cavalry, which 
numbered at least 300 men, the Wise Legion Cavalry (later 
the 10th Virginia), mustering at least 400, and several 
other miscellaneous companies of cavalry around Richmond-- 
probably at least 240 men--are not accounted for in Johns­
ton's memorandum, which would increase the size of his 
cavalry force by 940 "effectives."
Huger's Division at Seven Pines has been estimated 
everywhere from 5,008 "effectives" by G. W. Smith and Jeffer­
son Davis, to 7,000 by Johnston himself. A more likely 
strength seems to be 6,257, calculated by Thomas Livermore 
in his Numbers and Losses. But this excludes four regiments, 
the 6th, 16th, 56th, and 57th Virginia, left at Drewry's and 
Chaffin's Bluffs. Allowing these regiments 300 "effectives" 
each, that would add 1,200 more troops to Huger's roster.
A. P. Hill's Division has long been underestimated by 
almost all authorities, since G. W. Smith placed its numbers 
at a ludicrously low 4,000 men. This is hardly possible, 
considering the four brigades and other miscellaneous troops 
that composed the division. Field's Brigade (augmented by 
the 9th Virginia Cavalry) reported 2,200 men. Anderson's 
Brigade came to Virginia with 2,87 3 "effectives," and had 
seen no combat to reduce its numbers. Lee had sent more 
than 3,00 0 men from Richmond to the Rappahannock in mid- 
April, and Gregg's Brigade, by subtraction in one of Lee's 
letters, should be credited at least 2,127 men. From these 
figures should be subtracted about 900 casualties— the 
highest estimate--incurrea at Hanover Court House.
All of these figures, however, are for "effectives." As
noted earlier, in the calculations on the army at Williams­
burg, "effective" numbers have to be transformed into "pre­
sent for duty," and officers have to be added to the tabula­
tion before a meaningful comparison with Federal numbers can 
be reached. Using Livermore's standard percentages for 
conversion— 93% for infantry and artillery, 86% for cavalry, 
and a 6.5% allowance for officers--the total number of 
troops in the Department of Northern Virginia on May 31 
totals 87,890.
In Richmond, there were between 2,600 and 4,800 more
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the Potomac as 103,382 s t r o n g . 19 The overwhelming numerical
officers and men. The lower figure allows 700 for the heavy 
artillery, 500 for the militia, 400 for the Tredegar Batta­
lion, and 1,000 for the miscellaneous troops. The higher 
number counts the heavy artillery at 1,400, the militia at 
1,000, the Tredegar Battalion still at 400, and the miscel­
laneous troops at 2,000. From contemporary evidence, it is 
very difficult to hone thv_se estimates any closer. Ripley's 
Brigade, estimated by Livermore at 2,356 "effectives," and 
Walker's, reported in mid-April as having 3,693 "effect­
ives," were both approaching Richmond that afternoon. Fol­
lowing the same conversion process for these two brigades, 
and adding in the troops at Richmond, this would be an 
additional 6,923— even excluding the heavy artillerymen, 
marines, and naval troops still at Drewry's Bluff. This 
gives a total number of Confederates— officers and men 
"present for duty"--in the vicinity of Richmond as at least 
9 4,813 men.
The objection can be made that Johnston certainly could 
not use all these men in his field army, that it is only fair 
to count the muskets of men actually in the line of battle. 
But that is precisely the sort of logic that McClellan 
attempted to employ, and which his own superiors and histori­
ans have rejected, arguing that for a true interpretation of 
his strength all the soldiers even theoretically available 
in the area should be counted.
See "Abstract from statement of troops serving in the 
Department of North Carolina, commanded by Maj. Gen. T. H. 
Holmes, April 19, 1862, in OR, IX: p. 459; Robert E. Lee to
Joseph E. Johnston, April 23, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph 
E. Johnston, May 17, 1862 (two letters), Orders No. --, D.
H. Hill's Division, May 17, 1862, "Strength of the several 
brigades of the Army of Northern Virginia near Richmond, as 
shown by General Johnston's memorandum of May 21, 1862," A.
L. Long to John H. Winder, May 23, 1862, Special Orders No. 
118, Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, May 23, 1862, 
Henry A. Wise to D. H. Hill, May 24, 1862, Special Orders 
No. 120, Department of Northern Virginia, May 28, 1862, 
Special Orders No. 21, Headquarters, May 30, 1862, "Strength 
of the Virginia forces in the Right Wing, Army before Rich­
mond," June 23, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 458, 523,
525, 530-533, 539, 540, 542, 558, 563, 615; "Reports of 
Brig. Gen. Charles W. Field, C. S. Army, with instructions 
from General Lee," April 20, 1862, in OR, XII (part 1): p.
434; Livermore, Numbers and Losses, pp. 81-86, Smith, The 
Battle of Seven Pines, pp. 172-173; Davis, Rise and Fall,
II: p. 153; Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," B&L, II:
pp. 208-209; Sears, McClellan, p. 187; Archer Anderson to 
Joseph E. Johnston, September 14, 1887, in RMH.
19jyicCle.ilan only reported 98,008 "present for duty," but
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advantage enjoyed by the Yankees in February had been almost 
completely neutralized.
Given McClellan's normal caution, Johnston could have 
safely awaited Ripley's and Walker's Brigades before attack­
ing. He could have dropped upon Lee the responsibility for 
supporting Drewry's Bluff instead of leaving four of Huger's 
regiments there. To have done either would have been con­
sistent with the stereotypical image of him as always post­
poning battle to gather more strength. But by May 30, 
Johnston had finally been presented with the opportunity he 
had been seeking— Keyes' IV Corps at Seven Pines was separa­
ted from the rest of the Federal army by several miles--and 
he was not about to delay in striking a moment longer. "If 
nothing prevents we will fall upon the enemy in front of 
Major-General [D. H.] Hill," Johnston told Smith on May 30, 
"early in the morning--as early as p r a c t i c a b l e . "20
Johnston's plan was simple (see Map No. 5). Three 
roads extended east from Richmond toward Keyes' position. 
Most of D. H. Hill's Division was on the center route, the 
Williamsburg Road, which led directly to Seven Pines. He 
was to bring his flanking brigade up from Charles City Road 
to the south, and attack toward Seven Pines. The brigade on
in a spurious bookkeeping maneuver omitted from this total 
5,374 officers and men actually present and available to 
him. See "Number of men composing the Army of the Potomac 
on the 31st day of May, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3): p. 204.
20joseph E. Johnston to G. W. Smith, May 30, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 3): p. 563.
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Charles City Road would be replaced by Huger's Division, 
marching up from Drewry's Bluff. Huger's first task was to 
secure Hill's right flank, but if he found no opposition he 
was authorized to attack northeast to support Hill. Long­
street would march his own division down Nine Mile Road, 
which first paralleled and then intersected the Williamsburg 
Road, running through Fair Oaks Station to Seven Pines, and 
attack on Hill's left. Longstreet was to supervise the 
combined movements of these three divisions. Meanwhile, 
part of Magruder's command and A. P. Hill's Division would 
defend the upper bridges of the Chickahominy, while Whiting's 
and McLaws ' Divisions would be held in reserve either to 
support Longstreet or engage any reinforcements McClellan 
attempted to send across the river.21
The sequence of events which lead to the development of
2lThis interpretation follows the account of G. W. 
Smith, rather than that of Johnston himself or Longstreet, 
who maintained in official reports and postwar memoirs that 
Longstreet was to support Hill on the Williamsburg Road 
rather than to move down Nine Mile Road. This is accepted 
for purposes of establishing Johnston's original intentions 
because of Joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, June 28, 
1862 in which Johnston referred to "the misunderstanding 
between Longstreet and myself in regard to the direction of 
his division," and asked that Smith omit several paragraphs 
from his official report. See G. W. Smith, The Battle of 
Seven Pines, pp. 19-22; "Report of General Joseph E. Johns­
ton, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia, and 
resulting correspondence," June 24, 1862, "Reports of Maj. 
Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Right Wing," 
June 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 933-941; Johnston,
Narrative, pp. 132-133; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, 
pp. 87-88; Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," B&L, II: 
pp. 211-212; Gustavus W. Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven 
Pines," B&L, II: pp. 225-226, 228.
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this plan, and the methods by which the orders were distribu­
ted, are critical to any understanding of what happened on 
May 31. About noon on May 30, D. H. Hill advised Johnston 
that Keyes ' entire IV Corps was concentrated near Seven 
Pines, and that there were apparently no Federal troops on 
the Charles City Road. "I received a prompt answer from 
him," Hill stated, "saying that, being satisfied by my 
report of the presence of the enemy in force in my immediate 
front, he had resolved to attack him, and directed me to 
serve with Major-General Longstreet and under his orders."22 
Longstreet arrived at Johnston's headquarters soon after his 
commander had received Hill's intelligence, and the two 
generals began to discuss details of the upcoming attack.23
Not only by choosing Longstreet to command the attack, 
but also by failing to call Smith into the conference about 
its direction and coordination, Johnston sent a clear signal 
just how far the Kentuckian had fallen in his estimation. 
There were other signs of Longstreet's rise and Smith's 
demise in the eyes of the army commander. Johnston's plan 
broke up Smith's "wing," leaving A. P. Hill on the upper 
Chickahominy and bringing Whiting up the Nine Mile Road as a 
reserve, with McLaws actually scheduled to be committed to 
battle first. This effectively reduced Smith to a division
22"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command­
ing division," -- -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 943.
23Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 87.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
443
commander or a spectator, depending on whether or not he 
chose to supersede Whiting. Johnston obviously did not 
intend him to do so, sending Smith a not-so-subtle message 
by transmitting movement orders directly to Whiting.24 
Whether Johnston now suspected that his nominal second-in- 
command lacked nerve— as Longstreet would later imply— or 
whether he simply feared a physical breakdown at a critical 
moment, is impossible to determine. In either case, the 
effect was the same: Johnston deliberately cut Smith out of 
the attack.
Johnston and Longstreet would have discussed a variety 
of options for executing the attack. Any map of the Richmond 
area, of course, suggested the possibility of attacking 
Keyes simultaneously in front and flank by sending one 
division down the Williamsburg Road and another down the 
Nine Mile Road. Yet this raised a serious question about 
the weight of Hill's frontal assault. At the moment, Hill 
had only three brigades on the Williamsburg Road; Brigadier- 
General Robert Rodes ' Mississippi-Alabama Brigade was sta­
tioned on the Charles City Road to protect his right flank.25 
Three brigades without reinforcements— fewer than 10,000 
men— alone could hardly be expected to spearhead the crushing 
attack Johnston envisioned. How could the frontal attack be
24joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, May 30, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 563.
25"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command­
ing division," —  -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 943.
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strengthened?
Three possible answers suggested themselves. First, 
Huger's Division could be brought up from Drewry's Bluff 
along Charles City Road to relieve Rodes to participate in 
the attack. This would give Hill his full division for the 
attack, secure his right flank, and even hold out the possi­
bility that Huger's three brigades might assist in enveloping 
the Federal left. The advantages of this approach were so 
clear that Johnston dispatched orders to Huger that even­
ing. 26
But this still left Hill attacking Keyes' front with 
only a single division. A second option for reinforcing his 
attack would be to bring some of Longstreet's brigades over 
to the Williamsburg Road to support the attack. If three of 
his six brigades marched across to support Hill, then the 
balance of forces in the attack would be seven brigades on 
the Williamsburg Road (Hill's Division and half of Long­
street 's) and seven on the Nine Mile Road (McLaws' Division 
and the other half of Longstreet's).27 yet against this 
plan there were two objections, one of command coordination 
and the other of Longstreet's ambition. With which column 
would Longstreet ride, and how would he coordinate the
26joseph E. Johnston to Benjamin Huger, May 30, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 1): p. 938 .
2^That this option was discussed can be inferred from 
Smith, "Two Days," p. 24 2; see also Freeman, Lee' Lieuten­
ants , I: p. 232n.
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attack on the other road? If he chose the Williamsburg 
Road, the entire left prong of the attack would be left in 
the hands of McLaws, one of the most junior-major-generals 
in the army. McLaws had just received his commission a week 
earlier and had not, with the exception of the skirmish at 
Williamsburg on May 4, maneuvered even a single brigade in 
combat.28 on the other hand, if Longstreet personally 
commanded operations on the Nine Mile Road, there remained a 
question of delegating the responsibility for opening the 
action entirely to Hill. In the light of Hill's performance 
at Williamsburg, which his critics could well have charac­
terized as rash, how safe would it be to leave to him the 
command of half the forces involved in the attack?
There was, however, a third possibility. Hill could be 
reinforced on the Williamsburg Road with Longstreet's entire 
division. This would put ten brigades in the main attack 
under Longstreet's direct supervision. The assault of 
McLaws' four brigades on the Nine Mile Road would then be 
relegated to the status of a supporting attack. Should 
greater weight be needed there, Johnston could always draw 
on Whiting's five brigades. The advantages of this plan, 
from an operational perspective, were the added weight to 
the attack on the center of the IV Corps' line and Long­
street 's personal supervision of the attack. As a disadvan­
tage, however, there was the fact that such a maneuver
28warner, Generals in Gray, pp. 204-205.
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required six of Longstreet's and three of Huger's brigades 
to share one constricted stretch of the Williamsburg Road, 
upon which both divisions would have to travel until Huger's 
men turned off on the Charles City Road. Without careful 
coordination, confusion could delay the opening of the 
attack.
When Longstreet left Johnston's headquarters, the army 
commander had decided to follow the simplest of the plans 
discussed: Longstreet would follow the Nine Mile Road, Hill
the Williamsburg Road. Huger would relieve Rodes ' Brigade, 
and, when Rodes reported to Hill, the North Carolinian would 
fire a signal gun to start the attack. The noise was to 
alert Longstreet's Division on the Nine Mile Road to begin 
its advance. The sequence of events was to begin as early 
as possible after d a w n . 29
With the advantage of hindsight, it is easy to fault 
Johnston's faith in the ability of his army to perform such 
a complex maneuver with clockwork efficiency with the divi­
sion separated by several miles of dense woodland and murky 
swamps. Yet such convoluted arrangements for opening battles 
by an intricate succession of attacks were a regular feature 
of Civil War combat. Lee attempted to start the battles of 
Cheat Mountain and Mechanicsville with just such maneuvers.20
29"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command­
ing division," —  -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 943.
30preeman, R. E. Lee, I: p. 562, II: pp. 111-112.
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General Braxton Bragg routinely employed complicated echelon 
movements to begin battles: he did so at Perryville, Stone's
River, and on the second day at Chickamauga.31 Upon his 
promotion to command of the Army of Tennessee, John Bell 
Hood did the same at Peachtree Creek and the Battle of 
Atlanta.32 Nor was faith in their divisions' abilities to 
conduct flawlessly in battle maneuvers that would have taxed 
their skills on the parade ground a strictly Confederate 
delusion. McClellan at Antietam, Hooker at Chancellorsville, 
and George G. Meade at Mine Run provide only three of a 
great number of examples of an equal Yankee fascination with 
overly complex opening gambits.33
But Johnston committed two far greater mistakes in 
planning his battle. Though he wrote Huger two letters— one 
on the evening of May 30 and one very early in the morning 
of May 31— he neglected to make clear either the scope of 
the battle or the fact that Huger would be responsible for 
starting it. Instead of telling Huger on May 30 that an 
attack was planned, Johnston merely informed him that "the 
reports of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill give me the impression that 
the enemy is in considerable strength in his front. It
3lGrady McWhiney, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat, 
Volume I: Field Command (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969), pp. 315, 350-352; Horn, Army of Tennessee, p. 
260.
3 2jy[cMurry, Hood, pp. 12 7-128, 130-131.
33gears, McClellan, pp. 297-299; Swinton, Campaigns, pp. 
271-273, 391.
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seems to me necessary that we should increase our force 
also." Even when he assigned Huger his post, Johnston did 
not specify that an attack by Hill's Division was contem­
plated: "For that object I wish to concentrate the troops
of your division on the Charles City road and concentrate 
the troops of Major-General Hill on that to Williamsburg." 
After providing Huger with directions, Johnston ended the 
letter with the only sentence, ambiguous as it was, that 
even hinted at his plans for attack. "Be ready, if an 
action should be begun on your left, to fall upon the enemy's 
left flank."34 There was no doubt in Johnston's mind that 
he intended to attack the next morning; thirty-five minutes 
after he wrote Huger, he sent much more explicit orders to 
Smith and Whiting. "If nothing prevents we will fall upon 
the enemy in front of Major-General Hill," he told them.35 
Why did he fail to reveal his intentions to Huger?
And why, in the predawn hours of May 31, did Joseph 
Johnston suddenly decide to limit Huger's actions even more 
strictly? The following confused note would have found 
Huger as he put his brigades into motion:
GENERAL: I fear that in my note of last evening,
of which there is no copy, I was too positive on 
the subject of your attacking the enemy's left 
flank. It will, of course, be necessary for you 
to know what force is before you first. I hope to
34joseph E. Johnston to Benjamin Huger, May 30, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 1): p. 938.
35joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, May 30, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 563.
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be able to have that ascertained for you by caval­
ry. As our main force will be on your left, it 
will be necessary for your progress to conform at 
first to that of General Hill. If you find no 
strong body in your front, it will be well to aid 
General Hill; but then a strong reserve should be 
retained to cover our right.36
This letter more clearly implied an attack, but disregarded
several points. Huger was not informed that his relief of
Rodes would signal the beginning of the battle; he was not
even told which brigade he would replace in Hill's division.
Cavalry was to scout the area in front of him, but what
cavalry, and when would it report to him? Most critically,
the message did not make Huger aware that a major attack by
fourteen brigades had been ordered, or that Longstreet was
in overall command. Johnston, it almost seemed, expected
Huger to divine his intentions by telepathy.
Johnston, anxious over the impending battle, may well
have dashed off the first note without thinking it through.
By the time he dispatched the second letter, he admitted
that he could no longer quite remember what he had written,
and revealed that he had not had a copy entered in his
letterbooks.3 7 it was a failure of both the individual and
of his mediocre staff; everyone simply assumed that the
correct information had been disseminated, and no one both-
36joseph E. Johnston to Benjamin Huger, May 31, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 1): p. 938.
37Nor does the letter appear in any of the extant 
Johnston letterbooks, either at the College of William and 
Mary or in the National Archives. The copy published in OR 
was provided by Huger.
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ered to check.
Yet, as Freeman pointed out, Huger's orders, "while not 
models of their kind," could reasonably be expected to put 
him in approximately the right place at roughly the correct 
hour. If he commenced his march early enough, if the roads 
were clear and the bridges intact, and if D. H. Hill had 
guides awaiting him as instructed, then Johnston's plan 
might not be irrevocably injured.38
But Johnston's second significant miscue on the day 
before the battle had the potential for far worse consequen­
ces. He had discussed with Longstreet several variations of 
his original plan, and though he had finally decided on his 
original concept, he failed to make sure that his division 
commander left the meeting with the same understanding.39 
Longstreet returned to his own camps and ordered his briga­
diers to issue ammunition, have rations cooked, and prepare 
for an early march.40 Yet along what route?
As Longstreet pondered the attack, more and more he
^Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 228; Joseph E.
Johnston to Benjamin Huger, May 30, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
1): p. 938.
39in addition to G. W. Smith's evidence that Johnston 
had decided on deploying Longstreet's Division on the Nine 
Mile Road and not the Williamsburg Road, his second letter 
to Huger may be cited. If Johnston had intended Longstreet 
to be on the Williamsburg Road, he would not have listed 
Hill as commanding the attack. See Joseph E. Johnston to 
Benjamin Huger, May 31, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 938.
4 0"Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army, 
commanding brigade," June 12, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p.
986.
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thought of the personal and strategic advantages which would 
accrue from sending his division down the Williamsburg Road 
and supervising the combined attack of his and Hill's bri­
gades. There could be no question of credit for a victory 
if Longstreet commanded both divisions. Combined with his 
defensive success at Williamsburg, an offensive triumph at 
Seven Pines would secure his own reputation as the army's 
chief fighting general and cement his place as Johnston's 
most trusted subordinate. Rationalizations come easily to 
an ambitious man: unity of command, weight of attack, and
the possible need to restrain the sometimes overly aggressive 
Hill would all have offered themselves to the Georgian that 
night.41
But by what authority could he modify the plan upon 
which Johnston had settled? At some point in the night, 
Longstreet convinced himself that as commander of the "right 
wing" he had been given the assignment to attack the enemy 
in front of Hill, and that he and the army commander had
4lLongstreet 's ambitions toward promotion and independ­
ent command later in the war have been argued by historians 
for years. It is evident upon reading the barrage of corre­
spondence with General Cooper during the three weeks follow­
ing May 5, that Longstreet's designs for carving from Johns­
ton's army a permanent command which would be larger than a 
single division began with the Battle of Williamsburg. See 
James Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, May 7, 1862, James Long­
street to Samuel Cooper, May 9, 1862, James Longstreet to 
Samuel Cooper, May 27, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 30; 
James Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, May 12, 1862, in Richard 
H. Anderson, Compiled Service Record, National Archives, 
Washington, D. C. It was no slip of the pen that Longstreet 
cited himself in all these letters as commanding the "Second 
Corps" of the army.
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discussed alternatives for that attack without ever firmly 
deciding on one. It would have been in character for Johns­
ton to have told Longstreet at some point in the discussion 
that he depended on him to use his own best judgment in 
controlling the attack. From such an expression of confi­
dence, Longstreet could easily have derived the idea that 
Johnston had entrusted to him the authority to change plans 
as circumstances might dictate.42 without notifying Johns­
ton, Longstreet sent a message to Hill informing the other 
division commander that his six brigades would march to the 
Williamsburg Road in the morning to support the attack.43
The only other possible explanations of Longstreet's 
conduct are that either he completely misunderstood Johns­
ton's instructions, or he coolly and consciously disobeyed 
orders. Neither seems satisfactory. As poorly conceived as 
was his correspondence with Huger, the idea that, in a 
conversation which must have consumed hours, Johnston could 
not make clear to Longstreet on which of two roads he wished 
his division to march, stretches plausibility beyond the
has already been shown, this was exactly the sort 
of authority that Johnston delegated to detached commanders 
such as Jackson and Ewell in the Valley or Whiting along the 
Potomac.
43nill stated in his report that "I was directed by 
General Longstreet to move with my whole division at dawn on 
the Williamsburg Road and to lead the attack on the Yankees." 
[emphasis added] That Hill would "lead" the attack on the 
Williamsburg Road implies that he had been informed that 
there would be other troops following his. See "Report of 
Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding division,"
-- -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 943.
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breaking point. Nor did Longstreet ever admit that he 
altered Johnston's original design. In both his official 
report of the battle and his memoirs, he steadfastly main­
tained that his dispositions were precisely those directed 
by the army c o m m a n d e r . 44 The account of the conference with 
Johnston and the outline of the plan of attack that Long­
street published in his memoirs demonstrate, however, a 
striking similarity to those passages in which he depicted 
Lee as firmly agreeing to fight only defensive battles 
during the Gettysburg C a m p a i g n . 45 Throughout his career, 
the Georgian repeatedly proved that he was quite capable, 
upon reflection, of hearing what he wished to have heard. 
Unfortunately, the army commander had an inkling that such 
was the case. To paraphrase Freeman on Lee and Longstreet 
in Pennsylvania, Johnston never had intended to commit 
himself to any changes that Longstreet might introduce to 
his plan of battle and he did not know that Longstreet 
considered him so pledged.46
In his ignorance that the general to whom he had as­
signed responsibility for the next day's attack had decided 
to change the plan, Johnston found several omens that appar­
ently augured for resounding success. The primary one was
44"Reports of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, 
commanding Right Wing," June 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): 
p. 939; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 87-88.
45i,ongstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 331.
46preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, III: p. 50.
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rain— a hard, driving, drenching rain accompanied by pounding 
thunder. The downpour began within hours of the time Johns­
ton decided to take the offensive, and raised the prospect 
that the Chickahominy would overflow its banks, rendering 
communication between the two parts of McClellan's army not 
difficult but impossible.47 jt did not occur to him that 
the same deluge might also swell the streams to his rear and 
slow the approach of Huger's Division or flood the low lying 
countryside to such an extent that troop movements would be 
hindered.
More news that Johnston considered good came to head­
quarters in the person of Colonel Armistead L. Long, Lee's 
military secretary, who rode out from Richmond with two 
messages from the Commanding General. First, Long informed 
the army commander that Ripley's South Carolina Brigade had 
been ordered to report to him when it arrived in Richmond, 
probably the next day.48 The other communication that Long 
carried with him was a personal message from Lee, "to tell
47joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, May 30, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 563; Smith, The Battle of Seven
Pines, p. 146; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 87.
48i>hat Long brought this news may be inferred from three 
facts. First, Lee did not include it in the letter he sent 
later in the day. Second, the order had just been issued at 
headquarters that morning, and it would have been natural for 
Long to carry it out with him. Third, Long and Johnston 
eventually got around to discussing reinforcements, at which 
point it would have occured to Long to mention Ripley's force 
even if he did not bring along a copy of the order. See 
Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 30, 1862, Special 
Orders No. 21, May 30, 1862, Headquarters, in OR, XI (part 
3): pp. 560, 563; Long, Personal Memoirs, pp. 158-159.
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him that he would be glad to participate in the battle. He 
had no desire to interfere with his [Johnston's] command, 
but simply wished to aid him on the field to the best of his 
ability and in any manner in which his services would be of 
most value."49 The offer both pleased and embarrassed 
Johnston. For two weeks, the two generals had been growing 
closer together in their strategic appreciation of the 
military situation. Lee's request to serve under Johnston 
was a heartening vote of confidence; but, at the same time, 
it was an awkward proposition. Lee could be relied upon to 
keep his word not to interfere, but his presence would raise 
a thorny issue of credit if a victory were gained. Johnston 
could scarcely have forgotten that the public awarded Beau­
regard the lion's share of the praise for Manassas; would it 
be said that Lee had been forced to ride out to Johnston's 
army to save Richmond? To Long, none of this internal 
struggle was apparent. He recorded that "General Johnston 
expressed gratification at this message, and the hope that 
General Lee would ride out to the field, with the desire 
that he would send him all the reinforcements he could." 
Johnston then informed Long that the battle would open the 
following day, though he did not elaborate on his plans.50
^Long, personal Memoirs, pp. 158-159.
50]3oth Freeman and Dowdey find much in Long's account 
for which to castigate Johnston. Freeman described Long as 
returning to Richmond with "a polite but indefinite answer to 
his message: Johnston would be happy to have him ride out to
the field, and, meantime, would Lee send him all the rein-
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Few soldiers and even fewer officers in the divisions 
of Longstreet, D. H. Hill, Huger, or Whiting got much sleep 
that night; a morning attack required preparations that 
consumed the hours of darkness. Huger, whose men had the 
longest distance to travel, was on the march soon after 3:00
forcements he could collect?" Thus far, Freeman was well 
inside the bounds of legitimate if arguable interpretation of 
Long's statement, which he cited as his authority for the 
sentence. But in the next pair of sentences— unsupported by 
any references— Freeman asserts that "Johnston did not tell 
Long, nor did Long learn from any other source, when the 
battle for Richmond would open. Still uncertainty; still 
suspense!" Dowdey went further afield, distorting the entire 
exchange: "To Lee's offer of his services, Johnston answered
civilly enough that Lee would be welcome at headquarters, but 
that the only service he could perform would be to send 
reinforcements. For what purpose he did not tell Colonel 
Long.1 [emphasis added]
Johnston could not have revealed the full details of his 
plans, even had he been willing to do so, because when Long 
approached him, the army commander had not yet held his 
conference with Longstreet to iron out the essentials of the 
attack. This may be inferred by the fact that Long did not 
mention Longstreet's presence and Longstreet did not mention 
Long. For Long to have arrived after Longstreet left Johns­
ton's headquarters would have placed the visit into the 
early evening, far later than Long's memoirs suggest. So 
Johnston could not have confided specifics of his operation 
to Long.
But it again stretches credibility to suggest that 
Johnston told Long nothing about his intentions. Lee already 
knew that Johnston planned to attack McClellan, and that he 
preferred to strike south of the River. That Lee knew some 
sort of attack was impending is implied by Long's statement 
that Lee "would be glad to participate in the battle." 
[emphasis added] It also makes little sense to believe that 
Johnston, who wanted Ripley's Brigade and any other rein­
forcements he could get, did not tell Lee when he expected 
to need them, particularly when the two men had been in daily 
contact since the first week of May, and Johnston had always 
advised Lee in advance of major movements, from the evacua­
tion of Williamsburg to the aborted attack on May 29. See 
Freeman, R. E. Lee, II: p. 67; Dowdey, The Seven Days, p.
86.
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A. M.51 Longstreet's  men started toward the Williamsburg 
Road prior to 6:30 A. M.52 On the Williamsburg and Charles 
City Roads, D. H. Hill had already roused his own troops, 
and awaited the arrival of Huger's lead brigade to relieve 
Rodes and allow him to open the attack.53 Whiting, who had 
been cast in the role of reserve on the Nine Mile Road, 
began his own march at first light.5^
Nor had the sun risen when G. W. Smith met Joseph 
Johnston just outside the city limits at his headquarters on 
the Nine Mile Road. Smith's arrival was an event that 
Johnston knew must eventually occur, but had not anticipated 
with pleasure. The previous day, he had essentially removed 
the Kentuckian— the man he once described as fit to lead the 
army by himself— from the command structure of the army.
Yet since Smith remained legally his second-in-command, 
Johnston felt constrained to explain to him the details of 
the attack.55
Johnston's evident expectation was that Smith would
53Thomas Pinckney to D. H. Hill, May 31, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 3): p. 563.
52"Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army, 
commanding brigade," June 12, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p.
986 .
53"Report of Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, C. S. Army, 
commanding division," —  -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p.
943 .
5/*Smith, The Battle of Seven Pines, p. 23.
55Smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 162.
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take the hint of his de facto demotion, and avail himself of 
one of two face-saving alternatives. Either he would per­
sonally resume command of Whiting's Division, or he would 
return to the upper Chickahominy and supervise the four 
brigades of A. P. Hill's Division guarding the bridges. If 
he chose to supersede Whiting, Johnston was willing to allow 
him a part, albeit a very small one, in the battle; the army 
commander could do so without fear, for, if Smith lost his 
taste for attacking, or suffered an attack of his illness, 
there was always Whiting there to replace him. Should Smith 
decide to retire to the far left of the army, he would be 
out of the way entirely.
But Smith confounded Johnston before the first light 
had streaked across the Virginia sky. Calmly ignoring the 
choices that his superior had tacitly laid before him, Smith 
told Johnston that he had left A. P. Hill in charge of 
observing bridges, and that he "did not propose relieving 
General Whiting of the command of the division;" instead, he 
"would accompany it to the designated point, and take what­
ever part circumstances might require of him in the coming 
contest."5 6
Whiting was scheduled to march down the Nine Mile Road 
to the point where it split: the left fork heading toward
New Bridge, the right to Fair Oaks Station. Since it was 
from this location Johnston intended to oversee the battle,
56jbid., pp. 162-163.
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Smith's announcement meant that he planned to remain at 
Johnston's shoulder all day. This was not a prospect that 
pleased Johnston, and he cast about quickly for an assignment 
for Smith. Smith recalls that Johnston decided that if the 
Federals "attempted to cross anywhere above New Bridge, he 
would place me in command of all our troops on that side, 
and that I must repel any attack they might make on Richmond, 
whilst the mass of our army was engaged with McClellan's
left w i n g . "57
The next news that Johnston received was far more 
welcome. Major-General Theophilus Holmes, whom Johnston had 
not seen since he departed to command in North Carolina, 
rode up to headquarters, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel 
Archer Anderson, his chief of staff. Holmes advised Johnston 
that he had received definitive orders from the Secretary of 
War to reinforce the army in front of Richmond with three of 
his brigades--more than 8,000 men. The leading troops,
3,000 soldiers of Walker's Brigade, would reach Drewry's 
Bluff sometime that day, which would allow Johnston to 
immediately call up the four regiments which he had been 
forced to leave t h e r e . 5 8  Not only would there be reinforce­
ments available the next day to follow up a successful 
battle, but it must have seemed to Johnston that the admini-
57smith, The Battle of Seven Pines, p. 23.
58Archer Anderson to Joseph E. Johnston, September 14, 
1887, in RMH; G. W. Randolph to John G. Walker, June 1, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 565.
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stration had finally decided to strip its coastal garrisons 
in order to defeat McClellan.
His satisfaction, however, was short-lived. Only 
minutes after Holmes and Anderson had departed, a frustrated 
inquiry from Whiting arrived by courier. Whiting had at­
tempted to start his division down the Nine Mile Road at 
daybreak, but found Longstreet's brigades blocking his 
march. Quickly becoming impatient, he directed his complaint 
to Smith. Unfortunately, not knowing the entire battle 
plan, Whiting omitted one key detail from his message: he
did not tell Smith that Longstreet was marching south across 
his lines, instead of east down the Nine Mile R o a d . 59
Johnston was standing beside Smith when the latter 
received the message. For Johnston, it was the first notice 
that something had gone awry with his plan. Whiting had 
sent his letter after 6:00 A. M. and his courier had consumed 
the better part of an hour in finding Johnston and Smith.
The chances for a near-dawn attack were diminishing rapidly. 
He directed Smith to send an aide to Longstreet to find out 
what had caused the delay. Lieutenant Robert F. Beckham was 
chosen for the mission. When Beckham asked Smith where 
Longstreet's headquarters could be found, Smith referred him 
back to the army commander. Johnston's answer was abrupt: 
Longstreet's Division was assigned to the Nine Mile Road, 
and General Longstreet, "in all probability," was at its
59smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 164.
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head. Beckham was to hurry Longstreet along and reassure 
Whiting that Longstreet was to precede h i m . 60
A tense hour passed before word came back from Beckham. 
It was not good news. He had ridden as far up the Nine Mile 
Road as Whiting's Division and could find no sign of the 
Georgian or his six brigades. But, either from an interview 
with Whiting, or from his own observations, Beckham realized 
what had happened; Longstreet was marching toward the Wil­
liamsburg Road. On his own initiative, he set off cross­
country in search of the missing d i v i s i o n . 61
Even after the receipt of Beckham's intelligence, 
Johnston resisted the idea that Longstreet had ignored his 
plan of attack. Perhaps the troops that had delayed Whiting 
were other brigades— in all events, Longstreet should have 
marched hours earlier— and the Georgian's division had 
passed down the Nine Mile Road in the dark, and was already 
east of the position where Johnston and Smith were standing. 
The lack of any noise from in front was not conclusive, 
because Longstreet would have kept troops in position as 
quiet as possible until Hill's attack began. Having con­
vinced himself that Beckham could well be mistaken, Johnston 
dispatched one of his own aides east down the Nine Mile 
Road, toward the Federal position at Seven Pines. If Lieu-
60lbid., A. P. Mason to W. H. C. Whiting, May 31, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 3): p. 564; Smith, The Battle of Seven
Pines, p . 24.
61smith, The Battle of Seven Pines, p. 24.
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tenant J. B. Washington could not find Longstreet on that 
part of the road either, the army commander instructed him 
to cut across to the Williamsburg Road. There he was to 
order Longstreet, if he found him, to send at least three 
brigades back to the Nine Mile Road if the attack had not
yet opened.62
That he would order three of Longstreet's brigades to 
countermarch back to the Nine Mile Road when the attack was 
already several hours late in opening revealed much about 
Johnston's state of mind on May 31. Either he forgot that 
he still had four brigades under McLaws and five under 
Whiting available for the left wing of his attack, or he had 
become fixed upon the idea of keeping Smith from having an 
active role in the battle. But it is also possible that, in 
the moment of his first offensive battle, Joseph Johnston 
proved unable to impose his will upon events. He had proven 
his ability to direct strategy, administer a department, 
maneuver his troops, and supervise (if loosely) a defensive 
battle; but, attacking— turning a plan into reality, despite 
the fact that troops took the wrong roads and generals 
misunderstood their orders— was a much more strenuous exer­
cise. So far his reactions could be excused as those of a 
novice commanding his first attack; but, with his orders to 
Lieutenant Washington, legitimate suspicions about Johnston's
62smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 169; Smith, The 
Battle of Seven Pines, p. 25.
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capacity to command an attack begin to surface.
Three hours had already passed since Whiting's initial 
complaint, when Washington spurred his horse toward Seven 
Pines just after 9:00 A. M. No one at headquarters saw him 
again that day. Washington became so absorbed in looking 
for Longstreet's brigades that he completely overshot the 
Confederate lines and delivered himself as a prisoner into 
the hands of the 100th New York, the regiment picketing the 
far right of Brigadier-General Silas Casey's Second Division 
of the IV Corps. Although Washington said nothing of his 
mission or the impending attack to his captors, the capture 
of an army commander's aide could not help but make the 
Yankees suspicious. "This circumstance," reported Casey,
"in connection with the fact that Colonel Hunt, my general 
officer of the day, had reported to me that his outer pickets 
had heard cars running nearly all night on the Richmond end 
of the railroad, led me to exercise increased vigilance."63
All Johnston knew, of course, was that Washington 
simply disappeared. In the meantime, Lieutenant Beckham 
rode back to the army commander's field headquarters with 
the news that he had found not only General Longstreet but 
his entire division and all its trains on the Williamsburg 
Road. Since Beckham had pursued Longstreet on his own 
initiative, however, he had had no orders to pass on to the
63"Reports of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, 
commanding Second Division," June -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
1): p .  914.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
464
commander of the right wing. It was now nearly 10:00 A. M.
To send a courier back to Longstreet with orders to transfer 
three brigades back to the Nine Mile Road would consume at 
least another hour, by which time the frontal attack by 
Hill's and Huger's Divisions should have commenced; and 
risked even more confusion.. In Johnston's mind there would 
have been only two viable options at this point: either to
call off the attack entirely and regroup, or follow Long­
street 's lead.
Johnston vacillated. As he told Major S. B. French, 
Smith's Chief Commissary, to post himself outside his ad­
vanced headquarters and listen for the sound of musketry 
from the south, he made a remark that revealed an inclination 
to cancel the attack. "He said that he wished the troops 
were back in their camps," recalled French.64 Left to 
himself, Johnston might well have called off the offensive, 
but within a few minutes another event occurred, an event 
that rendered such a course impossible in Johnston's mind: 
Robert E. Lee appeared on the field.
Lee could not bring himself to remain in Richmond, 
doing nothing but shifting papers while the army battled for 
the city. He made sure that the orders forwarding Walker's 
and Ripley's troops had gone out, and ordered Pemberton to 
send an additional pair of regiments from South Carolina. 
Sometime during the morning, his patience exhausted, the
64smith, The Battle of Seven Pines, p. 26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
465
Commanding General mounted Traveller and rode out toward 
Johnston's headquarters. Eventually, probably about 11:00 
A. M . , Lee arrived at Johnston's forward command post in a 
house just off to the right of the Nine Mile Road, where the 
road to New Bridge turned off.65
There is little doubt that Lee approached Johnston on 
May 31 with exactly the same intentions in mind that he had 
sent Colonel Long to communicate the previous day. He 
wanted to help. He needed, for his own peace of mind, to be 
involved in the defense of Richmond. He had told Johnston 
he would be happy to serve in any capacity; and, he did not 
seek to usurp command. The remainder of Lee's military 
career provides mute testimony to his sincerity: he rarely
interfered directly in the tactical conduct of his corps, 
division, or brigade commanders. He would have been far 
less likely to do so in the case of a general— whom he 
considered a peer and a friend— commanding an army.
But Johnston, growing more anxious each moment for the 
success of his plan, was hardly in a state to appreciate 
this fact. His design had already begun to go awry with 
Gustavus Smith as an unwelcome witness. As he waited for 
the guns that would herald the belated attack on the Wil­
liamsburg Road, his confidence further unraveled. Johnston 
could not see Lee in any other light than as a threat to his 
reputation and his command. Would Lee take some sort of
65preeman, R. E. Lee, II: p. 68.
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action if he found out about the morning's miscues? If the 
attack commenced after Lee's arrival, would he somehow be 
accorded the credit?
"There was a tenseness in the air" between the two men 
at that moment, wrote Douglas Southall Freeman. It was 
obvious that an attack was brewing, although not yet under­
way; but, Johnston was hardly in a mood to confide his plans 
or his problems to Lee. Lee was caught in the prison of his 
own "hands-off" attitude; he would not ask until Johnston 
seemed willing to answer.^ The net result was that Johnston 
now found himself with two pairs of eyes gazing directly 
over his shoulders.
He waited. Longstreet had nearly 30,000 soldiers 
between his own and the divisions of Hill and Huger. There 
was no reason that even an attack delayed into midday might 
not crush Keyes. He "still had full faith," he told Smith, 
possibly with more bravura apparent than he actually felt as 
noon approached, that Longstreet's attack would destroy the 
IV Corps.67 Smith, who had the luxury of being very nearly 
an uninvolved bystander, was not so sure.
The minutes dragged silently past, until sometime in 
the early afternoon when Johnston finally decided that he 
needed another update on Longstreet's position and progress.
66Ibid.; see also Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I; p.
236 .
67Smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 171.
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He directed Smith to send Major Whiting across country to 
check on the Georgian. About 2:00 P. M . , the staff officer 
spurred his mount south through the woods toward the Wil­
liamsburg Road.68 Everyone else— Johnston and his staff, 
Smith and his, and Robert E. Lee--waited nervously as their 
apprehension grew. Something must have gone horribly wrong.
A dull roar sounded in the woods to the south shortly 
before 4:00 P. M. Johnston listened, but heard only cannon. 
An artillery duel, he concluded. To Lee's ear the noise 
contained the faint echo of musketry, and he said as much. 
Johnston could not discern it.69 More than two-thirds of 
the day had lapsed without combat. With only a few hours of 
daylight left, it almost sounded as if the army commander 
was hoping that Longstreet had the sense to postpone an 
assault which would be made too late to be decisive.
But Lee was correct: a bloody battle was rolling down
the Williamsburg Road. Major Whiting confirmed this at 4:00 
P. M. when he galloped back to headquarters with an urgent 
message from Longstreet. The full text has been lost, but 
Smith's report summarized its substance:
[H]e had attacked and beaten the enemy after 
several hours, severe fighting; that he had been 
disappointed in not receiving assistance upon his
68smith did not specify a time for Whiting's departure 
in his memoirs. Freeman guessed at 2:00 P. M . , which seems 
logical enough, since the trip should have consumed about an 
hour each way, and the Major returned at 4:00 P. M. See 
Ibid., p. 167; Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 236.
69pavis, Rise and Fall, II: p. 122.
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left; and, although it was now nearly too late, 
that an attack, by the Nine Mile road, upon the 
right flank and rear of the enemy would probably 
yet enable him to drive them into the Chickahominy 
before dark.70
Johnston was taken aback. Longstreet's attack had been 
launched several hours earlier. How was it possible that 
neither the report of a signal gun, nor sounds beyond the 
barely audible noise heard-'nalf an hour ago had penetrated 
to the Nine Mile Road? After reading the Georgian's note, 
Johnston concluded that perhaps, with swift action, he might 
yet achieve his goal that afternoon. Three of Whiting's 
brigades; those of Hood, J. J. Pettigrew, and Whiting's own 
under its senior colonel had halted in the vicinity of 
headquarters. The need for haste drove all thoughts of 
proper chain of command from Johnston's mind. Without 
pausing to locate Whiting, he began to order those units 
into line. He dispatched Smith back up the road to bring 
forward the remainder of the division: the brigades of Wade
Hampton and Robert Hatton.71
What had happened on the Williamsburg Road?
Longstreet's impromptu change of the attack plan had 
required three divisions to share at least a part of that
70This sentence is from the version of Smith's report 
printed in his memoirs, not that which he submitted to the 
Adjutant General after Johnston later requested several 
omissions. Smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 170.
71johnston never later admitted that he personally 
assumed command of Whiting's Division, but on this point 
Smith and Davis agreed convincingly. See Ibid., p. 174; 
Davis, Rise and Fal1, II: pp. 122-123.
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road as they deployed for battle. When Huger's lead brigade 
arrived at rain-swollen Gillies Creek, it discovered Long­
street 's troops had beaten it to the ford which they were 
crossing single file on a plank laid across a wagon b e d . 72 
There was ample reason for Huger to be surprised. He had 
never even been informed that Longstreet's Division was 
involved in the attack, and could claim precedence at the 
crossing— his troops had the assignment of relieving Rodes 
on the Charles City Road so that the battle could commence. 
But Longstreet's men refused: they had built the bridge and
intended to cross it first.73
Impatient at this delay, Huger asked for the location 
of Longstreet's command post and urged his horse across the 
creek to the Poe House, farther down the Williamsburg Road. 
There he found Longstreet and D. H. Hill.74 Huger voiced 
his complaint, and probably demanded to know which other 
parts of the plan had been kept from him. Hill, by far the 
most junior of the three generals, would have had little to 
say. Longstreet, as he often did when challenged, fell back 
on his authority as commander of the right wing to justify 
his division passing the creek first. Huger then played
^^Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 91; Smith, Two 
Days," p . 229.
^Endorsement by Benjamin Huger, August 10, 1862, 
appended to "Reports of Maj Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. 
Army, commanding Right Wing," June 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
1): p. 942.
74Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 235.
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what he considered to be his trump card. He asked Longstreet 
his date of commission which, if junior to his own, would 
give Huger the overall command despite any-of Johnston's 
intentions. Both men had the same date of rank as major- 
generals, which put the issue back to either their respective 
standings in the skeletal Confederate Regular Army or the 
prewar United States Army. Longstreet was suspiciously 
vague on the dates of his own commissions. Huger, with old- 
army rank-consciousness had no trouble providing his first, 
at which point--without citing specifics— Longstreet flatly 
asserted his own seniority. Huger was personally uncon­
vinced, but found himself maneuvered into a position where 
it seemed necessary to drop the issue. Longstreet retained 
command, and Huger's troops continued to cool their heels as 
his men inched across the precarious bridge.75
Longstreet now decided to further modify Johnston's 
simple plan of attack. As wing commander, controlling three
^^Most historians have correctly dismissed Longstreet's 
contention in his memoirs that he had admitted to Huger that 
he was the junior officer and that Huger had declined to take 
command, citing Endorsement by Benjamin Huger, August 10, 
1862, appended to "Reports of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. 
S. Army, commanding Right Wing," June 10, 1862, in OR, XI 
(part 1): p. 942. There is, however, even more compelling
evidence to support Huger's position, a letter he addressed 
to Lee the next week concerning Longstreet's rank and the 
reponse from the Adjutant General's Office, which reveals 
that the discussion had extended to dates of rank in the 
Confederate Regular Army. It may also be inferred from this 
document that Longstreet did not give Huger specific dates 
for his own commissions, or else Huger would have phrased 
his letter to confirm them rather than to ascertain them. 
Benjamin Huger to Robert E. Lee, June 7, 1862, Samuel Cooper 
to Benjamin Huger, June 8, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
471
divisions, he evidently did not feel that his proper place 
was the direct tactical supervision of a single division.
So he divided his six brigades into two demi-divisions, 
under Brigadier-Generals Richard Anderson and Cadmus Wilcox. 
Wilcox would take his own troops, plus those of Colston and 
Pryor, down the Charles City Road and support Huger on the 
extreme right of the attack, operating under the now-dis­
gruntled major-general's orders. Anderson, with his own 
brigade as well as James Kemper's (A. P. Hill's old brigade), 
would support Hill's attack. George Pickett was deployed 
independently along the line of the York River Railroad in a 
half-hearted attempt to connect Hill's left with the right 
flank of the troops on the Nine Mile Road.
Longstreet's revised dispositions eradicated any possi­
ble advantage of increased weight of numbers gained by 
sending his division down the Williamsburg Road. Pickett's 
brigade was wasted. Rodes had not yet rejoined Hill, which 
left his main attack with only five brigades--three of his 
own and two of Longstreet's. The possibility of the six 
brigades under Huger achieving anything decisive on the 
Charles City Road was questionable: the ground there was
exceedingly swampy, and Hill had reported on May 3 0 that he 
did not believe that there was any significant body of 
Federal troops within r e a c h . W o r s e ,  the new attack plan
7^The best reconstruction of these orders is in Freeman, 
Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 239. But see also "Reports of Maj.
Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Right Wing,"
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entailed even more delays. Longstreet, Huger, and Hill met 
sometime around 10:00 A. M.77 When the meeting adjourned, 
Longstreet's Division— including Wilcox's detachment which 
had been designated to move down the Charles City Road—  
pulled off to the side of the road and watched Huger's 
Division march past.7  ^ This pointless "leapfrog" arrangement 
consumed still more precious time.
The continuing delays weighed more heavily in the mind 
of D. H. Hill than they apparently did to Longstreet or 
Huger. The aggressive North Carolinian had been waiting all 
morning to strike his blow, and following the meeting of the 
three generals he decided to take some actions of his own.
He correctly reasoned that his right flank would be secured 
by Huger's six brigades quickly enough to risk recalling his 
own detached brigade to strengthen his attack. Either he 
asked Longstreet for permission or, on his own authority as 
division commander, Hill sent orders to Rodes not to wait 
for Huger's Division to relieve him before rejoining the 
main body of the division. Even so, Rodes' Alabama and one 
Mississippi regiment took a great deal of time struggling
June 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 939-942; Longstreet,
Manassas to Appomattox, p. 92; Smith, "Two Days," p. 229; 
Smith, The Battle of Seven Pines, p. 77.
77"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command­
ing division," -- -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 943.
78"Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army, 
commanding brigade," June 12, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p.
986.
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north through White Oak Swamp. "The men had to wade in 
water waist-deep and a large number were entirely submerged," 
Hill reported. "It was absolutely necessary to proceed with 
great caution to prevent the loss of both ammunition and 
life."79
Longstreet had'not relieved Hill of the necessity of 
awaiting Huger's deployment on the right to initiate the 
attack. But by 1:00 P. M . , the North Carolinian could not 
wait any longer. He lined his division up in a two-brigade 
front: Rodes' Brigade south of the Williamsburg Road,
Samuel Garland's to the north, supported respectively by the 
brigades of Gabriel Rains and George B. Anderson. There was 
still no word from Huger, and only Rodes' skirmishers had 
arrived. Nonetheless, apparently on his own initiative, D.
H. Hill fired his signal guns and sent his division for­
ward.80
Advancing at the sound of the signal guns, Brigadier- 
General Samuel Garland was unaware that, across the road, 
only Rodes' skirmishers were present, and that for the first 
fifteen minutes his brigade would be attacking the Federal
79"Report of Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes, C. S. Army, com­
manding brigade," June 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 971.
80"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command­
ing division," —  -, 1862, "Report of Brig. Gen. R. E.
Rodes, C. S. Army, commanding brigade," June 7, 1862, in OR, 
XI (part 1): pp. 943, 971.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
474
IV Corps all by itself.81 But the woods were too dense for
Garland's regiments to keep their alignment with each other,
much less to discover that the brigade on their right had
not moved. "The difficulties of the ground were almost
insurmountable," Garland stated four days later:
The recent rains had formed ponds of water through­
out the woods with mud at the bottom, through 
which the men waded forward knee-deep, and occa­
sionally sinking to the hips in boggy places, 
almost beyond the point of extrication. The 
forest was so thick and the undergrowth so tangled 
that it was impracticable to see the heads of the 
several regiments as they moved forward, and the 
deploying intervals were consequently very imper­
fectly preserved.82
Nonetheless, Garland's 2,200 men, unaware that for the 
first half hour they constituted the entire attacking force 
of Johnston's army in the Battle of Seven Pines, moved out 
a g g r e s s i v e l y .83 <phe 2nd Mississippi Battalion had been 
ordered out as skirmishers, with directions to remain at 
least 150 yards ahead of the main body of the brigade. But 
in the confusion caused by the limited visibility, when the 
Mississippians became engaged with the first line of Yankee 
pickets, the remaining five regiments under Garland's command 
closed the distance and moved up through them. The 2nd
81"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command­
ing division," —  -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 943.
82"Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland, Jr., C. S. Army, 
commanding Third Brigade, Third Division," June 3, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 1): p. 961.
83Garland, in Ibid., reported his strength at 2,065 
effectives. Allowing 6.5% for officers, this would have 
given him about 2,199 soldiers carried into action.
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Mississippi Battalion ceased to exist as a separate fighting 
force, even though it had taken as yet few casualties; 
individual companies and squads attached themselves to the 
nearest regiment and fought on their own for the remainder
of the afternoon.84
This was only the beginning of the disintegration of 
the formal command structure of Garland's Brigade and Hill's 
Division. Within minutes, as his brigade hit the first line 
of Federal abatis, Garland began to lose control of events. 
His senior colonel, Duncan McRae of the 5th North Carolina, 
who had been entrusted with the supervision of the brigade's 
right flank, had not completely recovered from his wound at 
Williamsburg. Physical exhaustion caused him to leave the 
field, and forced Garland to personally move to the far 
right of his lines. It only required a few minutes for the 
brigade commander to restore order to the Tarheels; but, 
while he did so, Colonel Daniel H. Christie's 23rd North 
Carolina had halted, believing it had heard an order to 
retreat. Simultaneously, the only field officer in the 24th 
Virginia, Major Richard L. Maury, was hit by Federal fire, 
leaving the brigade's largest regiment in c o n f u s i o n . 85
His troops now heavily engaged with the enemy and 
somewhat out of control, Garland began to wonder where his 
supporting brigade was. He wanted to send a courier back to
8 4 i b i d . , p. 962.
8 5 i b i d .
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speed Anderson's march to the battle, but discovered that 
his entire staff was busy just trying to straighten out his 
own line of battle. "I trusted to Colonel Anderson's intui­
tion as an accomplished soldier to perceive that we were 
hotly engaged," wrote Garland— trusting Anderson's instincts 
more likely from necessity than choice. But he was not 
disappointed: "as I anticipated, he arrived upon the scene
just at the proper time."86
Colonel Anderson brought up his own 1,835 men, rein­
forced by two regiments from Brigadier-General Richard 
Anderson's Brigade of Longstreet's Division, adding weight 
to Garland's attack just as it stalled. Yet the addition of 
six more regiments to the fight was only a mixed blessing.
The impenetrability of the woods caused Anderson's regiments, 
like Garland's before them, to march forward in a somewhat 
haphazard fashion. The 28th Georgia, for example, ended up 
on the right of the 49th Virginia when it entered the battle, 
after beginning the approach march on the Virginian's left.87 
When Anderson's augmented brigade arrived at the forward 
line of the battle, the ability of Confederate commanders to 
control the attack diminished even further. Garland ex­
plained in his official report that "the passage of lines 
being a feat in tactics which had never been practiced by
86ibid.
87"Report of Colonel George B. Anderson, Fourth North 
Carolina Infantry, commanding Special Brigade," June 5, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 951, 953.
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any of us, large fragments of those regiments who were left 
without field or company officers were joined in and con­
tinued forward with that brigade."®®
Much the same thing occurred on the north side of the 
Williamsburg Road as had happened with Longstreet's Division 
at the Battle of Williamsburg several weeks earlier. Inade­
quate reconnaissance left regimental commanders blind. The 
attacking brigades became so intermingled that no one re­
tained effective control. Brigade commanders scurried about 
the field rallying and reorganizing individual companies and 
regiments. The senior generals, in this case D. H. Hill and 
Richard Anderson, found themselves able to do little more 
than continue to pour reinforcements into the battle.
The brigades on the left of Hill's Division, however, 
continued to make headway throughout the afternoon, because 
Federal reactions were equally disjointed. Though he claimed 
that the capture of Lieutenant Washington alerted him to the 
possibility of an attack, the only action that Brigadier- 
General Silas Casey took to prepare the troops in front of 
Garland to receive it was to support his picket line witn a 
single regiment, the 430-man-strong 103rd Pennsylvania.®®
88"Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland, Jr., C. S. Army, 
commanding Third Brigade, Third Division," June 3, 1862, in 
OR, XI (part 1): p. 963.
89"Reports of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, 
commanding Second Division," June -, 1862, "Report of Maj. 
Audlev w. Gazzam. One hundred and third Pennsylvania Infan­
try," June 2, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 914, 928.
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Casey did not order his division under arms until two Confed­
erate artillery shells "were thrown over my camp," by which 
time the 103rd Pennsylvania was trying to resist five times 
its own numbers. It held for about fifteen minutes. As 
Casey began to order his division into line— still in piece­
meal fashion— the Pennsylvanians "came down the road in some 
confusion, having suffered considerable loss. . . ."90
Nonetheless, with more than 4,200 men in his own three 
brigades, reinforced by as many men as IV Corps commander 
Erasmus Keyes could spare while organizing a second line of 
defense, Casey might have succeeded in holding his own 
against the Confederates attacking north of the Williamsburg 
Road. But fifteen minutes after Samuel Garland's men as­
saulted the 103rd Pennsylvania, Robert Rodes finally brought 
his own brigade into the battle.
In his haste to open the battle, D. H. Hill committed 
an error very similar to that of Richard Anderson at Wil­
liamsburg: he did not pay enough attention to one of his
flanks. By the time Garland's Brigade had deployed in the 
line of battle, Hill could see elements of two regiments 
from Rodes' Brigade on the south side of the Williamsburg 
Road. Colonel John B. Gordon's 6th Alabama had spread out 
in front as skirmishers, and Colonel William H. Taylor's 
12th Mississippi had fallen in about 150 yards behind them.
90"Reports of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army, 
commanding Second Division," June -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
1): pp. 914.
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Rodes warned Hill that he could not possibly have the remain­
der of the brigade in place for at least another fifteen 
minutes and possibly as much as half an hour. Nonetheless, 
Hill had resolved to order the attack.91
This decision presented Rodes with the difficult tactic­
al problem of just how to get his brigade, arriving unit by
unit and already exhausted by its passage through the swamps,
into the battle as quickly as possible. He could already
hear the sound of musketry on his left to indicate that
Garland was engaged. In an instant, Rodes reacted with the 
type of decisiveness that would begin, this day, to mark him 
as one of the premier, small-unit tacticians of the army; he 
determined to attack almost immediately en echelon, bringing 
each regiment through the dense woods into the battle in 
successive lines. As he closed with the Yankees —  literally 
under their guns--Rodes intended to redeploy his units from 
parallel lines into a brigade front with all five regiments
abreast.92
The maneuver was more than audacious, it was downright 
dangerous. Garland's Brigade to his left had already proven 
unable to perform a passage of the lines of its own skirmish­
ers, and had been thrown into total disorder by its rein­
forcements. What Rodes prepared to do was more complicated
91"Reports of Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes, C. S. Army, 
commanding brigade," June 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p.
971 .
92jbid.
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Yet despite appalling casualties, Rodes' Brigade managed 
to implement its commander's plan. Gordon's 6th Alabama
ka
capitalized on the fact that the Federal pickets to the 
north of the road were distracted by the firing there, and 
advanced without pause over the first line of abatis, and 
threatened Casey's main line of rifle pits almost before 
anyone knew they had attacked. Colonel Gordon himself was 
the first man through Casey's line of outposts, leaping his 
horse over the abatis, and shouting for his men to follow 
him through. Though a cry of "Shoot that man on horseback" 
echoed through the Federal line, the Colonel miraculously 
continued to press home his attack unscathed.9 3
Union resistance stiffened beyond the first pickets, 
however, and the 6th Alabama and 12th Mississippi stalled in 
front of Casey's main line of defense. Rodes placed himself 
at the head of the 5th Alabama as it struggled up from its 
trek from the Charles City Road and led it to support the 
Mississippians. His remaining two infantry units--a heavy 
artillery battalion, under Captain C. C. Otey; and the 12th 
Alabama— had been instructed to enter the line of battle at 
predesignated points as they marched up. If everything 
proceeded as planned, all 2,200 men of the brigade would be
93"Report of Col. John B. Gordon, Sixth Alabama Infan­
try," June 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 979; Gordon,
Reminiscences, p. 56.
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in action within half an h o u r . 94
Of course the conditions under which Rodes operated 
were no better than those which bedeviled Garland on the far 
side of the road. The woods were so thick that Rodes himself 
lost track of half of the 5th Alabama, ending up on the 
flank of the 12th Mississippi with only five companies. The 
heavy artillery battalion, new to the army and composed 
primarily or older men who had never intended to be infantry 
in the first place, decided that it had been given orders to 
halt short of the battle. The 12th Alabama, ordered to the 
far right flank, had discovered easier ground and advanced 
out of step with the rest of the brigade, to the point of 
crowding Gordon's skirmishers.9 5
Rodes' Brigade was poised, at that moment, on the point 
of the same degenerating confusion that had already made a 
shambles of the command structure on the left of the divi­
sion. That did not happen here, however, due to Rodes' 
skill, the high standard of training in his brigade, the 
movements of his supporting brigade, and a healthy dose of 
luck. The lost companies of the 5th Alabama, under their 
field officers, reoriented themselves, and arrived as a unit 
on the opposite side of the 12th Mississippi, allowing Rodes 
to quickly reunite the entire regiment during a momentary
94"Reports of Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes, C. S. Army, 
commanding brigade," June 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp.
971-972.
95ibid.
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break in the firing. He personally bullied the heavy artil­
lery battalion into the fight. Colonel Robert T. Jones of 
the 12th Alabama joined Gordon's 6th Alabama on the far 
right of the brigade and, without orders, provided enfilading 
fire against the Federal line.96
At this juncture, Rodes' original orders called for him 
to sidestep his entire brigade to the right, allowing Rains' 
Brigade to attack through his lines. But Rains had percep­
tively noticed that Rodes had his hands full just forming 
his brigade under fire, and was certainly not prepared to 
perform a right oblique march. So the commander of the 
supporting brigade swung his own regiments around the right 
of Rodes' units. The maneuver proved decisive despite the 
considerable amount of time it took Rains ' men to pick their 
way through the swamps, and Rodes' later complaints that 
Rains had left his men without support for too long a period. 
Rains' attack, when it came, rolled up Casey's left flank 
and levered his entire division out of its line.97
It had taken about two hours to drive the Federals from 
their first defensive line, and the fact that the Confederate 
attack continued to roll forward was due far more to momentum 
than planning or organization. Hill's main role after 3:00 
P. M. was to try to keep his brigades separate and moving
96ibid.
97ibid.; "Report of Brig. Gen. Gabriel J. Rains, C. S. 
Army, commanding brigade," June 8, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): 
p p . 969-97 0 .
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forward at roughly the same pace. He fed reinforcements 
into the battle more cautiously now, paying close attention 
to avoiding the kind of snafu that had threatened to paralyze 
his left in the early going.98
Longstreet's role in the battle after it opened was far 
less significant than Hill's. He had released Anderson and 
Kemper to the division commander before the opening of the 
attack, so when the North Carolinian committed their troops 
it was on his own initiative. The Georgian never appeared 
anywhere near the front line of the battle.99 His sole 
contribution to Hill's attack seems to have been to order 
Wilcox's Brigade to countermarch yet again, back from Charles 
City Road to the Williamsburg Road, where Wilcox arrived too 
late to make any real contribution to the battle.100 By the 
time Longstreet penned his 4:00 P. M. note to Johnston that 
his men were driving the enemy, Hill had supervised--if 
loosely— all the fighting. And all the fighting had been 
done, thanks to Longstreet's orders, by six of thirteen 
available brigades.
Yet there was more than a kernel of truth in Long­
street 's contention that he had defeated the Yankees and
98"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command­
ing division," -- -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 944.
99d . H. Hill to Gustavus W. Smith, May 22, 1885, quoted
in Smith, The Battle of Seven Pines, p. 66.
100»Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army,
commanding brigade," June 12, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp.
986-987.
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that they needed only one more sharp push to disintegrate 
the IV Corps, if not also the III. Despite the substantial 
reinforcements from Samuel Heinztelman's III Corp which had 
arrived to bolster his position, and the fact that he had 
enjoyed several hours to deploy Couch's division as Casey's 
men slowly crumbled, Erasmus Keyes could not hold his second 
line. Hill's men, admittedly at the cost of murderous 
casualties, sent the Yankees reeling back again. By this 
point Hill's reinforced division had captured ten cannon and 
held a field scattered with "6,700 muskets and rifles in 
fine condition, ordnance, commissary, and medical stores."101 
A flank attack down the Nine Mile Road might well have 
delivered the coup de grace, at least to the extent of 
routing two Federal corps back to the Chickahominy.
But by the time that Johnston received Longstreet's 
message, the conditions under which such an attack would 
have been possible had changed. Even as Johnston frantically 
prepared to attack with Whiting's Division, another Federal 
corps commander took decisive action to save the day for the 
Army of the Potomac. Edwin Vose Sumner's II Corps, deployed 
along the north bank of the Chickahominy between the Upper 
and Lower Bridges, was the portion of McClellan's army 
closest to the fighting. But the bridges were under water, 
and Sumner was the commander who had vacillated so long at
101"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command­
ing division," -- -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 945.
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Williamsburg that he allowed Hancock's flanking action to 
accomplish nothing. It should have been a recipe for disas­
ter .
Yet when the moment came on May 31, Sumner did not 
hesitate. At 1:00 P. M., McClellan advised him that an 
attack had commenced south of the river and ordered Sumner 
"to be in readiness to move at a moment's warning." At 2:30 
P. M., the call came to cross the bridges and march to 
support Keyes and Heintzelman.102 perhaps the difference 
from Williamsburg was that Sumner was not in overall command; 
he merely had to react to orders. His division commanders, 
Israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick, were instructed to 
cross the Chickahominy, regardless of the condition of the 
bridges. "Our men," reported Richardson, "were obliged to 
wade (part of the bridge having been swept away) nearly up 
to their middles in water, and of course could follow but 
slowly.103 By 4:00 P. M., Sedgwick's division was marching 
into position on the Federal right at Seven Pines, and the 
advance by Whiting's Division would not hit the flank of a 
defeated enemy, but would encounter three fresh brigades of 
unbloodied Yankees.
Johnston ordered Hood's Brigade into the woods and
102''RepOrt of Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Army, 
commanding Second Corps," June 9, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): 
p. 763.
103"RepOrt of Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson, U. S. 
Army, commanding Division," June 6, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
1): p. 764.
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swamps between the Nine Mile and Williamsburg Roads, in an 
attempt to link Whiting's right flank with Hill's left. The 
Texans obligingly angled off into the forest and promptly 
got lost, removing themselves from the remainder of the 
b a t t l e . 1^4 The army commander planned to send Pettigrew's 
and Whiting's Brigades abreast in line of battle down the 
Nine Mile Road. When Smith brought up Hampton and Hatton, 
the former would extend the line, and the latter would 
become the division r e s e r v e . 105 was a relatively orthodox
deployment for those four brigades, marred only by two 
facts: there were three different generals supervising the
move and nobody knew that Sedgwick's division was in the 
woods.
By taking personal command of the division, Johnston 
had, in his anxiety, both abdicated his role as army command­
er and also reduced Smith and Whiting to high-ranking super­
numeraries. He sent Smith dashing back and forth— first to 
bring up Hampton and Hatton; again to modify their marching 
orders; and finally, when contact was made at Fair Oaks 
Station, to detach brigades from Magruder farther down the 
river. These were errands that any competent lieutenant 
serving as an aide de camp should have been able to handle. 
Johnston kept Whiting at his side; but while he issued his
104jy[cMurry, Hood, p. 41; Smith, Confederate War Papers, 
p. 174.
105gmith, Confederate War Papers, pp. 174-175.
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own orders through the division commander, Johnston did not 
allow him to function as a commanding general. In the case 
of Smith, whom Johnston already distrusted, his actions were 
understandable, if not laudable. In the case of Whiting, 
who was one of Johnston's most trusted subordinates, his 
usurpation of the Brigadier-General's command revealed just 
how badly he was feeling the strain of battle.
As a result of these unwieldy command arrangements, 
Whiting's Division took far longer than it should have to 
deploy for battle. Hood, as already noted, simply disap­
peared. Hampton's Brigade, blundering around in the woods, 
almost engaged in a fire fight with Pettigrew's m e n . 106 & s  
the sun began to sink, the division finally moved forward, 
only to run into the unexpected fire of Sedgwick's division.
Two batteries of Federal artillery, supported by two of 
Sedgwick's brigades: the First under Brigadier-General
Willis A. Gorman and the Third under Brigadier-General 
Napoleon J. T. Dana, had arrived in the vicinity of Fair 
Oaks Station. Sedgwick himself was farther down the line, 
supervising the movement of his other brigade as it connected 
with the right flank of the hard-pressed III and IV Corps at 
Seven Pines. This left the immediate direction of the bulk 
of his division in Sumner's h a n d s . 1^7
106Ibid., p. 175.
107»RepOrt of Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, 
commanding Second Division," June 4, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
1): p. 792.
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Whiting, ever pessimistic, had warned Johnston that the 
Federals might have crossed the river. But suddenly sensing 
a chance to win a victory regardless of all the day's mis- 
cues, Johnston ignored him. "Oh!" one of Whiting's staff 
officers recalled the army commander exclaiming, "General 
Whiting, you are too cautious."108 when the Union artillery 
opened on the unsuspecting Confederates, the response of the 
leading brigades was an immediate, uncoordinated attack.
This assault failed in short order. Since it had occurred 
more or less spontaneously, and had not involved all the 
personnel of the three brigades, the troops rallied very 
quickly. They were ordered in again.109
This attack involved all four of the available brigades, 
and was pressed with a great deal more vigor. Brigadier- 
General Gorman, whose troops supported one of the batteries, 
reported the contest "as severe a fire of musketry as ever 
was witnessed or heard, perhaps, by the oldest officers of 
the army. . . ."HO practically invisible in the woods and 
supported by twelve cannon, the Federal troops at Fair Oaks 
made up for the ignominious retreat of their comrades at 
Seven Pines. Neither Gorman's nor Dana's brigades suffered
108j3_ w . Frobel to Gustavus W. Smith, February -, 1868, 
quoted in Smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 179.
109Ibid.
110'iRepOr-t- 0f Brig. Gen. Willis A. Gorman, U. S. Army, 
commanding First Brigade," June 3, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 800.
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more than 200 casualties; the four brigades of Whiting's 
Division took nearly 1,300. Three of his four engaged 
brigadiers went down: Hatton killed, Pettigrew seriously
wounded and captured, Hampton shot in the foot. As dusk 
began to fall, it was no longer a question of whether or not 
Whiting's men could break through the enemy, but whether 
they could hold their g r o u n d . m
The abortive attack of Whiting's Division highlighted 
the tactical mismanagement of the Battle of Seven Pines. 
Johnston started his brigades forward without any attempt to 
reconnoiter for Yankees along their route of march. By 
accompanying the division personally, the army commander not 
only confused its chain of command, but also removed himself 
from the best location on the field from which to coordinate 
reinforcements. There was no one left at his former head­
quarters with either complete knowledge of the battle plan 
or authority to shift troops in Johnston's absence; if 
McClellan had been industrious enough to counterattack 
Johnston's far left flank, there would have been no way for 
A. P. Hill to request reinforcements quickly. Given all of 
this, why did Johnston decide to supervise Whiting's attack 
in person?
Three answers suggest themselves, all of which may have
111"Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac at 
the Battle of Fair Oaks, of Seven Pines, V a ., May 31-June 1, 
1862," in OR, XI (part 1): p. 758; Smith, Confederate War
Papers, pp. 176-177.
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affected the army commander's choice, and rest upon a clear 
understanding of the mental strain Johnston felt in the late 
afternoon hours of May 31.
Johnston had been conscious of his growing cadre of 
observers since before dawn. Smith, who had every reason 
now to be a critical witness, had been with him since first 
light, accompanied by his entire staff. Whiting, who had 
ridden up as his division approached at midmorning, had 
hovered around headquarters all day as well; though Johnston 
accounted him as a friend, Whiting represented another 
officer whose opinion of the army commander's capabilities 
might suffer as the result of a botched battle. To these 
two, Lee's presence was added sometime around noon--his rank 
and his position both made his presence discomforting to 
Johnston as he waited for the battle to open. And finally, 
at just about 4:00 P. M . , as Johnston received Longstreet's 
note, President Davis himself cantered down the Nine Mile 
Road to join the impromptu entourage that had conglomerated 
around him.H^
The President's arrival may have been the last straw 
for Johnston. He knew that Davis's opinion of his adminis­
trative ability had been marred by the President's recent 
excursions to the front when the Chief Executive had been 
greeted by disorganization and nonexistent attacks. He 
could also be sure that Davis, unlike Lee, would immediately
H2[)aviSf Rise and Fall , II: p. 122.
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open any conversation with direct inquiries into the progress 
of the battle. With Smith around and fully aware of the 
original design, Johnston would be forced to admit that 
nothing had thus far transpired in accordance with his 
wishes. He would have to tell Davis that Longstreet had 
taken the wrong road, that the attack had opened six to 
eight hours late, and that no one on the Nine Mile Road had 
been sure enough that the fight had begun to launch the left 
wing into action promptly.
On the other hand, if Johnston rode off with Whiting's 
Division, he would escape such a painful situation, at least 
for the moment. If Whiting's attack succeeded, and he could 
bring back tidings that included the destruction of at least 
one Federal corps, then he could reasonably expect that 
embarrassing post mortems would be delayed for a much longer 
time, and might be avoided forever in the flush of a desper­
ately needed victory.
It is also possible that Johnston, whose ambitious 
strain always made him consider the question of personal 
reputation and ultimate credit for battles won, rode with 
Whiting's Division not because he feared the President's 
inquisition, but because he scented victory. Johnston never 
forgot that at Manassas he had dispatched Beauregard to the 
threatened flank rather than going there himself; in his 
Narrative he wrote: "After assigning Beauregard to the
command of the troops immediately engaged, which he properly
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suggested belonged to the second in rank, not to the command­
er of the army, I returned to the supervision of the whole 
field. " H 3  After that battle, noted Freeman, "there was 
praise for Johnston, to be sure," yet "the concentration of 
the two armies, not less than the victory itself, was assumed 
to be the work of Beauregard."114 Nothing that Johnston 
said or wrote, then or later, ever managed to dispel this 
impression. If Whiting or Longstreet delivered the knockout 
blow at Seven Pines while Johnston remained again at head­
quarters, it must have occurred to him that history might 
well repeat itself.
Both of the foregoing explanations reflect less than 
favorably on Johnston's personal integrity. They imply that 
the army commander might base his actions on personal mo­
tives— and not purely military considerations— even under 
the strain of a battle that had gotten out of his control. 
There is also the possibility that the overriding concern in 
Johnston's mind was one of command. His two most trusted 
lieutenants had each botched a major operation: Smith by
declining to attack on May 28, and Longstreet that morning 
by following the wrong road. The Kentuckian and the Georgian 
were the two generals whom Johnston had always considered 
not only competent but absolutely indispensable. If he 
could not safely assign missions to them, how could he rely
H3johnston, Narrative, pp. 48-49.
l^Freeman, Lee's Lieutenant's, I: p. 80.
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on their juniors? When the instant came in which Johnston 
expected to strike the decisive blow, he may well have acted 
out of a belief that the only way to assure an immediate and 
aggressive movement was to lead it himself.
It should be emphasized, however, that Johnston's 
choice to accompany Whiting's Division was made in minutes 
if not seconds. All of the considerations detailed above 
may have influenced him to a greater or lesser degree; but, 
in the necessity for haste that he would have felt upon the 
receipt of Longstreet's note, Johnston had precious little 
time to think the options through. He did not have the 
luxury of hours to brood and rationalize like Longstreet the 
previous night; he had to determine his course as immediately 
as did Rodes when be brought his brigade into the fighting 
south of the Williamsburg Road. It is quite possible that 
all of these considerations passed so rapidly through the 
army commander's mind that later, upon reflection, he could 
not reconstruct his reasons even to himself.H 5
There would be no occasion for such reflection that 
evening, however, for Joseph Johnston. As it became obvious
115The manner in which Johnston rewrote his role at the 
key moment in the battle during the postwar years gives a 
very strong indication of just how uncomfortable the General 
was with his rather rash decision to lead Whiting's Division 
himself. In both the Narrative and his article for Battles 
and Leaders, Johnston related that he had directed that the 
division be sent forward, omitting the fact that he accompa­
nied it and issued orders directly to its brigadiers. See 
Johnston, Narrative, pp. 136-137; Johnston, "Manassas to 
Seven Pines," B&L, II: p. 214.
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that Whiting's Division had been stalemated and the evening 
shadows grew longer and longer, he realized that his army 
could not follow up the blow that had sent two Federal corps 
reeling, at least not that day. Yet despite the result at 
Fair Oaks Station, Longstreet's apparent partial victory 
might be completed with another attack the next day. "So I 
announced to my staff officers," Johnston recalled, "that 
each regiment must sleep where it might be standing when the 
contest ceased for the night, to be ready to renew it at 
dawn next morning. " ®
But the battle, if it was to continue on June 1, would 
have to do so in his absence. Johnston had hardly given 
those last orders when a stray musket ball hit him in the 
right shoulder. Though this inflicted little more than a 
superficial wound, the effects of the random fragment of a 
Federal artillery shell which then slammed into his chest 
were far more serious. The impact unseated him from his 
saddle, and though he never lost consciousness it was a 
dazed and severely wounded Johnston that his aides carried 
off the field.H-7
Though he did not yet realize it, Joseph E. Johnston's 
campaign in the defense of Richmond had abruptly ended.
l l ^ J o h n s t o n ,  Narrative, p. 138. 
117Ibid.
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Chapter Twelve 
Johnston's Campaign: An Assessment
As cynical as the proposition appears, dying in battle 
at the proper moment can do great things for a general's 
reputation, while surviving even a great victory can be a 
dreadful mistake. The American Civil War was full of exampl 
that proved both cases. For almost a century following the 
death of Albert Sidney Johnston, the fatal wound he received 
on the first day of the Battle of Shiloh deflected from his 
memory criticism of his conduct of operations in the months 
preceding the battle. From the standpoint of his entrance 
into the pantheon of Confederate legends, no novelist or 
scriptwriter could have imagined a more dramatic end for 
"Stonewall" Jackson than to be shot down by his own men at 
Chancellorsville, in the hour of one of his most audacious 
and successful maneuvers.
On the opposite side of the coin, by surviving Gettys­
burg, both George Meade and George Pickett found themselves 
forced to endure the decline of their reputations from glory 
into mediocrity. Meade lived to be castigated for failing 
to pursue Lee's beaten army, raked over the coals by an 
unsympathic Congressional committee, superseded by Grant, 
and eventually denied the post of Commanding General of the 
United States Army in favor of a man who had been his junior
495
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throughout the war. Pickett faced humiliation and defeat at 
Five Forks and questions after the war about just how he, 
among all the generals and all but one of the field officers 
in his three brigades, had avoided Yankee fire in the charge 
that destroyed his division. Ironically, the verdict of their 
peers and historians on both men would probably have been much 
more favorable if Meade had fallen defending Cemetery Ridge 
and Pickett had died assaulting it.
Johnston's eventual recuperation from the wounds he 
received at Seven Pines landed him in the company of Meade and 
Pickett rather than Jackson or the other Johnston. By the 
time Johnston had recovered sufficiently to return to active 
duty, Robert E. Lee had an undisputable claim to command of 
the Army of Northern Virginia. He had driven McClellan away 
from Richmond in the Seven Days Battles, routed John Pope at 
Second Manassas, invaded Maryland, and fought the Army of the 
Potomac to a bloody standstill at Antietam Creek. When Lee's 
accomplishments were compared to Johnston's record— partial 
credit for victory at First Manassas, a minor defensive 
success at Williamsburg, and the disjointed stalemate at 
Seven Pines— it was obvious that no one could expect Jeffer­
son Davis to remove Lee from command in order to reinstate 
Johnston.
But the President could hardly be accused of injustice 
to the man who had become the Confederacy's second ranking 
field general. Johnston was assigned in November, 1862, to
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command Department No. 2, a vast theater that included both 
Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee and John C. Pemberton's 
army defending Vicksburg. It was not a fortunate assignment. 
Johnston, who would have preferred to lead any single field 
army, saw his authority as "little more than n o m i n a l . H e  
quarreled with the President over strategy, complained that 
he could never get Pemberton to follow his orders, and 
presided over the Confederate debacle at Vicksburg. With 
defeat came frenzied rounds of mutual recriminations that 
extended to generals and politicians alike; Johnston did not 
escape unscathed.
Yet Vicksburg did not end his career as it did Pember­
ton's. After Bragg's defeat at Missionary Ridge in November, 
1863, the President set personal rancor aside and appointed 
Johnston to succeed Bragg in command of the Army of Tennessee. 
His administrative abilities paid immediate dividends in the 
restoration of morale and efficiency to his dispirited 
divisions, and when the campaign of 1864 opened he was back 
in the spotlight again: defending Atlanta against Sherman
while Lee resisted Grant before Richmond. But Johnston's 
fabian policy of retreating, with the avowed intent of 
drawing Sherman deeply enough into Confederate territory to 
assure his army's destruction, did not suit Jefferson Davis 
at all. By mid-July, Johnston had backed up to the suburbs 
of Atlanta, and when he could not get from the army commander
Ijohnston, Narrative, p. 154.
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what he considered to be sufficient guarantees of offensive 
action, the President sacked Johnston in favor of John Bell 
Hood. Hood attacked and lost thousands of men and the city. 
Johnston claimed that he had been on the verge of launching 
a successful offensive when relieved; Davis countered that the 
General had, in fact, been on the verge of abandoning Atlanta 
without a fight.
The final postscript to Johnston's career was his recall 
in February, 1865, this time at the insistence of Lee, to 
undertake the hopeless task of trying to halt Sherman's 
rampage through the Carolinas. Johnston scored a small 
tactical victory at the Battle of Bentonville on March 19, 
attacking an isolated wing of Sherman's army; but, it was far 
too late to have any effect on the course of the war.
When the war ended it was followed in remarkably short 
order by a war of words among ex-Confederate politicians and 
military officers, scrambling to avoid being assessed the 
responsibility for the South's defeat. Men who had fought and 
bled together now divided into new camps and attacked each 
other with a petty vindictiveness that often served more to 
diminish their reputations than to protect them. Carefully 
worded statements of fact— as misleading as they were true—  
along with innuendo, edited documents, artfully doctored 
reminiscences, and outright lies were the weapons in this 
second, far less honorable conflict.
None of the principals in Johnston's defense of Richmond
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managed to remain above the mud-slinging. The memoirs and 
articles of Joseph Johnston, Jefferson Davis, Gustavus Smith, 
and James Longstreet were colored by self-justification and 
marred by inaccuracies, as were those of lower ranking 
officers from Jubal Early to John Gordon, Armistead Long to 
John Bell Hood. For anyone determined to pick his way through 
the literary charges and countercharges in order to reconcile 
all the discrepancies, it represents an assignment as hazard­
ous as that handed to the Yankee pickets who had to enter 
Yorktown after Gabriel Rains had booby-trapped the town with 
explosives.
The campaign to defend Richmond represents a particular 
problem for the historian intent upon assessing Johnston's 
performance as a general, for the course of events leading up 
to Seven Pines has received relatively little attention, even 
among the writers of memoirs. This is due, in part, to the 
fact that, while the defense of Richmond in 1862 ended 
successfully under the direction of Lee and not Jackson, 
those of Vicksburg and Atlanta did not. Generals rarely 
feel the need to defend victorious campaigns. When the 
question of Johnston's Peninsular Campaign did arise in his 
own memoirs, it was often merely as a blind for some argument 
about Vicksburg or Atlanta. Hood, for example, voiced the 
contention that Johnston had supposedly contemplated the 
evacuation in 1862 as a rationale for believing that he
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would have deserted Atlanta in 1864.2
To evaluate Johnston's performance in 1862 fairly then, 
it is necessary to approach that campaign as much as possible 
without reference to later battles or subsequent controver­
sies. In one sense, it is almost necessary to pretend that 
Johnston's wound at Seven Pines indeed proved fatal in order 
to reach a judgment on his capacity as a general at that time.
Johnston quickly convinced himself that his injuries had 
snatched victory from his grasp. In his initial report, filed 
June 24, 1862, Johnston ignored Longstreet's mistake in 
following the Williamsburg Road (he also asked Gustavus Smith 
to purge a reference to it from his own report) and relied 
heavily on the Georgian's recounting of the fighting in front 
of Seven Pines. Longstreet, anxious to find a scapegoat for 
his delay in opening the attack, blamed Huger for not marching 
into position in time. Johnston picked this up and asserted 
that "had Major-General Huger's Division been in position and 
ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill 
moved, I am satisfied that Keyes' corps would have been 
destroyed instead of being merely d e f e a t e d .
Eventually, due primarily to the efforts of Gustavus
^Hood, Advance and Retreat, pp. 23, 154-156.
^"Report of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, 
commanding Army of Northern Virginia, and resulting corre­
spondence," June 24, 1862, "Reports of Maj. Gen. James Long­
street, C. S. Army, commanding Right Wing," June 10, 1862, 
in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 935, 939-941; Smith, Confederate War
Papers, pp. 165-171.
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Smith, Huger would be exonerated of the charge that he did not 
arrive at his designated objective on time.^ Johnston, still 
convinced that a decisive success had only narrowly eluded 
him, shifted the ground of his argument, and laid the blame 
on Smith. "Darkness only," halted the battle on May 31, 
Johnston contended, but after the army was turned over to 
Smith there was "no serious fighting" on June 1, despite the 
fact that "advantage of position and superiority of numbers 
would have enabled them to defeat that [Keyes'] corps had 
the engagement been renewed on Sunday morning. . . ."^
Though Smith spent thirty years presenting evidence to 
disprove this assertion, arguing that he had attempted to 
attack on the second day, only to be frustrated by Long­
street 's inaction, he never managed to escape the image of a 
general who folded up under the strain of combat. Freeman, 
the first historian to examine the evidence closely, seriously 
condemned the Kentuckian for "vacillation, overcaution and 
conflicting orders" on June 1.6 Though his rationalizations
^Smith dealt with Huger's "alleged 'slow movements'" in 
everything he wrote about the battle, more out of an interest 
in smearing Longstreet's name than from any regard or friend­
ship for Huger. The best case is made in Smith, The Battle 
of Seven Pines, pp. 64-82.
^That Johnston did not initially blame Smith for the 
failure to gain a victory on June 1 is evident from the tone 
of his June 24, 1862 report. "Report of General Joseph E. 
Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia, 
and resulting correspondence," June 24, 1862, in OR, XI (part 
1): pp. 933-935; Johnston, Narrative, pp. 139, 141.
^Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I: p. 243.
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changed, Johnston enjoyed great success for many years in 
advancing the idea that, as Beauregard was almost universally 
blamed for not pressing home the attack on Grant after Albert 
Sidney Johnston fell at Shiloh, Smith was the culprit for 
not delivering the coup de grace at Seven Pines.
Though there was in truth very little to praise in 
Smith's conduct of the battle on June 1, Johnston's accusation 
that he had forfeited the fruits of a hard-won victory was 
without any factual basis. By Sunday morning, there were an 
equal number of Federal and Confederate soldiers on the field 
south of the Chickahominy, including fresh troops on both 
sides that had not participated in the previous days' fight­
ing. Of the Union units which had been bloodied in Hill's 
attack, only a portion of Casey's division had not been
sufficiently reorganized to go into combat again. The
Confederate advantage of surprise had certainly been lost. 
Casualties among general officers had been severe for a battle 
of no more than five hours and included the army commander 
and four of the ten brigade commanders who were actually 
engaged. Yankee confidence, far from being shattered, 
remained solid enough that almost all the actions of June 1 
were Federal and not Confederate attacks.^
But the opportunity to smash at least Keyes' IV Corps on
May 31 had been very real. Had Johnston's original plan been
^"McClellan's Report (2)," in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 41-
42.
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executed, Keyes' six brigades would have been assaulted by 
thirteen Confederate brigades: three under Huger, four under
Hill, and six under Longstreet. Union reinforcements avail­
able in the first two hours would only have been Heintzelman's 
six brigades, while Johnston had four under McLaws and five 
under Whiting in reserve. But Johnston's relatively simple 
plan went hopelessly awry from the very beginning.
It is questionable to what extent Johnston may be faulted 
for Longstreet's carefully rationalized disobedience. Both 
Robert E. Lee and Braxton Bragg discovered in their turn that 
Longstreet, while undeniably talented, was incredibly willful, 
and his cooperation with operations of which he did not 
approve was notoriously poor. Nonetheless, given the vague 
nature of the orders Johnston dispatched to Huger, it is 
possible to suspect that Johnston may well have employed 
somewhat ambiguous language in his final oral orders to his 
wing commander.
It is a military truism that no plan survives contact 
with the enemy. It is the army commander's responsibility 
to adapt to unexpected events; therefore, the delegation of 
an important mission such as Longstreet's supervisory author­
ity over the attack of the right wing does not relieve the 
commanding general from the responsibility to maintain 
control of the various detachments of his army. In these 
terms, at the Battle of Seven Pines, Joseph Johnston failed 
miserably.
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Johnston made no provisions for couriers or staff 
officers to move on a regular basis between the separated 
wings of his army in order to keep him updated on the progress 
of each division. When the first reports arrived that 
Longstreet had taken the wrong road, Johnston wasted precious 
hours without deciding on a modified plan or a cancellation 
of the attack. In the event the signal guns did not carry, 
there was no back-up for alerting units on the Nine Mile 
Road that the attack to the south had begun. Finally,
Johnston totally abdicated his responsibility for the overall 
conduct of the battle when he led Whiting's Division down the 
Nine Mile Road to Fair Oaks Station.
Yet it must be noted that similar failings bedeviled 
almost every commanding general, Confederate or Union, in his 
first offensive battle. Civil War battles were almost all 
planned and fought by generals who had never commanded more 
than a single regiment under fire prior to 1861. Lee at 
Mechanicsville, Bragg at Stone's River, Hood at Peachtree 
Creek, and Beauregard at Drewry's Bluff all committed the same 
or comparable mistakes, as did McClellan at Antietam, Hooker 
at Chancellorsville, Meade at Mine Run, Sherman at Chicksaw 
Bluffs, and Grant at Belmont. The good generals learned from 
their mistakes, and slowly, painfully, improved their perform­
ances in subsequent battles. It was, however, as Bruce 
Catton pointed out with regard to Ulysses Grant, "at a 
prodigious cost to himself and to some thousands of young men
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who, without quite realizing it, had joined the Union Army in 
order to pay for his education."8 In almost every case, it 
was very difficult to render a valid judgment on the basis 
of' the first offensive battle, because almost no one ever 
performed well. The value of a general could best be deter­
mined by observing whether or not he was able to improve 
upon this performance.
If Johnston had botched Seven Pines, he had not done so 
in a disastrous manner: he had not won, but he had not been
defeated either; and, his army certainly survived to fight 
again. A man as realistic as Jefferson Davis would have known 
that the proof would come the next time. And that, of course, 
would eventually be the rub. Robert E. Lee handled the Battle 
of Mechanicsville on June 26, 1862, little, if any, better 
than Johnston managed the Battle of Seven Pines. But Lee's 
second attack, the Battle of Gaines' Mill, came on the 
following day and proved that if he had not become perfect 
overnight he was capable of learning something from his own 
mistakes. Johnston may well have been just as able to learn 
from his own mistakes as Lee, and might have proved that on 
June 1 had he not been wounded. Through choice or circum­
stance, however, Joseph Johnston did not fight another 
offensive battle until nearly three years later, at Benton- 
ville on March 19, 1865.
^Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1960), pp. 216-217.
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This, of course, was hardly knowable on the evening of 
May 31, 1862. Based on his performance at Seven Pines, a 
verdict on Johnston as a battlefield commander would have 
been a provisional one: if he had not proved to be an imme­
diate savant, he had not been an unmitigated disaster. His 
conduct rated another opportunity, and throughout the war 
Jefferson Davis made good-faith efforts to give him that 
chance.
Johnston claimed that, even allowing for his failure to 
totally crush Keyes' corps, the Battle of Seven Pines resulted 
in two very favorable advantages for his successor. The 
attack had rocked McClellan enough to freeze him in his tracks 
for about three weeks, and this period of inaction provided 
enough time for Lee to receive substantial reinforcements: 
"General Lee did not attack the enemy until June 26th, because 
he was engaged from June 1st until then in forming a great 
army. . . ."9
The first of these contentions was valid: the first
thing McClellan did in the battle's aftermath was demand 
that more troops be sent to him before he could advance.10 
But Johnston's insistence that Lee benefited from the time 
to build a great army that he had been denied was inaccurate. 
Johnston cited the Army of Northern Virginia as having been 
augmented between June 1 and 26 with the divisions of Holmes,
^Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," B&L, II: p. 217.
lOsears, McClellan, pp. 196-197.
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Jackson, and Ewell, as well as the brigades of Ripley and 
Alexander Lawton and miscellaneous troops . But Johnston's 
argument here was spurious. Holmes and Ripley were in the 
Richmond area on May 31 and already subject to his orders.
If he had considered their participation critical to success, 
it required but a single day's delay in his battle plan. 
Jackson and Ewell were also under Johnston's command; they 
were not available at the end of May because Johnston himself 
had approved the operations in the Shenandoah Valley which 
detained them. As has already been shown, in May, 1862, 
Johnston definitely considered the absence of those two 
divisions to be completely compensated for by the correspond­
ing absence of the armies of Banks and McDowell on his 
flanks. Thus, in Johnston's catalogue of units sent to Lee 
during June, only Lawton's Georgia Brigade had not actually 
been near his army or under his control on May 31, and 
Lawton's regiments did not quite muster enough men— even by 
Johnston's own optimistic estimate— to do more than replace 
the battle losses of Seven Pines.12 The time won at Seven 
Pines benefitted Lee by allowing Jackson to finish the Valley 
Campaign (the troops already in transit to arrive), and to 
dig substantial entrenchments in front of Richmond.
The successes and failures of Seven Pines, however, were 
hardly the whole measure of Johnston's defense of Richmond up
Hjohnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," B&L, II: p. 217.
 ^^ ibid.
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to May 31, 1862. Between the February conference in Richmond 
and Johnston's fall from his horse beside the Nine Mile Road, 
the Confederates had gained several important strategic 
advantages. First and foremost, the campaign had bought for 
Jefferson Davis three months of valuable time--time to produce 
or import weapons, time to muster and train new troops, and 
time to reorganize the army onto a wartime footing. The 
second material result of Johnston's campaign was that by the 
end of May the overwhelming numerical advantage of Union 
numbers— nearly a four-to-one superiority in February--had 
been reduced so far at the point of contact that Johnston's 
inferiority to the Army of the Potomac was roughly 10,000 
men. In armies of 80,000-100,000 troops, this hardly repre­
sented any decisive disadvantage. And Lee fared even better 
the next month, entering the Seven Days' Battles with a slight 
numerical superiority, and fielding the largest army the 
Confederacy ever sent into battle. This had been achieved by 
a combination of strategic juggling in Virginia and along 
the Atlantic Coast, where garrisons were stripped to bare 
essentials; and the operational maneuvers of Confederate 
forces in Virginia which led to the immobilization of Banks 
and McDowell. Finally, from the nucleus of detached garri­
sons, strung out across the Potomac frontier throughout the 
winter of 1861-1862, a solid, well-organized, maneuverable 
army had been formed: the Army of Northern Virginia. It
was not, and it never became, a perfect organization, but
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the army that Joseph Johnston unknowingly and unwillingly 
bequeathed to Robert E. Lee stood upon a very firm foundation.
But these accomplishments cannot be ascribed to Joseph 
Johnston simply because he commanded the Department of 
Northern Virginia. Other key leaders, from Davis to Lee and 
from Jackson to Magruder, played essential roles in the 
defense of Virginia. To what extent did Joseph Johnston 
contribute to the successes of early 1862?
The breathing spell won for the Confederacy in this 
campaign was chiefly the result of three events: the Valley
Campaign, the siege of Yorktown, and the retreat up the 
Peninsula. Johnston's role in the Valley Campaign was 
supportive but not seminal. He clearly envisioned the 
potential for combined operations between Jackson and Ewell 
when the rest of the army left northern Virginia for the 
Yorktown line, though he did not map out a specific strategy. 
He expected Jackson and Ewell to react opportunistically to 
Federal miscues. It was the correspondence of Lee and Jackson 
in late April that developed the original premises of the 
campaign which would paralyze several Federal armies and 
terrorize Washington. Nonetheless, Johnston supported the 
general thrust of the operation when he found out about it, 
and though his mid-May strategic concepts were slightly at 
variance with those of Lee and Jackson, they were equally 
workable. Johnston certainly never lost sight of the impor­
tant contribution that active forces in the Valley and
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central Virginia could make to the defense of Richmond, and 
he never pursued a myopic strategy of concentration of all the 
troops in Virginia under his immediate control as a panacea 
to overcome his own manpower deficiencies.
Initial credit for the delay of McClellan at Yorktown has 
to be accorded without question to John B. Magruder. In the 
critical two weeks between March 17 and 31, he held his line 
with bravado and a paltry number of troops while Lee wrestled 
with the problems of determining McClellan's intentions and 
reinforced him with agonizing slowness. From April 1 through 
Johnston's evacuation on May 3, 35,000 soldiers on the 
Peninsula would probably have bought the Confederacy as much 
time as the 7 0,00 0 eventually committed there. All that was 
required of a commanding general throughout most of the 
month was a stolid resolution to defend the trenches and 
redoubts. Magruder himself, Longstreet, Smith, or even D. H. 
Hill had the skill and tenacity to maintain that line during 
April, 1862. What Johnston provided was twofold: the only
realistic evaluation of just how long Yorktown could be held, 
and the insight to know exactly when it must be abandoned.
The first, even though Johnston's views did not prevail during 
the April conference in Richmond, alerted both Lee and Davis 
to the amount of time that they could continue to defer making 
some very tough choices. The second, if McClellan's own 
engineers are to be believed, at least saved the army thou­
sands of casualties, and possibly avoided its capture. Had
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Johnston's army remained in the Yorktown entrenchments when 
the Confederate batteries at Gloucester Point were dismounted, 
there would have been no troops far enough up the Peninsula 
to resist Franklin's landing at West Point: the army would
have been cut off from Richmond and assailed from both front 
and rear. Johnston's was the key decision that kept the 
seige of Yorktown from turning into an irredeemable disaster.
The month that the Army of the Potomac required to creep 
from Yorktown to Seven Pines must be equally attributed to 
Joseph Johnston and George McClellan. It is arguable that had 
Johnston merely decamped from Yorktown and never looked back, 
the Federal commander could have taken, in his own timidity, 
almost as long to approach Richmond as he did with Johnston 
retreating slowly and stopping periodically to offer battle. 
But that fact does not diminish Johnston's efficiency— only 
extremely incompetent generals depend upon their enemies to 
do the wrong thing.
Despite his failure to closely supervise the Battle of 
Williamsburg, Johnston's retreat was marked by skillful 
maneuver and strategic insight under difficult conditions. 
Clear thinking and careful supervision of the army's movements 
were needed to overcome the muddy roads and general scarcity 
of transportation. Johnston was able to overcome these 
hindrances and to balance the deployment of his four divi­
sions so that two would be present to handle the rear guard 
contest at Williamsburg and two would be close enough to
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oppose an amphibious landing near West Point. The point 
between the Pamunkey and Chickahominy River at which Johnston 
chose to end his retreat and await McClellan was selected 
based on a sound appreciation of his strategic position.
His lines were clear of navigable water, logistically con­
venient to Richmond, and heavily enough wooded to partially 
negate McClellan's still prevalent numerical advantage. It 
was also a line that, for as long as he held it, kept Johns­
ton's army solidly between McClellan and McDowell. If the 
failure of the Richmond authorities to press the completion 
of the fortifications at Drewry's Bluff had not compelled 
him to retreat across the Chickahominy, McClellan would have 
been faced with a serious operational dilemma. He would 
either have to attack Johnston on ground of Johnston's own 
choice in which his soldiers had been digging entrenchments 
and laying out abatis for three to five days, forfeiting the 
advantages of his naval and heavy artillery, or he would 
have to risk crossing the Chickahominy with the Confederates 
on his flank. In the end, fear of Federal ironclads and not 
McClellan forced Johnston out of this position.
Thus, from an operational standpoint, Johnston performed 
quite well. He contributed to the Valley Campaign, made the 
key decision at Yorktown, and handled the retreat up the 
Peninsula with efficiency and aplomb. If his initial concep­
tion of strategy in the Valley was somewhat hazy, he knew 
how to exploit the opportunities presented him. Confronted
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with multiple threats, his instincts were consistently 
sound, and, as in the case of his timing of the Yorktown 
evacuation, sometimes inspired.
As the Commanding General of the Confederate Army, it was 
Lee and not Johnston who found the steady stream of troops who 
reinforced the army between March and June. Lee made the best 
possible use of the time won by Johnston, Jackson, and 
Magruder to muster new troops and cajole governors and 
generals alike into accepting smaller forces in Georgia and 
the Carolinas. Lee took pains to see that when new regiments 
were organized they went to the static garrisons to replace 
more seasoned troops to reinforce the army in Virginia. Thus 
Johnston consistently received the best-trained brigades 
available in the eastern Confederacy. Yet Johnston had been 
the one participant in the April conference who insisted that 
it was feasible to reduce the coastal garrison. He had argued 
his point adamantly; as an army commander there was really 
nothing else he could do.
Johnston consistently used his administrative skills to 
maintain the army assembled under him at the highest possible 
strength. Prom the winter through the spring, Joseph Johnston 
proved himself an exceptionally capable administrator, 
managing his limited supplies as efficiently as possible, 
and combatting desertion, malingering, sickness, malnutrition, 
and disaffection every day. Johnston conducted both the 
retreat from the Potomac and the retreat from Yorktown with
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minimal losses of critical supplies, and supervised the 
transitional elections required by the Conscription Act in a 
manner that minimized their damage to the army's efficiency.
His instincts for command organization were sound, but 
continually thwarted by Confederate law. He did not ever 
favor operating his army as separate divisions, realizing that 
such an arrangement was terminally unwieldy for an army in 
battle or on the march. His original organization of the army 
in northern Virginia had been in two corps of two divisions 
each, with a strong reserve division, which he maintained 
until the President ruled that the law did not recognize the 
position of corps commander. This glaring defect in Confed­
erate military organization was not remedied until October, 
1862, with the creation of the rank of Lieutenant General, 
but Johnston--like Lee after him--circumvented the statutes 
by creating unofficial "wing" commands under his senior 
division commanders. Gustavus Smith and James Longstreet 
commanded wings of two divisions each in the Manassas and 
Yorktown withdrawals. As his army grew when stationed on 
the Chickahominy by the subdivision of Magruder's command 
into two divisions and the addition of A. P. Hill and Huger, 
Johnston reorganized his army into three unofficial corps 
with an army artillery reserve and an independent cavalry 
force--an organization strikingly similar to the one employed 
by Lee from Chancellorsville onward.
Johnston's choices for command of wings and divisions
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proved that he had a keen, if occasionally myopic, eye for 
picking talented commanders. Discounting Magruder, who was 
incorporated into his army by virtue of his former depart­
mental command, of all Johnston's choices for senior posi­
tions, only Gustavus Smith failed in the rest of the war to 
justify his confidence. Longstreet, Jackson, Stuart, Ewell,
A. P. Hill, Richard Anderson, Early, and Hampton rose to corps 
command under Lee; D. H. Hill achieved the same position in 
the Army of Tennessee. Though he never advanced beyond 
division command, Whiting competently carried out the thank­
less task of defending the critical port city of Wilmington 
until the last months of the war. All these men owed their 
initial recommendations for promotion to Joseph Johnston.
Yet the allegation that Johnston turned over a demoral­
ized and disorganized body of troops to Lee, who had to 
quickly whip it into shape has persisted to the present day. 
Colonel Robert H. Chilton, who served faithfully on Lee's 
staff, contended after the war that the condition of the Army 
of Northern Virginia on June 1, 1862
appeared to me to be in a very disorganized condi­
tion. Large unauthorized absences of officers and 
men greatly weakened its force, exhausting waste­
fulness pervaded all departments, especially 
apparent with each change of camp, in the abandon­
ment of supplies of different kinds, and a laxity 
of discipline prevailed, which greatly impaired 
the efficiency of this Army. . . .13
l^Robert H. Chilton to Jefferson Davis, December 14, 
1877, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, VIII:
p. 60.
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But two facts should be noted about Chilton's statement, which 
is typical of the assertions made about the army's state in 
early June. First, Chilton himself later attributed these 
conditions not to any lack on the part of Johnston, but to the 
deleterious effects of the recent elections and the necessity 
for fighting two battles in the same month. Secondly, 
Chilton's accusation conveniently ignored the fact that 
several of the staff officers whose departments he castigated, 
notably Pendleton and Alexander, were the same men who rapidly 
gained reputations for administrative excellence under Lee.
Douglas Southall Freeman made a point of emphasizing 
Lee's administrative ability by exaggerating the condition of 
Johnston's army at the end of May:
In some of its aspects discipline had been lax 
under Johnston; drunkenness had been frequent; many 
things were at loose ends. Some of the regiments 
reported a third of the troops sick. Lee worked as
fast as he could to improve the condition of the
men. The commissary and the quartermaster's 
service were improved. Favoritism in granting 
details for service in the rear was ended.
But Freeman's own footnotes reveal just how misleading this
paragraph was. The allegation concerning drunkenness was
supported only by a passage from gossipy War Office clerk J.
B. Jones and a Confederate Army regulation on stern penalties
for drunkenness that was only issued on May 22. It neither
referred specifically to the Army of Northern Virginia nor was
it available to support Johnston's own efforts to combat
■ ^ F r e e m a n ,  R. E. Lee, II: pp. 87-88.
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intoxication throughout his tenure in command. His statement 
of excessive sickness is buttressed not by army returns but 
by a single regimental history. Nothing is cited to support 
Freeman's contention that Lee made immediate improvements in 
the army's logistical services. The praise given Lee for 
ending "favoritism" in details comes from several documents 
that Lee submitted to the War Office complaining that the 
Richmond authorities had been the offenders, not Johnston and 
his officers, as Freeman's passage subtly implied. In fact, 
Lee's missives to Randolph and Cooper merely echoed complaints 
that Johnston had been making since the fall of 1861.
In one aspect and one aspect only did the status of the 
army immediately improve under Lee: relations with his civil
superiors. Johnston and Davis both suffered from the same 
kind of stiff neck; neither could admit a fault gracefully.
Nor could either man readily forgive transgressions. As the 
friction slowly built between army commander and chief 
executive over the spring of 1862, the necessary trust for a 
desperate campaign quietly eroded. Although Davis did not 
lose his respect for Johnston as a general, and Johnston never 
ceased to be formally respectful in his dealings with the 
President, from March through May, Lee constantly had to 
intervene between them. Johnston was a prickly subordinate 
and Davis was not an easy master to serve. In the necessary 
aspects of civil diplomacy required of a senior military 
officer in a republic, Johnston was plainly deficient where
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Lee was patently gifted. It was a failing that haunted 
Johnston for the rest of his career.
But on balance, Johnston's performance as an army 
commander in Virginia should be rated as a success. He was 
far from perfect, and his two greatest lacks--the ability to 
closely control a battlefield and the knack for getting along 
with his superiors--would eventually develop into fatal 
flaws. But they were not such during the Peninsular Campaign. 
Three years later, in a report drafted with the intention of 
humiliating Joseph Johnston, an embittered John Bell Hood said 
that "the results of a campaign do not always show how the 
General in command has discharged his duty. Their enquiry 
[sic] should be not what he has done, but what he should have 
accomplished with the means under his control. Hood's 
standard was one that governments cannot always afford but 
historians usually employ. By either standard, concrete 
results or credible performance, Joseph Eggleston Johnston's 
defense of Richmond fares quite well.
ISjohn Bell Hood to Samuel Cooper, February 15, 1865, in 
Hood, Advance and Retreat, p. 317.
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APPENDIX A
The deleted paragraph from 
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, 
September 12, 186 2 
(original in the Robert Morton Hughes papers, 
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia)
The spectacle which is presented in the conduct of the 
Governments on the two sides of the Potomac towards their 
Commanding Generals cannot fail to arrest our attention.
The Commanding General of the Northern army, a veteran of 
more than fifty years is superseded by his junior of half 
his years, of scarcely one-fourth of his period of service, 
because defeated. He is merely removed, however, from the 
direct command. His superior rank is left him. When we 
look to the South of the same line, what do we see? The 
greatest and most important battle ever fought in America 
has been won. It has been won by a general [holding] the 
highest rank in his republic. It has been won by his leav­
ing the District in which he commanded, making a forced
march (of _____ miles), forming a junction with an army too
weak to maintain its ground, and by their united force, 
against immense odds, winning a victory, which in the minds 
of all men and nations establishes the glory and indepen­
dence of the Confederate States, and crowns the army and its 
generals with the highest honor to which they could aspire: 
the applauding acclamation of the country, the Thanks of 
Congress, voted unanimously. Such is the first result pre­
sented to our view. What is the next reaped by the vic­
torious General? What next? The General was already first 
in the highest grade known to the service--He could not be 
advanced. Something should be done— so he was degraded. 
Three officers, his inferiors in grade, and in service, for
neither of them had fought or won a battle for the Republic,
were placed above him. Besides all this, a study in dignity 
is offered him. His noble Compeer in the battle has his 
preferment connected with the victory won by their common 
toils and dangers. His commission bears the date of the 
21st of July. But care is taken to exclude the idea that 
the general commanding had any part in winning our triumph. 
His commission is made to bear such a date that his once 
inferiors in the service of the United States, and of the 
Confederate States, shall be above him. But it must not be 
dated as of the 21st July. It shall (must) not suggest the 
victory of Manassas.
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APPEN D IX  B
The Department of Northern Virginia, 
S March 1, 1862 
(compiled from the Official Records)
General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding
Potomac District
1st Division: Brigadier-General Jubal A. Early
Early's Brigade— Colonel Duncan K. McRae 
20th Georgia 
5th North Carolina 
23rd North Carolina 
24th Virginia
Jeff. Davis (Alabama) Artillery
Kershaw's Brigade— Brigadier-General Joseph B. Kershaw 
2nd South Carolina 
3rd South Carolina 
7th South Carolina 
8th South Carolina
Boykin's Rangers (South Carolina) Cavalry Company 
Alexandria (Virginia) Artillery





King William (Virginia) Artillery
2nd Division: Major-General Gustavus W. Smith





Wise (Virginia) Artillery 
Wilcox's Brigade--Brigadier-General Cadmus M. Wilcox














3rd Division: Major-General James Longstreet






R. H. Anderson's Brigade— Brigadier-General R. H. Anderson 
4th South Carolina 
5th South Carolina 
6th South Carolina 
9th South Carolina 
Faquier (Virginia) Artillery






4th Division: Major-General Richard S. Ewell





Baltimore Light (Maryland) Artillery
Trimble's Brigade--Brigadier-General Isaac R. Trimble 
15th Alabama




21st North Carolina 
Henrico (Virginia) Artillery





1st Louisiana Battalion 
Bedford (Virginia) Artillery
Forces near Dumfries: Brigadier-General W. H. C.
Whiting




6th North Carolina 
1st Tennessee
Staunton (Virginia) Artillery
Hampton's Brigade— Colonel Wade Hampton 
14th Georgia 
19th Georgia 
16th North Carolina 
Hampton (South Carolina) Legion





Company D, 1st North Carolina Artillery 
Nelson No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery
detachment—
Company A, 4th Virginia Cavalry
Forces at Leesburg: Brigadier-General D. H. Hill
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detachment--
four companies, 2nd Virginia Cavalry 
Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers, Company No. 1
Manassas garrison: Colonel George B. Anderson
27th Georgia 
28th Georgia 
4th North Carolina 
49th Virginia
Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion
Cavalry Brigade: Brigadier-General J. E. B. Stuart
1st North Carolina Cavalry 
1st Virginia Cavalry
2nd Virginia Cavalry (minus four companies)
4th Virginia Cavalry 
6th Virginia Cavalry 
Jeff. Davis (Mississippi) Legion
Reserve Artillery: Colonel William Nelson Pendleton
Pendleton's Command—
Company A, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery 
Company E, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery 
Hamilton Regular (Georgia) Artillery 
Amherst (Virginia) Artillery 
Ashland (Virginia) Artillery 
Fluvanna (Virginia) Artillery 
Fluvanna No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery 
Morris Louisa (Virginia) Artillery 
Powhatan (Virginia) Artillery
Walton's Command-- Major J. B. Walton
1st Company, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery 
2nd Company, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery 
3rd Company, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery 
4th Company, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery 
St. Paul's (Louisiana) Foot Rifles
Aquia District
Major-General Theophilus Holmes, commanding
French's Brigade--Brigadier-General Samuel French 
2nd Arkansas Battalion
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35th Georgia 
22nd North Carolina 
2nd Tennessee 
47th Virginia
Fredericksburg (Virginia) Artillery 
Maryland Flying Artillery
Walker's Brigade— Brigadier-General John G. Walker 
1st Arkansas
1st North Carolina (state troops)
2nd North Carolina (state troops)
3rd North Carolina (state troops)
Stafford (Virginia) Artillery 
Purcell (Virginia) Artillery
detachments--




Major-General Thomas J. Jackson, commanding






Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery 
Allegheny (Virginia) Artillery




1st Virginia Regular (Irish) Battalion 
Hampden (Virginia) Artillery 
West Augusta (Virginia) Artillery




cavalry— Colonel Turner Ashby 
7th Virginia Cavalry 
Chew's (Virginia) Horse Artillery
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In transit between the Valley and the Aquia Districts:
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APPEN D IX  C
The Army of Northern Virginia on the Peninsula,
May 1, 1862 
(compiled from the Official Records)
General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding
Right of Position: Major-General John B. Magruder
McLaws ' Division: Brigadier-General Lafayette McLaws




Noland's Virginia Battalion 
Williamsburg (Virginia) Artillery 
Norfolk (Virginia) Artillery
Griffith's Brigade--Brigadier-General Richard Griffith 




Peninsula (Virginia) Artillery 
1st Company, Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers 
Company A, 1st North Carolina Artillery 
Read's (Georgia) Artillery 
Henrico (Virginia) Artillery
Kershaw's Brigade— Brigadier-General Joseph B. Kershaw 
2nd South Carolina 
3rd South Carolina 
7th South Carolina 
8th South Carolina 
Gracie's Alabama Battalion 
Alexandria (Virginia) Artillery
Cobb's Brigade--Brigadier-General Howell Cobb 
16th Georgia 
24th Georgia 




Morris Louisa (Virginia) Artillery




Jones' Division: Brigadier-General David R. Jones












Forces at Williamsburg: Colonel Benjamin S. Ewell
32nd Virginia 
52nd Virginia Militia 
68th Virginia Militia 
115th Virginia Militia 
Old Dominion (Virginia) Rifles 
10th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion
Center of Position: Major-General James Longstreet






R. H. Anderson's Brigade— Brigadier-General R. H. 
Anderson
4th South Carolina Battalion 
5th South Carolina 
6th South Carolina 
9th South Carolina 
Faquier (Virginia) Artillery
Colston's Brigade--Brigadier-General Raleigh Colston 
3rd Virginia















3rd Company, Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers




Richmond Fayette (Virginia) Artillery
Left of Position: Major-General D. H. Hill
Early's Division--Brigadier-General Jubal A. Early
Early's Brigade— Colonel Duncan K. McRae 
20th Georgia 
5th North Carolina 
2 3rd North Carolina 
24th Virginia
Jeff. Davis (Alabama) Artillery





King William (Virginia) Artillery
Ward's command— Colonel George Ward 
2nd Florida 
2nd Mississippi
Rains' Division: Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains
Rains' Brigade— Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains 
13th Alabama









4th North Carolina 
49th Virginia
nineteen heavy artillery batteries in Yorktown
forces at Gloucester Point— Colonel Charles Crump 
46th Virginia 
9th Virginia Militia 
21st Virginia Militia 
61st Virginia Militia
Mathews (Virginia) Light Dragoons Cavalry Company 
Mathews (Virginia) Artillery 
Virginia heavy artillery battalion
Reserve: Major-General Gustavus W. Smith






Pettigrew's Brigade--Brigadier-General J. J. Pettigrew 
2nd Arkansas Battalion 
35th Georgia 
22nd North Carolina 
47th Virginia 
1st Maryland Battery
Whiting's Division: Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting




6th North Carolina 
Staunton (Virginia) Artillery 
Company D, 1st North Carolina Artillery
Hood's Brigade— Brigadier-General John B. Hood






Hampton's Brigade— Colonel Wade Hampton 
14th Georgia 
19th Georgia 
16th North Carolina 
Hampton (South Carolina) Legion 
Madison (Louisiana) Artillery
Cavalry Brigade: Brigadier-General J. E. B. Stuart
1st Virginia Cavalry 
3rd Virginia Cavalry 
4th Virginia Cavalry 
Wise (Virginia) Legion Cavalry 
Jeff. Davis (Mississippi) Legion 
Studar (Virginia) Horst Artillery
Reserve Artillery: Brigadier-General William N. Pendleton
Pendleton's Command--
Company A, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery 
Company E, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery 
Hamilton Regular (Georgia) Artillery 
Amherst (Virginia) Artillery 
Ashland (Virginia) Artillery 
Fluvanna (Virginia) Artillery 
Fluvanna No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery 
Powahatan (Virginia) Artillery
Walton's Command— Major J. B. Walton
1st Company, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery
2nd Company, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery
3rd Company, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery
4th Company, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery
St. Paul's (Louisiana) Foot Rifles
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APPENDIX D
Department of Northern Virginia 
and troops in the vicinity of 
Richmond, May 21, 1862 
(compiled from the Official Records)
General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding
Left Wing
Major-General Gustavus W. Smith, commanding
Smith's Division: Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting




6th North Carolina 
Staunton (Virginia) Artillery 
Company D, 1st North Carolina Artillery









Hampton (South Carolina) Legion (minus cavalry) 
Madison (Louisiana) Artillery





Pettigrew's Brigade--Brigadier-General J. J. Pettigrew 
2nd Arkansas Battalion 
35th Georgia 
22nd North Carolina




A. P. Hill's Division: Major-General A. P. Hill
Field's Brigade— Brigadier-General Charles W. Field 
5th Alabama Battalion 
2nd Virginia Heavy Artillery
(in the process of reorganizing as 22nd Virginia 
Battalion)
3rd Virginia Heavy Artillery, Local Defense Troops 
(in the process of disbanding, with many of the 





Branch's Brigade— Brigadier-General L. O'Brien Branch 
12th North Carolina 
18th North Carolina 
28th North Carolina 
37th North Carolina
Company F, 13th North Carolina Artillery Battalion






Pee Dee (South Carolina) Artillery
Gregg's Brigade--Brigadier-General Maxcey Gregg 
1st South Carolina 
1st South Carolina Rifles 
12th South Carolina 
13th South Carolina 
14th South Carolina
Center
Major-General John B. Magruder, commanding
Magruder's Division: Major-General Lafayette McLaws
McLaws' Brigade--Brigadier-General Paul J. Semmes 
5th Louisiana




Noland's Virginia Battalion 
Williamsburg (Virginia) Artillery 
Norfolk (Virginia) Artillery
Kershaw's Brigade— Brigadier-General Joseph B. Kershaw 
2nd South Carolina 
3rd South Carolina 
7th South Carolina 
8th South Carolina 
Grade's Alabama Battalion 
Alexandria (Virginia) Artillery
Cobb's Brigade— Brigadier-General Howell Cobb 
16th Georgia 
24th Georgia




Morris Louisa (Virginia) Artillery
Griffith's Brigade— Brigadier-General Richard Griffith 




1st Company, Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers
D. R. Jones' Division: Major-General David R. Jones











Reserve Artillery: Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Cabell
Pulaski (Georgia) Artillery 
Company A, 1st North Carolina 
Peninsula (Virginia) Artillery 
Henrico (Virginia) Artillery
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Left Wing
Major-General James Longstreet, commanding
Longstreet's Division: Brigadier-General R. H. Anderson
R. H. Anderson's Brigade— Colonel Micah Jenkins 
4th South Carolina Battalion 
5th South Carolina 
6th South Carolina 
9th South Carolina 
Faquier (Virginia) Artillery












Colston's Brigade— Brigadier-General Raleigh Colston 
3rd Virginia 
13th North Carolina 
14th North Carolina 
Donaldson (Louisiana) Artillery





3rd Company, Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers




Richmond Fayette (Virginia) Artillery
D. H. Hill's Division: Major-General D. H. Hill
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Featherston's Brigade--Colonel George B. Anderson 
27th Georgia 
28th Georgia 
4th North Carolina 
49th Virginia
Garland's Brigade— Brigadier-General Samuel Garland 
2nd Florida
2nd Mississippi Battalion 
5th North Carolina 
23rd North Carolina 
24th Virginia 
38th Virginia
Jeff. Davis (Alabama) Artillery
Rains' Brigade— Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains 
13th Alabama 
2 6th Alabama 
6th Georgia 
23rd Georgia





4th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion 
(serving as infantry)
King William (Virginia) Artillery
Wise's Brigade— Brigadier-General Henry Wise 
(this brigade probably still in the process of 
moving up from Richmond)





Artillery— Major Scipio F. Pierson 
Hardaway (Alabama) Artillery 
Hanover (Virginia) Artillery
Huger's Division: Major-General Benjamin Huger
Armistead's Brigade--Brigadier-General Lewis Armistead 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
536
Goochland (Virginia) Artillery




Lynchburg No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery 
Portsmouth (Virginia) Artillery
Blanchard's Brigade— Brigadier-General A. G. Blanchard 
3rd Georgia 
4th Georgia 
2 2nd Georgia 
1st Louisiana
Norfolk United (Virginia) Artillery
Cavalry Brigade: Brigadier-General J. E. B. Stuart
1st Virginia Cavalry 
3rd Virginia Cavalry 
4th Virginia Cavalry 
9th Virginia Cavalry
10th Virginia Cavalry (formerly Wise Legion) 
Cobb (Georgia) Legion Cavalry 
Jeff. Davis (Mississippi) Legion 
Hampton (South Carolina) Legion Cavalry 
Stuart (Virginia) Horse Artillery
Artillery Reserve: Brigadier-General William N. Pendleton
Pendleton's Command—
(in the process of being broken into battalions) 
Company A, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery 
Company E, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery 
Hamilton Regular (Georgia) Artillery 
Chesapeake (Maryland) Artillery 
Lloyd's (North Carolina) Artillery 
Rhett's (South Carolina) Artillery 
Amherst (Virginia) Artillery 
Ashland (Virginia) Artillery 
Fluvanna (Virginia) Artillery 
Fluvanna No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery 
Hupp's (Virginia) Artillery 
Long Island (Virginia) Artillery 
Mosely's (Virginia) Artillery 
Orange (Virginia) Artillery 
Parker's (Virginia) Artillery 
Powhatan (Virginia) Artillery 
Ringgold (Virginia) Artillery
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Walton's Command— Major J. B 
1st Company, Washington 
2nd Company, Washington 
3rd Company, Washington 












Troops detraining in Richmond, assigned to the 
Department of Northern Virginia:
Ripley's Brigade— Brigadier-General Rosewe'll Ripley 
44th Georgia 
4 8th Georgia 
1st North Carolina 
3rd North Carolina
Troops from the Department of North Carolina marching toward 
Drewry's Bluff and Richmond, already assigned to the 
Department of Northern Virginia:
Holmes' Division: Major-General Theophilus H. Holmes
Ransom's Brigade— Brigadier-General Robert Ransom 
24th North Carolina 
25th North Carolina 
26th North Carolina 
35th North Carolina 
48th North Carolina 
49th North Carolina
Daniel's Brigade— Colonel Junius Daniel 
43rd North Carolina 
45th North Carolina 
50th North Carolina 
14th Virginia Cavalry Battalion
Walker's Brigade— Brigadier-General John G. Walker 
3rd Arkansas 
2nd Georgia Battalion 
27th North Carolina 
46th North Carolina 
30th Virginia
Artillery— Colonel James Deshler
Company C, 1st North Carolina Artillery 
Petersburg (Virginia) Artillery 
Stafford (Virginia) Artillery
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
538
Troops stationed at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs:
Infantry-






Simms' Battalion, Conference Marines (two
companies)




Bowyer's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery 
Dabney's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery 
Jones' (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery 
Patterson's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery 
Pierce's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery 
Price's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery 
Southside (Virginia) Heavy Artillery




Troops in and around the Richmond area:
Infantry—
Company F, 5th Virginia Battalion
6th Virginia Local Defense Battalion (Tredegar)
19th Virginia Militia
25th Virginia Local Defense Battalion (City) 
(the City Battalion just organizing)
179th Virginia Militia 
Confederate Guards Company 
Ordnance Guard Company
Artillery--Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Shields 
companies incorporated in June into the 
18th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion-- 
Atlantic (Virginia) Artillery 
Cockade (Virginia) Mounted Artillery 
Southhampton Lee (Virginia) Artillery
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companies incorporated in June into the 
19th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion—
Bossieux (Virginia) Guards
Campbell's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery 
Chalmer's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery 
United (Virginia) Artillery
companies incorporated in June into the 
20th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion—
Robertson's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery 
St. Brides' (Virginia) Artillery
Cavalry--
2nd (Pate's) Virginia Cavalry Battalion 
(in the process of reorganizing into a new 
5th Virginia Cavalry)
5th Virginia Cavalry
(in the process of disbanding and reorganizing as 
the 16th Virginia Cavalry Battalion)
15th Virginia Cavalry Battalion
(in the process of initial organization)
Valley District
Major-General Thomas J. Jackson, commanding
Jackson's Division: Major-General Thomas J. Jackson






Allegheny (Virginia) Artillery 
Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery




1st Virginia Regular (Irish) Battalion 
Hampden (Virginia) Artillery 
West Augusta (Virginia) Artillery
Taliaferro's Brigade--Brigadier-General W. B. 
Taliaferro






Ewell's Division: Major-General Richard S. Ewell









Taylor's Brigade--Brigadier-General Richard Taylor 










Maryland Line--Colonel Bradley Johnson 
1st Maryland
Baltimore (Maryland) Light Artillery
Artillery--
Richmond (Virginia) Artillery 
Rockbridge No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery 
Lynchburg Lee (Virginia) Artillery 
8th Star (Virginia) Artillery
Cavalry— Brigadier-General Turner Ashby
7th Virginia Cavalry
Steuart's Command— Brigadier-General George H. Steuart 
2nd Virginia Cavalry 
6th Virginia Cavalry
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APPENDIX E
Seniority of General Officers in the 
Department of Northern Virginia, 
March 1, 1862
This list has been drawn from LS-AIGO, Ezra Warner's 
Generals in Gray, and Francis Heitman's Biographical 
Register. When it has been impossible to determine 
definitely relative seniority between generals (i. e., two 
generals without previous military records appointed on the 
same day), the assumption has been made that the order in 
which the Adjutant and Inspector General received their 
names was the intended precedence of rank.
General
1. J. E. Johnston; July 4, 1861; commanding 
department.
Major-Generals
2. G. W. Smith; September 19, 1861; commanding 2nd 
Division.
3. T. H. Holmes; October 7, 1861; commanding Aquia 
District.
4. J. Longstreet; October 7, 1861; commanding 3rd 
Division.
5. T. J. Jackson; October 7, 1861; commanding Valley 
District.
6. R. S. Ewell; January 23, 1862; commanding 4th 
Division.
Brigadier-Generals
7. D. R. Jones; June 17, 1861; commanding brigade.
8. S. R. Anderson; July 9, 1861; " "
9. D. H. Hill; July 10, 1861; commanding forces at
Leesburg.
10. R. H. Anderson; July 19, 1861; commanding brigade.
11. R. Toombs; July 19, 1861; " "
12. A. Elzey; July 21, 1861;
13. J. A. Early; July 21, 1861; commanding 1st Divi­
sion .
14. I. R. Trimble; August 9, 1861; commanding brigade.
15. W. H. C. Whiting; August 28, 1861; commanding
forces at Dumfries.
16. J. E. B. Stuart; September 24, 1861; commanding
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cavalry brigade.
17. C. M. Wilcox; October 21, 1861; commanding brig­
ade .
18. R. E. Taylor; October 21, 1861; commanding brig­
ade .
19. R. Taylor; October 21, 1861; commanding brigade.
20. S. French; October 23, 1861; " "
21. R. Griffith; November 2, 1861; " "
22. Richard Garnett; November 14, 1861; commanding 
brigade.
23. J. G. Walker; January 9, 1862; commanding brigade.
24. G. E. Pickett; February 13, 1862; " "
25. J. B. Kershaw; February 13, 1862; " "
26. A. P. Hill; February 26, 1862; " "
Even a superficial examination of this list reveals 
that seniority was not always the determining factor when 
Johnston decided on the men to handle key assignments.
There were seven brigadiers senior to Jubal Early, who 
remained in command of brigades while he headed a division. 
Likewise Whiting, the commander of Johnston's de facto 
division on the Potomac, was also junior to seven other men 
who still commanded only brigades.
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APPENDIX P
Seniority of General Officers in the 
Department of Northern Virginia, 
May 31, 18 62
This list has been drawn from LS-AIGO, Ezra Warner's 
Generals in Gray, and Francis Heitman's Biographical Regis­
ter . When it has been impossible to determine definitely 
relative seniority between generals (i.e., two generals 
without previous military records appointed on the same 
day), the assumption has been made that the order in which 
the Adjutant and Inspector General received their names was 
the intended precedence of rank.
General
1. J. E. Johnston; July 4, 1861; commanding depart­
ment .
Major-Generals
2. G. W. Smith; September 19, 1861; commanding Left 
Wing.
3. T. H. Holmes; October 7, 1861; commanding division.
4. B. Huger; October 7, 1861; commanding division.
5. J. Longstreet; October 7, 1861; commanding Right
Wing.
6. J. B. Magruder; October 7, 1861; commanding Center.
7. T. J. Jackson; October 7, 1861; commanding Valley
District.
8. R. S. Ewell; January 23, 1862; commanding division.
9. D. H. Hill; March 26, 1862; "
10. D. R. Jones; April 5, 1862; " "
11. L. McLaws; May 23, 186 2; " "
12. A. P. Hill; May 26, 1862;
Brigadier-Generals
13. H. A. Wise; June 5, 1861; commanding brigade.
14. R. H. Anderson; July 19; 1861; commanding division.
15. R. Toombs; July 19, 1861; commanding brigade.
16. A. Elzey; July 21, 1861; " "
17. I. R. Trimble; August 9, 1861; " "
18. R. S. Ripley; August 21, 1861; " "
19. W. H. C. Whiting; August 28, 1861; commanding 
division.
20. J. R. Anderson; September 3, 1861; commanding 
brigade.
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21. A. G. Blanchard; September 21, 1861; commanding 
brigade.
22. G. J. Rains; September 23, 1861; commanding brigade,
23. J. E. B. Stuart; September 24, 1861; commanding
cavalry brigade.
24. C. M. Wilcox; October 21, 1861; commanding brigade.
25. R. E. Rodes; October 21, 1861; commanding brigade,
26. R. Taylor; October 21, 1861;
27. R. Griffith; November 2, 1861;
28. W. Mahone; November 16, 1861;
29. L. O'B. Branch; November 16, 1861;
30. M. Gregg; December 14, 1861;
31. R. E. Colston; December 24, 1861;
32. J. G. Walker; January 9, 1862;
33. R. Ranson; February 12, 1862;
34. G. E. Pickett; February 13, 1862;
35. J. B. Kershaw; February 13, 1862;
36. H. Cobb; February 13, 1862;
37. J. J. Pettigrew; February 26, 1862;
38. J. B. Hood; March 3, 1862;
39. W. B. Taliaferro; March 4, 1862;
40. G. H. Steuart; March 6, 1862; commanding cavalry 
detachment in Valley District.
41. C. Winder; March 7, 1862; commanding brigade.
42. C. W. Field; March 9, 1862; "
43. W. N. Pendleton; March 26, 1862; commanding
Artillery Reserve.
44. L. A. Armistead; April 1, 1862; commanding brigade.
45. R. Pryor; April 16, 1862; " "
46. W. Hampton; May 23, 1862; " "
47. T. Ashby; May 23, 1862; commanding cavalry, Valley 
District.
48. R. Hatton; May 23, 1862; commanding brigade.-
49. S. Garland; May 23, 1862; " "
The much expanded officer corps of the Department of 
Northern Virginia on May 31, 1862, reveals one of the major 
reasons that the Confederacy would eventually enact legis­
lation creating the rank of Lieutenant-General for corps 
commanders. Johnston's three wing commanders held unoffi­
cial commands; technically Smith, Magruder, and Longstreet 
were all division commanders who led their wings by virtue 
of being the senior division commander. But the return of 
Holmes and the addition of Huger would have quickly upset 
Johnston's organizational scheme, because both officers were 
senior to Magruder and Longstreet. A quick glance at the 
list will also explain why Johnston resisted the addition of 
Henry Wise to his army for as long as possible; the politi­
cal general, whose record included non-cooperation in west­
ern Virginia and disaster at Roanoke Island, would have 
immediately become the senior brigadier-general in the de­
partment, and very likely an early candidate for a division
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